Journal articles: 'Democracy Democracy Algeria Egypt'

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Sadki, Larbi. "Guided democracy in Algeria and Egypt." Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (November 1995): 249–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357719508445160.

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Dolgov, Boris. "Democracy and Islamism in Arab states (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt)." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 47, no. 4 (2007): 122–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2007-47-4-122-138.

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Dillman, Bradford L. "Parliamentary Elections and the Prospects for Political Pluralism in North Africa." Government and Opposition 35, no. 2 (April 2000): 211–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00024.

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HAVE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S bolstered prospects for democratization and greater pluralism? This study argues that, with the possible exception of Algeria's 1991 elections, they have not been harbingers of democracy in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The elections can be viewed as public displays by the state or limited political barometers, rather than processes which create obligations for the government. They have been means through which regimes have sought to dampen reactions to political immobilism, structural adjustment and the death of a social contract. Some elections have been manipulative, exclusionary exercises of elites trying to roll back the liberalizations of the 1980s, while others have been pseudo-competitive instruments of regime maintenance. Most of the elections can be seen as mechanisms for a top-down ‘artificializing’ of pluralism in order to preserve the core of regime control. In Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, there seems to be no contradiction between fostering a selectively pluralistic atmosphere and simultaneously undermining the transition to democracy. In Morocco, pluralism and alternance seem to remain quite compatible with continued political domination by the Makhzen. Mona Makram-Ebeid's characterization of Egypt's 1995 elections could equally be applied to others in the region: ‘What has occurred is a pluralization of the political sphere, yet it has been liberal neither in intent nor outcome.’

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Spierings, Niels. "Democratic disillusionment? Desire for democracy after the Arab uprisings." International Political Science Review 41, no. 4 (September 10, 2019): 522–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512119867011.

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Have the Arab uprisings influenced the desire for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa? This study presents a systematic explanation of the different impact the uprisings had on people’s desire for democracy across the region. It applies the relatively new consequence-based theory of democratic attitudes, and integrates the notion of deprivation into it. The expectations derived from this framework are tested empirically by examining data from 45 public opinion surveys in 11 Middle East and North Africa countries (2001–2014) and combining them with a systematic country-level case comparison. The study shows that the desire for democracy drops mainly in countries of major protest and initial political liberalization, but no substantial democratization (e.g. Egypt, Morocco) indeed, and that a lack of major protest or initial reform (e.g. Algeria, Yemen) ‘prevents’ disillusionment. The seemingly exceptional Lebanese and Tunisian cases also show the mechanism holds for specific groups in society: Lebanese Sunnis and the poorest Tunisians.

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Zoubir, Yahia H. "Democracy and Islam in Malek Bennabi's Thought." American Journal of Islam and Society 15, no. 1 (April 1, 1998): 107–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v15i1.2201.

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The growth of political Islam in the 1970s and the possibility ofIslamist parties coming to power in various countries led many scholarsand political analysts to question the compatibility of Islam and democracy.Most studies have concentrated on popular Muslim thinkers whowere considered Islamic activists such as Sayyid Qutb or Abu ‘Ala Al-Maududi, but no attention has been paid to the thought of the remarkableAlgerian Islamic thinker, Malek Bennabi (1905-1973). A French-educatedelectrical engineer, strongly influenced by the ideas of Rashid Ridaand Mohammed Abdu, Bennabi’s most important concern throughout hislife was the adaptation of Islamic values to modernity. Very familiar withwestern civilization-as well as many others-he felt that the Muslimworld failed to rise above its inertia not only because it is incapable ofabsorbing modem technology, but also because its elite borrowed failingideologies, such as Marxism, without attempting to recapture the bestvalues that were produced by Islamic civilization. In other words, theMuslim world failed to reproduce the experience of such successfulnations as Japan. In his view, Japan achieved modernity because “the‘deadly ideas’ [i.e., materialism] of the west did not make it deviate fromits path: It [Japan] remained faithful to its culture, its traditions, and itspast.”’ More importantly, throughout his work Bennabi puts most of theblame for the Muslim world‘s predicament, not on western colonialism,but on the Islamic world itself, a notion that m s against the prevailingopinion in the Arab-lslamic world that argues that western powers aremostly responsible for the backwardness of the Muslim world.After his return to Algeria in 1963, following his long exile in Egypt,Malek Bennabi joined the first Islamist organization in Algeria,Al-Qiym al-Zslamyya (Islamic Values), founded the same year. Theassociation was opposed to the “Marxist” policies of President Ahmed ...

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Tessler, Mark. "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43, no. 3-5 (October 2002): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002071520204300302.

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Weiss, Dieter. "Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation." International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 1 (February 1995): 29–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800061560.

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A number of Arab countries have been exposed to structural adjustment programs. Under the guidance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, these programs are aimed at making various kinds of Arab socialist and mixed-economy regimes more “market-friendly,” a policy that started in the 1950s and 1960s in countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, and Egypt. Considering the mounting social tension that results from continuing population growth, urban agglomeration, and unemployment, it would be naive to expect—with Fukuyama—an “end of history” as most countries try to adopt market regimes and to strengthen civil society and parliamentary democracy. As Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) well knew, economic and social change is a never-ending process. In the search for viable and sustainable strategies it may be stimulating to consider the insights of this great scholar of the Arab world who wrote 600 years ago.IBN KHALDUN'S SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORYIbn Khaldun was born in Tunis into an influential clan of South Arabian origin with substantial influence in Islamic Spain and, after the fall of Seville in 1248, in north-western Africa. He was exposed to the turmoils of his time. He held his first position in 1352 at the court at Tunis at the age of 20 and then went on to high political, administrative, diplomatic, and judicial posts in the service of various rulers in the Maghrib, Spain, and Egypt.

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Sadiki, Larbi. "POPULAR UPRISINGS AND ARAB DEMOCRATIZATION." International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 1 (February 2000): 71–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074380002105x.

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This paper proposes that domestic political conflict presents opportunities for positive change with long-term effects despite the “inherent plausibility” of its harmfulness. This position is tested using examples of Arab bread riots in the context of the wave of Arab democratizations over the past twenty years. Although generally guided and controlled, Arab political liberalizations (especially those of Sudan, Algeria, and Jordan) have their roots in pressure from below. Elsewhere (as in Tunisia and Egypt), similar pressure has helped consolidate—or, at least, place—political reform on the agenda of de-legitimized ruling elites. Democracy and democratization in the Arab Middle East have almost invariably meant a trend toward “parliamentarization” and “electoralization,” without yet presaging polyarchal rule. Between 1985 and 1996, the Arab world has experienced more than twenty pluralist or multiparty parliamentary elections, twice the number that took place in the entire preceding period since the early 1960s, when many Arab countries won independence from colonial rule. A focus on the khubz-iste (the quietist bread seeker who abandons quietism as soon as his livelihood is threatened by the state) and the hitiste (the quietist unemployed who becomes active in bread protests) provides a new perspective on democratization processes in Arab societies.

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Gershoni, Israel, Sara Pursley, and Beth Baron. "EDITORIAL FOREWORD." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (April 8, 2011): 197–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811000018.

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As this IJMES special issue on “Relocating Arab Nationalism” is going to press, democracy movements in the Arab world have toppled the old regimes in Tunisia and Egypt; uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya are shaking the foundations of their respective governments; and protests in Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, and Oman have sent rulers scrambling to respond with some combination of reform and repression that they hope will ensure their survival. The events have had reverberations in Iran, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere; but they have clearly, at least so far, reverberated most strongly from one Arab country to another. This is reflected, among many other ways, in the protesters' self-conscious borrowing and repetition of chants and slogans, such as tūnis huwwa al-ḥall (Tunisia is the solution) and the ubiquitous al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-niẓām (the people want the fall of the regime). In showing how Arabist symbols, discourses, and identifications can be mobilized for purposes that are not only cultural but also deeply political, even when they do not involve any project to create a Pan-Arab nation-state, the protests sweeping the Arab world have made the recurring themes of this special issue more timely than we had imagined.

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Siddiqui, Rushda. "Defining Religion Based States in West Asia." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 4 (December 2011): 341–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492841106700404.

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As speculation grows about the possibility of a turbulent Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or even Algeria drifting from demanding democracy and political liberalism to establishing an Islamic state, this article, by attempting to define religion based states would want to form a background to the speculations. The author would like to point out that the coming power by a political party with a religious affiliation would not make the states into Islamic States. As a matter of fact, given the kind of external and internal forces at play in West Asia and North Africa, it would not be possible for any country to redefine the basis of its identity, let alone transform itself into a theocratic state in classical parlance. With the close of the Second World War and the establishment of nation–states in the new world order, two deviant states were created from Asia. Israel and Pakistan were created taking religion, instead of geography or history of the land or ethnicity or race or existing socio-political structures, for the foundational basis of their identity. It heralded a new era for history. These states were going to be yardsticks for later day religion based socio-political movements. If these movements were going to gain power, they would need to conform to the newly set patterns for religion based states. Re-creating a theocratic state based on classical historical lines, is no longer an option.

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Khan, Shaza. "Modernizing Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 106–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i2.1796.

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As the political climate between many western and Muslim nations continuesto intensify, the rhetoric of a “clash of civilizations” has reemerged inour news media, governments, and academic institutions. Muslims andnon-Muslims, with varying political agendas, insist that Islam is inherentlyincompatible with modernity, democracy, and the West. Yet the contributorsto Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle Eastand Europe demonstrate otherwise as they examine the (re)Islamization ofEurope and the Middle East and reveal the ways in which “Islamic politicalactivism” (p. 3), or Islamism, promotes modernization.In the first of three sections, “Issues and Trends in Global Re-Islamization,” François Burgat describes how the progressive components of Islamization get hidden under a myriad of misconceptions. The termIslamist, he asserts, often serves to essentialize Muslim political activists bydepicting them as a homogenous group comprised of Islamic militants. Theuse of this term also “tends to strengthen the idea that Islamists are the onlyones using … religion for political purposes” (p. 28), though clearly otherindividuals, institutions, and religious organizations use religion for politicalends as well. Due to the essentialized and reductionist uses of the term, thereal characteristics of Islamism as a “relative, plural, and reactive” phenomenonare rarely recognized (p. 18). These obscuring lenses blur the image(s)of Islam even more in a country like France, where issues related to religionare often relegated to the “irrational.” In such contexts, Islamist movementsare constantly invalidated, though the activists’ reasons for opposition maywell be rooted in legitimate political, economic, and social factors.The obscurants that Burgat details in chapter 1 often cause individualsto view Islamists as anti-modernist and retrogressively reactionary. Yet inchapter 2, “The Modernizing Force of Islam,” Bjorn Olav Utvik argues “thatif Islamism is a reaction it is a progressive one, a step forward into somethingnew, not trying to reverse social developments, but rather to adapt religionso that it enables people to cope with the new realities” (p. 60). Utviklinks modernization to both urbanization and industrialization and characterizesit as a phenomenon that results in increased individualization, socialmobilization, and recognition of state centrality in achieving political ends(p. 43). He then proceeds to draw parallels between the goals of Islamistmovements and characteristics of modernization.In the next chapter, “Islam and Civil Society,” John Esposito furtherdemonstrates Islam’s compatibility with modernization and, more specifically,with democracy. He surveys Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Iran,and the Gulf states in an effort to illustrate the importance, functionality,and popularity of their Islamic organizations. Importantly, he asserts thatwhile most of these Islamist movements begin by working within the foldof the governments’ established political processes, “the thwarting of a participatorypolitical process by governments that cancel elections or represspopulist Islamic movements fosters radicalization and extremism” (p. 92).Esposito suggests that increasing open competition for political power inthese countries and sustaining a reexamination of traditional Islamic rulingsregarding pluralism, tolerance, and women’s role in society will result ingreater compatibility between Islam and democracy ...

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Djerbal, Dalila, and Louisa Ait Hamou. "Women and democracy in Algeria." Review of African Political Economy 19, no. 54 (July 1992): 106–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056249208703958.

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Entelis, John P. "Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?" Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 4 (December 2011): 653–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2011.630878.

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Northey, Jessica Ayesha. "Associations and democracy in Algeria." Democratization 24, no. 2 (March 8, 2016): 209–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1144590.

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Volpi, Frédéric. "Algeria: When Elections Hurt Democracy." Journal of Democracy 31, no. 2 (2020): 152–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0028.

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Masoud, Rezaei. "Egypt and Democracy Dilemma." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9, no. 6 (June 30, 2015): 217–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5897/ajpsir2014.0763.

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Ejobowah, John Boye. "Islam and Democracy." American Journal of Islam and Society 20, no. 3-4 (October 1, 2003): 193–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v20i3-4.1838.

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In all of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria was the first country to be infected by the wind of democratization that swept the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s. The country became a political laboratory for the rest of the Arab world, as liberalization opened spaces for moderate and radical Islamic groups to contest elections. Unfortunately, these elections quickly descended into a long drawn-out and brutal war with the secularist rulers. This bitter battle, fought most fiercely between 1992-99, turned Algeria into a hot spot, thereby raising the question of whether democracy is feasible in the Muslim world. Frederic Volpi's new book seeks to answer this question by analyzing the process of political liberalization and the severe problems it generated in Algeria. Volpi presents early and mid-twentieth-century North African scholars' reinterpretations of the Islamic creed that activated the emergence of anti-secularist movements in the Maghreb as a point of departure for his historical narrative of the Algerian conflict. Although Algeria's militant movement was coopted by the state party (the National Liberation Front [FLN]) and lost its dynamism during the post-independence years, it still sought to change the political system by operating from the community level, where it had built a network of associations. The author shows how this network's provision of services designed to meet the people's welfare needs helped thrust Islamic leaders into the political limelight as they utilized their organizational capacities and authority to transform the 1988 October food riots into a political protest ...

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Omar, Boudjelal. "The Limits of Representative Democracy in Algeria." مجلة جيل الدراسات السياسية و العلاقات الدولية 2, no. 6 (2016): 109–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.12816/0030160.

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NAJJAR, FAUZI M. "The Future of Democracy in Egypt." Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (January 2008): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10669920802172338.

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Masoud, Tarek. "Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in Egypt." Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (October 2011): 117–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2011.610717.

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Onians, Charles. "Supply and Demand Democracy in Egypt." World Policy Journal 21, no. 2 (2004): 78–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/07402775-2004-3003.

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Moghadam, Valentine. "Engendering Democracy." International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (July 26, 2011): 387. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074381100047x.

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The year 2011 will forever be known as the year of mass protests for regime change and democratization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Opinions on causes and outcomes have focused on the role of young people, the demands of “the Arab street,” and the possible transition to a liberal, Islamist, or coalition type of governance. Middle East specialists have long been aware of the problems of authoritarian regimes, widening inequalities, high rates of youth unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure and public services, and rising prices attenuated only by subsidies. But something has been missing from recent discussions and analyses. Let us pose it in the form of a number of (socialist-feminist) questions. We have seen that “the Arab street” is not exclusively masculine, but what kind of democratic governance can women's rights groups expect? To what extent will Tunisian women shape the democratic transition and the building of new institutions? In Egypt, will an outcome be—to use a phrase coined by East European feminists in the early 1990s—a “male democracy”? How can a democratic transition benefit working women and the poor?

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Entelis, John P., and Lisa J. Arone. "Algeria in Turmoil: Islam, Democracy and the State." Middle East Policy 1, no. 2 (June 1992): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.1992.tb00031.x.

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Pitts, Jennifer. "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question." Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (September 2000): 295–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00104.

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Roberts, Hugh. "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy." Government and Opposition 27, no. 4 (October 1, 1992): 433–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1992.tb00422.x.

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THE PUBLIC REACTION OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND commentators to the suspension of the electoral process in Algeria following President Chadli's resignation on 11 January was profoundly mixed. Relief at the fact that Algeria was not about to become ‘a second Iran’ very quickly gave way to disapproval of the manner in which this prospect had been conjured away at the last moment, as numerous leader writers in London and Paris and no doubt elsewhere indulged themselves in vigorous criticism of what they had not hesitated to call a ‘military coup’.

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Daniel Blackburn. "Focus: Trade unions and democracy in Egypt." International Union Rights 25, no. 2 (2018): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.14213/inteuniorigh.25.2.0010.

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Saikal, Amin. "Authoritarianism, revolution and democracy: Egypt and beyond." Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 (November 2011): 530–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.613903.

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García-Rivero, Carlos, and Hennie Kotzé. "Democracy and Islam in the Arab World: Lessons from Algeria." Comparative Sociology 5, no. 4 (2006): 327–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913306779147344.

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AbstractThe study of Arab political culture has been developed extensively in recent times in an attempt to test whether the lack of democracy in the Arab world can be ascribed to its political culture, in which religion plays a major role. There are divergent conclusions with regards to this question. In this article, using quantitative techniques, we have analyzed satisfaction with the way democracy is implemented in Algeria at the elite and general public levels. More specifically, we have looked at whether the demand for more religious influence within the state affects levels of satisfaction with the way democracy is being implemented within Algeria. Our results indicate that the low level of satisfaction with the way democracy is implemented in Algeria amongst elites and the public is not driven by political culture or religion specifically – but by a perception of a lack of respect for human rights in the country and, in the case of the general public, also by a lack of confidence in the Algerian state.

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Гринин, Леонид, and Андрей Коротаев. "Revolution vs. Democracy (revolution and conterrevolution in Egypt)." Полис. Политические исследования (Polis. Political Studies), no. 3 (May 26, 2014): 139–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2014.03.09.

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Snider, Erin A., and David M. Faris. "The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt." Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (September 2011): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00497.x.

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Agrama, Hussein Ali. "Reflections on secularism, democracy, and politics in Egypt." American Ethnologist 39, no. 1 (February 2012): 26–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01342.x.

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Willoughby, Jay. "The Awakening of Muslim Democracy." American Journal of Islam and Society 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 153–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i2.985.

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Jocelyn Cesari (senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkly Center; director,Islam in World Politics program), teaches contemporary Islam at theHarvard Divinity School and directs its Gerogetown-based interfaculty“Islam in the West” program. On March 3 at the IIIT headquarters in Herndon,VA, she elaborated on the topics discussed in her latest book: The Awakeningof Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State (CambridgeUniversity Press: 2014). She explained that this book was based on threeyears of research on state-Islam relations in Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan,and Tunisia.She began her talk by saying that she was interested in “broadening outthe concept of political Islam,” which had existed before the now well-knownmovements and parties in the Muslim world. The key moment in this regardwas the building of nation-states in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq (under SaddamHussein), and Pakistan. She pointed out how the West was enthusiasticabout Arab Spring, which brought both men and women into the streets withoutsigns proclaiming “Islam” in a “bizarre” manner of protest.She maintained that political Islam cannot be limited only to secularismand the state, for the former, especially in Europe, is supposed to engenderthe decline of religiosity, the movement of religion to the private sphere, andthe separation of religion and state. But all of this is unique to the West becauseIndia, the oft-proclaimed world’s “largest democracy,” is officially secular despiteits pervasive Hinduism. She wondered why the West cannot see Islamin the same way. And, moreover, why does the last century of the very westernapproaches of secularization and modernization have to determine what ...

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Zoubir, Yahia H. "Algeria and U.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islam and Promoting Democracy." Middle East Policy 9, no. 1 (March 2002): 64–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00042.

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Hatab, Shimaa. "Deepening democracy or stabilization?" Review of Economics and Political Science 4, no. 1 (January 14, 2019): 20–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/reps-10-2018-009.

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Purpose Is the need for stability pre-empting the need for democratic values? How can the EU cope with two contradictory security requirements: the need to promote democratic norms and to secure geostrategic interests? This paper takes on the security-democracy dilemma in a complex way that transcends the realpolitik frame overshadowing the analysis of the EU’s policy orientation in the Southern Mediterranean while considering its normative role as a fig leaf for security interests. Design/methodology/approach This paper investigates the EU’s foreign policy orientation reflected in the ENP in terms of the two logics of action of consequentialism and appropriateness. Tracing changes at the policy level over time between 2011 and 2015, the paper zooms into the implementation of the “new” ENP in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to highlight additional variation across countries. Findings Building on a document analysis of the official declarations for the policy-making level and of ENP action plans for the implementation level, the paper argues that local political dynamics and the level of the EU’s threat perception shape the EU’s response to the partner countries.

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Rowe, Paul. "Democracy and Disillusionment: Copts and the Arab Spring." Sociology of Islam 2, no. 3-4 (June 10, 2014): 236–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00204008.

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This essay considers the role that Copts played in the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt and the way in which the political changes of the time affected Coptic interest representation in the Egyptian state. Copts, the indigenous Christians of Egypt, were eager participants in the protests that brought down former president Hosni Mubarak. However, their enthusiasm for a new era was dampened by the inability of lay Coptic movements to challenge the status quo in a way favorable to Coptic interests. Dissent against the management of security under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (scaf) led Copts toward cautious optimism when Muhammad Morsi was elected president in 2012. However, the transition to democracy in Egypt as laid out by the Islamist government ultimately squandered the goodwill of Egyptian Christians and contributed to their disillusionment with the democratic idea. The result has been the further polarization of Egyptian society in ways which have deepened cleavages between Christians and the Islamist movement and rendered more ambiguous the role of the church and lay movements in representing Coptic interests.

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Esselimani, Sami, Mustafa Sagsan, and Sevki Kiralp. "E-Government Effect on Participatory Democracy in the Maghreb: Indirect Effect and Government-Led Participation." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (April 1, 2021): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6642998.

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The evolution of the concept of democracy throughout decades of theory and practice has led to the firm understanding that democracy is progressive in terms of thought and practice. An important feature of democracy is the ability of individuals to discuss and participate in matters of public interest. E-government offers an opportunity for governments and citizens to engage in more deliberate practices of democracy. This paper focuses on the Maghreb region (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and discusses the direct effect of e-government on participatory democracy and also the indirect effect, which is referred to as the “indirect government-led relationship” between e-government and participatory democracy. A quantitative approach was adopted, and a questionnaire was distributed using a nonprobability, judgement sampling method, which focuses on a population with specific knowledge and expertise. A total of 702 answers were collected. The results show that e-government positively affects participatory democracy directly and also indirectly through increasing corruption control, transparency, and accountability.

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Bayat, Assef. "Populism, Liberalization and Popular Participation: Industrial Democracy in Egypt." Economic and Industrial Democracy 14, no. 1 (February 1993): 65–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0143831x93141004.

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Drevon, Jérôme. "Democracy and Islamist Violence: Lessons from Post-Mubarak Egypt." Digest of Middle East Studies 23, no. 1 (April 24, 2014): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dome.12032.

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Khan, Muqtedar. "Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt." Middle East Policy 21, no. 1 (March 2014): 75–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12058.

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Karkour, Islam. "Why on Earth Would Some People Reject Democracy? An Autoethnographic Reflection on Education and Democracy in Egypt." Interchange 50, no. 3 (April 13, 2019): 305–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10780-019-09362-4.

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Driessen, Michael D. "Public Religion, Democracy, and Islam: Examining the Moderation Thesis in Algeria." Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 171–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041512798838049.

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Zaghlami, Laeed. "Social media in Algeria: New tools for democracy and press freedom." Relation 1 (2019): 267–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1553/relation5s267.

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Güney, Ayli˙n, and Aslihan çelenk. "The European Union's Democracy Promotion Policies in Algeria: Success or Failure?" Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 1 (March 2007): 109–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629380601099559.

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Kucukcan, Talip. "Islam, Democracy., and Freedom in North Africa." American Journal of Islam and Society 9, no. 2 (July 1, 1992): 276–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v9i2.2565.

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The Islamic Society of the London School of Economics (LondonUniversity) recently orgamed a one-day conference on “Islam, Democracy andFreedom in North Africa.” In attendance were scholars from several universitiesas well as religious leaders and former statesmen. The audience was composedmainly of university students.The first session featured S. Salaam of the Sorbonne (Paris), who discussedthe recent situation in Algeria after touching on late nineteenth- and earlytwentiethcentury social, political, and religious developments. He talked aboutthe ulama’s role as a source of mobilization against French colonial rule as wellas their attempts to motivate the masses, through their dynamic Islamic teachings,to struggle for the emancipation of Algeria. According to him, the moral andspiritual support of the learned segment of Algerian society enabled the nationalistleaders to unite the people behind a national cause, one which is also conceivedof as the religious obligation of jihad. On a more recent note, Salaam noted thatthe media has attributed the Islamic Salvation Party’s (FIS) success in the lastelections to Algeria’s economic backwardness. While there may be some truthto this argument, the success of Islamic ideology lies in its emphasis on socialjustice and equality, the strengthening of morality, and the uplifting of Qur’anicteachings. This is in stark contrast to the widespread corruption prevalent amongthe ruling elite. Salaam argued that the FIS has provided people with an authenticsense of identity which can be used to fill the gaps caused by modernization.The second paper was presented by Julian C. Hollick, a radio joumalist withAmerica’s National Public Radio organization. Addressing the topic of Islamand the media, Hollick laid out the Western media’s misconceptions anddistortions of Islam, which he attributed to either poor journalism or ignoranceof (or prejudice towards) Islam. He noted that journalists are not as objectiveas is commonly believed, for they are products of a given society and share inits stereotypical images and prejudices. These factors can prevent a journalistfrom penetrating beneath the surface of a foreign culture and society. Hollickproposed that ignorance of different interpretations of events and a superficialstudy of the phenomenon being investigated results in both poor journalism anda distorted coverage of events. He stated that many Western journalists tend tocover the ”pathologic aspects of development“ in the Muslim world (i.e., militantIslam and women’s rights) since such stories have a greater chance of being ...

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Abdel-Latif, Hany, Tapas Mishra, and Anita Staneva. "Arab Countries between Winter and Spring: Where Democracy Shock Goes Next!" Economies 7, no. 1 (March 14, 2019): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies7010020.

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We examine the role of democracy shocks in the cross-country economic growth processes over a period of five decades since 1960. The recent uprisings that arose independently and spread across the Arab world form the main context of our investigation. We study if (i) a shock to democracy in one country triggers institutional reforms and growth upsurge in the neighbouring countries, and (ii) the magnitude and direction of response to democracy shocks are contingent upon income pathways of countries. To estimate the spillover effects of democracy shocks, we model and estimate growth interdependence among individual countries with similar democratic characteristics. To study the nature of responses of democracy shocks on cross-country growth processes, we build and estimate a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model where we allow countries to be interdependent with regard to bilateral migration and geographical proximity. Using the GVAR model, we also stimulate a positive shock to democracy in Egypt—the most populous Arabic country—and study its impacts on institutional reforms and economic growth in the rest of the Arab World. We find that high and upper-middle income countries are immune to democracy shocks in Egypt, whereas the lower middle and low income countries are susceptible to another revolutionary wave.

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Wani, Gowhar Quadir. "Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring." American Journal of Islam and Society 36, no. 1 (January 17, 2019): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v36i1.860.

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The debate on Islam and democracy is one of the most heated in academia,engaging both Muslims and non-Muslims, normative and analytic approaches.It also takes place on two levels: political-theoretical determinationsof the compatibility or incompatibility between Islam and democracy,and empirical discussions over how much Muslims (or Muslim societies)have modernized or resisted modernization. These debates have yieldeda vast literature, to which the present book under review is a significantaddition. It presents an overview of the historical developments regardingIslam and democracy and anticipates future trends in seven major countries:Turkey (Chapter 2), Iran (Chapter 3), Pakistan (Chapter 4), Indonesia(Chapter 5), Senegal (Chapter 6), Tunisia (Chapter 7), and Egypt (Chapter8). The book also includes an introductory chapter (Chapter 1) and a conclusion(Chapter 9).The introduction provides a literature review and brief overview of thedevelopments that served as immediate causes of Arab Spring in variouscountries. Various analysts have cited factors including a ‘youth bulge’ (amajority of the population in the Muslim world is comprised of citizensunder 30), poverty, unemployment, repressive monarchial regimes, andthe mass provocative events of self-immolation (as of Bouazizi in Tunisia)or killing (as of Khalid Said in Egypt) or torture (as of graffiti artists inSyria). Other analysts are of the opinion that the Muslim countries wereat last catching up to the rest of the democratic world. This book considersthese factors, presenting a critical assessment of Huntington’s equation ofmodernization with secularization and his equation of rejecting secularism ...

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Braund, David. "The Luxuries of Athenian Democracy." Greece and Rome 41, no. 1 (April 1994): 41–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383500023184.

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In 424 B. C. or thereabouts, an oligarchically-minded critic of the Athenian democracy observed:And if account is to be taken of more minor matters, it is as a result of their mastery of the sea that the Athenians have mixed with various peoples in different areas and discovered a range of festive practices. In consequence, what is sweet in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, Pontus, the Peloponnese or elsewhere has all been brought together in one place because of [sc.the Athenians'] mastery of the sea. (The Old Oligarch, 2.7)Though critical of the democracy in principle, the Old Oligarch is strikingly positive here in one sense. This is no denunciation of the baleful and corrupting influence of luxuries imported from overseas. Rather, it is an explicit statement of an advantage of sea-power to the Athenians. A minor advantage, on this assessment, but evidently considered worthy of attention. Moreover, here as throughout his work, the Old Oligarch has in mind not a narrow elite, but the Athenian demos at large, the masses. On his analysis, the demos, through its sea-power, rules Athens and its empire effectively and in its own interest, which includes the acquisition and enjoyment of the best produce of the Mediterranean and Black Sea worlds. Under the democracy, it is claimed, the masses enjoy what may be termed luxury-goods.

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Muedini, Fait, and Bryan Dettrey. "Public Support for Democratic Reform in post-Mubarak Egypt." Middle East Law and Governance 10, no. 2 (August 2, 2018): 185–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763375-01001004.

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This article investigates support for democracy after the overthrow of Egypt’s long-time President Hosni Mubarak. It specifically examines concerns prompting the protests and support for several democratic reforms in Egyptian governance. The results suggest corruption slightly outweighed the lack of democracy as a primary concern of Egyptians over the last few years. Specific democratic reforms such as a fair judicial system and the ability to criticize government receive significant support. Less support is found for equal rights for women and considerably less support for civilian control of the military. The article concludes with a discussion of how little support for providing civilian control over the military may represent an obstacle to a democratic transition. Democratic consolidations are more likely to be successful if democracy is “the only game in town”. 1 The role of the military in the ouster of Mubarak and now Mursi suggests the military has significant influence on Egyptian governance, with little support for altering this institutional arrangement.

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van der Krogt, Christopher J. "The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?" Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 26, no. 3 (December 6, 2014): 382–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2014.987556.

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Pizzo, Paola. "The ‘Coptic question’ in post-revolutionary Egypt: citizenship, democracy, religion." Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 14 (September 28, 2015): 2598–613. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1061136.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Democracy Democracy Algeria Egypt'

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