Journal articles: 'Democratic stability'

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LoGerfo, Jim, and Daniel King. "Thailand: Toward Democratic Stability." Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996): 102–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0009.

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Hollyer, James R., B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability." British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 4 (February 2, 2018): 1251–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000308.

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Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

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Kyritsis, Dimitrios. "Legitimacy, stability and democratic persuasion." Jurisprudence 8, no. 2 (May 4, 2017): 352–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2017.1296098.

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Carugati, Federica. "Democratic Stability: A Long View." Annual Review of Political Science 23, no. 1 (May 11, 2020): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052918-012050.

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What are the sources of democratic stability? The evidence from three modern waves suggests that stability rests on economic growth, strong states, and liberal institutions. But can we secure democratic stability beyond liberalism? This question is relevant to those developing countries that have little hope, and perhaps little interest in liberal democracy. But it is also increasingly relevant to those developed nations where the achievements of the twentieth-century liberal order are being eroded. This article takes a fresh look at democratic stability by reviewing the evidence from the last two and a half millennia. Particular attention is devoted to the case of ancient Athens, which highlights the importance of alignment between shared norms and appropriately designed institutions. Athens’ case suggests that goods that we usually associate with modern liberal democracy do not necessarily rely on a given set of values and do not have a unique institutional manifestation.

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Cornell, Agnes, and Victor Lapuente. "Meritocratic administration and democratic stability." Democratization 21, no. 7 (November 10, 2014): 1286–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.960205.

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Maxfield, Sylvia. "Capital Mobility and Democratic Stability." Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 95–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0080.

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Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. "South Africa: Explaining Democratic Stability." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45, no. 2 (April 2007): 219–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040701317592.

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Lloyd, Robert B. "Nigeria's Democratic Generals." Current History 103, no. 673 (May 1, 2004): 215–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2004.103.673.215.

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If democracy firmly establishes itself in this African giant and economic reform leads to increasing wealth and stability, Nigeria could serve as a beacon of inspiration for a continent many view as hopeless.

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HAGGARD, STEPHAN, and ROBERT R. KAUFMAN. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule." American Political Science Review 106, no. 3 (August 2012): 495–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000287.

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Recent work by Carles Boix and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson has focused on the role of inequality and distributive conflict in transitions to and from democratic rule. We assess these claims through causal process observation, using an original qualitative dataset on democratic transitions and reversions during the “third wave” from 1980 to 2000. We show that distributive conflict, a key causal mechanism in these theories, is present in just over half of all transition cases. Against theoretical expectations, a substantial number of these transitions occur in countries with high levels of inequality. Less than a third of all reversions are driven by distributive conflicts between elites and masses. We suggest a variety of alternative causal pathways to both transitions and reversions.

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Siaroff, Alan. "Democratic Breakdown and Democratic Stability: A Comparison of Interwar Estonia and Finland." Canadian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (March 1999): 103–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900010118.

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AbstractTwo of the new states of interwar Europe were Estonia and Finland. Both arose out of the Russian Empire and both were literate, Protestant nations. Yet democracy broke down in Estonia but survived in Finland. These outcomes would seem ironic, given that Finnish independence involved a brutal civil war and Finland was linguistically divided—factors not present in Estonia. This study, however, examines not just the nature of independence but also the constitutional structures, party politics and regime crises of these two neighbouring cases. In terms of the factors commonly cited as favouring stable democracy, the Estonian-Finnish contrast shows the particular explanatory importance of political culture, the speed of democratization, the views of elites and the nature of the party system. What happened in Finland also implies that a presidential, or at least a balanced semipresidential, system cannot be considered as inherently dangerous for democratic stability.

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Dewal, Snigdha, Jack A. Goldstone, and Michael Volpe. "Forecasting Stability or Retreat in Emerging Democratic Regimes." Politics and Governance 1, no. 1 (May 6, 2013): 32–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i1.93.

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Drawing on the literatures on elite transitions, factionalism and the new institutionalism, this paper hypothesizes that the stability of partially democratic and emerging democratic regimes is dependent on the willingness of elites to make credible commitments to cooperate and comply with democratic rules. That willingness (or lack thereof) can be signaled by the presence of cooperative or conflict-precipitating events and actions in the periods around elections. We identify and analyze a variety of intra-elite interactions and demonstrate that conflict-precipitating events significantly increase the odds of a democratic retreat in the months before or just after an election, while cooperative events can balance them and prevent retreat. Using event data collected from 40 low- and middle-income countries for two-year periods around national elections between 1991 and 2007 we show that the imbalance of conflict-precipitating over cooperative events is far greater in cases of retreat from democracy. Furthermore, international intervention and pressure had a negative relationship with democratic stability. A logistic regression model accurately identified democratic retreat in 79 percent of the cases examined. Factor analysis revealed several common patterns of intra-elite conflict that can lead to democratic retreat, or conversely, patterns of cooperative events that bolster democratic consolidation. Finally, the data strongly argues for a model of democratic development that depends on open-ended elite maneuvering and the emergence of elite agreements, rather than a model where strong prior institutional constraints determine elite actions.

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Steege, Paul. "Andrew I. Port.Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic.:Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic." American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 935–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.113.3.935.

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Geissel, Brigitte. "Democratic Resource or Democratic Threat? Profiles of Critical and Uncritical Citizens in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Sociology 7, no. 1 (2008): 4–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913307x233692.

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AbstractWhy are some countries democratic and democratize continuously, while others stagnate? According to theories on political culture, citizens' attitudes are crucial elements. In this context the discussion on critical citizens is gaining prominence: Critical citizens are regarded as a threat to democratic stability or as promoter for democratic reforms. Based on the International Social Survey data (2004), I will contribute some empirical evidence to this controversy. In addition to the common equating of criticism with discontentment, I will also include the normative disposition of “critical” attentiveness. Bivariate and multivariate analyses show that contentment, praised in previous research, or discontentment, as suggested by recent studies, are not the decisive attitudes. It is the political attentiveness which promotes democracies.

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Subramanian, Arvind, and Shanker Satyanath. "What Determines Long-Run Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions." IMF Working Papers 04, no. 215 (2004): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451875072.001.

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Harsch, D. "Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic." German History 26, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 595–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/gerhis/ghn068.

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WRIGHT, JOSEPH. "Political Competition and Democratic Stability in New Democracies." British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (February 8, 2008): 221–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000124.

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This article examines the way in which the initial level of political competition in a new democracy affects the stability of that regime. The author argues that new democracies with low levels of initial political competition are more likely to fail because those initially excluded from the democratic game seek to subvert the regime in the future. Using data from ninety-two new democracies born since 1946, he finds that a higher level of initial political competition in a new democracy makes for a more durable democracy. New democracies at war and born during the Cold War are less likely to survive. Finally, he finds evidence that new democracies with low levels of initial political competition are also more likely to meet with civil conflict.

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ROGOZHINA, N. G. "Political Parties of Thailand – Examination for Democratic Stability." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 11, no. 3 (August 17, 2018): 102–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-3-102-119.

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On the threshold of elections designed to be held in February 2019, the first after the military junta seized power in 2014, it is important to define the role of parties in the political process of Thailand, which as other developing countries of Asia, faces challenges in democratic state building. The contemporary political history of kingdom represents the confrontation of two tendencies – authoritarianism and democracy what has a reverse impact on political parties, their character, structure and ability to represent interests of the society as a whole. The author analyses the process of party evolution in the historical retrospective in the context of transformation of political system – from bureaucratic to semidemocratic subjected to economic modernization and changes in socio structure of society where traditional form of organization patron-client is persisted. The author defines three stages of evolution of party system in Thailand The first is characterized by the full control of civil-military bureaucracy over parties. The second stage is closely related to the formation of provincial political clientele groups. The third stage marks the evolvement of party of “power” with the implication for strengthening the parliamentary democracy in the beginning of XXI century. And as the result of it – to the destabilization of political system, based on the relative balance of power between two main political forces – bureaucracy and army interested in reservation of authoritarian government, and bourgeoisie supporting the liberalization of political institutes. With the emergence of party of “power” supported by the majority of population advocating parliamentary democracy political spectrum has changed. The arising conflict of interests subjected to collision of positions regarding the model of political governance was overcome by military coup. Analyzing the political spectrum on the threshold of elections the author comes to conclusion that the restoration of compromised model of political governance sample of 80-90 years of XX century is the most likely option of political development of Thailand in the near future. Though it differs in one aspect – the social structure has changed, there is the rise of that groups of population that intend to participate in the political process, what will force the power to be more transparent and social oriented. These challenges face the political parties as well.

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International Monetary Fund. "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Financial System Stability Assessment." IMF Staff Country Reports 14, no. 315 (2014): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781484394779.002.

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Seligson, Mitchell A., and Edward N. Muller. "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983." International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 301. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600669.

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Neuhouser, Kevin. "Democratic Stability in Venezuela: Elite Consensus or Class Compromise?" American Sociological Review 57, no. 1 (February 1992): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2096148.

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Beall, Jo, Stephen Gelb, and Shireen Hassim. "Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa." Journal of Southern African Studies 31, no. 4 (December 2005): 681–700. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070500370415.

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Ehwarieme, William. "The Military Factor in Nigeria’s Democratic Stability, 1999-2009." Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 3 (June 2011): 494–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x10382217.

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Bayar, Murat, and Andreas Kotelis. "Democratic Peace or Hegemonic Stability? The Imia/Kardak Case." Turkish Studies 15, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 242–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.933948.

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Schedler, Andreas. "The breaching experiment. Donald Trump and the normative foundations of democracy." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 13, no. 4 (December 2019): 433–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12286-019-00438-0.

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AbstractIs US president Donald Trump a threat to democracy? Alerting against his manifold transgressions of democratic norms, many comparative political scientists have thought so. Their practical worries, however, have been inconsistent with prevalent theories of democratic stability. As careful examination shows, his main democratic norm violations have been discursive, and they have revealed him to be, not an ideological enemy of democracy, but a self-centered actor without deep democratic commitments. None of this should ring democratic alarm bells. But it does. As I suggest, Donald Trump has been conducting a kind of sociological “breaching experiment” on the political science community which has exposed a remarkable divergence between our main theories of democratic stability (which focus on structures, political behavior, and self-interest) and our tacit convictions (about the causal relevance of actors, political language, and normative commitments).

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Higley, John. "Elite Trust and the Populist Threat to Stable Democracy." American Behavioral Scientist 64, no. 9 (July 19, 2020): 1211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764220941215.

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One aspect of elite theory holds that democratic stability depends heavily on elites trusting each other to keep distributive issues from reaching acute degrees impelling power seizures. This presumes that agreement about the distribution of valued things is seldom deep or wide in large publics. When distributive issues rise to clear public consciousness, the tendency is toward civil strife. Populists assail and undermine elite trust and the management of politics by elites. They thereby weaken an important basis of democratic stability. I argue that the rise of populist leaders to power leads to an erosion of elite trust, which makes distributive issues more acute and threatens the stability of democratic institutions.

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Christensen, Robert K., Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise. "The Ukrainian Orange Revolution brought more than a new president: What kind of democracy will the institutional changes bring?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 207–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.03.006.

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The authors discuss the institutional changes proposed in Ukraine’s constitutional framework and election laws that could fundamentally alter the separation of powers and the responsiveness of Ukrainian government to the electorate. We analyze the proposed institutional changes from the perspective of what they portend for Ukraine’s democratic transition. Building on the most recent vein of democratization studies examining institutional factors affecting democratic stability, we emphasize that it cannot be assumed that Ukraine is ‘‘in transition to democracy.’’ We conclude that comprehending the likelihood of achieving democratic stability must be contextualized in an understanding of intervening factors— political, economic, and historical—that ultimately influence democratic stability. Our analysis reminds government reform advocates that it is necessary to go beyond the basic institutional framework of proposed governmental changes in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of democratization.

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Miao, Ying. "The Paradox of Middle-Class Attitudes in China: Democracy, Social Stability, and Reform." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 45, no. 1 (April 2016): 169–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261604500108.

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This article explores the seemingly paradoxical attitudes of the Chinese middle class towards democracy, social stability, and reform. Using fieldwork data from Ningbo, this article shows that a group of objective, middle-class individuals can concurrently display high levels of support for democratic principles and low levels of participation in real-life socio-political events. Being generally confident in China's social stability, these individuals have little to no desire for significant democratic reform, or indeed any reform that occurs outside the purview of the state, as it is considered destabilising. By highlighting the distinction between how these members of the middle class respond to generic democratic concepts, real-life sociopolitical affairs, and the idea of democratic reform, this article argues that the Chinese middle class are aware of what “should be,” what “could be,” and what “is,” which lends their socio-political attitudes a paradoxical appearance.

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Mozaffar, Shaheen. "Negotiating Independence in Mauritius." International Negotiation 10, no. 2 (2005): 263–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1571806054740976.

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AbstractThe democratic institutions, especially the electoral institutions for converting votes into seats that were chosen during independence negotiations, have been the key to democratic stability in Mauritius. These institutions emerged out of strategic bargaining structured around a combination of contextual and contingent variables. Conflicting political interests reflecting a combination of class, sectarian and communal interests influenced the institutional preferences of Mauritian elites involved in independence negotiations, leading them to converge on institutional designs that they expected would protect and promote those interests in the new democratic polity. Once in place, the new institutions represented equilibrium outcomes, creating incentives for all actors, engendering a learning curve in peaceful accommodation of inter-group conflicts, and establishing the political basis for social stability, democratic consolidation, and economic development.

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Barrett, Patrick S. "Chile’s Transformed Party System and the Future of Democratic Stability." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 3 (2000): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166436.

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Chile today is experiencing a new sociopolitical compromise no less significant than the so-called “compromise state” of the 1930s and 1940s. A central feature of the new arrangement has been the performance of Chile’s party system. This role should be understood in terms of how it reflects, and helps to mitigate or aggravate, the tension between capital accumulation and the struggles over sociopolitical inclusion and distribution.

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Uhunmwuangho, Sunday Okungbowa, and Philomena Urhoghide. "Comparative Analysis of Traditional Institution to Democratic Stability in Nigeria." Dynamics of Public Administration 30, no. 2 (2013): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/j.0976-0733.30.2.009.

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Akhremenko, A. S., A. P. Petrov, and I. B. Philippov. "DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL AND STABILITY: FROM LIPSET HYPOTHESIS TO ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 90, no. 3 (2018): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2018-90-3-87-112.

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Edosa, E. "National Integration, Citizenship, Political Participation and Democratic Stability in Nigeria." AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities 3, no. 3 (September 10, 2014): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ijah.v3i3.6.

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Dale, Gareth. "Andrew Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic." Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 3 (July 2010): 147–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_00017.

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Cochran, David Carroll. "Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of Irish Americans." Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (1995): 587. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151885.

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Huckfeldt, Robert, and Carol Weitzel Kohfeld. "Electoral stability and the decline of class in democratic politics." Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16, no. 8-9 (August 1992): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(92)90098-6.

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Munck, Gerardo L. "Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of Chile's 1993 Elections." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no. 2 (1994): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166172.

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Once again, Chile stands out within the Latin American region. In the early 1970s, Salvador Allende's brand of socialism attracted worldwide attention and captured the imagination of the international Left. In the years thereafter, Pinochet's authoritarianism set the pace for a global resurgence of the new Right. Finally, in just the last few years, Chile has become a symbol of a new sort, rapidly establishing itself as a democratic success story. Chile's democratic progress becomes especially evident when viewed alongside the large set of Latin American countries that have democratized since the late 1970s. Indeed, an analysis of the last presidential and congressional elections in Chile (11 December 1993) indicates that it has undoubtedly made greater strides toward democratic consolidation than any other country in Latin America — all the more striking when one considers that its transition from authoritarian rule was concluded only as recently as 1990.

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Stoiber, Michael, Michèle Knodt, and Marie-Sophie Heinelt. "Heterogeneity, Participation and Democratic Quality in Latin America: A Comparison between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru." Comparative Sociology 11, no. 3 (2012): 422–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913312x638615.

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Abstract Societal and economic heterogeneity are regarded as a challenge to the functioning of democracies. We integrate this problem as context variables into a model of evaluating the quality of democracy. The context determines the optimal composition of participation structures. This demand has to be confronted with the given structure and its effectiveness. We discuss the problem of effective participation for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which share similar problems regarding economic inequality and societal heterogeneity. Our main aim is to analyze how different institutional settings are enabling citizens, particularly minorities, in the decision making process and how these elements affect democratic stability and the quality of democracy. We deduce the demand for differentiated participation structures from the societal and institutional context and qualitatively compare the effectiveness of the given participation structures. We analyze how the deficits in the institutional arrangements and their effectiveness affect the democratic quality and the democratic stability of the systems. We find that overlapping societal and socio-economic heterogeneity can be considered as especially threatening to democratic consolidation and stability.

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Gozutok, Mahmut Ulas. "NGOs, Political Protest and Civil Society: Book Review." Indonesian Perspective 1, no. 1 (June 2, 2016): 95–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ip.v1i1.10431.

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Non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) play a key role for providing a platform for citizens to raise their discontents in democratic settings. NGO activities for encouraging democratic public engagement pose no threats against stability in consolidated democratic regimes with effectively functioning political parties. On the other hand, they can be acontentious issue in countries with shaky foundations of democracy. In fact, Huntington mainly champions in one of his most widely cited works by the civil society literature the idea that associations of social capital such as civil society can have detrimental repercussions on stability and order in infantile democratic regimes since political parties in such contexts are argued to be ill‐equipped to handle challenges brought bymodernization. On the other hand, primary elements of social capital (i.e.civil society) are acknowledged to be the prerequisites for effectivefunctioning of democracies.Keywords: NGOs, democracy, civil society, social capital

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Makarovič, Matej, and Janja Mikulan Kildi. "Towards a Model Explaining the Political (In)stability and Variety of Regimes in the Post-Soviet Region." Comparative Sociology 16, no. 1 (February 13, 2017): 66–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341416.

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The article examines the conditions of political stability and different regime trajectories in the post-Soviet region. The impact of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors is explored to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for political stability and democracy, as well as their relationship with each other. Applying fuzzy set comparative analysis, this article demonstrates the significance of social inclusion in political stability, although it cannot confirm any causality between political stability and democracy in the post-Soviet region. In terms of the necessary conditions for democracy, only a democratic political culture is significant; while both democratic political cultureandthe absence of a strong economic dependence on natural resources are sufficient conditions for democracy in the region.

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Fuqoha, Fuqoha, Arif Nugroho, and Indrianti Azhar Firdausi. "Stabilitas Pemerintahan Pasca Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia antara Checks and Balances dan Demokrasi Transaksional." Ajudikasi : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 3, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.30656/ajudikasi.v3i2.1893.

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Realizing of implementation a democratic State, in Indonesian constitutional system is prepared by principles of constitutional democracy. The principle of constitutional democracy is carried out with the intention of implementing a democratic system with limited by constitution. Among the principles of democracy are the electoral system to elect State leaders and people's representatives. Good government will creation a government stability and political stability in realizing the goals and ideals of the State through the concept of checks and balances. The conception of checks and balances in a democratic frame can be realized with the principles of transformative democracy and / or transactional democracy. In the constitution of Indonesia, the principle of transactional democracy can occur before and after the general election of the President and Vice President. Transactional democracy can threaten government and / or political stability if group / coalition solidity is not created in carrying out checks and balances.

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VonDoepp, Peter. "The Survival of Malawi's Enfeebled Democracy." Current History 100, no. 646 (May 1, 2001): 232–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2001.100.646.232.

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[T]he image of sure-footed democratic progress must be placed against the picture that emerges from other dimensions of Malawi politics, a picture that presents a more disturbing view and that suggests the prospects for democratic stability and longevity are in question.

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Barth, Thorsten D. "Freedom, Equality and the Quality of Democracy." International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development 4, no. 1 (January 2013): 17–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jsesd.2013010102.

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Freedom and equality are the content, the substance and the tension in a liberal democracy of today. Freedom and equality describe the design, stability and the quality of a democracy. Especially in a Quintuple Helix Model, the quality of democracy and sustainable development are closely related, because a high-quality democracy is a prerequisite for promoting sustainability in democracies. By investigating the quality of democracy this article develops two theses: 1.) Democracy with their quality rises or falls with the expression of freedom and/or equality; 2.) Democracy generates its stability from a balanced interaction between freedom and equality. With the concept of Democratic Life this article examines these two theses: Democratic Life as newly developed concept measures the quality of democracy with providing information about the type of a democracy and an approach to measure a democracy´s democratic development for the top 20 of the Democracy Ranking (2009). The central keys of the Democratic Life concept are the ‘Index of Classification’ and the ‘Democratic-Life-Index’, which are formed from an ‘Index of Freedom’ and an ‘Index of Equality’. By empirical examination of the research question of Democratic Life two essential questions in the modern democratic theory can be investigated: 1.) How democratic is a democracy? 2.) How much freedom and equality does a liberal democracy need? The countries analyzed for the Democratic Life concept in this article are the United States, Australia, Sweden and Germany in comparison between 1995 and 2008. This degree of democratic quality will create a lot of problems towards developing sustainability in a democracy, because in the United States there is currently a big disparity between freedom and equality.

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Obiyan, A. Sat. "Political Parties Under the Abubakar Transition Program and Democratic Stability in Nigeria." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 27, no. 1 (1999): 41–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1548450500005898.

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Nigeria has witnessed civilian rule for just over eight of nearly 39 years of self-rule. Incessant military incursions into the political terrain have led to several transition programs aimed at instituting democracy. This article focuses on the nature and operations of political parties in the recent transition and their implications for a stable democratic polity. The purpose of this focus is to recognize the enormous potential with which political parties are endowed for fostering or impeding the creation and sustenance of a cohesive, stable democratic system.

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Obiyan, A. Sat. "Political Parties Under the Abubakar Transition Program and Democratic Stability in Nigeria." Issue 27, no. 1 (1999): 41–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047160700503114.

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Nigeria has witnessed civilian rule for just over eight of nearly 39 years of self-rule. Incessant military incursions into the political terrain have led to several transition programs aimed at instituting democracy. This article focuses on the nature and operations of political parties in the recent transition and their implications for a stable democratic polity. The purpose of this focus is to recognize the enormous potential with which political parties are endowed for fostering or impeding the creation and sustenance of a cohesive, stable democratic system.

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Clayton, Katherine, Nicholas T. Davis, Brendan Nyhan, Ethan Porter, Timothy J. Ryan, and Thomas J. Wood. "Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 23 (June 2, 2021): e2024125118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2024125118.

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Democratic stability depends on citizens on the losing side accepting election outcomes. Can rhetoric by political leaders undermine this norm? Using a panel survey experiment, we evaluate the effects of exposure to multiple statements from former president Donald Trump attacking the legitimacy of the 2020 US presidential election. Although exposure to these statements does not measurably affect general support for political violence or belief in democracy, it erodes trust and confidence in elections and increases belief that the election is rigged among people who approve of Trump’s job performance. These results suggest that rhetoric from political elites can undermine respect for critical democratic norms among their supporters.

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Dunn, Kris. "Authoritarianism and Intolerance Under Autocratic and Democratic Regimes." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 2, no. 1 (September 30, 2014): 220–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.260.

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Based on findings indicating that authoritarians express greater intolerance in situations where diversity is more apparent, Stenner (2005) proposes that democracies may sabotage their stability by allowing the unbridled expression of societal pluralism. She therefore suggests that pluralism in democracies be suppressed in order to pacify authoritarians and the threat their unbridled intolerance may pose to the stability of these countries. Based on data from the World and European Values Surveys, I examined 75,478 individuals across 75 countries to determine if authoritarians are indeed more intolerant in more democratic societies; a key assumption upon which Stenner’s suggestion rests. While authoritarianism was more strongly and negatively related to tolerance in more democratic countries, authoritarians in more democratic countries were more tolerant than were authoritarians in more autocratic countries. I argue that Stenner’s concern may be valid if we strictly consider rapid pluralization within a single generation within consolidating democracies, but for established democracies, her concern appears unwarranted.

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Share, Donald. "Policy Stability and Democratic Change: Energy in Spain's Transition.Thomas D. Lancaster." Journal of Politics 53, no. 1 (February 1991): 274–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131750.

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Yiftachel, Oren. "The state, ethnic relations and democratic stability: Lebanon, Cyprus and Israel." GeoJournal 28, no. 3 (November 1992): 319–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00817909.

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Cornell, Agnes. "Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs." Governance 27, no. 2 (April 22, 2013): 191–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12037.

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Bodea, Cristina, and Raymond Hicks. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions." International Organization 69, no. 1 (December 17, 2014): 35–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000277.

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AbstractDespite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibility). Democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions. CBI in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth. Besides being more disciplinarian, it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and, therefore, inflation. Empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions, as well as a credibility effect.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Democratic stability'

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