Relevant bibliographies by topics / Deferred acceptance mechanism

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Book chapters
  4. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Deferred acceptance mechanism'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 18 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Deferred acceptance mechanism"

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Pu, Yun. "College admissions in three Chinese provinces: Boston mechanism vs. deferred acceptance mechanism." China Economic Review 67 (June 2021): 101622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2021.101622.

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Kennes, John, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan. "Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 2 (2019): 55–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170077.

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In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. "Expanding “Choice” in School Choice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (2015): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20120027.

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Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits much of the desirable properties of DA but performs better in ex ante efficiency. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28
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Bichler, Martin, Zhen Hao, Richard Littmann, and Stefan Waldherr. "Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement." OR Spectrum 42, no. 4 (2020): 965–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7.

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Abstract Deferred-acceptance auctions can be seen as heuristic algorithms to solve $${{\mathcal {N}}}{{\mathcal {P}}}$$ N P -hard allocation problems. Such auctions have been used in the context of the Incentive Auction by the US Federal Communications Commission in 2017, and they have remarkable incentive properties. Besides being strategyproof, they also prevent collusion among participants. Unfortunately, the worst-case approximation ratio of these algorithms is very low in general, but it was observed that they lead to near-optimal solutions in experiments on the specific allocation proble
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Rees-Jones, Alex. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 225–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171028.

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Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorit
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Hassidim, Avinatan, Déborah Marciano, Assaf Romm, and Ran I. Shorrer. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?" American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 220–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171027.

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Honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy-proof mechanism--irrespective of others' behavior, the best course of action is to report one's preferences truthfully. We review evidence from different markets in different countries and find that a substantial percentage of participants do not report their true preferences to the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Two recurring correlates of preference misrepresentation are lower cognitive ability and the expectation of stronger competition. We evaluate possible explanations, which we hope will inform practicing market designer
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Feigenbaum, Itai, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo, and Jay Sethuraman. "Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reassignment After Late Cancellations." Management Science 66, no. 11 (2020): 5341–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3469.

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In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key operational issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem must be simple to implement, truthful, and efficient while also alleviating costly student movement between schools. We propose and axiomatically justify a class of reassignment mechanisms, the permuted lottery deferred acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms. Our mechanisms generalize the commonly used deferred acceptance (DA) school choice mechanism to a
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Kloosterman, Andrew, and Peter Troyan. "School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance." Theoretical Economics 15, no. 3 (2020): 1095–133. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3621.

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We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy‐proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to a curse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have i
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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered." American Economic Review 101, no. 1 (2011): 399–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.399.

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Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities
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Chen, Yan, Ming Jiang, and Onur Kesten. "An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 50 (2020): 31696–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2009282117.

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College admissions policies affect the educational experiences and labor market outcomes for millions of students each year. In China alone, 10 million high school seniors participate in the National College Entrance Examination to compete for 7 million seats at various universities each year, making this system the largest centralized matching market in the world. The last 20 y have witnessed radical reforms in the Chinese college admissions system, with many provinces moving from a sequential (immediate acceptance) mechanism to some version of the parallel college admissions mechanism, a hyb
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Deferred acceptance mechanism"

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Nesterov, Alexander. "Three essays in matching mechanism design." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17647.

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In diese Dissertation, betrachte ich das Problem der Aufteilung der unteilbaren Objekte unter Agenten, ihren Vorlieben entsprechend, und die Transfers fehlen. In Kapitel 1 studiere ich den Kompromiss zwischen Fairness und Effizienz in der Klasse der strategy-proof Aufteilungsmechanismen. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass für die strategy-proof Mechanismen folgende Effizienz- und Fairness-Kriterien nicht miteinander vereinbar sind: (1) Ex-post-Effizienz und Neidfreiheit, (2) Ordnung-Effizienz und schwache Neidfreiheit und (3) Ordnung-Effizienz und gleiche-Teilung-untere-Grenze. In Kapit
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Marutani, Kyohei. "Essays on the Theory of Indivisible Good Markets." Kyoto University, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/253062.

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Zhu, Min. "Three essays on matching mechanisms." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015LYO22003.

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Les mécanismes d’assortiment, sont des marchés dont l’objet est de réaliser une allocation économique efficace mais qui opèrent sans échange monétaire. L’efficacité d’un mécanisme peut être évaluée de manière théorique, mais il est aussi important d’évaluer sa performance avec des agents réels pour tenir compte des biais comportementaux et leur rationalité limitée. La thèse résumée dans cette note s’inscrit dans cette démarche en fournissant des résultats empiriques qui permettront d’améliorer l’utilisation des mécanismes d’appariement sur le terrain. Le premier chapitre de la thèse vise à ana
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Bonkoungou, Somouaoga. "Essays on matching and preference aggregation." Thèse, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/20781.

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Book chapters on the topic "Deferred acceptance mechanism"

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Blumrosen, Liad, and Osnat Zohar. "Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms." In Web and Internet Economics. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_13.

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Chen, Yan, and Onur Kesten. "From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms." In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17.

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Conference papers on the topic "Deferred acceptance mechanism"

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Zhang, Yuzhe, Kentaro Yahiro, Nathanaël Barrot, and Makoto Yokoo. "Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/82.

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In this paper, we identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which can represent a variety of real-life constraints in two-sided matching settings. Since M-convexity is not closed under union, a union of symmetric M-convex sets does not belong to this well-behaved class of constraints in general. Thus, developing a fair and strategyproof mechanism that can handle this class is challenging. We present a novel mechanism called Quota Reduction Deferred Acceptance (QRDA), which repeatedly applies the standard DA mechanism by sequentially reduc
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