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Journal articles on the topic 'Deferred acceptance mechanism'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 18 February 2022

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1

Pu, Yun. "College admissions in three Chinese provinces: Boston mechanism vs. deferred acceptance mechanism." China Economic Review 67 (June 2021): 101622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2021.101622.

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2

Kennes, John, Daniel Monte, and Norovsambuu Tumennasan. "Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 2 (2019): 55–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170077.

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In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools’ priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation
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3

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. "Expanding “Choice” in School Choice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (2015): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20120027.

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Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism has emerged as a prominent candidate for placing students to public schools. While DA has desirable fairness and incentive properties, it limits the applicants' abilities to communicate their preference intensities, which entails ex ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism that allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It inherits much of the desirable properties of DA but performs better in ex ante efficiency. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28
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4

Bichler, Martin, Zhen Hao, Richard Littmann, and Stefan Waldherr. "Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement." OR Spectrum 42, no. 4 (2020): 965–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7.

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Abstract Deferred-acceptance auctions can be seen as heuristic algorithms to solve $${{\mathcal {N}}}{{\mathcal {P}}}$$ N P -hard allocation problems. Such auctions have been used in the context of the Incentive Auction by the US Federal Communications Commission in 2017, and they have remarkable incentive properties. Besides being strategyproof, they also prevent collusion among participants. Unfortunately, the worst-case approximation ratio of these algorithms is very low in general, but it was observed that they lead to near-optimal solutions in experiments on the specific allocation proble
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5

Rees-Jones, Alex. "Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 225–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171028.

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Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorit
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6

Hassidim, Avinatan, Déborah Marciano, Assaf Romm, and Ran I. Shorrer. "The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?" American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 220–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171027.

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Honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy-proof mechanism--irrespective of others' behavior, the best course of action is to report one's preferences truthfully. We review evidence from different markets in different countries and find that a substantial percentage of participants do not report their true preferences to the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Two recurring correlates of preference misrepresentation are lower cognitive ability and the expectation of stronger competition. We evaluate possible explanations, which we hope will inform practicing market designer
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7

Feigenbaum, Itai, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo, and Jay Sethuraman. "Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reassignment After Late Cancellations." Management Science 66, no. 11 (2020): 5341–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3469.

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In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key operational issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem must be simple to implement, truthful, and efficient while also alleviating costly student movement between schools. We propose and axiomatically justify a class of reassignment mechanisms, the permuted lottery deferred acceptance (PLDA) mechanisms. Our mechanisms generalize the commonly used deferred acceptance (DA) school choice mechanism to a
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8

Kloosterman, Andrew, and Peter Troyan. "School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance." Theoretical Economics 15, no. 3 (2020): 1095–133. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3621.

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We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy‐proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to a curse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have i
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9

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered." American Economic Review 101, no. 1 (2011): 399–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.399.

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Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities
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10

Chen, Yan, Ming Jiang, and Onur Kesten. "An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 50 (2020): 31696–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2009282117.

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College admissions policies affect the educational experiences and labor market outcomes for millions of students each year. In China alone, 10 million high school seniors participate in the National College Entrance Examination to compete for 7 million seats at various universities each year, making this system the largest centralized matching market in the world. The last 20 y have witnessed radical reforms in the Chinese college admissions system, with many provinces moving from a sequential (immediate acceptance) mechanism to some version of the parallel college admissions mechanism, a hyb
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11

Goto, Masahiro, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, and Makoto Yokoo. "Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 2 (2017): 226–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160124.

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To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property.
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12

Delaram, Jalal, Omid Fatahi Valilai, Mahmoud Houshamand, and Farid Ashtiani. "A matching mechanism for public cloud manufacturing platforms using intuitionistic Fuzzy VIKOR and deferred acceptance algorithm." International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management 16, no. 2 (2021): 107–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17509653.2021.1892549.

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13

Fack, Gabrielle, Julien Grenet, and Yinghua He. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions." American Economic Review 109, no. 4 (2019): 1486–529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151422.

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We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school
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14

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match." American Economic Review 107, no. 12 (2017): 3635–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425.

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Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further
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15

Carvalho, José Raimundo, Thierry Magnac, and Qizhou Xiong. "College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: A structural empirical analysis." Quantitative Economics 10, no. 3 (2019): 1233–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/qe951.

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We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences are shown to be identified from data on their choices and their exam grades under exclusion restrictions and support conditions. The counterfactuals we consider balance the severity of congestion and the quality of the match between schools and students. Moving to deferred acceptance or inverting the ti
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16

Kapor, Adam J., Christopher A. Neilson, and Seth D. Zimmerman. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms." American Economic Review 110, no. 5 (2020): 1274–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170129.

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This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households’ belief accuracy.
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17

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (2009): 1954–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954.

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The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tiebreaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated
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18

Delaram, Jalal, Mahmoud Houshamand, Farid Ashtiani, and Omid Fatahi Valilai. "A utility-based matching mechanism for stable and optimal resource allocation in cloud manufacturing platforms using deferred acceptance algorithm." Journal of Manufacturing Systems 60 (July 2021): 569–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmsy.2021.07.012.

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19

Erdil, Aytek, and Haluk Ergin. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice." American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (2008): 669–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.669.

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In several school choice districts in the United States, the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied after indifferences in priority orders are broken in some exogenous way. Although such a tie-breaking procedure preserves stability, it adversely affects the welfare of the students since it introduces artificial stability constraints. Our main finding is a polynomial-time algorithm for the computation of a student-optimal stable matching when priorities are weak. The idea behind our construction relies on a new notion which we call a stable improvement cycle. We also investi
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20

Trifunović, Dejan. "The Review of Methods for Assignment of Elective Courses at Universities." Economic Themes 57, no. 4 (2019): 511–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ethemes-2019-0029.

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AbstractIn this paper we present a review of matching algorithms that are used for matching students with elective courses at universities. This is an example of a market where price mechanism cannot be used to determine the equilibrium allocation. In the Random Serial Dictatorship students select courses based on their position in a random queue. This mechanism is not ex post Pareto-efficient and its drawback is overcome in the Probabilistic Serial Assignment, although this mechanism is not strategy-proof. In the auction mechanism, students’ bids for courses do not represent their true prefer
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21

Kurata, Ryoji, Naoto Hamada, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. "Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 58 (January 26, 2017): 153–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.5297.

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School choice programs are implemented to give students/parents an opportunity to choose the public school the students attend. Controlled school choice programs need to provide choices for students/parents while maintaining distributional constraints on the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status. Previous works show that setting soft-bounds, which flexibly change the priorities of students based on their types, is more appropriate than setting hard-bounds, which strictly limit the number of accepted students for each type. We consider a case where soft-bounds are
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22

Wang, Shuo, Huihui Li, Lisa Sarran, et al. "Hepcidin in Male Double Red Blood Cell Donors - Relationship Between Parameters of Iron Metabolism and Erythropoiesis." Blood 118, no. 21 (2011): 2109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1182/blood.v118.21.2109.2109.

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Abstract Abstract 2109 Hemoglobin (Hb) below 12.5g/dL accounts for more than 40% of all blood donor deferrals, and no standardized message is provided to these deferred donors. Furthermore, many donors who meet Hb standards are iron depleted. In light of this, the FDA requested comments on possibly changing the minimal acceptable Hb and/or the inter-donation interval. Here we explore several parameters of iron utilization after red blood cell (RBC) donation to understand its relationship to erythropoiesis. Hepcidin is the central regulator of iron absorption, suppressed by low iron stores. We
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23

Karasu, Gülsün Tezcan, Akif Ye¸silipek, Sibel Karaüzüm, et al. "The Value of Donor Lymphocyte Infusions In Unstable Mixed Chimerism In Patients with Beta Thalassemia." Blood 116, no. 21 (2010): 4521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1182/blood.v116.21.4521.4521.

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Abstract Abstract 4521 The only curative option for ß talasemia remains allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HSCT) to correct the genetic defect and provide a normal hemoglobin level in the recipient. Engraftment of donor derived cells is necessary for a success of transplantation. However, it has been shown that complete donor hematopoesis is not essential for sustained engraftment in thalassemia. Donor and recipient cells may coexist and produce a functional graft commonly referred to as donor/recipient mixed chimerism (MC) even with a low amount of engrafted donor cells. We d
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24

Золотухин, Владимир, Vladimir Zolotukhin, Анастасия Тарасенко, and Anastasiia Tarasenko. "SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIFICITY IN THE RUSSIAN MENTALITY." Bulletin of Kemerovo State University. Series: Humanities and Social Sciences 2017, no. 3 (2017): 55–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2542-1840-2017-3-55-60.

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This article analyzes the socio-philosophical and socio-cultural approaches to law enforcement practices in the sphere of criminal punishment and its reflection in the Russian mentality. The recognition of ideological pluralism and multidimensionality of the social environment with the existence of differences and contradictions indicates the presence of the law enforcement boundaries as a measure of their certainty. This is due to the fact that law enforcement is associated with mutual interest of the society in the formation of citizenship in the balance of incentives and penalties. The dial
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25

BB, Inncio. "The Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2881880.

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26

Bó, Inácio, and Rustamdjan Hakimov. "Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence★." Economic Journal, July 25, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez036.

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Abstract We test experimentally the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under IDAM than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous appli
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27

Chen, Yan, and YingHua He. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation." Economic Theory, July 5, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3.

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AbstractWhen participating in school choice, students may incur information acquisition costs to learn about school quality. This paper investigates how two popular school choice mechanisms, the (Boston) Immediate Acceptance and the Deferred Acceptance, incentivize students’ information acquisition. Specifically, we show that only the Immediate Acceptance mechanism incentivizes students to learn their own cardinal and others’ preferences. We demonstrate that information acquisition costs affect the efficiency of each mechanism and the welfare ranking between the two. In the case where everyone
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28

Jiao, Zhenhua, Ziyang Shen, and Guoqiang Tian. "When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?" Social Choice and Welfare, August 19, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01357-4.

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29

Tello, Benjamín. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 17, no. 2 (2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0131.

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AbstractWe consider two-sided many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences. In this context, we study the preference revelation game induced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that acyclicity of the hospitals’ preference profile (Romero-Medina and Triossi 2013a. “Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets.” Economics Letters 118 (1):237–9) is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the outcome of every Nash equilibrium in which each hospital plays a dropping strategy is stable.
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30

Calsamiglia, Caterina, Francisco Martínez-Mora, and Antonio Miralles. "School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation." Economic Journal, August 10, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa095.

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Abstract We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the
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31

Winters, Marcus A., and Colin Shanks. "The Effect of Attending a Charter School in Newark, New Jersey, on Student Test Scores." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, August 16, 2021, 016237372110364. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/01623737211036463.

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We exploit information about parental preference and a randomized component in the assignment of students to schools within a deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism to estimate the causal effect of enrolling in a charter school in Newark, New Jersey, on student test scores. The estimates incorporate variation from students attending about 70% of the city’s charter schools, accounting for about 85% of charter school enrollment. Enrolling in a Newark charter school that participated in the DA assignment process leads to a large and statistically significant increase in math and English Language Arts
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32

Hassidim, Avinatan, Assaf Romm, and Ran I. Shorrer. "The Limits of Incentives in Economic Matching Procedures." Management Science, May 13, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3591.

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Organizations often require agents’ private information to achieve critical goals such as efficiency or revenue maximization, but frequently it is not in the agents’ best interest to reveal this information. Strategy-proof mechanisms give agents incentives to truthfully report their private information. In the context of matching markets, they eliminate agents’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences. We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under the strategy-proof deferred acceptance in a high-stakes matching environment. We show that applicants to graduate progr
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33

Leshno, Jacob D., and Irene Lo. "The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice." Review of Economic Studies, November 6, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa071.

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Abstract This paper develops a tractable theoretical framework for the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism for school choice that allows quantifying welfare and optimizing policy decisions. We compute welfare for TTC and Deferred Acceptance (DA) under different priority structures, and find that the choice of priorities can have larger welfare implications than the choice of mechanism. We solve for the welfare-maximizing distributions of school quality for parametrized economies, and find that optimal investment decisions can be very different under TTC and DA. Our framework relies on a novel c
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34

Tsetsos, Konstantinos, Valentin Wyart, S. Paul Shorkey, and Christopher Summerfield. "Neural mechanisms of economic commitment in the human medial prefrontal cortex." eLife 3 (October 21, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/elife.03701.

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Neurobiologists have studied decisions by offering successive, independent choices between goods or gambles. However, choices often have lasting consequences, as when investing in a house or choosing a partner. Here, humans decided whether to commit (by acceptance or rejection) to prospects that provided sustained financial return. BOLD signals in the rostral medial prefrontal cortex (rmPFC) encoded stimulus value only when acceptance or rejection was deferred into the future, suggesting a role in integrating value signals over time. By contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) enc
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35

Shi, Peng. "Optimal Priority-Based Allocation Mechanisms." Management Science, March 31, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3925.

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This paper develops a tractable methodology for designing an optimal priority system for assigning agents to heterogeneous items while accounting for agents’ choice behavior. The space of mechanisms being optimized includes deferred acceptance and top trading cycles as special cases. In contrast to previous literature, I treat the inputs to these mechanisms, namely the priority distribution of agents and quotas of items, as parameters to be optimized. The methodology is based on analyzing large market models of one-sided matching using techniques from revenue management and solving a certain a
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