Relevant bibliographies by topics / De jure and de facto judicial independence

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'De jure and de facto judicial independence'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "De jure and de facto judicial independence"

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Ram Mohan, M. P., K. V. Gopakumar, and Tyson Smith. "Nuclear Energy Safety, Regulatory Independence, and Judicial Deference: The Case of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India." Administration & Society 52, no. 7 (2019): 1009–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095399719882640.

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Research examining regulatory independence has either suggested de jure independence to be a predictor of de facto independence or suggested that the presence of de jure may not always indicate de facto independence. We study the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) to emphasize how AERB has enjoyed de facto independence, even in the absence of de jure independence. Using “judicial deference” principle, and through a mapping of substantive court cases, the article demonstrates Indian judiciary has consistently applied deference to AERB’s decision-making process, thereby showing confidence in the nuclear regulatory regime sustained as its inception.
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TAYLOR, MATTHEW M. "The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model with Illustration from Venezuela under Chávez." Journal of Latin American Studies 46, no. 2 (2014): 229–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x14000017.

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AbstractThis paper presents a heuristic model of judicial independence that illustrates how it is that changes in de facto judicial independence may occur, even in the absence of overt institutional changes in de jure protections. The model is illustrated by the marked decline in the independence of Venezuela's high court between 1998 and 2010, under President Hugo Chávez. Focusing on the trade-off that courts face between jurisprudential change and policy change, the paper demonstrates how courts – even those that closely mirror the executive branch's policy preferences – may enter into conflict with dominant executives, and find their judicial independence restricted by informal means.
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Epperly, Brad, and Jacqueline Sievert. "Conflict and Courts: Civil War and Judicial Independence across Democracies." Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 3 (2018): 700–713. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912918803200.

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Many argue that during conflict, executive power expands at the expense of the judiciary and civil liberties. Although this is a common conjecture, no systematic study of conflict and judicial independence exists. We argue that conflict, rather than strictly inhibiting independence, is instead a critical juncture that increases the possibility of institutional change, either positive or negative. We assess this claim in three ways: cross-national analyses of (1) de facto and (2) de jure judicial independence after the onset of conflict, and (3) a case study of statutory and jurisdictional changes to the federal judiciary after the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War. Each illustrates that conflict onset is associated with a higher likelihood of changing levels—both decreases and increases—rather than unidirectional decreases in judicial independence. We then present preliminary hypotheses and analyses for three factors that, given conflict onset, should be associated with either improved or worsened conditions for the judiciary. This study has implications for research on conflict, courts, and the rule of law in both political science and legal studies.
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Hayo, Bernd, and Stefan Voigt. "The long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence." Economics Letters 183 (October 2019): 108603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108603.

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Hanretty, Chris. "Explaining the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters." British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (2009): 75–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712340999024x.

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Institutions operating beyond direct control of government, such as central banks, constitutional courts and public broadcasters, enjoy guarantees of de jure independence, but de jure independence is no guarantee of de facto independence. This is especially so for public broadcasting, where cultural variables are often assumed to be decisive. In this article, the de jure and de facto independence of thirty-six public service broadcasters world-wide are operationalized, and de jure independence is found to explain a high degree of de facto independence when account is taken of the size of the market for news. Other variables considered in previous literature – such as bureaucratic partisanship and the polarization of the party system – are not found to be significant.
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Hayo, Bernd, and Stefan Voigt. "Explaining de facto judicial independence." International Review of Law and Economics 27, no. 3 (2007): 269–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.004.

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Melton, James, and Tom Ginsburg. "Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?" Journal of Law and Courts 2, no. 2 (2014): 187–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/676999.

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Jasmine, M. Fouad, E. Fayed Mona, and A. Emam Heba Talla. "A New Insight into the Measurement of Central Bank Independence." Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 8, no. 1 (2019): 67–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2019-0004.

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Abstract The present paper attempts to expand the existing literature on Central Bank Independence (CBI) by proposing new measures for CBI. It designs two indices: one tackling the de jure CBI and the other assessing the de facto level of CBI. The two measures outweigh traditional measures in various aspects; first, the two indices are more comprehensive in terms of possible institutional arrangements. The de jure index incorporates several aspects related to CBI that were not previously grouped together in a unified index i.e. financial independence, limitations related to indirect credit to government, accountability and transparency. The de facto index comprises the main existing indicators for measuring actual CBI (i.e. turnover ratio, political vulnerability indicator and monetary policy reaction function) in addition to new variables, as the lender of last resort function, independence of central bank board, and financial independence that were not included in almost all previous studies. Second, the two indices allow a higher level of precision as they comprise aspects that can be objectively codified with a minimum level of subjectivity. Third, the two indices cover the same attributes of CBI to facilitate measuring the deviation between de jure and de facto level of independence for any central bank. The current paper provides a comprehensive definition and analysis of both indices to enable their replication in future studies.
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Ward, Rowena. "‘National’ and ‘Official’ Languages Across the Independent Asia-Pacific." PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies 16, no. 1-2 (2019): 82–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/pjmis.v16i1-2.6510.

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Between November 2018 and 2020, residents of New Caledonia will have three opportunities to vote on whether to become an independent state. Residents of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville will vote on the same issue in June 2019. Should the residents of either territory vote for independence, the issue of whether a language shall be designated the national and / or official language for the new state will arise. If the decision is to designate a language for the new state, the choice of which language will also surface. This chapter considers the language choices made by a number of countries across the linguistically diverse Asia Pacific region post-independence and in so doing, provides some models for the language configurations which may eventuate should either territory become independent. The linguistic configurations discussed here are divided into Category 1 - countries where a national and / or official language are legally specified or have de jure legal status. - and Category 2 – countries where no language is legally named but at least one language may be de facto national or official. Examples of Category 1 countries include Indonesia where Bahasa Indonesia is the only de jure national and official language and Vanuatu where Bislama is the de jure national language and is also a de jure co-official language with both English and French, the languages of the former colonial powers. Examples of Category 2 countries discussed here include Papua New Guinea where Tok Pisin is named as one of the possible languages needed for an applicant to become a Papua New Guinean citizen but does not have de jure national language status and the Solomon Islands where Pijin is the de facto national language and English is the de facto official language.
 Whilst the results of either the Bougainville and New Caledonian referenda are not clear, the different configurations already in place serve as a pointer to what may eventuate should the residents of either territory vote for independence.
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van Ham, Carolien, and Holly Ann Garnett. "Building impartial electoral management? Institutional design, independence and electoral integrity." International Political Science Review 40, no. 3 (2019): 313–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119834573.

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Electoral integrity is a persistent concern in both established and transitional democracies. Independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to strengthen electoral integrity and are now the most common model of electoral management worldwide. Yet, empirical research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and electoral integrity. We argue that conflicting findings might be driven by the lack of detailed data on EMB institutional design, with most studies using rudimentary classifications of ‘independent’, ‘governmental’ and ‘mixed’ EMBs, without addressing specific dimensions of EMB formal independence such as appointment procedures, budgetary control and formal competences. In this paper we analyse new detailed data on EMB institutional design in 72 countries around the world, develop a more detailed typology of dimensions of de jure EMB independence, and demonstrate how de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB independence and electoral integrity.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "De jure and de facto judicial independence"

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Dias, Clarissa F. "Do Constitutions Matter? Essays on the Impact of Constitutional Provisions on De Facto Judicial Independence in Latin American Countries." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2013. http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_diss/29.

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Conventional wisdom holds that constitutions shape behavior, structures, and institutions. Looking at provisions in the constitutions of 19 Latin American countries, I show the level of judicial independence exercised by a country’s courts and judges is a function of constitutional provisions.
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Books on the topic "De jure and de facto judicial independence"

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Epperly, Brad. The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845027.001.0001.

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This book argues that explaining judicial independence—considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics—requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and indeed of greater import in autocracies. This is because a full “insurance” account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition’s effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is developed via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country’s 2010 “constitutional revolution,” and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.
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Book chapters on the topic "De jure and de facto judicial independence"

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Epperly, Brad. "Integrating De Jure Independence." In The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845027.003.0005.

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Chapter 4 addresses the disconnect between the results in Chapter 3 and existing case studies of competition and independence. It argues that in democracies, changes in the competitiveness of the electoral arena should primarily be associated changes in the formal, de jure provisions for courts. This is because the costs and benefits of infringing on de jure vs. de facto insurance vary across regime type. In democracies, the stronger effects of constitutionalism mean that flouting the rules has a greater likelihood of producing public backlash. The main test of this argument is an in-depth case study of the de jure attacks on the independence of the judiciary in Hungary after the 2010 election. This case study draws on extensive expert interviews with leading legal scholars, government officials, and Hungarian Constitutional Court justices. Recognizing that theories should be tested “out of sample” whenever possible, it ends by assessing the argument cross-nationally, and demonstrates that in democracies changing levels of competition are associated with changes in de jure rather than de facto independence.
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Jaffrelot, Christophe. "A De Facto Ethnic Democracy?" In Majoritarian State. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190078171.003.0003.

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The concept of ethnic democracy as coined by Sammy Smooha illustrates a two-tiered citizenship, the majority enjoying more rights than the minority, both de facto and de jure and the Israel model remains the archetype of this phenomenon. This chapter highlights the shift from secular multicultural democracy to majoritarian ethnic democracy in the India. Although Muslims were always institutionally marginalized from the army, police and administration since independence, their involvement in the public sphere has been further undermined by cow vigilantism, mob lynching on the suspicion of carrying beef, prevention of interfaith marriages and prohibiting them from acquiring any property in residential areas. This rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with ostracism of the Muslim minority has meant that the Hindutva ideology has infiltrated all major institutions in India, and threatens to dominate the public sphere through grassroots work, which thereby makes India a de facto Hindu Rastra (state/ country).
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Moser, Carolyn. "Civilian Crisis Management in an Accountability Crisis?" In Accountability in EU Security and Defence. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844815.003.0008.

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This chapter brings all the findings of this volume together. The point of departure was the finding of a de jure–de facto discrepancy regarding peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP: while the formal institutional and procedural features of EU peacebuilding are fundamentally intergovernmental, its administrative and operational realities have become Europeanized. This development prompts the question to what extent the transfer of powers by Member States to Brussels-based EU civilian crisis management structures has been matched with the establishment of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the European level. With a view to answering this interrogation, the chapter provides a concluding overview of existing accountability arrangements—political, legal, and administrative in nature—from both a de jure and a de facto perspective. The core finding is that while there is a considerable accountability deficit existing in law, this deficit has incrementally been countered by practice. As a result of this de facto readjustment of accountability, checks and balances are stronger at the EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. The conclusions further sketch out lessons learned, both for theory and practice, and provide an outlook on accountability in (civilian) CSDP.
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Cukierman, Alex. "De Jure, De Facto, and Desired Independence: The Bank of Israel as a Case Study." In The Bank of Israel. Oxford University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300734.003.0001.

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Epperly, Brad. "Examining Insurance across Regime Type." In The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845027.003.0004.

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Chapter 3 consists of direct tests of the empirical implications of the theoretical model forwarded in Chapter 1. It begins by revisiting the logic of insurance, specifically what it is about the electoral environment that should induce leaders to maintain or further judicial independence, addressing issues of concepts and measures at length. Panel models show that competition is strongly associated with de facto judicial independence in autocratic regimes, but less so in democratic. These results hold up not only accounting for potential confounding variables, but also against numerous competing explanations and further robustness checks. Recognizing that these analyses are purely observational, it argues for the appropriateness of two instruments of competition. Two-stage least squares models show the effectiveness of these instruments of competition, and offer the first attempt to assess the relationship between competition and independence in a causal manner. The results are strongly supportive of the theory of autocratic insurance, but far less so for democratic: the relationship between competition and independence in democracies, weak already in the linear models, becomes non-existent in the instrumental variables analysis.
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Walsh, Camille. "Taxpayers and Taxeaters." In Racial Taxation. University of North Carolina Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469638942.003.0007.

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Chapter Six focuses on how demands for racial integration in education after Brown also frequently deployed tax-based activism to achieve their ends, from busing cases to the important, though brief, extension of civil rights litigation logic from education to poverty and welfare rights. In this decade the effects of the War on Poverty and welfare activism worked together to generate the first combined race- and class-based equal protection claims. Response to the poverty jurisprudence of the court was largely filtered through the language of taxpayers' rights. Finally, this chapter examines the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District case in 1971 and the response of many angry "taxpaying citizens" at the thought of desegregation and busing. Swann was the high point for the judicial attempt at equalizing educational opportunities, even as the de jure/de facto distinction was beginning to break down.
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Calabresi, Steven Gow. "The Civil Law Legal Tradition." In The History and Growth of Judicial Review, Volume 2. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190075736.003.0002.

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This chapter traces the origins and development of the civil law legal tradition, which assigns to judges only a mechanical, highly constrained form of decision-making. The civil law legal tradition is characterized globally by a historical reliance on Roman law; a modern rationalist code and no body of judge-made case law under the code; textualism and formalism; and the absence of jury trial and an inquisitorial approach to civil and criminal procedure. The civil law tradition allows judicial review, which has been seen as being inherently political, to be exercised soley by a separate institution, called a Constitutional Court, which alone interprets and enforces the Constitution and which is de facto the most important court in the country, even though de jure there are coequal courts of cassation and councils of state. Traditionally, judges received little social deference and were low on the hierarchy of status in civil law countries, whereas scholars and codifiers came first. The civil law legal tradition conceives of the separation of powers in a very wooden, ahistorical way that precludes judges from ever making policy by deciding administrative law and constitutional law cases. It was therefore necessary to create powerful constitutional courts as a specially chosen fourth branch of government in order for judicial review to work in civil law countries. The chapter conclude by looking at the court systems in civil law countries, which typically have three supreme courts: 1) a constitutional court; 2) a court of cassation; and 3) a council of state.
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