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Journal articles on the topic 'Demand model; Price discrimination'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 12 February 2022

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1

D’Haultfœuille, Xavier, Isis Durrmeyer, and Philippe Février. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium with Unobserved Price Discrimination." Review of Economic Studies 86, no. 5 (October 29, 2018): 1973–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy064.

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Abstract In markets where sellers are able to price discriminate, individuals pay different prices that may be unobserved by the econometrician. This article considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model of differentiated products with such price discrimination and limited information on prices taking the form of, e.g., observing list prices from catalogues or average prices. Within this framework, identification is achieved not only with usual moment conditions on the demand side, but also through supply-side restrictions. The model can be estimated by GMM using a nested fixed point algorithm that extends the usual contraction mapping algorithm to our setting. We apply our methodology to estimate the demand and supply in the French new automobile market. Our results suggest that discounting arising from price discrimination is important. The average discount is estimated to be 9.6%, with large variation depending on buyers’ characteristics and cars’ specifications. Our results are consistent with other evidence on transaction prices in France.

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2

Gao, Xing You. "The Second-Degree Price Discrimination of m Firms with n Demand Intervals Pricing Based on Cournot Model." Advanced Materials Research 971-973 (June 2014): 2432–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.971-973.2432.

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Under the condition of linear demand function, the distribution law of equilibrium segment points of firms enforcing second-degree price discrimination to maximize respective revenues is analyzed in the case of m firms with n intervals pricing by using complete information static game theory. This is a promotion for two firms pricing with n segment intervals and m firms pricing with two segment intervals. The results show that: when m firms divide demand to enforce second-degree price discrimination, the necessary condition of revenue maximization is to divide demand into some intervals and let the length of each interval become geometric series, whose common ratio is 1 / m. The unified formula of equilibrium production, equilibrium price and market equilibrium total revenue of all four kinds of markets under the condition of second-degree price discrimination are presented in the most general sense, further more, the nature of which are analyzed in detail.

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3

Colombo, Stefano. "Spatial price discrimination in the unidirectional Hotelling model with elastic demand." Journal of Economics 102, no. 2 (October 10, 2010): 157–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0171-y.

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4

Zhang, Tong, Yixue Huo, Xin Zhang, and Jie Shuai. "Endogenous third-degree price discrimination in Hotelling model with elastic demand." Journal of Economics 127, no. 2 (September 24, 2018): 125–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-018-0635-z.

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5

Liu, Qihong, and Jie Shuai. "Price Discrimination with Varying Qualities of Information." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 1093–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0091.

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Abstract Advances in information technology have greatly enhanced firms’ ability to collect, market and utilize consumer information. As the market for consumer information expands rapidly, businesses are armed with unprecedented means to target any group of consumers they desire. This has important and far-reaching impacts on consumer welfare. In this paper we analyze the welfare impacts of price discrimination facilitated by increasing qualities of consumer information. We employ a two-dimensional spatial differentiation model where consumer information is available on one dimension, and better information leads to more refined price discrimination. We find that as information quality improves, equilibrium prices and profits monotonically increase while consumer surplus and social surplus monotonically decrease. Price discrimination has a reduced demand elasticity effect which becomes stronger when consumer information becomes more precise. Our results suggest that regulators need to pay more attention to the potential damage to consumer welfare by the increasing collection and utilization of consumer information. We also endogenize firms’ information acquisition decisions.

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6

Khan, Romana J., and Dipak C. Jain. "An Empirical Analysis of Price Discrimination Mechanisms and Retailer Profitability." Journal of Marketing Research 42, no. 4 (November 2005): 516–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.2005.42.4.516.

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Retailers typically engage in some form of price discrimination to increase profitability. In this article, the authors compare the impact on retailer profitability of two price discrimination mechanisms: quantity discounts based on package size (second-degree price discrimination) and store-level pricing or micromarketing (third-degree price discrimination). Whereas the latter has been well addressed in the marketing literature, there is limited empirical research on the use of quantity discounts for price discrimination. Using store-level sales data, the authors estimate a structural demand model, accounting for parameter heterogeneity and price endogeneity. They combine the parameter estimates with a model of retailer pricing to conduct optimal pricing and profitability simulations under several scenarios, ranging from constraining the retailer not to engage in any form of price discrimination to the least restrictive scenario of setting nonlinear price schedules specific to each store. The pricing simulations enable the decomposition of profitability as a result of the different forms of price discrimination. Profits are greatest when retailers combine second- and third-degree price discrimination. The authors find that the ability to engage in second-degree price discrimination contributes more to retailer profitability than does third-degree price discrimination.

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7

Hendel, Igal, and Aviv Nevo. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets." American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (December 1, 2013): 2722–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.7.2722.

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We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. We offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market-level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who stockpile for future consumption, and less price-sensitive consumers, who do not stockpile. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales (i) capture 25–30 percent of the gap between non-discriminatory profits and (unattainable) third-degree price discrimination profits, (ii) increase total welfare, and (iii) have a modest impact on consumer welfare. (JEL D11, D12, L11, L12, L81)

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8

Li, Jun, Sifan Wu, and Xiaoman Feng. "Optimization of On-Street Parking Charges Based on Price Elasticity of the Expected Perceived Parking Cost." Sustainability 13, no. 10 (May 20, 2021): 5735. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13105735.

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Price discrimination is widely employed to regulate on-street parking behaviors to provide better service to users, and the prices are usually set according to the occupancy of parking spaces without direct consideration of user perception. A binary logit-style choice model is built to describe the parking choice between on-street parking and off-street parking. A new index, named the price elasticity of expected perceived parking cost, is proposed to evaluate users’ response to parking charge. Based on the theory of second-degree price discrimination, three user types are defined according to the parking duration, namely, the preferred users, the neutral users, and the non-preferred users. The optimized parking prices are calculated by the proposed index. A case study of Guangzhou’s on-street parking is presented. It is found that the current pricing scheme for Type-I Zones (High Demand Zones) is reasonable, while the pricing scheme for the Type-II Zones (Low Demand Zones) does not achieve the objectives of usage optimization of on-street parking spaces. An optimized price scheme for the Type-II Zones is proposed to achieve the usage optimization of on-street parking spaces for short-term parking.

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9

Veloso,, Merlita, and Jose Alkuino. "Demand for Sweetpotato Quality Using the Hedonic Price Model in Northwestern Leyte." Science and Humanities Journal 3, no. 1 (November 30, 2003): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.47773/shj.1998.031.1.

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Research conducted to estimate implicit prices of sweetpotato using the Hedonic Price Model revealed that consumers attach economic importance to sweetpotato quality. Both urban and rural consumers were responsive to changes in quality characteristics. The price paid by rural consumers is affected significantly by age of consumers and quality charactersitics such as color, shape and starch content. The price paid by urban consumers is strongly influenced by color, shape, protien, starch, sugar and fiber content of sweetpotatoes. Among income classes, low income consumers were more discriminating than high-income consumers.

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10

Rantzien, Vilhelm Horn af, and Anna Rude. "Peak-load pricing in public transport: a case study of Stockholm." Journal of Transport Literature 8, no. 1 (January 2014): 52–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s2238-10312014000100004.

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This paper studies how the price affects the demand for public transport in the peak- and off-peak period in the public transport in Stockholm. Further, the study investigates how differences in price elasticities of demand in the peak- and off-peak period can enable an increase in revenues as well as the total number of passengers while dampening the peak-load problem through price discrimination. The data is set up to examine the effect of the price on the number of passengers travelling by subway from January 1999 to December 2008. A number of control variables are used to isolate the effect of a price change in our econometric model. Thereafter, the elasticities of demand for each period are calculated in order to find Ramsey prices that can be used when a monopoly firm maximizes profit and minimizes the welfare loss. The study concludes that the price elasticities of demand differ between the peak- and the off-peak period and that SL should charge a higher price in the peak-period and a lower price in the off-peak period to both increase their revenue, the total number of passengers, and reduce their problems associated with the peak-load demand.

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11

Yan, Zhenying, Pingting Zhang, Yujia Zhang, Hui Liu, Chenxi Feng, and Xiaojuan Li. "Joint Decision Model of Group Ticket Booking Limits and Individual Passenger Dynamic Pricing for the High-Speed Railway." Symmetry 11, no. 9 (September 5, 2019): 1128. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym11091128.

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Rail operators in many countries discount group tickets to improve revenue by increasing price-driven demand. For individual passengers, dynamic pricing is beneficial for maximizing revenue based on the price discrimination principle. Usually, group fares are cheaper than individual fares. If too many group tickets are sold, there will not be enough tickets available to meet high-priced individual demand; by contrast, if not enough group tickets are sold and there is insufficient individual demand, the unsold seats will not have value once the train departs. Therefore, for railway operators, it is worth looking for a balance between group discounts and dynamic pricing to maximize benefits. Essentially, rail operators need to find the symmetry point of the expected revenue between accepting group bookings and reserving tickets for individuals when making decisions. In this study, we formulated a joint decision model of group ticket booking control and dynamic pricing and investigated the effect of the joint decision. The results of numerical experiments showed that incorporating group discounts into dynamic pricing can improve expected revenue when passenger demand is weak, and compared to setting fixed quantities for group tickets, dynamically controlling the limit of group bookings can effectively increase expected revenue. Further analysis of the impacts of time, number of tickets sold, and group demand was helpful to implement the proposed joint policy.

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12

Ding, Shiyao, and Siqi Zhang. "Pricing Mechanism of Charging Pile Power Supply Market——Based on RTP Theory and Price Discrimination Model." E3S Web of Conferences 275 (2021): 01073. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202127501073.

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Based on the data of monopoly enterprises in China’s new energy charging pile power retail market, this paper explores the application of RTP differential pricing in new areas. First of all, from the perspective of business, this paper constructs the incentive cost model of low period which can minimize the supply pressure of power sales enterprises. Then, from the perspective of charging consumers, based on the assumption of user’s conversion cost, an improved demand response model is established according to the price elasticity. The paper is to consider the premise of maximizing social welfare, in the supply and demand of both sides to improve the pressure of electricity measurement, to minimize the operation and maintenance costs in peak and trough period.

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13

Sun, Ching-Jen. "Dynamic Price Discrimination with Customer Recognition." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 217–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0048.

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AbstractThis paper studies a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recognition. Specifically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, the monopolist can condition the price–quality offers on the observed purchasing behavior in the first period. In this setup, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers in two dimensions: by quality as well as by purchase history. We fully characterize the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy when there are two types of consumers. When the type space is a continuum, we show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal contracts (price–quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partitional perfect Bayesian equilibria.

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14

Yumkella, K. K., L. J. Unnevehr, and P. Garcia. "Noncompetitive Pricing and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Selected U.S. and Thai Rice Markets." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 26, no. 2 (December 1994): 406–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s107407080002633x.

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AbstractA “pricing to market” international trade model is applied to U.S. and Thai rice exports to high and middle income countries that are continuous rice importers. These markets are characterized by strong quality preferences and highly inelastic demand, and thus exporters may exercise market power. Evidence of noncompetitive pricing either through price discrimination across destinations or through imperfect exchange rate pass-through is found in this small but growing segment of the international rice trade.

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15

Tavor, Tchai, Limor Dina Gonen, and Uriel Spiegel. "The Sorting Process as a Tool for Promoting the Demand of Heterogeneous Customers." Mathematics 9, no. 2 (January 12, 2021): 152. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9020152.

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The present study concerns product diversification. The products differ in size, shape, flavor, fat content, etc., so that the producer can more specifically modify the particular product to the unique requirements of nonhomogeneous customers. The mathematical model assumes diversified demands of nonhomogeneous consumers for an initial unsorted item. The sorting process generates a better match between customer requirements and the actual supply of sorted products. Thus, the implementation of sorting costs allows for an increase in customer demands by adopting product characteristics that are closer to customer needs and tastes. The study also considers the pricing policy for diversified products in order to determine if price discrimination is preferable for attaining the manufacturer’s goal of profit maximization.

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16

Nunes, Paulo. "Pricing strategy in the context of durable goods monopoly with discrete demand." Ekonomski anali 60, no. 204 (2015): 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1504061n.

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Considering a model of discrete demand with two consumers, this article shows that irrespective of the difference between the willingness to pay of consumers with high and low incomes, if interest rates are low, a durable goods monopolist has an advantage in discriminating prices over time. If the difference in willingness to pay is limited and interest rates high, the monopolist has an advantage in setting a price equal to the low-income consumer?s willingness to pay. Finally, in the case of great difference in willingness to pay and high interest rates, the monopolist has an advantage in setting a price equal to the high-income consumer?s willingness to pay, and not selling the durable good to the low-income consumer. The results show that the Coase conjecture can fail if the difference in willingness to pay is great, and interest rates are high.

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17

Horoshkova, Lidiia, Vladimir Volkov, and Іevhen Khlobystov. "Decentralized pricing management in housing and municipal economy." University Economic Bulletin, no. 43 (November 20, 2019): 59–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.31470/2306-546x-2019-43-59-66.

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Actuality of research theme. The process of Ukraine's integration into the European Community actualizes the issue of the compliance of the administrative and territorial structure with European principles of regional and local development organization, and the formation of local self-government. Nowadays the problem of developing an effective system of management of the infrastructure united territorial communities (UTCs) formation in the context of administrative and territorial reform implementation based on the principles of decentralization becomes especially acute. Problem statement. Nowadays conditions, the reform of the administrative-territorial structure and the decentralization of power in Ukraine require special attention to the problem of housing and communal services management, since its maintenance is ensured by local authorities and created in the process of reforming the united territorial communities (OTСs). Analysis of the last researches and publications. The modern aspects of decision of problems of development of territorial communities and local self-government such scientists engage in, as Pavliuk A. P., Oliinyk D. I., Batalov O. A., Datsko O. I., Murkovych L. L., Molodozhen Yu. B.and other [1-4]. The results of own researches of problem are in to [5-13]. Selection of unexplored parts of general issue. The new administrative and territorial system should become the basis for constructing a new model of territorial administration, based on the principles of decentralization, subsidiarity, balance of national interests with regional and territorial communities` interests representation, local self-governance widespread, territorial communities` power and autonomy, coherence with natural geographical capacity. That is why the problem of mechanism for managing regional housing and communal services programs and to determine the optimal pricing models taking into account world experience. Task statement, research aim. To search for new mechanisms of efficient pricing management in housing and utilities using world experience and peculiarities of domestic business practices. Method or methodology of realization of research. In the process of realization researches drawn on scientific (analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, analytical grouping) and special (abstracting, economical-mathematical design, etc.) methods of study of the economic phenomena and processes. Exposition of basic material (job performances). In the world practice certain methods of pricing under natural monopoly were formed. The analysis of the essence and peculiarities of these methods to adopt the best practices: а) Rate of return regulation. This is the most traditional approach to set price of goods (services) of natural monopolies. It is based on cost-plus pricing calculation. It is used in Ukraine. b) Price cap regulation (price restrictions). The method`s essence is to set fixed maximum price limitations by the regulatory institution. The institution has the right to set the price, which is lower or equals the limit, and to profit. As the profit does not correlate to costs, there is the stimulating mechanism to cut them. The model assumes quite a long period between tariff revisions – 4-5 years. c) Profit-sharing plan with sliding scale. Unlike the previous method, in which natural monopoly gains significant profits, this method assumes to use the sliding scale of profit distribution between a producer and a consumer. d) Price discrimination. Price discrimination is a pricing strategy that charges customers or their groups’ different prices for the same product or service. Price difference does not depend on production costs or supply costs. Price discrimination is possible if consumers` direct price elasticity of demand is different. Conclusions. The analysis of the natural monopoly`s world pricing practice, including national housing and utilities sector has been carried out. It has been stated that the main methods of monopolistic pricing are: rate of return regulation; price cap regulation (price restrictions); profit-sharing plan with sliding scale; price discrimination; multi-rate tariffs; pricing for different competition forms, compatible with natural monopoly.The obtained findings prove the necessity of modification to the housing and utilities sector’s monopoly market by implementation of competition elements.

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18

Chen, Haitao, Zhaohui Dong, Gendao Li, and Hetian Zhao. "Joint Advertisement and Trade-In Marketing Strategy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain." Sustainability 12, no. 6 (March 12, 2020): 2188. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12062188.

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With environmental problems becoming severe, many firms, including HP, Huawei, and Apple are simultaneously implementing trade-in programs and advertising to stimulate market demand. Offering trade-in service by the manufacturer is a method of price discrimination by providing replacement consumers with a rebate when they purchase new products. With the recycled, used products, the manufacturer can benefit through a strict series—via a remanufacturing process. Although numerous literatures have investigated the pricing strategy and advertising decisions in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), to the best of our knowledge, there is little research that analyzes and compares the economic and social performance of these two marketing strategies. To fill this gap, we establish two supply chain models with two periods, namely, an advertisement model and a joint model, while the equilibrium purchasing behavior of the replacement consumers can be characterized under three conditions: (1) all of the replacement consumers purchasing new products (ATA); (2) partial replacement consumers purchasing (PTA); (3) no replacement consumers purchasing (NTA). These three conditions are decided by the numerous relationships of the parameters. Solving the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in both models, the critical value in the joint model is higher in the advertisement model, which indicates that developing the trade-in program can enhance the robustness of the business model. Furthermore, through numerical example, we find that the market demand in the joint model is higher than in the advertisement model, and the cost of marketing strategy in the joint model is lower in the advertisement model, which means that the efficiency of the marketing strategy is higher than the single marketing strategy. As a result, comparing the economic and social performance between the two models, we conclude that the advertisement elasticity of the market demand is the key factor of the manufacturer’s profits and total social welfare.

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19

Saayman, Melville, Juan Carlos Martín, and Concepción Román. "There is no fuzziness when it comes to measuring service quality in national parks." Tourism Economics 22, no. 6 (December 2016): 1207–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354816616669036.

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Nature-based tourism is the leitmotiv for South African National Parks (SANParks) and Kruger National Park is an icon within the system. The mission and vision of SANParks have evolved from pure conservationism to a more recreation- and customer-oriented agent. The aim of this article is to address the issue of service quality (SQ) provided to satisfy the visitors’ needs, demands and expectations. A questionnaire with eight different dimensions and 31 SQ attributes is used to evaluate the SQ for the period April 2012 to March 2013. A method based on a fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making model is applied to dynamically evaluate the SQ in the park. Our results suggest that the SQ differs depending on which time of the year the park is visited, opening an important venue to park managers about whether a price discrimination policy could moderate this observed effect.

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20

Aguirre, Iñaki, Simon Cowan, and John Vickers. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1601–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1601.

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This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions—involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets—are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output. (JEL D42)

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21

Leung, Hing-Man. "Intertemporal price discrimination and consumer demand." Journal of Economics 65, no. 1 (February 1997): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01239057.

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22

Gerstner, Eitan. "Sales: Demand-supply variation or price discrimination?" Journal of Economics and Business 37, no. 2 (May 1985): 171–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0148-6195(85)90015-3.

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23

Aguirre, Iñaki, and Simon G. Cowan. "Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand." Economic Theory Bulletin 3, no. 2 (November 20, 2014): 329–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-014-0063-3.

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24

Bonatti, Alessandro, and Gonzalo Cisternas. "Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination." Review of Economic Studies 87, no. 2 (September 12, 2019): 750–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz046.

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Abstract We study the implications of aggregating consumers’ purchase histories into scores that proxy for unobserved willingness to pay. A long-lived consumer interacts with a sequence of firms. Each firm relies on the consumer’s current score–a linear aggregate of noisy purchase signals—to learn about her preferences and to set prices. If the consumer is strategic, she reduces her demand to manipulate her score, which reduces the average equilibrium price. Firms in turn prefer scores that overweigh past signals relative to applying Bayes’ rule with disaggregated data, as this mitigates the ratchet effect and maximizes the firms’ ability to price discriminate. Consumers with high average willingness to pay benefit from data collection, because the gains from low average prices dominate the losses from price discrimination. Finally, hidden scores—those only observed by the firms—reduce demand sensitivity, increase average prices, and reduce consumer surplus, sometimes below the naive-consumer level.

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25

Li, Cuihong, and Fuqiang Zhang. "Advance Demand Information, Price Discrimination, and Preorder Strategies." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15, no. 1 (February 2013): 57–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.1120.0398.

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26

Esteves, Rosa-Branca, and Carlo Reggiani. "Elasticity of demand and behaviour-based price discrimination." International Journal of Industrial Organization 32 (January 2014): 46–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.10.010.

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27

Malueg, David A., and Marius Schwartz. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination." Journal of International Economics 37, no. 3-4 (November 1994): 167–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)90044-2.

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28

Anam, Mahmudul, and Shin-Hwan Chiang. "Price discrimination and social welfare with correlated demand." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61, no. 1 (September 2006): 110–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.006.

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29

Koh, Winston T. H. "Household Demand, Network Externality Effects and Intertemporal Price Discrimination." Journal of Economics 84, no. 1 (January 18, 2005): 49–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-004-0100-z.

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30

Kats, Amoz. "Spatial oligopoly and price discrimination with downward sloping demand." Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, no. 1 (February 1989): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-0462(89)90033-1.

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31

Neufeld, John L. "Price Discrimination and the Adoption of the Electricity Demand Charge." Journal of Economic History 47, no. 3 (September 1987): 693–709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700049068.

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Between 1905 and 1915, as state price regulation became widespread, electric utilities in the United States faced severe competition. The primary source of electricity for industry then was not utilities but self-generation by the user in an “isolated plant.” The demand-charge rate structure first became widespread during this period. The demand-charge rate structure has been interpreted as a misapplication of the peak-load pricing principle, a view which has made its popularity a puzzle. Instead it was adopted as a sophisticated mechanism which institutionalized profit-maximizing price discrimination given the competition from isolated plants.

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32

Reggiani, Carlo. "Spatial Price Discrimination in the Spokes Model." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 23, no. 3 (July 10, 2014): 628–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12066.

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33

Cui, Tony Haitao, Jagmohan S. Raju, and Z. John Zhang. "A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions." Marketing Science 27, no. 5 (September 2008): 779–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0314.

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34

Kutlu, Levent. "A conduct parameter model of price discrimination." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 (May 23, 2017): 530–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12135.

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35

Fabra, Natalia, and Mar Reguant. "A model of search with price discrimination." European Economic Review 129 (October 2020): 103571. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103571.

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Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Luca Dedola. "A macroeconomic model of international price discrimination." Journal of International Economics 67, no. 1 (September 2005): 129–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2004.09.009.

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Fang, Fang, and Andrew Whinston. "Option Contracts and Capacity Management-Enabling Price Discrimination under Demand Uncertainty." Production and Operations Management 16, no. 1 (January 2, 2007): 125–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00170.x.

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Liu, Zhijian, Ni Xiao, and Hui Xu. "Contract Price Model Under Active Demand Response." Advances in Science, Technology and Engineering Systems Journal 3, no. 6 (2018): 324–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.25046/aj030640.

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Wang, Guoli, Wansheng Tang, and Ruiqing Zhao. "An uncertain price discrimination model in labor market." Soft Computing 17, no. 4 (September 28, 2012): 579–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00500-012-0933-2.

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Liu, Qihong, and Konstantinos Serfes. "Imperfect price discrimination in a vertical differentiation model." International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, no. 5-6 (June 2005): 341–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.01.005.

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41

Cowan, Simon. "The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with nonlinear demand functions." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 2 (June 2007): 419–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00075.x.

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Williams, Martin. "Pricing In The Case Of Privately-Owned Water Utilities." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 8, no. 4 (October 4, 2011): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v8i4.6130.

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This paper is concerned with the extent of price discrimination among customer classes for privately-owned water utilities that are regulated by state commissions. The test of price discrimination requires the specification and estimation of long-run marginal cost functions for each class of customer and prices of service. This procedure yields the price-long-run marginal cost ratios for each customer class required to test for price discrimination. We examine whether the rates afforded the respective customer classes are set in accordance with variations in the elasticity of demand of the respective customer classes. In so doing, we proceed to test the existence of Ramsey pricing.

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Forghani, Kamran, Abolfazl Mirzazadeh, and Mehdi Rafiee. "A Price-Dependent Demand Model in the Single Period Inventory System with Price Adjustment." Journal of Industrial Engineering 2013 (December 30, 2013): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/593108.

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The previous efforts toward single period inventory problem with price-dependent demand only investigate the optimal order quantity to minimize the total inventory costs; however, there is no method in the literature to avoid unwanted costs due to the deviation between the actual demand and the previously estimated demand. To fill this gap, the present paper supposes that stochastic demand rate with normal distribution is sensitive to the selling price; this means that increasing the selling price would decrease the demand rate and vice versa. After monitoring the consumption trend within a section of the period, a new selling price is implemented to change the demand rate and reduce the shortage or salvage costs at the end of the period. Three functions were suggested to represent the demand rate as a function of selling price, and the numerical analysis was implemented to solve the proposed problem. Finally, an illustrative numerical example was solved for different configurations in order to show the advantages of the proposed model. The results revealed that there is a significant improvement in the system costs when price revision is considered.

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Green, Paul E., and Abba M. Krieger. "A hybrid conjoint model for price-demand estimation." European Journal of Operational Research 44, no. 1 (January 1990): 28–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(90)90311-x.

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Yu, Ying, Ji Zhu, and Chenwei Wang. "A newsvendor model with fuzzy price-dependent demand." Applied Mathematical Modelling 37, no. 5 (March 2013): 2644–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apm.2012.06.008.

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Heywood, John S., and Guangliang Ye. "Patent licensing in a model of spatial price discrimination." Papers in Regional Science 90, no. 3 (December 27, 2010): 589–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2010.00338.x.

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Adams, Charles F. "A Note on Pricing With Market Power: Third-Degree Price Discrimination With Quality-Differentiated Demand." American Economist 64, no. 2 (March 6, 2019): 183–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0569434519835777.

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The article points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures results in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of such discrimination. Deriving quality-differentiated linear demand and cost structures from the constructs underlying undergraduate microeconomics, the article compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for quality choices and monopoly power in manipulating those choices. The analysis illustrates the potential for substantially greater monopoly profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for. JEL Classifications: A1, A22, D11, D21, D42

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Widarjono, Agus, and Sarastri Mumpuni Ruchba. "Demand for Meat in Indonesia: Censored AIDS Model." Agris on-line Papers in Economics and Informatics 13, no. 2 (June 30, 2021): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.7160/aol.2021.130209.

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This study estimates the demand for meat in Indonesian urban households encompassing beef, goat, broiler chicken, and native chicken. We estimate the demand for meat using cross-sectional data from the 2013 Indonesian Socio-Economic Household Survey data, which records food expenditure for a week before the survey. Because of some zero expenditure, the Censored Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) using the consistent two-step estimation is applied. The estimated own-price elasticities indicate that all meat products are price-inelastic. Nonetheless, broiler chicken is the most responsive meat product while goat is the least responsive meat product to price changes. All meat products are normal good referring to the estimated income elasticities. However, Native chicken is the most responsive and goat is the most unresponsive to the income change. The estimated cross-price elasticities conclude that broiler chicken and beef are substitute goods. The policy simulation indicates that beef is a meat product that is unresponsive to price and income changes. Native chicken is the most responsive meat product to price and income change, followed by broiler chicken.

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Lin, Zhi Bing. "The Effects of Demand Randomness in Newsvendor Model." Applied Mechanics and Materials 397-400 (September 2013): 2595–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.397-400.2595.

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In this paper, we consider a newsvendor model while its demand randomness is changeable. We analyze how the demand randomness affects the decision variables and objective functions in two difference situations: (1) the retail price is fixed;(2) the retail price is changeable. In first situation, we characterize the optimal order quantity, expected profit and variance of profit based on the benchmark model. In second situation, we show that the expected profit is joint concave function with respect to order quantity and retail price, also give the first order conditions. Finally, we use number analysis to show the effects of demand randomness on optimal retail price and order quantity

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Meyer, Richard W. "A Tool to Assess Journal Price Discrimination." College & Research Libraries 62, no. 3 (May 1, 2001): 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/crl.62.3.269.

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This econometric study tests pricing practices of publishers and their monopoly power. It suggests that traditional publishers will retain their market clout as they shift to offering electronic publications. Librarians’ common experience with price discrimination was corroborated by a powerful model comparing prices charged to institutions while holding constant for production costs, source of publication, discipline areas, and the availability of titles in electronic format. The model also provides a robust selection tool to compare actual prices to model-predicted prices among the subscriptions within any given collection and to predict those that, statistically, are significantly overpriced. The study results reveal that commercial publishers are not the only ones that appear to over-price titles by a statistically significant amount. Campuses face continued increases in prices for traditional and electronic resources, but statistical modeling offers an opportunity for controlling costs.

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