Journal articles: 'Decision-making heuristics'

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Vis, Barbara. "Heuristics and Political Elites’ Judgment and Decision-Making." Political Studies Review 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2018): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929917750311.

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It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition— availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research.

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Gál, Peter, Miloš Mrva, and Matej Meško. "Heuristics, biases and traps in managerial decision making." Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 61, no. 7 (2013): 2117–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.11118/actaun201361072117.

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The aim of the paper is to demonstrate the impact of heuristics, biases and psychological traps on the decision making. Heuristics are unconscious routines people use to cope with the complexity inherent in most decision situations. They serve as mental shortcuts that help people to simplify and structure the information encountered in the world. These heuristics could be quite useful in some situations, while in others they can lead to severe and systematic errors, based on significant deviations from the fundamental principles of statistics, probability and sound judgment. This paper focuses on illustrating the existence of the anchoring, availability, and representativeness heuristics, originally described by Tversky & Kahneman in the early 1970’s. The anchoring heuristic is a tendency to focus on the initial information, estimate or perception (even random or irrelevant number) as a starting point. People tend to give disproportionate weight to the initial information they receive. The availability heuristic explains why highly imaginable or vivid information have a disproportionate effect on people’s decisions. The representativeness heuristic causes that people rely on highly specific scenarios, ignore base rates, draw conclusions based on small samples and neglect scope. Mentioned phenomena are illustrated and supported by evidence based on the statistical analysis of the results of a questionnaire.

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Lord, Charles G. "Heuristics in Public Decision Making." Contemporary Psychology 45, no. 1 (February 2000): 95–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/002178.

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Hoffmann, Thomas. "Heuristics in Legal Decision-Making." Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum 8, no. 1 (May 12, 2020): 62–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.11590/abhps.2020.1.03.

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Keller, Niklas, Edward T. Cokely, Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, and Odette Wegwarth. "Naturalistic Heuristics for Decision Making." Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 4, no. 3 (September 2010): 256–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1518/155534310x12844000801168.

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Moser, Andrea K. "Buying organic – decision-making heuristics and empirical evidence from Germany." Journal of Consumer Marketing 33, no. 7 (November 14, 2016): 552–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcm-04-2016-1790.

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Purpose Identifying the drivers that positively influence consumption of organic products is of utmost importance to reach consumers beyond the niche. Therefore, this study aims to propose an innovative framework which conceptualizes motivating beliefs and a simple decision-making heuristic as predictors of buying organic. Design/methodology/approach A structural equation approach is applied. Data were obtained from a nationwide panel (n = 1,760) and included survey data and scanner data for five different food categories. Findings The model is supported by actual purchasing data in all categories. While beliefs explained about 75 per cent of the variance in the decision-making heuristic for organic products, the heuristic in turn predicted up to 20 per cent of the variance in buying behavior. Research limitations/implications Further research should aim to validate the proposed constructs and relationships and refine the factors. Practical implications Consumers have to understand and value the benefits of organic products. Self-interested and environmental beliefs are equally strong motivations which can be seen as an opportunity for marketing. Originality/value The results contribute to understanding the structure and the impact of heuristics and quantify the competing beliefs by which heuristics are driven.

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del Campo, Cristina, Sandra Pauser, Elisabeth Steiner, and Rudolf Vetschera. "Decision making styles and the use of heuristics in decision making." Journal of Business Economics 86, no. 4 (March 22, 2016): 389–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11573-016-0811-y.

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Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali, Maqsood Ahmad, and Faisal Mahmood. "Heuristic biases in investment decision-making and perceived market efficiency." Qualitative Research in Financial Markets 10, no. 1 (February 5, 2018): 85–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/qrfm-04-2017-0033.

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Purpose This paper aims to clarify the mechanism by which heuristics influences the investment decisions of individual investors, actively trading on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), and the perceived efficiency of the market. Most studies focus on well-developed financial markets and very little is known about investors’ behaviour in less developed financial markets or emerging markets. The present study contributes to filling this gap in the literature. Design/methodology/approach Investors’ heuristic biases have been measured using a questionnaire, containing numerous items, including indicators of speculators, investment decisions and perceived market efficiency variables. The sample consists of 143 investors trading on the PSX. A convenient, purposively sampling technique was used for data collection. To examine the relationship between heuristic biases, investment decisions and perceived market efficiency, hypotheses were tested by using correlation and regression analysis. Findings The paper provides empirical insights into the relationship of heuristic biases, investment decisions and perceived market efficiency. The results suggest that heuristic biases (overconfidence, representativeness, availability and anchoring) have a markedly negative impact on investment decisions made by individual investors actively trading on the PSX and on perceived market efficiency. Research limitations/implications The primary limitation of the empirical review is the tiny size of the sample. A larger sample would have given more trustworthy results and could have empowered a more extensive scope of investigation. Practical implications The paper encourages investors to avoid relying on heuristics or their feelings when making investments. It provides awareness and understanding of heuristic biases in investment management, which could be very useful for decision makers and professionals in financial institutions, such as portfolio managers and traders in commercial banks, investment banks and mutual funds. This paper helps investors to select better investment tools and avoid repeating expensive errors, which occur due to heuristic biases. They can improve their performance by recognizing their biases and errors of judgment, to which we are all prone, resulting in a more efficient market. So, it is necessary to focus on a specific investment strategy to control “mental mistakes” by investors, due to heuristic biases. Originality/value The current study is the first of its kind, focusing on the link between heuristics, individual investment decisions and perceived market efficiency within the specific context of Pakistan.

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Gilbert-Saad, Antoine, Rod B. McNaughton, and Frank Siedlok. "Inexperienced decision-makers' use of positive heuristics for marketing decisions." Management Decision 59, no. 7 (May 11, 2021): 1706–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-09-2019-1330.

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PurposeResearch has reliably demonstrated that decision-makers, especially expert ones, use heuristics to make decisions under uncertainty. However, whether decision-makers with little or no experience also do, and if so, how? is unknown. This research addresses this issue in the marketing context by studying how a group of young and generally inexperienced entrepreneurs decide when asked to set a price and choose a distribution channel in a scenario involving a hypothetical firm.Design/methodology/approachThe authors used think-aloud protocols to elicit data and then used inductive procedures to code the data for analysis.FindingsThe inexperienced entrepreneurs in the sample used three types of heuristics in their decision-making, forming a structured process that narrows in scope. First, metacognitive heuristics, which specify a decision-making approach, were used, followed by heuristics representing the criteria they considered, and finally, heuristics detailing the execution of a selected option. The authors also found that heuristics relating to a market orientation, especially customer-centric criteria, were the most common, but these were balanced with ones representing an internal orientation or growth.Research limitations/implicationsThe generally inexperienced decision-makers the authors’ studied used heuristics in a structured way that helped them to select and balance several potentially conflicting decision-making criteria. As with most research using qualitative research designs, the generalizability of these findings is unclear. Further research on the mechanisms by which relatively inexperienced decision-makers learn the heuristics they use is recommended.Originality/valueThis research's novelty lies in its focus on heuristic use by nonexpert decision-makers under conditions of uncertainty and the findings about their scope and the order they are used. As the authors collected data from think-aloud protocols with relatively young entrepreneurs with limited experience, they also offer a description of the heuristics used by nascent entrepreneurs when making marketing decisions about pricing and channels. The most surprising conclusion is that even without relevant domain-specific knowledge, decision-makers can use heuristics in an ecologically rational way (i.e. structured to match the environment).

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Kang, Mijung, and Min Jae Park. "Employees’ judgment and decision making in the banking industry." International Journal of Bank Marketing 37, no. 1 (February 4, 2019): 382–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijbm-04-2018-0111.

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Purpose Heuristics are used in the judgment and decision-making process of bank employees; however, discussions and research on the type or range of judgmental heuristics are very difficult to find throughout the world. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze what types of heuristics are used in bank employees’ judgment and decision-making processes and the extent to which those types of heuristics prevent rational decision making due to the systematic biases they generate. In particular, this study aims to conduct empirical research based on various scenarios related to the banking industry. Design/methodology/approach To examine the heuristics in decision-making circumstances and the level of subsequent biases, the present study narrowed the scope of research to the three main types of heuristics introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), namely, representativeness heuristics, availability heuristics and anchoring and adjustment heuristics. To analyze the bank employees’ decision making, this study specifically investigated the level of decision-making heuristics and the level of bias by focusing on these three types of heuristics. This study targeted bank employees who either sell financial products or are engaged in customer service work at a real/physical bank. Findings For representativeness heuristics, this study found bank employees’ judgment of probability was influenced by biases, such as insensitivity to prior probability, insensitivity to sample size, misconception of chance and insensitivity to predictability. Regarding availability heuristics, it found that bank employees judge the probability of events based on the ease of recalling an event instead of the actual frequency of the event, and so they fall prey to systematic biases. Finally, regarding anchoring and adjustment heuristics, this study found that employees fall prey to judgment biases as they judge the probability of conjunctive events and disjunctive events based on anchoring and insufficient adjustment. Originality/value Although people who are well-trained in statistics can avoid rudimentary errors, they fall prey to biased judgment at a similar level to those who are not properly trained in statistics when it comes to more complicated and ambiguous issues. It clearly indicates that it is risky to determine that financial experts would be more rational than the general public in making various judgments required in the policy-making process. To conclude, it is imperative to recognize the existence of heuristics-based systematic biases in the judgment and decision-making process and, furthermore, to reinforce the education and training system to improve bank employees’ rational choice and judgment ability.

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Unkic, Nahid, and Jasmina Okicic. "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECISION-MAKING HEURISTICS AND PERCEIVED QUALITY OF LIFE." EURASIAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 9, no. 2 (2021): 90–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.15604/ejbm.2021.09.02.001.

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The purpose of this research is to provide some insights into relationship between decisionmaking heuristics and perceived quality of life. Using the purposive sampling technique, data collection was carried out, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from June to October 2020, yielding a sample of 319 valid responses. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between decision-making heuristics and the perceived quality of life, we, primarily, use descriptive statistical analysis, chi-square test and probit regression model. The research findings have revealed positive association between all three decision-making heuristics, i.e. representativeness, anchoring, availability, and perceived quality of life. Furthermore, the group with above-average perceived quality of life have higher representativeness, anchoring, and availability scores comparing to the group with below-average perceived quality of life. These differences are statistically significant. Furthermore, out of three decision-making heuristics components, availability, or a heuristic whereby people make judgments about the likelihood of an event based on how easily a similar example comes to mind, seems to be the strongest predictor of the perceived quality of life. Memories that are easily recalled are often insufficient for estimating likelihood of occurring similar events again in the future. In that respect, availability may produce low-quality information in the decision making process. Ultimately, this may lead to bad decisions.

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Roosan, Don, Justin Clutter, Brian Kendall, and Charlene Weir. "Power of Heuristics to Improve Health Information Technology System Design." ACI Open 06, no. 02 (July 2022): e114-e122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0042-1758462.

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Abstract Background Clinical decision-making can be prone to error if health system design does not match expert clinicians' higher cognitive skills. There is a gap in understanding the need for the importance of heuristics in clinical decision-making. The heuristic approach can provide cognitive support in designing intuitive health information systems for complex cases. Objective We explored complex decision-making by infectious diseases (ID) clinicians focusing on fast and frugal heuristics. We hypothesized that ID clinicians use simple heuristics to understand complex cases using their experience. Methods The study utilized cognitive task analysis and heuristics-based decision modeling. We conducted cognitive interviews and provided clinicians with a fast-and-frugal tree algorithm to convert complex information into simple decision algorithms. We conducted a critical decision method–based analysis to generate if–then logic sentences from the transcript. We conducted a thematic analysis of heuristics and calculated the average time to complete and the number of crucial information in the decision nodes. Results A total of 27 if–then logic heuristics sentences were generated from analyzing the data. The average time to construct the fast-and-frugal trees was 1.65 ± 0.37 minutes, and the average number of crucial pieces of information clinicians focused on was 5.4 ± 3.1. Conclusion Clinicians use shortcut mental models to reduce complex cases into simple mental model algorithms. The innovative use of artificial intelligence could allow clinical decision support systems to focus on creative and intuitive interface design matching the higher cognitive skills of expert clinicians.

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Riyazahmed, K., and MG Saravanaraj. "Implications of Heuristics in Financial Decision Making." Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 6, no. 7 (2016): 1245. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2249-7315.2016.00509.8.

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Richardson, Luann G. "Awareness of Heuristics in Clinical Decision Making." Clinical Scholars Review 7, no. 1 (2014): 16–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/1939-2095.7.1.16.

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Evidence-based principles should unquestionably play a key role in decision making. However, we must recognize that gaps in both knowledge and evidence occur in daily clinical practice. Subjective judgment can be a constructive component in making clinical decisions. The use of heuristics has been used both purposely and instinctively to help fill gaps and assist in solving complex dilemmas. A goal of this article is to encourage clinicians to assess their own decision-making skills as well as the skills of novices and experts with whom they work with.

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Besedeš, Tibor, Cary Deck, Sudipta Sarangi, and Mikhael Shor. "Age Effects and Heuristics in Decision Making." Review of Economics and Statistics 94, no. 2 (May 2012): 580–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00174.

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Abualsamh, Rashad A., Barbara Carlin, and Reuben R. McDaniel. "Problem structuring heuristics in strategic decision making." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 45, no. 2 (April 1990): 159–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(90)90009-x.

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Forbes, William, Robert Hudson, Len Skerratt, and Mona Soufian. "Which heuristics can aid financial-decision-making?" International Review of Financial Analysis 42 (December 2015): 199–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2015.07.002.

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Adebola Olaborede and Lirieka Meintjes-van der Walt. "Cognitive Bias Affecting Decision-Making in the Legal Process." Obiter 41, no. 4 (March 24, 2021): 806–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/obiter.v41i4.10489.

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Several empirical research studies have shown that cognitive bias can unconsciously distort inferences and interpretations made by judges either at the hearing, ruling or sentencing stage of a court trial and this may result in miscarriages of justice. This article examines how cognitive heuristics affects judicial decision-making with seven common manifestations of heuristics such as availability heuristics, confirmation bias, egocentric bias, anchoring, hindsight bias, framing and representativeness. This article contends that the different manifestations of heuristics pose a potentially serious risk to the quality and objectivity of any criminal case, despite the professional legal training and experience of judges and magistrates. Therefore, suggestions on how best to avoid and minimise the effects of cognitive heuristics, especially within South African courts are proffered. These include creating awareness raising, cross-examination and replacement.

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Kaaronen, Roope O. "Mycological rationality: Heuristics, perception and decision-making in mushroom foraging." Judgment and Decision Making 15, no. 5 (September 2020): 630–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500007841.

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AbstractHow do mushroom foragers make safe and efficient decisions under uncertainty, or deal with the genuine risks of misidentification and poisoning? This article is an inquiry into ecological rationality, heuristics, perception, and decision-making in mushroom foraging. By surveying 894 Finnish mushroom foragers, this article illustrates how socially learned rules of thumb and heuristics are used in mushroom foraging, and how simple heuristics are often complemented by more complex and intuitive decision-making. The results illustrate how traditional foraging cultures have evolved precautionary heuristics to deal with uncertainties and poisonous species, and how foragers develop selective attention through experience. The study invites us to consider whether other human foraging cultures might use heuristics similarly, how and why such traditions have culturally evolved, and whether early hunter-gatherers might have used simple heuristics to deal with uncertainty.

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Brunyé, Tad T., Shaina B. Martis, and Holly A. Taylor. "Cognitive load during route selection increases reliance on spatial heuristics." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 5 (January 1, 2018): 1045–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1310268.

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Planning routes from maps involves perceiving the symbolic environment, identifying alternate routes and applying explicit strategies and implicit heuristics to select an option. Two implicit heuristics have received considerable attention, the southern route preference and initial segment strategy. This study tested a prediction from decision-making theory that increasing cognitive load during route planning will increase reliance on these heuristics. In two experiments, participants planned routes while under conditions of minimal (0-back) or high (2-back) working memory load. In Experiment 1, we examined how memory load impacts the southern route heuristic. In Experiment 2, we examined how memory load impacts the initial segment heuristic. Results replicated earlier results demonstrating a southern route preference (Experiment 1) and initial segment strategy (Experiment 2) and further demonstrated that evidence for heuristic reliance is more likely under conditions of concurrent working memory load. Furthermore, the extent to which participants maintained efficient route selection latencies in the 2-back condition predicted the magnitude of this effect. Together, results demonstrate that working memory load increases the application of heuristics during spatial decision making, particularly when participants attempt to maintain quick decisions while managing concurrent task demands.

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Crumlish, Niall, and Brendan D. Kelly. "How psychiatrists think." Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 15, no. 1 (January 2009): 72–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/apt.bp.107.005298.

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SummaryOver the past decade, the study of error in medicine has expanded to incorporate new insights from cognitive psychology, generating increased research and clinical interest in cognitive errors and clinical decision-making. The study of cognitive error focuses on predictable errors in thinking that result from the use of cognitive shortcuts or ‘heuristics’. Heuristics reduce the time, resources and cognitive effort required for clinical decision-making and are a feature of mature clinical thinking. Heuristics can also lead to bias and must be used with an awareness of their weaknesses. In this article, we describe heuristics commonly used in clinical decision-making and discuss how failure of heuristics results in cognitive error. We apply research findings on decision-making in medicine to decision-making in psychiatry and suggest directions for training and future research into cognitive error in psychiatry.

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Graber, Mark A. "Heuristics, language and medical errors." Russian Family Doctor 24, no. 4 (February 27, 2021): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rfd50991.

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The use of heuristics, cognitive rules of thumb or shortcuts, are a common part of medical decision making. While using heuristics lessens the cognitive burden of decision making and often comes up with the correct answer, reliance on heuristics can also lead to medical errors. In this introduction we will define heuristics and discuss some of the more common heuristics/biases that may lead to biased decision making and patient harm. We will also look at the use of language in medicine and how that can lead us to make diagnostic errors.

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Chóliz, Mariano. "Cognitive Biases and Decision Making in Gambling." Psychological Reports 107, no. 1 (August 2010): 15–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/02.09.18.22.pr0.107.4.15-24.

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Heuristics and cognitive biases can occur in reasoning and decision making. Some of them are very common in gamblers (illusion of control, representativeness, availability, etc.). Structural characteristics and functioning of games of chance favor the appearance of these biases. Two experiments were conducted with nonpathological gamblers. The first experiment was a game of dice with wagers. In the second experiment, the participants played two bingo games. Specific rules of the games favored the appearance of cognitive bias (illusion of control) and heuristics (representativeness and availability) and influence on the bets. Results and implications for gambling are discussed.

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Abatecola, Gianpaolo, Andrea Caputo, and Matteo Cristofaro. "Reviewing cognitive distortions in managerial decision making." Journal of Management Development 37, no. 5 (June 11, 2018): 409–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jmd-08-2017-0263.

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Purpose Why and how do cognitive distortions in managerial decision making occur? All organizations are imperfect systems (Katz and Kahn, 1966), with wrong decisions often just round the corner. As a consequence, addressing these important questions continues to be particularly lively in the management development area, especially in terms of its intended contribution to the de-biasing activity. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to provide the current scientific dialogue on the topic with updated lenses, which can also be innovative from some aspects. Design/methodology/approach The review framework is based on the recent, impactful article on biases in managerial decision making by Kahneman et al. (2011), and on Bazerman and Moore’s (2013) perspective on emanating heuristics, considered as the causes of biases. Accordingly, the authors derive four intertwined thematic clusters of heuristics, through which the authors systematically group and critically analyze the management literature mostly published on the topic since 2011. Findings From the analyzed clusters the authors propose an integrative framework of emanating heuristics, which focuses on the co-evolving relationships and potentially self-reinforcing processes in and between them. Originality/value The value of the contribution is threefold: from a methodological perspective, to the authors’ knowledge, the studies adopted as the basis of the analysis have not yet been simultaneously used as a comprehensive ground for updated reviews on this topic; from a conceptual perspective, the emerging integrative co-evolutionary framework can help explain the dangerous connections among cognitive traps and emanating heuristics; and from a practical perspective, the resulting framework can also be helpful for future de-biasing attempts in the business arena.

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Adamus-Matuszyńska, Anna. "Heuristics and biases as sources of negotiators’ errors in the pre-negotiation phase. Review of literature and empirical research." Optimum. Economic Studies, no. 3(101) (2020): 79–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/oes.2020.03.101.07.

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Purpose – Heuristics and biases are simplifying strategies that people (in the analysed issue – negotiators) use in the decision-making process, even when they can take advantage of supporting tools (e.g. Negotiation Support System), which will allow them to make the optimal choice [Wachowicz, 2006]. Many empirical studies have found that decision makers use heuristics and are biased [Bateman, Zeithaml, 1989; Jackson, Dutton, 1988; Kahneman et al. 1982; Zajac, Bazerman, 1991]. Therefore, the question should be asked: are negotiators, like managers (whose decisions were examined), instead of consciously and intentionally using tools supporting decision-making during negotiations, subject to heuristics and cognitive errors? As a consequence of this general question one may ask the specific research questions: (1) What heuristics do the negotiators undergo? (2) How do heuristics influence the decision-making process? (3) How can the impact of heuristics and biases be minimized by taking advantage of negotiation support tools? Research methods – The article is a review of psychological, sociological and management sciences theories, concepts and empirical researches on heuristics and biases. The review was made according to the following categories: (a) theories that recognize the inevitability of heuristics in the decision-making process, (b) theories that attempt to identify opportunities to minimize or even reduce the impact of heuristics on decisions, and (c) those that offer alternative solutions. Results – The summary highlights those heuristics which might occur in the decision-making process in the pre-negotiation phase. Originality/value – There is no research exploring the role of specific heuristics and biases in particular stages of negotiations.

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Singh, Manasvini. "Heuristics in the delivery room." Science 374, no. 6565 (October 15, 2021): 324–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.abc9818.

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Decisions about delivery Heuristics, or simplified decision rules, have been found to influence decision-making in several settings. Singh found that when patients experience a complication during birth either via vaginal or cesarean delivery, their doctors are more likely to switch to the opposite delivery mode for their next patient’s birth (see the Perspective by Li and Colby). There is also evidence that this heuristic may lead to worse patient outcomes. —TSR

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Maldonato, Mauro. "Undecidable Decisions: Rationality Limits and Decision-making Heuristics." World Futures 63, no. 1 (January 2007): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604020600951143.

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Heller, Rachael F., Herbert D. Saltzstein, and William B. Caspe. "Heuristics in Medical and Non-Medical Decision-Making." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 44, no. 2 (February 1992): 211–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724989243000019.

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Pairs of hypothetical medical and non-medical problems were given to 44 pediatric residents at three levels of hospital training. Each problem was designed to detect a specific heuristic-based bias in making diagnoses. Discounting, disregarding base rate, and over-confidence in contextually embedded redundant information were more evident on medical than on non-medical problems. In particular, a greater number of third-year residents disregarded base-rate information than did first- and second-year residents on medical but not on non-medical problems. On medical problems, a greater number of first-year residents expressed greater confidence in redundant information that was contextually embedded than in information that was presented in a listed format. Over one-third of the residents confused prospective and retrospective probabilities; three-fourths showed evidence of augmentation; virtually all residents expressed greater confidence in a diagnosis based on redundant rather than on non-redundant listed information. These latter effects were consistent across training level and occurred on both medical and non-medical problems. The results are discussed in terms of prototype theory and the nature of medical training.

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Muoni, Tambu. "Decision-making, intuition, and the midwife: Understanding heuristics." British Journal of Midwifery 20, no. 1 (January 2012): 52–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2012.20.1.52.

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Cioffi, Jane. "Heuristics, servants to intuition, in clinical decision-making." Journal of Advanced Nursing 26, no. 1 (July 1997): 203–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2648.1997.1997026203.x.

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Hughes, Tasha M., Lesly A. Dossett, Sarah T. Hawley, and Dana A. Telem. "Recognizing Heuristics and Bias in Clinical Decision-making." Annals of Surgery 271, no. 5 (May 2020): 813–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/sla.0000000000003699.

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Doswell, Charles A. "Weather Forecasting by Humans—Heuristics and Decision Making." Weather and Forecasting 19, no. 6 (December 1, 2004): 1115–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/waf-821.1.

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Abstract The decision-making literature contains considerable information about how humans approach tasks involving uncertainty using heuristics. Although there is some reason to believe that weather forecasters are not identical in all respects to the typical subjects used in judgment and decision-making studies, there also is evidence that weather forecasters are not so different that the existing understanding of human cognition as it relates to making decisions is entirely inapplicable to weather forecasters. Accordingly, some aspects of cognition and decision making are reviewed and considered in terms of how they apply to human weather forecasters, including biases introduced by heuristics. Considerable insight into human forecasting could be gained by applying available studies of the cognitive psychology of decision making. What few studies exist that have used weather forecasters as subjects suggest that further work might well be productive in terms of helping to guide the improvement of weather forecasts by humans. It is concluded that a multidisciplinary approach, involving disciplines outside of meteorology, needs to be developed and supported if there is to be a future role for humans in forecasting the weather.

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Blumenthal-Barby, J. S., and Heather Krieger. "Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Medical Decision Making." Medical Decision Making 35, no. 4 (August 21, 2014): 539–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989x14547740.

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Hoy, Wayne K., and C. J. Tarter. "Swift and smart decision making: heuristics that work." International Journal of Educational Management 24, no. 4 (May 18, 2010): 351–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513541011045272.

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Hafenbrädl, Sebastian, Daniel Waeger, Julian N. Marewski, and Gerd Gigerenzer. "Applied Decision Making With Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics." Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 5, no. 2 (June 2016): 215–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2016.04.011.

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Dhami, Sanjit, Ali al-Nowaihi, and Cass R. Sunstein. "Heuristics and Public Policy: Decision-making Under Bounded Rationality." Studies in Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (June 2019): 7–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022219832148.

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How do human beings make decisions when, as the evidence indicates, the assumptions of the Bayesian rationality approach in economics do not hold? Do human beings optimize, or can they? Several decades of research have shown that people possess a toolkit of heuristics to make decisions under certainty, risk, subjective uncertainty, and true uncertainty (or Knightian uncertainty). We outline recent advances in knowledge about the use of heuristics and departures from Bayesian rationality, with particular emphasis on growing formalization of those departures, which add necessary precision. We also explore the relationship between bounded rationality and libertarian paternalism, or nudges, and show that some recent objections, founded on psychological work on the usefulness of certain heuristics, are based on serious misunderstandings. JEL classifications: D01, D04, D81, D9

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Kim, Eun Joo, Sarah Tanford, and Choongbeom Choi. "Family versus couples: How travel goal influences evaluations of bundled travel packages." Journal of Vacation Marketing 26, no. 1 (April 17, 2019): 3–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1356766719842325.

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This research investigates how travel goal activates judgmental heuristics when choosing a travel package. Family travelers must consider the complex needs of all family members, whereas couples face simpler demands. Since motivations vary according to traveling companions, the decision-making processes are different by the travel goal. Pricing is a determinant of decisions for travel packages bundled with add-on items. When the decision process requires less mental effort, the availability heuristic operates when filtering products by travel goal, and the representativeness heuristic works when seeking consistency between add-on items and the travel goal. Dual processing theories suggest that goal influences the motivation to process information systematically or automatically when making choices. An experiment was conducted to examine how the decision-making process differs as a function of travel goal, price bundling, and the consistency between the travel goal and add-on item. The findings suggest that judgmental heuristics influence travel purchase decision when motivation to process information is low. Specifically, the current research supports the proposition that automatic processing influences couples’ travel decisions while systematic processing works for family travel decisions. The research suggests the use of an effective segmentation for vacation packages in the online purchase environment and highlights the importance of a travel goal in decision-making.

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Simon, Scott, Loel Collins, and Dave Collins. "Observational Heuristics in a Group of High Level Paddle Sports Coaches." International Sport Coaching Journal 4, no. 2 (May 2017): 235–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/iscj.2017-0012.

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Observation of performance forms a critical part of the complex coaching process. A professional judgment and decision making (PJDM) framework enables optimum decisions to be made under time pressure and with limited information that derive from that observation. Observation and the associated decision making can be particularly affected by heuristic bias. We extend the work on PJDM via a greater focus on its relationship with observation within the coaching process. After revisiting PJDM and observation, we introduce and explore heuristics as a “tool” within the observation process. Specifically, we propose that observation is prone to heuristics built on a coach’s experience and understanding. We report on a small scale preliminary investigation with a group of high-level paddle sport coaches. We identify heuristics that both restrict and enhance the effectiveness of the observation in an effort to promote discussion and further research.

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Štukelj, Gašper. "On the simplicity of simple heuristics." Adaptive Behavior 28, no. 4 (August 6, 2019): 261–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319861589.

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Recent evidence suggests that the take-the-best heuristic—flagship of “fast and frugal heuristics” research program—might in fact not be as frugal as tallying, which is considered to be a more complex strategy. Characterizing a simple decision strategy has always seemed straightforward, and the debate around the simplicity of the take-the-best heuristic is mostly concerned with a proper specification of the heuristic. I argue that the predominate conceptions of “simplicity” and “frugality” need to be revised. To this end, a number of recent behavioral and neuroscientific results are discussed. The example of take-the-best heuristic serves as an entry point to a foundational debate on bounded agency. I argue that the fast and frugal heuristics needs to question some of its legacy from the classical AI research. For example, the assumption that the bottleneck of decision-making process is information processing due to its serial nature. These commitments are hard to reconcile with the modern neuroscientific view of a human decision-maker. In addition, I discuss an overlooked source of uncertainty, namely neural noise, and compare a generic heuristic model to a similar neural algorithm.

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Mumtaz, Adeel, Tahir Saeed, and M. Ramzan. "Factors affecting investment decision-making in Pakistan stock exchange." International Journal of Financial Engineering 05, no. 04 (December 2018): 1850033. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2424786318500330.

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This study analyzes the impact of various factors like heuristic, risk aversion, financial tools and techniques, firm’s corporate governance, and day-to-day experience on the investor’s decision-making. The sample consisted of 701 individual investors trading in the Pakistan Stock Exchange. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is used for the estimation of research models. The findings revealed that heuristics, risk aversion, financial tools and techniques have a significant positive effect on the investment decisions of investors. The day-to-day experience and corporate governance (CG) play an important role in investment decision-making of the financial sector in Pakistan. This study will contribute to creating awareness in a diversity of investors for investing in the equity market and increases the investors’ confidence.

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Khader, Patrick H., Thorsten Pachur, Stefanie Meier, Siegfried Bien, Kerstin Jost, and Frank Rösler. "Memory-based Decision-making with Heuristics: Evidence for a Controlled Activation of Memory Representations." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23, no. 11 (November 2011): 3540–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00059.

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Many of our daily decisions are memory based, that is, the attribute information about the decision alternatives has to be recalled. Behavioral studies suggest that for such decisions we often use simple strategies (heuristics) that rely on controlled and limited information search. It is assumed that these heuristics simplify decision-making by activating long-term memory representations of only those attributes that are necessary for the decision. However, from behavioral studies alone, it is unclear whether using heuristics is indeed associated with limited memory search. The present study tested this assumption by monitoring the activation of specific long-term-memory representations with fMRI while participants made memory-based decisions using the “take-the-best” heuristic. For different decision trials, different numbers and types of information had to be retrieved and processed. The attributes consisted of visual information known to be represented in different parts of the posterior cortex. We found that the amount of information required for a decision was mirrored by a parametric activation of the dorsolateral PFC. Such a parametric pattern was also observed in all posterior areas, suggesting that activation was not limited to those attributes required for a decision. However, the posterior increases were systematically modulated by the relative importance of the information for making a decision. These findings suggest that memory-based decision-making is mediated by the dorsolateral PFC, which selectively controls posterior storage areas. In addition, the systematic modulations of the posterior activations indicate a selective boosting of activation of decision-relevant attributes.

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Dangol, Jeetendra, and Rashmita Manandhar. "Impact of Heuristics on Investment Decisions: The Moderating Role of Locus of Control." Journal of Business and Social Sciences Research 5, no. 1 (July 21, 2020): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/jbssr.v5i1.30195.

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This paper aims to assess the impact of heuristics on the investment decision by analysing the effect of four heuristic biases, i.e., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment, and overconfidence bias on rationality of Nepalese investor's investment decision-making and also examines the moderating effect of the internal locus of control in between. The study used 391 respondents based on a convenient sampling procedure, and structured questionnaire survey. The study result indicates that there is a significant relationship between irrationality in investment decision-making and all four heuristic biases. In addition, the study also concludes that locus of control has significant moderating effect in the relationship between investment decisions and three heuristic biases, i.e., availability, representative and anchoring bias. However, the study documents no moderation effect in case of relationship with overconfidence bias.

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Fodor, Oana Catalina, Petru Lucian Curşeu, and Alina Maria Fleştea. "Affective states and ecological rationality in entrepreneurial decision making." Journal of Managerial Psychology 31, no. 7 (September 12, 2016): 1182–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jmp-07-2015-0275.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of affective appraisal dimensions on the use of two ecologically rational, social heuristics: imitate the majority (IMH) and imitate the best (IBH) during an entrepreneurial strategic decision-making process (ESDM). Design/methodology/approach The authors test the hypotheses in a controlled field experiment, on a final sample of 98 entrepreneurs. Findings The study shows that entrepreneurs experiencing affect described by certainty appraisal display a preference for relying on IMH, but not on IBH. Moreover, entrepreneurs who experience unpleasant affect tend to rely more on IMH, rather than IBH. The reverse is true for the entrepreneurs who experience positive affect. Finally, the use of IMH is most likely under unpleasant and certain affect, while the use of IBH is most likely under pleasant and certain affect. Originality/value The main contribution of this study is that it provides initial support for the impact of affective appraisal dimensions on the use of ecologically rational heuristics (i.e. heuristics that save important resources, but bring beneficial results) during an ESDM process.

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Lindsay, R. O., and Barbara Gorayska. "Consequences of basing ethical judgments on heuristics." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 322–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00042904.

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AbstractBaron assumes that ethical decision-making can be evaluated without specifying more general features of the cognitive system within which it occurs. It is suggested that ethical principles are heuristics employed during goal-oriented action planning. Heuristics are bound to generate suboptimal decisions in some cases. It is rational to replace a particular heuristic only when the cost of associated error exceeds the cost of constructing and installing a more successful alternative.

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Ericson, Keith Marzilli, and Amanda Starc. "Heuristics and Heterogeneity in Health Insurance Exchanges: Evidence from the Massachusetts Connector." American Economic Review 102, no. 3 (May 1, 2012): 493–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.493.

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We examine heuristic decision rules in consumer choice on health insurance exchanges using data from the Massachusetts Connector. Consumers may have difficulty making optimal choices in a complex environment. The heuristic “choose the cheapest plan” is suggested by the decision context, previous research, and the data: about 20% of enrollees choose the cheapest plan possible. We find evidence of this heuristic in many models, but while heuristics may play a role, preference heterogeneity is also important. Our most flexible models find an insignificant heuristic effect. In part because holding context fixed, this heuristic is observationally equivalent to extreme price sensitivity.

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Teichman, Doron, and Eyal Zamir. "Behavioral Economics and Court Decision-Making." Review of Law & Economics 17, no. 2 (July 1, 2021): 385–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2021-0058.

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Abstract The economic analysis of law assumes that court decisions are key to incentivizing people and maximizing social welfare. This article reviews the behavioral literature on court decision making, and highlights numerous heuristics and biases that impact judges and jurors and cause them to make decisions that diverge from the social optimum. In light of this review, the article analyzes some of the institutional features of the court system that may help minimize the costs of biased decisions in the courts.

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Spiegel, Thais, and Ana Carolina P. V. Silva. "Decision-Making Cognitive Process." International Journal of Computers in Clinical Practice 3, no. 1 (January 2018): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijccp.2018010101.

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In the study of decision-making, the classical view of behavioral appropriateness or rationality was challenged by neuro and psychological reasons. The “bounded rationality” theory proposed that cognitive limitations lead decision-makers to construct simplified models for dealing with the world. Doctors' decisions, for example, are made under uncertain conditions, as without knowing precisely whether a diagnosis is correct or whether a treatment will actually cure a patient, and often under time constraints. Using cognitive heuristics are neither good nor bad per se, if applied in situations to which they have been adapted to be helpful. Therefore, this text contextualizes the human decision-making perspective to find descriptions that adhere more closely to the human decision-making process. Then, based on a literature review of cognition during decision-making, particularly in healthcare context, it addresses a model that identifies the roles of attention, categorization, memory, emotion, and their inter-relations, during the decision-making process.

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Meinert, Judith, and Nicole C. Krämer. "How the expertise heuristic accelerates decision-making and credibility judgments in social media by means of effort reduction." PLOS ONE 17, no. 3 (March 16, 2022): e0264428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264428.

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Real-time communication, unlimited distribution of information, and the lack of editorial supervision in social media communication aggravate recipients’ credibility evaluations and information selection by what aspects of the source such as expertise have emerged as important anchors for evaluations. It has long been assumed that credibility judgments in social media are specifically guided by heuristics. However, the existing studies merely give indications, for example, based on individuals’ self-report but do not test whether important attributes and prerequisites of heuristic decision-making, such as effort reduction, are present. Against this background, the current study (N = 185) analyses by applying a reduced two-alternative choice paradigm whether the relation between the expertise cue and credibility judgments and the choice of information sources is guided by a heuristic, namely the expertise heuristic. Findings indicate that the presence of the expertise cue reduced respondents’ task latencies significantly, although participants’ decision behavior was not independent from additional information. This is discussed in detail with recourse to theoretical conceptualizations of cognitive heuristics.

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Cox, James L., Stephen Lucci, and Tayfun Pay. "Effects of Dynamic Variable - Value Ordering Heuristics on the Search Space of Sudoku Modeled as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem." Inteligencia Artificial 22, no. 63 (January 10, 2019): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.4114/intartif.vol22iss63pp1-15.

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We carry out a detailed analysis of the effects of different dynamic variable and value ordering heuristics on the search space of Sudoku when the encoding method and the filtering algorithm are fixed. Our study starts by examining lexicographical variable and value ordering and evaluates different combinations of dynamic variable and value ordering heuristics. We eventually build up to a dynamic variable ordering heuristic that has two rounds of tie-breakers, where the second tie-breaker is a dynamic value ordering heuristic. We show that our method that uses this interlinked heuristic outperforms the previously studied ones with the same experimental setup. Overall, we conclude that constructing insightful dynamic variable ordering heuristics that also utilize a dynamic value ordering heuristic in their decision making process could drastically improve the search effort for some constraint satisfaction problems.

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Tomlin, Damon. "Consensus decision-making: performance of heuristics and mental models." Evolution and Human Behavior 42, no. 4 (July 2021): 316–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.12.004.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Decision-making heuristics'

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