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Journal articles on the topic 'Democratic economy'

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1

Dymski, Gary A., and John E. Elliott. "Capitalism and the Democratic Economy." Social Philosophy and Policy 6, no. 1 (1988): 140–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002715.

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Mainstream economics evaluates capitalism primarily from the perspective of efficiency. Social philosophy typically applies other or additional normative criteria, such as equality, democracy, and community. This essay examines the implications of these contrasting sets of criteria in the evaluation of capitalism. Its first two sections consider the criteria themselves, assuming that a trade-off exists between them. The last three sections question whether such a trade-off necessarily occurs, and explore the claim that improvements in nonefficiency dimensions of capitalist society may enhance, rather than conflict with, efficiency.
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2

Beetham, David. "Market economy and democratic polity." Democratization 4, no. 1 (March 1997): 76–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510349708403503.

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3

FLEURBAEY, MARC. "An Egalitarian Democratic Private Ownership Economy." Politics & Society 21, no. 2 (June 1993): 215–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329293021002005.

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4

Cooper, Richard N., Stephan Haggard, and Robert R. Kaufman. "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047508.

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5

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions." Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (April 1997): 263. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/422121.

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6

McDermott, John. "On the theory of democratic economy." Socialism and Democracy 9, no. 2 (December 1995): 95–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854309508428168.

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7

Madra, Yahya M. "Democratic Economy Conference: An Introductory Note." South Atlantic Quarterly 115, no. 1 (January 2016): 211–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00382876-3425035.

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8

Wesche, Tilo. "Democratic deliberation and economic democracy." Philosophy & Social Criticism 47, no. 1 (January 2021): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453720984103.

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In Democracy without Shortcuts, Cristina Lafont elaborates the view that participatory deliberation is at the heart of every democracy and that both truth-tracking and mutual justification are the aims of democratic deliberation. What remains unconsidered in her approach is the economic framework in which democratic deliberation takes place. In my comment, I will take the following view: no political democracy without a democratisation of the economy. I will elaborate on this relationship as a concept of economic democracy. I will argue for that there is no political democracy without an economic democracy.
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9

Ingvar B. Maehle. "The Economy of Gratitude in Democratic Athens." Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens 87, no. 1 (2018): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2972/hesperia.87.1.0055.

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10

Buzdalov, I. "Cooperation and Democratic Reforms in the Economy." Problems in Economics 31, no. 4 (August 1988): 42–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/pet1061-1991310442.

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11

Lehman, Howard P., and Stephen John Stedman. "Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development." African Studies Review 37, no. 2 (September 1994): 171. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/524778.

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12

Landa. "Behavioral Political Economy, Argumentation, and Democratic Theory." Good Society 24, no. 1 (2015): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/goodsociety.24.1.0086.

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13

Longstreth, Frank H. "Historical political economy and liberal democratic capitalism." Economy and Society 19, no. 1 (February 1990): 95–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03085149000000004.

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14

Caspary, William R. "Prospects and Limits of a Democratic Economy." Humanity & Society 28, no. 3 (August 2004): 235–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016059760402800303.

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15

Casey, J. Tyson, and Cristina Moon. "Anchoring the Heart of a Democratic Economy." Tikkun 33, no. 3 (2018): 54–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/08879982-6817937.

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16

Innes, Duncan, and Stephen Gelb. "Towards a democratic economy in South Africa." Third World Quarterly 9, no. 2 (April 1987): 545–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436598708419987.

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17

Elliott, John E., and Barry S. Clark. "Richard Henry Tawney on the Democratic Economy." International Journal of Social Economics 16, no. 3 (March 1989): 44–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068298910137021.

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18

Cockerton, Camilla M., and Stephen John Stedman. "Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development." International Journal of African Historical Studies 27, no. 1 (1994): 214. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/221011.

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19

Miller, Ethan. "Community Economy: Ontology, Ethics, and Politics for Radically Democratic Economic Organizing." Rethinking Marxism 25, no. 4 (October 2013): 518–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.842697.

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20

Mousseau, Michael. "Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace." Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 2 (January 28, 2016): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894215616408.

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This article draws on new data and analyses to investigate whether the contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace. A series of studies have shown that contractualist economy accounts for the democratic peace, but defenders of the democratic peace claim that these studies contain measurement errors, that democracy correlates with peace at least in interaction with contractualist economy, and that the causation is reversed from democracy to contractualist economy and peace. Results are consistent across all tests: there is no support for democracy as a cause of peace. The democratic peace is a statistical artifact explained by contractualist economy.
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21

Thompson, Frank. "Enterprise and Personal Finance in Schweickart's Democratic Economy." Radical Philosophy Review of Books 11, no. 11 (1995): 41–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/radphilrevbooks199511/124.

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22

Hogan, Brendan. "Agency, political economy, and the transnational democratic ideal." Ethics & Global Politics 3, no. 1 (January 2010): 37–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/egp.v3i1.4852.

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23

Alperovitz, Gar. "The Emerging Paradoxical Possibility of a Democratic Economy." Review of Social Economy 69, no. 3 (September 2011): 377–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2011.592127.

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24

Harris, Laurence. "The mixed economy of a democratic South Africa." Investment Analysts Journal 19, no. 33 (June 1990): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10293523.1990.11082282.

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25

Martz, John D., and Edward A. Lynch. "Latin America's Christian Democratic Parties: A Political Economy." Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 1 (February 1994): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2517429.

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26

Roemer, John E. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation." Econometrica 67, no. 1 (January 1999): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00001.

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27

Rothschild, J., and R. Russell. "Alternatives to Bureaucracy: Democratic Participation In The Economy." Annual Review of Sociology 12, no. 1 (August 1986): 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.12.080186.001515.

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28

Trzcionka, Magdalena. "The Bitcoin – Democratic Money in a Neoliberal Economy." Ad Americam 19 (February 8, 2019): 155–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/adamericam.19.2018.19.11.

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This article examines the bitcoin, at present the most popular cryptocurrency. The bitcoin grew on the major pillars of the neoliberal market economy, such as liberalization, deregulation and privatization. But in the end, it turned out to be a cure for the dysfunctions of the financial system, which was based on neoliberal assumptions. The difficulty in capturing the character and status of the bitcoin still makes it elusive for the existing rules of law. Some governments observe the evolution of the bitcoin market with interest; others try to work against it. All of this makes the bitcoin an intriguing subject for research.The aim of this article is to present the original assumptions of the bitcoin system; trace the reactions to the bitcoin’s emergence in virtual reality, and next on the very real financial market; and analyze the reinterpretation of the idea that underlies the creation of the cryptocurrency. This article attempts to assess the bitcoin’s potential of achieving a seemingly impregnable position on the global financial market.
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29

Martz, John D. "Latin America’s Christian Democratic Parties: A Political Economy." Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 1 (February 1, 1994): 111–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182168-74.1.111.

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30

Radu, Michael. "Latin America's Christian Democratic parties. A political economy." Orbis 38, no. 1 (December 1994): 154–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0030-4387(94)90157-0.

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31

Vanberg, Georg. "Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and institutional design." Public Choice 177, no. 3-4 (June 18, 2018): 199–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0570-0.

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32

Siek, Yany. "Chinese Democratization: An Inevitability or Possibility?" Political Science Undergraduate Review 1, no. 2 (February 15, 2016): 121–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/psur28.

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China's rapid economic growth since its late 1970 reforms has produced significant debate among scholars concerning whether or not it will democratize. Despite extensive liberalization of its economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains an iron grip on its political system. Modernization theory and the potential for a stagnating economy present two compelling arguments for a democratic future. Although Chinese authoritarianism faces significant pressures, the CCP's use of pragmatic political reforms, adaptation, and alternative forms of legitimacy make it resilient. Economic growth or decline is not a sufficient condition for democratization. Rather, the likelihood of democratization will depend on the ability of the CCP to address emerging challenges such as political corruption that could threaten China's authoritarian resilience.
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33

Kurtz, Marcus J. "The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America." World Politics 56, no. 2 (January 2004): 262–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0013.

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Scholars have usually understood the problem of democratic consolidation in terms of the creation of mechanisms that make possible the avoidance of populist excesses, polarized conflicts, or authoritarian corporatist inclusion that undermined free politics in much of postwar Latin America. This article makes the case that, under contemporary liberal economic conditions, the nature of the challenge for democratization has changed in important ways. Earlier problems of polarization had their roots in the long-present statist patterns of economic organization. By contrast, under free-market conditions, democratic consolidation faces a largely distinct set of challenges: the underarticulation of societal interests, pervasive social atomization, and socially uneven political quiescence founded in collective action problems. These can combine to undermine the efficacy of democratic representation and, consequently, regime legitimacy. The article utilizes data from the Latin American region since the 1970s on development, economic reform, and individual and collective political participation to show the effects of a changing state-economy relationship on the consolidation of democratic politics.
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34

Schneider, Nathan. "An Internet of ownership: Democratic design for the online economy." Sociological Review 66, no. 2 (March 2018): 320–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038026118758533.

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The disappointments of the online economy – for instance, user surveillance and systemic labor abuses – stem at least in part from its failures to meaningfully share ownership and governance with relevant stakeholders. Under the banner of ‘platform cooperativism’, an emerging network of cooperative developers, entrepreneurs, labor organizers and scholars is developing an economic ecosystem that seeks to align the ownership and governance of enterprises with the people whose lives are most affected by them. This represents a radical critique of the existing online economy, but it is also a field of experimentation for alternative forms of ownership design. This essay presents and analyzes some of the ways platform cooperativism has begun to generate ownership designs that could serve the platform economy of the future differently than the investor-owned structures that currently prevail.
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35

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Daniel M. Kselman. "Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies." Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 11 (September 21, 2012): 1453–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453450.

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This article examines the relationship among a country’s democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country’s economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends in fact to increase as a country moves from low to intermediate levels of democracy and development. They also uncover preliminary evidence that a history of regime instability may have independent consequences on the prevalence of one or the other linkage mechanism. Finally, the results suggest that a country’s level of economic development and exposure to the international economy are more consistent predictors of programmatic effort and coherence than are measures of a country’s regime type.
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36

Gómez-Ramírez, Leopoldo. "On Theories of a Democratic Planned Economy and the Coevolution of “Pro-democratic Planning” Preferences." International Critical Thought 4, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 178–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2014.906787.

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37

Haagh, Louise. "Rethinking Democratic Theories of Justice in the Economy after COVID-19." Democratic Theory 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 110–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/dt.2020.070214.

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This article argues that the COVID-19 crisis has brought to light the importance of state democratic capacities linked with humanist governance. This requires securing individuals’ silent freedoms as embedded in the way “developmental” institutions that constitute social relations and well-being are governed. I argue health and well-being inequalities brought out by the crisis are but a manifestation of the way, in the context of the competition paradigm in global governance, states have become relatedly more punitive and dis-embedded from society. The answer lies in providing a more explicit defence of the features of a human development democratic state. An implication is to move democratic theory beyond the concern with redistributive and participatory features of democracy to consider foundational institutional properties of democratic deepening and freedom in society.
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38

Tang, Min, Narisong Huhe, and Qiang Zhou. "Contingent Democratization: When Do Economic Crises Matter?" British Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (May 20, 2015): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123415000095.

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This article argues that the effect of economic crises on democratic transition is contingent on economic structure. Specifically, a high level of state engagement in the economy makes social forces dependent on the ruling elites for patrimonial interests and, therefore, the authoritarian regime liable for economic failure. Moreover, when authoritarian elites own a high share of economic assets, this aggravates the economic loss of both the business class and the masses when economic crises occur, which in turn makes defection of the business class, the revolt of the masses and the alliance of the two social classes more likely. Cross-national analyses show that economic crises trigger democratic transition only when state engagement in the economy is above a certain level.
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39

Scott, Anne. "The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future." Women’s Philosophy Review, no. 12 (1994): 25–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wpr19941215.

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40

Huq, Parvaz Azharul. "The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralisation in Urban Bangladesh." Dynamics of Public Administration 31, no. 2 (2014): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/0976-0733.2014.00792.5.

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41

Araya, Daniel. "Design Education and Democratic Innovation in the Knowledge Economy." International Journal of Learning: Annual Review 13, no. 3 (2007): 25–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1447-9494/cgp/v14i03/45235.

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42

Okoye, Emma I., Ugochukwu J. Nwoye, Chukwunonso Ekesiobi, and Justina Obiorah. "Repositioning Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Implications on National Economy." Asian Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting 8, no. 3 (October 27, 2018): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.9734/ajeba/2018/44731.

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43

Korzeniewicz, Roberto P., and Kimberley Awbrey. "Democratic transitions and the semiperiphery of the world-economy." Sociological Forum 7, no. 4 (December 1992): 609–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01112318.

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44

Carlin, Ryan E., Timothy Hellwig, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, and Matthew M. Singer. "When Does the Public Get It Right? The Information Environment and the Accuracy of Economic Sentiment." Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 9 (February 3, 2021): 1499–533. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989758.

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Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.
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45

MORGAN, IWAN. "JIMMY CARTER, BILL CLINTON, AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC ECONOMICS." Historical Journal 47, no. 4 (November 29, 2004): 1015–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x0400408x.

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Jimmy Carter's response to stagflation, the unprecedented combination of stagnation and double-digit inflation that afflicted the American economy during his presidency, made him the subject of virulent attack from liberal Democrats for betraying New Deal traditions of activist government to sustain high employment and strong economic growth. Carter found himself accused of being a do-nothing president whose name had become ‘a synonym for economic mismanagement’ like Herbert Hoover's in the 1930s.1 Liberal disenchantment fuelled Edward Kennedy's quixotic crusade to wrest the 1980 Democratic presidential nomination from Carter. ‘[H]e has left behind the best traditions of the Democratic Party’, the Massachusetts senator charged, ‘We are instructed that the New Deal is old hat and that our best hope is no deal at all.’2 A quarter-century later a more dispassionate analysis would suggest that Carter was neither a do-nothing president nor a throwback to the past in terms of economic policy. Far from being the ‘Jimmy Hoover’ of liberal obloquy, Carter was really ‘Jimmy Clinton’ because in seeking solutions for stagflation his administration laid the foundations of a new political economy that the next Democratic president would build upon.
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46

Tsakalotos, E. "The political economy of social democratic economic policies: the Pasok experiment in Greece." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 114–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/14.1.114.

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47

Bearce, David H., and V. Ximena Velasco-Guachalla. "How Can We Explain Regime Type Differences If Citizens Don't Vote Based on Foreign Economic Policy?" Foreign Policy Analysis 16, no. 3 (August 14, 2019): 492–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz017.

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Abstract Political economy research shows that more democratic governments generally have more open trade policies with more flexible exchange rate regimes, yet political behavior theory argues that citizens do not think of foreign economic policy as salient and do not cast their votes considering such issues. This note investigates the puzzle about how democracies could have different foreign economic policies than autocracies if citizens do not vote based on these international issues. Using a political model with two possible ways for societal actors to influence state policy (electoral and/or special interest pressure), it first considers how voting based on salient domestic outcomes like inflation and unemployment may lead democratic governments towards more open trade and flexible exchange rates. Second, if more societal groups are able to lobby as special interests in more democratic regimes, then governments may also be pushed toward these same foreign economic policies. Thus, there is no fundamental contradiction between the political economy empirical results and the political behavior theory, although scholars need to adjust their theories to explain foreign economic policy differences across political regime type.
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48

Lain, Bru. "POLANYI’S ECONOMIC EMBEDDEDNESS, COUNTERMOVEMENT, AND REPUBLICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY." Ethics, Politics & Society 1 (May 15, 2018): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/eps.1.1.63.

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The aim of this article is to contend that Karl Polanyi’s work bears significant coincidences with the republican tradition of thought. The first of them is one of a methodological or epistemological kind, and it consists of the use of a very similar “social ontology”. The second one is of a substantive sort, and it is related to the “material conditions for freedom” which derive from a very similar conception of freedom and property. In the third section, we propose a republican reading of Polanyi’s work based on three of the author’s primary notions, those of “economic embeddedness”, “double movement”, and “political economy”. The article concludes by arguing that such concepts may prove useful both for understanding the democratic-republican program and for underlining its present validity in contemporary market societies.
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49

Gauna, Anibal F. "Revisiting the Issue of Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela, 1974-1998." Journal of Politics in Latin America 9, no. 1 (April 2017): 33–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1866802x1700900102.

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This article examines the issue of democratic deterioration by revisiting the Venezuelan case (1974–1998). Using sequence elaboration and alternative case-focused theories, it tests and confirms the hypothesis that presidential partyarchy was the main contextual explanatory factor behind the crisis that led to Venezuela's democratic deterioration. Building on elite conflict theory, it also aims to integrate previous studies’ insights and better explain the timing of factors to illustrate how economic presidentialism (the highly autonomous executive control of a state-controlled economy) was the main mechanism leading to democratic deterioration.
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50

Sen, Amartya. "The Political Economy of Hunger." Common Knowledge 25, no. 1-3 (April 1, 2019): 348–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-7299462.

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Sen’s essay concerns the existence of extensive hunger amidst unprecedented global prosperity in the contemporary world, but he argues that the problem would be decisively solvable if our response were no longer shaped by Malthusian pessimism. Effective famine prevention does not turn on food supply per head and the automatic mechanism of the market: there can be plenty of food while large sections of the population lack the means to obtain it. Effective famine prevention thus requires “entitlements.” Economically, governments can and should provide public employment programs so that those threatened by famine can be empowered to command food. Politically, democratic participation and a free press can work to ensure government accountability for famine prevention. The choice that Sen urges, however, is not for the state over the market—the experience of the Indian state of Kerala demonstrates that a voluntaristic approach can work as well or better than China’s compulsory “one child policy” in limiting the rapid population growth that contributes to world hunger. Rather, a reasoned solution to the problem of hunger must acknowledge the complementary importance of both well-functioning markets and open and democratic public action.
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