Academic literature on the topic 'Democratic boundary problem'
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Journal articles on the topic "Democratic boundary problem"
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Arrhenius, Gustaf. "THE DEMOCRATIC BOUNDARY PROBLEM RECONSIDERED." Ethics, Politics & Society 1 (May 14, 2018): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.52.
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Who should have a right to take part in which decisions in democratic decision making? This “boundary problem” is a central issue for democracy and is of both practical and theoretical import. If nothing else, all different notions of democracy have one thing in common: a reference to a community of individuals, “a people”, who takes decision in a democratic fashion. However, that a decision is made with a democratic decision method by a certain group of people doesn’t suffice for making the decision democratic or satisfactory from a democratic perspective. The group also has to be the right one. But what makes a group the right one? The criteria by which to identify the members of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions have been surprisingly difficult to pin down. In this paper, I shall revisit some of the problems discussed in my 2005 paper in light of some recent criticism and discussion of my position in the literature, and address a number of new issues.
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Miller, David. "Reconceiving the democratic boundary problem." Philosophy Compass 15, no. 11 (August 31, 2020): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12707.
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Simmons, A. John. "Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem." Ratio Juris 26, no. 3 (August 1, 2013): 326–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12017.
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Nili, Shmuel. "Democratic Theory, the Boundary Problem, and Global Reform." Review of Politics 79, no. 1 (2017): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670516000747.
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AbstractOne of the enduring problems in democratic theory is its inability to specify who should belong to the demos. In recent years, several scholars have been arguing that democratic theory should try to overcome this “boundary problem” through different kinds of global reform. I argue, however, that the boundary problem is an analytical distraction in thinking about global reform. I begin with general doubts as to whether the boundary problem can ground global reform. I then join the developing conversation on Arash Abizadeh's and Robert Goodin's boundary problem arguments. I offer new reasons for why both arguments encounter fundamental difficulties. I conclude by anticipating the concern that my argument does not take the need for global reform seriously enough.
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Cabrera, Luis. "Individual rights and the democratic boundary problem." International Theory 6, no. 2 (June 20, 2014): 224–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1752971914000037.
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How should the geographic boundaries of democratic participation be set? This has been a notoriously difficult theoretical question, beset by paradoxes around determining democratic participants democratically. It also is seen as increasingly important in practical terms, amid deepening interdependence between states, immigration tensions, and suprastate regional integration. Numerous recent accounts have called for extending participation beyond the state. The case is generally made on intrinsic grounds: democracy demands it. Respect for individual autonomy is said to be violated when outsiders are deeply affected by decision processes, or subject to coercion from them, without being able to participate in them. Yet, familiar problems around restrictions on the autonomy of persistent democratic minorities remain in such accounts, and they could be magnified with expanded boundaries. An alternative approach is offered here, grounded in a rights-based instrumental justification for democracy. It sees participation as foundationally – though not solely – valuable as a means of promoting and protecting fundamental rights. It recommends extending participation boundaries to reinforce protections within regional and ultimately global institutions. Democratic participation would remain crucial at all levels, not principally as an expression of autonomy but to provide checks on power and promote accountability to individuals in multilevel polities.
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Verschoor, Marco. "The democratic boundary problem and social contract theory." European Journal of Political Theory 17, no. 1 (March 2, 2015): 3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885115572922.
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How to demarcate the political units within which democracy will be practiced? Although recent years have witnessed a steadily increasing academic interest in this question concerning the boundary problem in democratic theory, social contract theory’s potential for solving it has largely been ignored. In fact, contract views are premised on the assumption of a given people and so presuppose what requires legitimization: the existence of a demarcated group of individuals materializing, as it were, from nowhere and whose members agree among themselves to establish a political order. In order to fill this gap in social contract theory, a distinction is made between three kinds of contract views: Lockean political voluntarism, contractarianism, and contractualism. Each of these views can be (re)interpreted in such a way that it offers a democratic solution to the boundary problem. Ultimately, however, a Rawlsian interpretation of the contractualist solution is defended.
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Theuns, Tom. "Pluralist Democracy and Non-Ideal Democratic Legitimacy." Democratic Theory 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 23–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2021.080103.
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The boundary problem holds that, whatever the theory of democratic legitimacy, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be considered met by it. Many contemporary attempts to solve the boundary problem can be understood as falling into two categories: functional demos views and global demos views. This article argues against both views. Functional demos views exacerbate the legitimacy puzzle posed by the boundary problem, while a global democracy cannot be held democratically accountable by its citizens. In the place of global demos and functional demos views, we ought to examine the democratic legitimacy of polities in light of the standards of pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy is a non-ideal conception of democracy that recognizes democratic procedures to be historically grounded, non-ideal, and problem-oriented.
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ABIZADEH, ARASH. "On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem." American Political Science Review 106, no. 4 (September 19, 2012): 867–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000421.
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Cultural–nationalist and democratic theory both seek to legitimize political power via collective self-rule: Their principle of legitimacy refers right back to the very persons over whom political power is exercised. But such self-referential theories are incapable of jointly solving the distinct problems of legitimacy and boundaries, which they necessarily combine, once it is assumed that the self-ruling collectivity must be a prepolitical, in principle bounded, ground of legitimacy. Cultural nationalism claims that political power is legitimate insofar as it expresses the nation's prepolitical culture, but it cannot fix cultural–national boundaries prepolitically. Hence the collapse into ethnic nationalism. Traditional democratic theory claims that political power is ultimately legitimized prepolitically, but cannot itself legitimize the boundaries of the people. Hence the collapse into cultural nationalism. Only once we recognize that the demos is in principle unbounded, and abandon the quest for a prepolitical ground of legitimacy, can democratic theory fully avoid this collapse of demos into nation into ethnos. But such a theory departs radically from traditional theory.
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Song, Sarah. "The boundary problem in democratic theory: why the demos should be bounded by the state." International Theory 4, no. 1 (March 15, 2012): 39–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1752971911000248.
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Democracy is rule by the demos, but by what criteria is the demos constituted? Theorists of democracy have tended to assume that the demos is properly defined by national boundaries or by the territorial boundaries of the modern state. In a recent turn, many democratic theorists have advanced the principles of affected interests and coercion as the basis for defining the boundaries of democracy. According to these principles, it is not co-nationals or fellow citizens but all affected or all subjected to coercion who constitute the demos. In this paper, I argue that these recent approaches to the boundary problem are insufficiently attentive to the conditions of democracy. Democracy is not merely a set of procedures; it also consists of substantive values and principles. Political equality is a constitutive condition of democracy, and solidarity is an instrumental condition of democracy. The affected interests and coercion principles create serious problems for the realization of these conditions – problems of size and stability. Building on this critique, this paper presents democratic considerations for why the demos should be bounded by the territorial boundaries of the state, grounded in the state's role in (1) securing the constitutive conditions of democracy, (2) serving as the primary site of solidarity conducive to democratic participation, and (3) establishing clear links between representatives and their constituents. I examine and reject a third alternative, a global demos bounded by a world state, and conclude by considering some practical implications of my argument.
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Tonkes, Elliot, and Dharma Lesmono. "A Longstaff and Schwartz Approach to the Early Election Problem." Advances in Decision Sciences 2012 (October 18, 2012): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/287579.
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In many democratic parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision availed to governments according to sovereign political systems. Prudent governments can take advantage of this constitutional option in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. The problem of establishing the optimal time to call an election based on observed poll data has been well studied with several solution methods and various degrees of modeling complexity. The derivation of the optimal exercise boundary holds strong similarities with the American option valuation problem from mathematical finance. A seminal technique refined by Longstaff and Schwartz in 2001 provided a method to estimate the exercise boundary of the American options using a Monte Carlo method and a least squares objective. In this paper, we modify the basic technique to establish the optimal exercise boundary for calling a political election. Several innovative adaptations are required to make the method work with the additional complexity in the electoral problem. The transfer of Monte Carlo methods from finance to determine the optimal exercise of real-options appears to be a new approach.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Democratic boundary problem"
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Zimmermann, Annette. "Democratic enfranchisement beyond citizenship : the all-affected principle in theory and practice." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:69996845-005b-4528-a626-d423115bde6c.
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This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision. The first paper ('Narrow Possibilism about Democratic Enfranchisement') examines how we should distribute democratic participation rights: a plausible version of AAP must avoid treating unlike cases alike, which would be procedurally unfair. The solution is to distribute participation rights proportionately to the risk that a person's interests will be affected. AAP thus implies an account of political equality that requires adherence to the 'one person-one vote' model only if interests are indeed equally affected. The second paper ('Economic Participation Rights and the AAP') argues that AAP supporters have paid insufficient attention to economic participation rights. The exercise of such rights raises unique worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise is constrained by a number of duties. The third paper ('What AAP Is, and How (Not) to Fight It') explores how AAP fares in light of possible objections from desirability and feasibility. Unlike crude versions of AAP, a plausibly restricted version of AAP cannot be dismissed as easily as many AAP sceptics may have thought. My reflections here are useful for AAP supporters and sceptics alike: this paper helps clarify what kind of objection can cast serious doubt on AAP. The fourth paper ('Criminal Disenfranchisement, Political Wrongdoing, and Affected Interests') asks: is AAP compatible with criminal disenfranchisement? AAP, when endorsed in combination with a plausible theory of punishment, is compatible with disenfranchising a narrow set of criminal wrongdoers only: those guilty of 'political wrongdoing', which is wrong primarily because it undermines democratic procedures and institutions for private gain. The upshot is that current blanket policies of criminal disenfranchisement are incompatible with AAP.
Books on the topic "Democratic boundary problem"
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Frank, Jason. Populism and Praxis. Edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.29.
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This chapter argues that contemporary democratic theory’s approach to populism has been unduly influenced by Carl Schmitt’s theory of political identification. Both liberal critics and radical democratic admirers of populism have focused attention on the question of who the people are (“the boundary problem”) while neglecting the related question of how the people act (“the enactment problem”). This framework obscures the central importance of populism’s experimentation with different forms of egalitarian praxis, and how these forms come to shape political subjectivity. The formative praxis of populism is clearly indicated in the nineteenth-century American case.
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Laski, Gregory. Pauline E. Hopkins’s Untimely Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190642792.003.0006.
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This chapter reveals how Pauline E. Hopkins transforms the boundary between slavery and freedom into the source of a paradoxical political hope—indeed, as the best chance for realizing democracy. Announcing in Contending Forces that problems such as rape and lynching constitute “duplications” of the past of bondage, Hopkins calls for a neo-abolitionist crusade. For Thomas Jefferson or W. E. B. Du Bois, such a declaration would signal democracy’s arrested development. In the recursive narrative structures and scenes of temporal arrest that characterize her fictional and journalistic oeuvre, however, Hopkins constructs a critical resource for the campaign to redress democracy’s failings. Interrogating the limits of liberal agency, she redefines scenes of slavery’s recurrence as a starting point for a politics that might realize progress because it engenders an uncertainty about what has changed. From her democratic vista, progress results not by breaking with the past but by embracing its persistence.
Book chapters on the topic "Democratic boundary problem"
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He, Baogang. "Civil Society, Pluralization and the Boundary Problem." In The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China, 123–46. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25574-0_7.
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Parvu, Camil Alexandru. "4. The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Cosmopolitan Implications." In zeta-cosmopolitanism, 93–114. Zeta Books, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/zeta-cosmopolitanism20156.
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Ochoa Espejo, Paulina. "Democratic Legitimacy and the Vicious Circle of People and Territory." In On Borders, 75–95. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190074197.003.0004.
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Real borders are arbitrary. Could they ever be legitimate? Could they get their legitimacy through democratic means? The people could decide where the border should go, but this approach creates a problem: Who exactly are the people who should decide? This is the famous “boundary problem,” to which this chapter offers a new approach. Most democrats, even nationalists and cosmopolitans, delimit the demos by relying on territorial jurisdictions. However, territory is not explicit in their arguments. This chapter urges democrats to recognize territory’s normative importance. Acknowledging territory is a risky, yet promising strategy. Risky, because it may lead to a vicious circle: one needs well-defined territorial borders to delimit the people, yet one needs a well-defined people to establish legitimate territorial borders. Promising, because it forces democrats to find new resources for dealing with the vicious circle. The chapter describes four possible strategies: asserting, circumventing, solving, and dissolving the circularity. It chooses the last.
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Ochoa Espejo, Paulina. "Natural Borders." In On Borders, 96–120. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190074197.003.0005.
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This chapter explores the historical idea of natural borders. Territories have been imagined as being naturally separated from one another by oceans, rivers, deserts, and mountains. Although most geographers today agree that natural borders are a myth, one of the central ideas in contemporary theories of border legitimacy (the concept of self-determination) still relies on the natural borders of states. This chapter makes two points. It first argues that seeking the natural borders of democracy on the basis of identity is a mistake. The chapter’s second point is more controversial: despite natural borders’ problematic history, I argue that we should endorse a specific type of natural border—a socio-ecological version of territorial politics centered on resilience—because we need it to deal with climate change, and because it can be a solution to the “boundary problem”: a logical circularity that makes democratic legitimacy impossible.
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Horning, Ned, Julie A. Robinson, Eleanor J. Sterling, Woody Turner, and Sacha Spector. "Protected area design and monitoring." In Remote Sensing for Ecology and Conservation. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199219940.003.0020.
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Researchers interested in remote locations have developed monitoring schemes, sometimes called “Watchful Eye” monitoring, that use a time series of remotely sensed images to assess changes over time to a protected area or habitat. For instance, the European Space Agency (ESA) and UNESCO have set up repeat analyses of satellite imagery for World Heritage sites. The first area for which they developed this technique was the habitat of the critically endangered mountain gorilla (Gorilla berengei berengei) in the Virunga Mountains in Central Africa, including the Bwindi and Mgahinga National Parks in Uganda, the Virunga and Kahuzi-Biega National Parks in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the trans-boundary Volcanoes Conservation Area. The project developed detailed maps of these inaccessible zones so that protected area managers can monitor the gorilla habitat. Previously, available maps were old and inaccurate (at times handmade), did not completely cover the range of the gorillas, and did not cross national boundaries. Because there was no systematic information from the ground regarding changes over time, researchers also used remotely sensed data to complete change detection analyses over the past two decades. Using both optical (Landsat series) and radar (ENVISAT ASAR) satellite data, researchers were able to quantify rates of deforestation between 1990 and 2003 and relate these rates to human migration rates into the area resulting from regional political instability. Researchers constructed the first digital base maps of the areas, digital elevation models (DEMs), and updated vegetation and land use maps. They faced significant problems in both field and laboratory activities, including lack of existing ground data, dense vegetation cover, and fairly continuous cloud cover. They therefore used a combination of ESA ENVISAT ASAR as well as Landsat and ESA Medium Resolution Imaging Spectrometer (MERIS) optical data. The radar images allowed them to quantify elevation and distances between trees and homes. Landsat and MERIS data helped identify forest cover types, with Landsat providing finer-scale images at less frequent intervals and MERIS serving lower-resolution images more frequently.