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Academic literature on the topic 'De sophisticis elenchis (Aristotle)'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 2 March 2023

Last updated: 28 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "De sophisticis elenchis (Aristotle)"

1

Swanson, Carrie. "Aristotle’s Expansion of the Taxonomy of Fallacy in De Sophisticis Elenchis 8." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 15, no. 1 (April 5, 2012): 200–237. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01501009.

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In the eighth chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle introduces a mode of sophistical refutation that constitutes an addition to the taxonomy of the earlier chapters of the treatise. The new mode is pseudo-scientific refutation, or “the [syllogism or refutation] which though real, [merely] appears appropriate to the subject matter” (τòν ὂντα μέν φαινóμενoν δέ ỏιϰειoν ιoῦ πράγμαιoς, 169b22–3). Against the grain of its most commonly accepted reading, I argue that Aristotle is not concerned in SE 8 to establish that both the apparent refutations of SE 4–7 and pseudo-scientific refutations issue in false conclusions. His concern rather is to provide a causal analysis of both classes of apparent refutation alike which will explain why both kinds of apparent refutation are sophistical – and whose solutions are therefore the task of no special science but of a dialectical σλλογιστιϰή τέχνη (172a35). I conclude my analysis with the observation that Aristotle exploits the results of SE 8 to fend off inSE 9, 10, and 11 respectively a triad of threats to the very existence of a τέχνη of the resolution of sophistical refutation. The three threats are: the impossibility of omniscience; the relativity of semantic beliefs; and the incapacity of a questioner ignorant of a science to expose the ignorance of a pretender to scientific expertise.

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Rapp, Christof. "Fallacious Arguments in Aristotle’s Rhetoric II.24." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 15, no. 1 (April 5, 2012): 122–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01501006.

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Just as Aristotelian dialectic sharply distinguishes between real and fallacious arguments, Aristotelian rhetoric distinguishes between real and fallacious enthymemes. For this reason Aristotle’s Rhetoric includes a chapter – chapter II.24 – that is exclusively devoted to what Aristotle calls “topoi” of fallacious enthymemes. Thus, the purpose of this chapter seems to be equivalent to the purpose of the treatise Sophistici Elenchi, which attempts to give a complete list of all possible types of fallacious arguments. It turns out that, although the Rhetoric’s list of fallacious types of rhetorical arguments basically resembles the list from the Sophistici Elenchi, there also are some striking differences. The paper tries to account for the relation between these two, more or less independent, Aristotelian approaches to the phenomenon of fallacious arguments. Can one of these two lists be seen as the basic or original one? And what is the point in deviating from this basic list? Are all deviations occasioned by the specific contexts of the rhetorical use on the one hand, and the dialectical on the other? Or do the two lists display different (or even incoherent) logical assumptions? Even an only tentative answer to this set of questions will help to clarify another but closely related scholarly problem, namely the relation between the Rhetoric’s list of topoi for real enthymemes and the Topics’ list of topoi for real dialectical arguments. It will also help to account for the general place of fallacious arguments within Aristotle’s dialectic-based approach the rhetoric.

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3

Schiaparelli, Annamaria. "Aristotle on the fallacies of combination and division in Sophistici Elenchi 4." History and Philosophy of Logic 24, no. 2 (January 2003): 111–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144534031000096145.

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4

Marmo, Costantino. "Scotus on Supposition." Vivarium 51, no. 1-4 (2013): 233–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341248.

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Abstract In his commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle’s Organon (Categories, Peri hermeneias, Sophistici elenchi, and Topics) and in his other works, John Duns Scotus shows his knowledge of both the modistic theory of language and the theory of supposition. My contribution sheds some light on the relationship between Scotus’ philosophy of language and the theory of supposition, collecting and commenting on all the passages in which he makes use of it or discusses some theoretical points. I take into special account the almost unknown commentary on the Topics, which is preserved in a Vatican manuscript.

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5

Schollmeyer, Jonas. "Gorgias’ Lehrmethode." Mnemosyne 70, no. 2 (February 20, 2017): 202–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342145.

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At the end of the Sophistici Elenchi, Aristotle claims that Gorgias gave his pupils ready-made speeches to learn by heart rather than teaching them a τέχνη. Gorgias’ Helen is often considered to have been a speech used by pupils as a model for the composition of their own speeches. However, there is little extant research into the question as to whether there are speeches still preserved that were composed with the aid of such models. In this paper I will argue that the Helen served as a model for the author of De flatibus. The stylistic similarities between both writings are well known. In addition, De flatibus imitates the composition and argumentation of the Helen. At multiple points, the mechanisms of λόγος as they are described by Gorgias are applied to medical problems. These and other connections between the two texts offer a unique perspective on the ways in which Gorgias’ method of instruction could function and be successful. It is likely that physicians were among Gorgias’ regular students.

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6

Lloyd, A. C. "(S.) Ebbesen Commentators and commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi: a study of post-Aristotelian ancient and medieval writings on fallacies. 1. The Greek tradition. Pp. ix + 355. 2. Greek texts and fragments of the Latin translation of “Alexander's” Commentary. Pp. xxxvii + 556. 3. Appendices, Danish summary, indices. Pp. iv + 415. (Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum 7, 1—3.) Leiden: Brill. 1981. Fl. 192 (3 vols)." Journal of Hellenic Studies 106 (November 1986): 231–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/629698.

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7

Goodwin, David. "The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies." Informal Logic 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1992). http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v14i1.2522.

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Arguments about fallacies generally attempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of argumentation and reasoning. To examine the structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores the connection between Nicholas Rescher's concept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments about fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, primarily with a view to analyzing its underlying strategies of argumentation. Finally, it examines how second-order distinctions (those designed to challenge previously formulated distinctions) underpin current arguments against the Aristotelian or "Standard Treatment" of the fallacies.

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8

Walker, Gustavo Fernandez. "Anonymus Cantabrigiensis: Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos Aristotelis edited by Sten Ebbesen." Aestimatio: Sources and Studies in the History of Science 2, no. 1 (August 31, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/aestimatio.v2i1.37734.

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The publication of the critical edition of this anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is something to be celebrated for numerous reasons. Needless to say, it is of great value for scholars interested in the reception of this particular item of the corpus Aristotelicum, especially since the editor is responsible for much of our current knowledge within the field. Reviewed by: Gustavo Fernandez Walker, Published Online (2021-08-31)Copyright © 2021 by Gustavo Fernandez WalkerThis open access publication is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND) Article PDF Link: https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/aestimatio/article/view/37734/28735 Corresponding Author: Gustavo Fernandez Walker,University of GothenburgE-Mail: gustavo.fernandez.walker@gu.se

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9

Huitink, Luuk, and Andreas Willi. "PROTAGORAS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF GRAMMAR." Cambridge Classical Journal, August 3, 2021, 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175027052100004x.

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Offering a re-evaluation of all the available evidence, including passages from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Poetics and Sophistici Elenchi, Diogenes Laertius’ biographical sketch as well as the grammar scene in Aristophanes’ Clouds, this article argues that Protagoras’ engagement with grammatical questions must have been more sophisticated and thorough than is often assumed. In Protagoras’ discovery of grammatical gender, formal considerations – most likely inspired by the analysis of personal names – played a more fundamental role than semantic ones, and his typology of πυθμένες λόγων equally presupposes the formal recognition of at least verbal mood, if not also tense.

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Books on the topic "De sophisticis elenchis (Aristotle)"

1

Aristotle. Les réfutations sophistiques. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2019.

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2

Aristóteles. Aristotle on fallacies, or, The Sophistici elenchi. New York: Garland, 1987.

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3

(Editor), B. G. Dod, ed. De Sophisticis Elenchis: Translatio Boethii, Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi, Et Recensio Guilleimi De Moerbeka (Aristoteles Latinus , No 1-3). Brill Academic Pub, 1997.

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4

Poste, Edward. Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429200106.

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5

(Translator), Edward Poste, ed. Aristotle On Fallacies Or The Sophistici Elenchi. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007.

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6

Poste, Edward. Aristotle on Fallacies; or the Sophistici Elenchi. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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7

Aristóteles. Aristotle On Fallacies Or The Sophistici Elenchi. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007.

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8

Poste, Edward. Aristotle on Fallacies; or the Sophistici Elenchi. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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9

Aristotle on Fallacies; or the Sophistici Elenchi. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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10

Aristotle on Fallacies; or the Sophistici Elenchi. Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

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Book chapters on the topic "De sophisticis elenchis (Aristotle)"

1

"self, at the end of his De Sophisticis Elenchis, speaks witheringly of." In New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (RLE: Plato), 64. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203101667-16.

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"Aristotle’s Expansion of the Taxonomy of Fallacy in De Sophisticis Elenchis 8." In Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy, 200–237. mentis Verlag, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783897858589_009.

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3

Hoffmann, Roald. "Nearly Circular Reasoning." In Roald Hoffmann on the Philosophy, Art, and Science of Chemistry. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199755905.003.0009.

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Scientific argument is supposed to be logical. But do scientists study logic? Probably not. Were they asked about the advisability of learning formal or applied logic, most would likely say, “Logic, as studied by philosophers, is just a systemization or description of what we, as scientists, do naturally. So we don’t need to study it.” The chain of reasoning that I’ve ascribed here to a straw-man scientist is, on analysis, full of the fallacies described by Aristotle in Sophistical Refutations (De sophisticis elenchis) more than 2,300 years ago. The argument suffers from circular reasoning, the fallacy of false cause, the argument ad populum (the populus here being scientists, as opposed to philosophers), and more. But actually I do not want to berate here the logically unsophisticated scientist (myself), nor to urge that scientists need study philosophy. Rather, I’d like to examine the curious role of logic in science. Good logical thinking is absolutely necessary to both everyday and revolutionary science. But I will argue that at the same time, reasoning in all science, paradigmatic or ground-breaking, on close scrutiny often turns out to be in part illogical. There is nothing new in this—we see readily the fallacies in the work of others, especially when they disagree with us, don’t we? I will try to make a case, however, that there may be a real advantage implicit in occasionally faulty reasoning, especially a mode which I will call nearly circular reasoning. Science is a curious mixture of the real and the ideal, the material and the spiritual, held together by discourse or argument. The latter is sometimes mathematical, but more often it transpires in the words of some language. The real is the material, say, a vial of a chemical, or its measured spectrum, the relative amount of light a solution of that chemical absorbs. The ideal may be a proposal on the mechanism of formation of the molecule, or a theory that interprets that spectrum as necessarily indicating the molecule contains a carbon-hydrogen bond. The discourse consists of the exposition of several arguments, several alternative models explaining the observable, and a choice between them.

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4

Bolton, Robert. "Aristotle’s Account of the Socratic Elenchus." In Oxford Studies In Ancient Philosophy, 121–52. Oxford University PressOxford, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198240952.003.0005.

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Abstract In his Topics and Sophistical Refutations Aristotle describes a method of enquiry and of proof which he calls ‘dialectic in the strict sense and peirastic’ (SE 34, i8339I). He claims not to be inventing this method but to be giving, for the first time, a descriptive codification of the rules for the proper practice of a method already widely in use (SE 34, i83is ff.). No close student of the Topics and Sophistical Refutations can doubt that the early Platonic dialogues, and thus the method practiced there by Socrates, served as one of Aristotle’s main sources of information about the method which he describes. Ample confirmation of this, if it be needed, will be provided in the course of the discussion here. If, however, Aristotle gives us a descriptive account of the rules of the method which Socrates uses, but hardly himself describes, then Aristotle’s account ought to be one of our main sources for understanding Socratic method. In particular, since Aristotle, in the Sophistical Refutations, describes at length the rules for the use of his method for the practice of elenchus this discussion ought to be one of our main aids for solving long-standing problems concerning the Socratic elenchus.

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5

Poste, Edward. "Περι Σοφιστικων Ελεγχων." In Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi, 1–172. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429200106-1.

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