Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Deontic logic'

Legal reasoning is a method that is applied by legal practitioners to make legal decisions. For a scenario, legal reasoning requires not only the facts of the scenario but also the legal rules to be enforced within it. Formal logic has long been used for reasoning tasks in many domains. Deontic logic is a logic which is often used to formalise legal scenarios with its built-in notions of obligation, permission and prohibition. Within the legal domain, it is important to recognise that there are many exceptions and conflicting obligations. This motivates the enrichment of deontic logic with not only the notion of defeasibility, which allows for reasoning about exceptions, but a stronger notion of typicality which is based on defeasibility. KLM-style defeasible reasoning introduced by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (KLM), is a logic system that employs defeasibility while a logic that serves the same role for the stronger notion of typicality is Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL). Deontic paradoxes are often used to examine deontic logic systems as the scenarios arising from the paradoxes' structures produce undesirable results when desirable deontic properties are applied to the scenarios. This is despite the various scenarios themselves seeming intuitive. This dissertation shows that KLM-style defeasible reasoning and PTL are both effective when applied to the analysis of the deontic paradoxes. We first present the background information which comprises propositional logic, which forms the foundation for the other logic systems, as well as the background of KLM-style defeasible reasoning, deontic logic and PTL. We outline the paradoxes along with their issues within the presentation of deontic logic. We then show that for each of the two logic systems we can intuitively translate the paradoxes, satisfy many of the desirable deontic properties and produce reasonable solutions to the issues resulting from the paradoxes.

The purpose of this paper is to make a suggestion to deontic logic: Respect Hume\'s Law, the answer to the is-ought problem that says that all ought-talk is completely cut off from is-talk. Most deontic logicians have sought another solution: Namely, the solution that says that we can bridge the is-ought gap. Thus, a century\'s worth of research into these normative systems of logic has lead to many attempts at doing just that. At the same time, the field of deontic logic has come to be plagued with paradox. My argument essentially depends upon there being a substantive relation between this betrayal of Hume and the plethora of paradoxes that have appeared in two-adic (binary normative operator), one-adic (unary normative operator), and zero-adic (constant normative operator) deontic systems, expressed in the traditions of von Wright, Kripke, and Anderson, respectively. My suggestion has two motivations: First, to rid the philosophical literature of its puzzles and second, to give Hume\'s Law a proper formalization. Exploring the issues related to this project also points to the idea that maybe we should re-engineer (e.g., further generalize) our classical calculus, which might involve the adoption of many-valued logics somewhere down the line.<br>Master of Arts

Orientador: Marcelo Esteban Coniglio<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-13T04:53:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Peron_NewtonMarques_M.pdf: 601027 bytes, checksum: 5828adda31c6102b730941a14056d7d9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009<br>Resumo: Esse trabalho expõe brevemente o que são as Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal ¿Observação: O resumo, na íntegra poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital.<br>Abstract: This work expose briefly what are the Logics of Formal Inconsistency ...Note: The complete abstract is available with the full electronic digital thesis or dissertations.<br>Mestrado<br>Filosofia<br>Mestre em Filosofia

In a recent paper, Bentzen proposes a semantically characterised logic called Action Type Deontic Logic, where normative concepts are applied to action expressions, rather than propositional statements. The logic offers solutions to many of the paradoxes of deontic logic. In particular, Bentzen's semantics solves many puzzles involving the interaction of permission with conjunction and disjunction. One of the reasons for these positive results is the assumption that agents always act according to norm. This assumption means that only agents with ideal behaviour are modelled; there is no possibility for norm-violation. In this thesis, proof techniques and decision procedures for Action Type Deontic Logic in the style of semantic tableau are investigated, and soundness, completeness and termination results are obtained. In order to account for the possibility of norm-violation, a new semantics based on a generalisation of Action Type Deontic Logic models is proposed. The new semantics keeps the possibility of norm-violation open, while many of the virtues of Action Type Deontic Logic remain.

In this thesis, the main focus is on deontic logic as a tool for formal representation of moral reasoning in natural language. The simple standard system of deontic logic (SDL), i.e. the minimal Kripkean modal logic extended with the deontic axiom, stating that necessity (interpreted as obligation) implies possibility (interpreted as permission), has often been considered inadequate for this aim, due to different problems, e.g. the so-called deontic paradoxes. A general survey of deontic logic and the problems with SDL is made in chapter 1. In chapter 2, a system denoted Classical Deontic-Modal logic (CDM1) is defined. In this system, there is a primary obligation operator indexed to sets of possible worlds, and a secondary requirement operator, defined in terms of strictly necessary conditions for fulfilling an obligation. This secondary operator has most of the properties of the necessity operator in SDL. In chapters 3 and 4, it is argued that CDM1 is able to handle the SDL problems presented in chapter 1 in an adequate way, and the treatment of these problems in CDM1 is also compared with their treatment in some other well-known deontic systems. In chapter 5, it is argued that even though the problems related to quantification in modal contexts are relevant to deontic logic, these issues are not specific to deontic logic. In chapter 6, the relations between some controversial features of moral reasoning, such as moral dilemmas and “non-standard” deontic categories like supererogation, and deontic logic are discussed. It is shown how CDM1 can be modified in order to accommodate these features.

Virtual Software Corporations (VSCs) are a novel and important organisational form for large-scale software development. The increased complexity of this development environment requires the use of tools to support human actors in undertaking their tasks, which in turn require modelling solutions able to capture the VSC specific issues. One of the key aspects identified for software development in a VSC setting is the need to support co-ordination. One approach in the development of support for coordination in heterogeneous environments in respect to processes and support tools, such as VSCs, is the use of commitment management. The purpose of this thesis is to define a formalism suitable for capturing and managing commitments, as a means to support co-ordination. This is done by first analysing existing VSCs, and determining the requirements for co-ordination support. Consequently a formalism is defined to address the requirements. The formalism is based on a commitment modelling approach and deontic logic, a modal logic, which is used to manage the commitments. The defined formalism is the basis of a prototype support system, which is used for testing and evaluating. The evaluation has focused on identifying the level of support provided for the initial requirements. To this end three process examples have been used: the initial case study, the study of an independent VSC and the example of a desired process for software configuration management.The results indicate that the formalism, through the use of the prototype system, is able to represent and to manage commitments, as the most important issues in coordinating VSC software development. Thus it has a significant contribution as a modelling approach and it was shown to be applicable to realistic process scenarios.

This dissertation presents the results of our research on some recent devel-opments in Abstract Algebraic Logic (AAL), namely on the Suszko operator, the Leibniz filters, and truth-equational logics. Part I builts and develops an abstract framework which unifies under a common treatment the study of the Leibniz, Suszko, and Frege operators in AAL. Part II generalizes the theory of the strong version of protoalgebraic logics, started in, to arbitrary sentential logics. The interplay between several Leibniz- and Suszko-related notions led us to consider a general framework based upon the notion of S-operator (inspired by that of "mapping compatible with S-filters" of Czelakowski), which encompasses the Leibniz, Suszko, and Frege operators. In particular, when applied to the Leibniz and Suszko operators, new notions of Leibniz and Suszko S-filters arise as instances of more general concepts inside the abstract framework built. The former generalizes the existing notion of Leibniz filter for protoalgebraic logics to arbitrary logics, while the latter is introduced here for the first time. Sev-eral results, both known and new, follow quite naturally inside this framework, again by instantiating it with the Leibniz and Suszko operators. Among the main new results, we prove a General Correspondence Theorem (Theorem ??), which generalizes Blok and Pigozzi's well-known Correspondence Theorem for protoalgebraic logics, as well as Czelakowski's less known Correspondence The-orem for arbitrary logics. We characterize protoalgebraic logics in terms of the Suszko operator as those logics in which the Suszko operator commutes with inverse images by surjective homomorphisms (Theorem ??). We characterize truth-equational logics in terms of their (Suszko) S-filters (Theorem ??), in terms of their full g-models (Corollary ??), and in terms of the Suszko operator, a characterization which strengthens that of Raftery, as those logics in which the Suszko operator is a structural representation from the set of S-filters to the set of AIg(S)-relative congruences, on arbitrary algebras (Theorem ??). Finally, we prove a new Isomorphism Theorem for protoalgebraic logics (Theorem ??), in the same spirit of the famous one for algebraizable logics and for weakly algebraizable logics. Endowed with a notion of Leibniz filter applicable to any logic, we are able to generalize the theory of the strong version of a protoalgebraic logic developed by Font and Jansana to arbitrary sentential logics. Given a sentential logic 5, its strong version St is the logic induced by the class of matrices whose truth set is Leibniz filter. We study three definability criteria of Leibniz filters: equational, explicit and logical definability. Under (any of) these assumptions, we prove that the St-filters coincide with Leibniz S-filters on arbitrary algebras. Finally, we apply the general theory developed to a wealth of non-protoalgebraic log-ics covered in the literature. Namely, we consider Positive Modal Logic P,A4,C, Belnap's logic B, the subintuitionistic logics w1C, and Visser's logic VP,C, and Lukasiewicz's infinite-valued logic preserving degrees of truth. We also consider the generalization of the last example mentioned to logics preserving degrees of truth from varieties of integral commutative residuated lattices, and further generalizations to the non-integral case, as well as to the case without multi-plicative constant. We classify all the examples investigated inside the Leibniz and Frege hierarchies. While none of the logics studied is protoalgebraic, all the respective strong versions are truth-equational.<br>Aquesta dissertació presenta els resultats de la nostra recerca sobre alguns temes recents en Lògica Algebraica Abstracta (LAA), concretament, l'operador de Suszko, els filtres de Leibniz, i les lògiques truth-equacionals. La interacció entre vàries nocións relacionades amb els operadors de Leibniz i de Suszko ens va portar a considerar un marc general basat en la noció de S-operador, que abasta els operadors de Leibniz, de Suszko, i de Frege, unificant així aquests tres operadors paradigmàtics de la LAA sota un mateix tractament.

Submitted by Marlene Santos (marlene.bc.ufg@gmail.com) on 2014-09-19T21:05:56Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Barros, Toni Cézar P. F..pdf: 1070248 bytes, checksum: c077f85b2926645e0b58a66a7f389dd4 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Cláudia Bueno (claudiamoura18@gmail.com) on 2014-09-28T02:24:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Barros, Toni Cézar P. F..pdf: 1070248 bytes, checksum: c077f85b2926645e0b58a66a7f389dd4 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2014-09-28T02:24:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Barros, Toni Cézar P. F..pdf: 1070248 bytes, checksum: c077f85b2926645e0b58a66a7f389dd4 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-17<br>There are two questions about deontic logic that appear frequently in the literature on the subject. The first concerns the legitimacy and the second the deontic paradoxes. The first of these, however, is not the main concern of this paper, we assume, alongside Castañeda the thesis that there are logical relationships, not only between propositions, but also among imperatives and norms. Thus, the main focus of this paper will be to investigate deontic paradoxes, and in particular, the Castañeda‟s solution. This solution involves a distinction between propositions and practitions as well as between imperatives and norms. We also show the advantage of this solution compared to other solution named scope deontic operator. Finally, we analyze Lou Goble‟s criticism to Castañeda‟s solution and objections to this criticism.<br>Há duas questões acerca da lógica deôntica que aparecem com frequência na literatura sobre o tema. A primeira diz respeito à sua legitimidade e a segunda aos paradoxos deônticos. A primeira destas, entretanto, não é a principal preocupação deste trabalho: assumiremos, ao lado de Castañeda, a tese que há relações lógicas, não somente entre proposições, mas também entre imperativos e entre normas. Assim, o foco principal deste texto consistirá em investigar o problema dos paradoxos deônticos e, em particular, a proposta de solução de Castañeda aos mesmos. Tal solução envolve a distinção entre proposições e practições, bem como entre imperativos e normas. Também mostraremos a vantagem desta solução em relação às outras, denominadas de soluções de escopo do operador deôntico. E, por fim, analisaremos a crítica de Lou Goble à solução de Castañeda e objeções a esta crítica.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ArquivoTotalEugenia.pdf: 1111400 bytes, checksum: 8d0150bdfd73d917028015cfe5760882 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-15<br>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>This work deals with the question of logical consistency inside the context of moral dilemmas or, more specifically, genuine moral dilemmas, which are situations where someone has a conflict between two obligatory actions guided by the same moral principle. In other words, it is a situation where there are two moral obligations which should be satisfied, but since they are incompatible, while sometimes one is the negation of the other, they cannot be both accomplished. When we formalize moral dilemmas along with some deontic principles, the result is a contradiction. Inside the framework of classical deontic logic, due to its limitation of dealing with paradoxes of such kind, the existence of moral dilemmas is taken as something absurd, as an affront to rationality. Thus, given the inconsistency, the solution would be to deny the existence of the dilemmas, which has been the most widespread solution, or to deny the deontic principles involved in the inconsistency. We do not agree with these two solutions. Instead, we propose to weaken the rationalist argumentation based on the existence of dialetheias and on the suggestion of dealing with moral dilemmas inside a paraconsistent framework, in such a way that the existence of inconsistence would not be a reason any more to deny the existence of such dilemmas.<br>RESUMOO presente trabalho aborda a questão da consistência lógica dentro do contexto dos dilemas morais; mais especificamente dilemas morais genuínos, que são situações nas quais uma pessoa tem o conflito entre duas ações obrigatórias guiadas pelo mesmo princípio. Ou seja, existem duas obrigações que deveriam ser satisfeitas, mas por se tratarem de ações incompatíveis, em que uma é a negação da outra, não podem ambas ser praticadas. Quando se faz a formalização do dilema moral conjuntamente com alguns princípios deônticos o resultado é uma contradição. Dentro do framework da Lógica Deôntica clássica, por causa de sua limitação em tratar com paradoxos devido a alguns princípios clássicos, a existência dos dilemas morais é tida como algo absurdo ou uma afronta à racionalidade. Assim, dada à inconsistência, a solução seria negar a existência dos dilemas ou negar os princípios deônticos envolvidos na inconsistência. A solução mais propagada foi a negação da existência dos dilemas. Entretanto, discordando dessa solução, tentamos enfraquecer a argumentação racionalista com base na ideia de dialetéias e consequentemente sugerindo que, se os dilemas morais forem tratados em um framework paraconsistente a inconsistência não seria motivo suficiente para negar a existência desses dilemas.

As distributed systems grow in complexity, the interactions among individuals (agents, services) of such systems become increasingly more complex and therefore more difficult to constrain and monitor. We propose to view such systems as socio-technical systems, in which organisational and institutional concepts, such as norms, can be applied to improve not only control on the components but also their autonomy by the definition of soft rather than hard constraints. Norms can be described as rules that guide the behavior of individual agents pertaining to groups that abide to them, either by explicit or implicit support. The study of norms, and regulatory systems in general, in their many forms -e.g. social norms, conventions, laws, regulations- has been of interest since the beginning of philosophy, but has seen a lot of evolution during the 20th century due to the progress in the philosophy of language, especially concerning speech acts and deontic logic. Although there is a myriad of definitions and related terminologies about the concept of norm, and as such there are many perspectives on how to analyse their impact, a common denominator is that norms constrain the behaviour of groups of agents in a way that each individual agent can build, with a fair degree of confidence, expectations on how each of their counterparts will behave in the situations that the norms are meant to cover. For example, on a road each driver expects everybody else to drive on only one side of the road (right or left, depending on the country). Therefore, normative contexts, usually wrapped in the form of institutions, are effective mechanisms to ensure the stability of a complex system such as an organisation, a society, or even of electronic systems. The latter has been an object of interest in the field of Artificial Intelligence, and it has been seen as a paradigm of coordination among electronic agents either in multi-agent systems or in service-oriented architectures. In order to apply norms to electronic systems, research has come up with abstractions of normative systems. In some cases these abstractions are based on regimented systems with flexible definitions of the notion of norm, in order to include meanings of the concept with a coarse-grained level of logic formality such as conventions. Other approaches, on the other hand, propose the use of deontic logic for describing, from a more theoretical perspective, norm-governed interaction environments. In both cases, the purpose is to enable the monitoring and enforcement of norms on systems that include -although not limited to- electronic agents. In the present dissertation we will focus on the latter type, focusing on preserving the deontic aspect of norms. Monitoring in norm-governed systems requires making agents aware of: 1) what their normative context is, i.e. which obligations, permissions and prohibitions are applicable to each of them and how they are updated and triggered; and 2) what their current normative status is, i.e. which norms are active, and in what instances they are being fullfilled or violated, in order words, what their social -institutional- reality is. The current challenge is on designing systems that allow computational components to infer both the normative context and social reality in real-time, based on a theoretical formalism that makes such inferences sound and correct from a philosophical perspective. In the scope of multi-agent systems, many are the approaches proposed and implemented that full these requirements up to this date. However, the literature is still lacking a proposal that is suited to the current state-of-the-art in service-oriented architectures, more focused nowadays on automatically scalable, polyglot amalgams of lightweight services with extremely simple communication and coordination mechanisms- a trend that is being called “microservices”. This dissertation tackles this issue, by 1) studying what properties we can infer from distributed systems that allow us to treat them as part of a socio-technical system, and 2) analysing which mechanisms we can provide to distributed systems so that they can properly act as socio-technical systems. The main product of the thesis is therefore a collection of computational elements required for formally grounded and real-time e¬fficient understanding and monitoring of normative contexts, more specially: 1. An ontology of events to properly model the inputs from the external world and convert them into brute facts or institutional events; 2. A lightweight language for norms, suitable for its use in distributed systems; 3. An especially tailored formalism for the detection of social reality, based on and reducible to deontic logic with support for constitutive norms; 4. A reduction of such formalism to production rule systems; and 5. One or more implementations of this reduction, proven to e¬fficiently work on several scenarios. This document presents the related work, the rationale and the design/implementation of each one of these elements. By combining them, we are able to present novel, relevant work that enables the application of normative reasoning mechanisms in realworld systems in the form of a practical reasoner. Of special relevance is the fact that the work presented in this dissertation simplifies, while preserving formal soundness, theoretically complex forms of reasoning. Nonetheless, the use of production systems as the implementation-level materialisation of normative monitoring allows our work to be applied in any language and/or platform available, either in the form of rule engines, ECA rules or even if-then-else patterns. The work presented has been tested and successfully used in a wide range of domains and actual applications. The thesis also describes how our mechanisms have been applied to practical use cases based on their integration into distributed eldercare management and to commercial games.<br>Con el incremento en la complejidad de los sistemas distribuidos, las interacciones entre los individuos (agentes, servicios) de dichos sistemas se vuelven más y más complejas y, por ello, más difíciles de restringir y monitorizar. Proponemos ver a estos sistemas como sistemas socio-técnicos, en los que conceptos organizacionales e institucionales (como las normas) pueden aplicarse para mejorar no solo el control sobre los componentes sino también su autonomía mediante la definición de restricciones débiles (en vez de fuertes). Las Normas se pueden describir como reglas que guían el comportamiento de agentes individuales que pertenecen a grupos que las siguen, ya sea con un apoyo explícito o implícito. El estudio de las normas y de los sistemas regulatorios en general y en sus formas diversas -normas sociales, convenciones, leyes, reglamentos- ha sido de interés para los eruditos desde los inicios de la filosofía, pero ha sufrido una evolución mayor durante el siglo 20 debido a los avances en filosofía del lenguaje, en especial los relacionados con los actos del habla -speech acts en inglés- y formas deónticas de la lógica modal. Aunque hay una gran variedad de definiciones y terminología asociadas al concepto de norma, y por ello existen varios puntos de vista sobre como analizar su impacto, el denominador común es que las normas restringen el comportamiento de grupos de agentes de forma que cada agente individual puede construir, con un buen nivel de confianza, expectativas sobre cómo cada uno de los otros actores se comportará en las situaciones que las normas han de cubrir. Por ejemplo, en una carretera cada conductor espera que los demás conduzcan solo en un lado de la carretera (derecha o izquierda, dependiendo del país). Por lo tanto, los contextos normativos, normalmente envueltos en la forma de instituciones, constituyen mecanismos efectivos para asegurar la estabilidad de un sistema complejo como una organización, una sociedad o incluso un sistema electrónico. Lo último ha sido objeto de estudio en el campo de la Inteligencia Artificial, y se ha visto como paradigma de coordinación entre agentes electrónicos, tanto en sistemas multiagentes como en arquitecturas orientadas a servicios. Para aplicar normas en sistemas electrónicos, los investigadores han creado abstracciones de sistemas normativos. En algunos casos estas abstracciones se basan en sistemas regimentados con definiciones flexibles del concepto de norma para poder influir algunos significados del concepto con un menor nivel de granularidad formal como es el caso de las convenciones. Otras aproximaciones proponen el uso de lógica deóntica para describir, desde un punto de vista más teórico, entornos de interacción gobernados por normas. En ambos casos el propósito es el permitir la monitorización y la aplicación de las normas en sistemas que incluyen -aunque no están limitados a- agentes electrónicos. En el presente documento nos centraremos en el segundo tipo, teniendo cuidado en mantener el aspecto deóntico de las normas. La monitorización en sistemas gobernados por normas requiere el hacer a los agentes conscientes de: 1) cual es su contexto normativo, es decir, que obligaciones permisos y prohibiciones se aplican a cada uno de ellos y cómo se actualizan y activan; y 2) cual es su estado normativo actual, esto es, que normas están activas, y que instancias están siendo cumplidas o violadas, en definitiva, cual es su realidad social -o institucional-. En la actualidad el reto consiste en diseñar sistemas que permiten inferir a componentes computacionales tanto el contexto normativo como la realidad social en tiempo real, basándose en un formalismo teórico que haga que dichas inferencias sean correctas y bien fundamentadas desde el punto de vista filosófico. En el ámbito de los sistemas multiagente existen muchas aproximaciones propuestas e implementadas que cubren estos requisitos. Sin embargo, esta literatura aun carece de una propuesta que sea adecuada para la tecnología de las arquitecturas orientadas a servicios, que están más centradas en amalgamas políglotas y escalables de servicios ligeros con mecanismos de coordinación y comunicación extremadamente simples, una tendencia moderna que lleva el nombre de microservicios. Esta tesis aborda esta problemática 1) estudiando que propiedades podemos inferir de los sistemas distribuidos que nos permitan tratarlos como parte de un sistema sociotécnico, y 2) analizando que mecanismos podemos proporcionar a los sistemas distribuidos de forma que puedan actuar de forma correcta como sistemas socio-técnicos. El producto principal de la tesis es, por tanto, una colección de elementos computacionales requeridos para la monitorización e interpretación e_cientes en tiempo real y con clara base formal. En concreto: 1. Una ontología de eventos para modelar adecuadamente las entradas del mundo exterior y convertirlas en hechos básicos o en eventos institucionales; 2. Un lenguaje de normas ligero y sencillo, adecuado para su uso en arquitecturas orientadas a servicios; 3. Un formalismo especialmente adaptado para la detección de la realidad social, basado en y reducible a lógica deóntica con soporte para normas constitutivas; 4. Una reducción de ese formalismo a sistemas de reglas de producción; y 5. Una o más implementaciones de esta reducción, de las que se ha probado que funcionan eficientemente en distintos escenarios. Este documento presenta el estado del arte relacionado, la justificación y el diseño/implementación para cada uno de esos elementos. Al combinarlos, somos capaces de presentar trabajo novedoso y relevante que permite la aplicación de mecanismos de razonamiento normativo en sistemas del mundo real bajo la forma de un razonador práctico. De especial relevancia es el hecho de que el trabajo presentado en este documento simplifica formas complejas y teóricas de razonamiento preservando la correctitud formal. El uso de sistemas de reglas de producción como la materialización a nivel de implementación del monitoreo normativo permite que nuestro trabajo se pueda aplicar a cualquier lenguaje o plataforma disponible, ya sea en la forma de motores de reglas, reglas ECA o incluso patrones si-entonces. El trabajo presentado ha sido probado y usado con éxito en un amplio rango de dominios y aplicaciones prácticas. La tesis describe como nuestros mecanismos se han aplicado a casos prácticos de uso basados en su integración en la gestión distribuida de pacientes de edad avanzada o en el sector de los videojuegos comerciales.

The cloud computing paradigm introduces an efficient utilisation of huge computing resources by multiple users with minimal expense and deployment effort compared to traditional computing facilities. Although cloud computing has incredible benefits, some governments and enterprises remain hesitant to transfer their computing technology to the cloud as a consequence of the associated security challenges. Security is, therefore, a significant factor in cloud computing adoption. Cloud services consist of three layers: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Cloud computing services are accessed through network connections and utilised by multi-users who can share the resources through virtualisation technology. Accordingly, an efficient access control system is crucial to prevent unauthorised access. This thesis mainly investigates the IaaS security enhancement from an access control point of view.

A central problem of deontic logic is to reconstruct a notion of normative system (understood as a set of norms, together with their logical consequences) assuming the non-cognitvistic thesis according to which norms are neither true nor false. This work aims to solve this fundamental problem, starting from the key distinction between the concept of norm and the concept of normative proposition (i.e. the meaning of a statement about the existence/validity of a norm within a given normative system). Once I have analyzed (and “de-constructed”) the concept of normative proposition, I’ll examine some of the main proposals to solve this problem put forward within the scope of philosophical logic and analytical jurisprudence. In the first place, I’ll examine the “standard” approach to deontic logic, based on possible-world semantics. I’ll argue that the main flaw of this approach consist in the fact that, within the “standard deontic logic”, norms are deemed to be truth-apt entities – and this collides with the core thesis of non-cognitivism in ethics. Then, I’ll take into account a second attempt to explain the logical relation between the elements of a normative system, based on the so-called Proof-Theoretical semantic theory (developed, first of all, by Prawitz and Dummett); the basic idea of this theory is that the meaning of logical operators (such as deontic modalities) is fixed by the schematic rules for introducing them into a deduction’s premises and conclusions. Lastly, I’ll try to construct a logic for normative systems by adopting the set-theoretical approach developed within the expressive conception of norms (put forward by Alchourrón and Bulygin), and distinguishing between ‘norms’ (understood as results of speech-acts) and ‘normative statements’ (sentences expressing normative propositions). In this alternative reconstruction I’ll discern between two main normative speech-acts (irreducible to one another): command and permission. I will assume, then, that logical relations do not occur between norms but only between the norm-contents which are, depending on the cases, commanded or permitted by a norm-authority. To explain this logical relations between norm-contents I’ll make use of the notions of satisfiability (of norms) and of ‘rational norm-giver’.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>The current dissertation has as its main objective an exposition and critical analysis of Charles Kielkopf's translation of the Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) into a normal alethic logic, and the resulting construction of a system of deontic logic that captures Kantian fundamental concepts and principles such as the concept of causal necessity and the formulations of the Categorical Imperative concerning Kingdom of Nature and Kingdom of Ends. Since this process results in an interpretation of aspects of the Kantian philosophy, it has been chosen, initially, a presentation in general lines of these concepts and, considering the difficulties regarding the applicability of a translation process between deontic and ontic principles, it was done necessary also an exhibition concerning the problem of the inferential barriers, as well as of his more immediate consequence, i. e., Jörgensen's Dilemma. In a second moment, it was also made a characterization of normal modal systems, deontic ones and alethic ones, as well as of the notions of translation between logics and of Dawson modelling. The final chapter consists of a critical examination of Kielkopf's proposal, which uses Dawson modelling to develop a deontic logic based on the alethic system K1. Such Dawson modelling allows the definition of a deontic modalities in terms of iterated alethic modalities, therefore this model constitutes a way of avoiding the problems regarding inferential barriers. The development of an alternative for attribution of logical status to deontic concepts doesn't constitute, however, in an innovative aspect of this proposal, such aspect can be founded in the use made by Kielkopf of his formal model as a tool for the investigation of philosophical concepts, such as the Kantian concepts already mentioned.<br>A presente dissertação tem como objetivo uma apresentação da proposta de Charles Kielkopf, de tradução da lógica deôntica standard em uma lógica normal alética e de seus resultados quanto à construção de um sistema de lógica deôntica que capture conceitos e princípios kantianos como necessidade causal e as formulações do Imperativo Categórico acerca do Reino da Natureza e do Reino dos Fins. Uma vez que este processo resulta em uma interpretação de aspectos da filosofia kantiana, optou-se inicialmente por uma apresentação em linhas gerais destas concepções e, tendo em vista as dificuldades referentes a aplicabilidade de um processo de tradução entre princípios deônticos e ônticos, fez-se necessária também uma exposição acerca do problema das barreiras inferenciais, bem como de sua conseqüência mais imediata, a saber, o Dilema de Jörgensen. Num segundo momento, também foi feita uma caracterização dos sistemas modais normais, tanto deônticos quanto aléticos, bem como da noção de tradução entre lógicas e dos modelos de Dawson. O capítulo final consiste justamente num exame crítico da proposta de Kielkopf, o qual faz uso dos modelos de Dawson para desenvolver uma lógica deôntica a partir do sistema lógico K1. Tais modelos de Dawson permitem a definição de uma lógica deôntica em termos de modalidades aléticas iteradas, com o que este modelo constitui-se em uma maneira de evitar os problemas referentes às barreiras inferenciais. O desenvolvimento de uma alternativa para a atribuição de um status lógico a concepções deônticas não constitui, contudo, o aspecto inovador desta proposta, tal aspecto encontra-se justamente na utilização por Kielkopf, de seu modelo formal como uma ferramenta para a investigação de concepções filosóficas, no caso, as concepções kantianas já citadas.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>The current dissertation is the result of an investigation about the semantic of deontic logic. Restricting to the propositional version, the work had as the main objective of study some lectures of the philosopher J. Hintikka which semantic proposal for deontic logic includes a re-interpretation of an important notion in Kant s philosophy: the notion of a Kingdom of Ends. Kant also figures in the Hintikka proposal through the illustration of one of the results of his matter, it means, the distinction between logical and deontic consequence, from which the so called Kant s Principle is an example. Having as the objective the exposition of this proposal, it has chosen to situate it in a discussion about the convenience of formalizations has a tool of philosophical analysis. Therefore, the proposal of Hintikka figures as an example of formalization which the results can have relevant philosophical features. The general exposition of the Kantian formulations of the Categorical Imperative, especially the formulation of the Kingdom of Ends (the subject matter of the first chapter), it has as an aim to point the most relevant features in Kantian practical philosophy for doing the analysis that accomplishes on the third chapter.<br>A presente dissertação é o resultado de uma investigação acerca da semântica para lógica deôntica standard. Restringindo-se à versão proposicional da mesma, o trabalho teve como principal objeto de estudo alguns textos do filósofo J. Hintikka, cuja proposta de semântica para lógica deôntica inclui a reinterpretação de uma noção importante da filosofia de I. Kant: a noção de Reino dos Fins. Kant também figura na proposta de Hintikka pela ilustração de um dos resultados de sua abordagem, a saber, a distinção entre conseqüência lógica e conseqüência deôntica, da qual o assim chamado princípio de Kant é um exemplo. Tendo como objetivo a exposição desta proposta, optou-se por situá-la em uma discussão a respeito da conveniência da formalização enquanto ferramenta de análise filosófica. Sendo assim, a proposta de Hintikka figura como um exemplo de formalização cujos resultados podem ter características filosóficas relevantes. A exposição geral sobre as formulações kantianas do Imperativo Categórico, em especial a formulação do Reino dos Fins (tema do primeiro capítulo), tem como objetivo justamente apontar as características de maior relevância na filosofia prática de Kant para o trabalho de análise que se efetiva no terceiro capítulo da dissertação.

This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal (modal) systems for deontic logics, both on the propositional level, and on the first order one. In particular we developed our study the Multi-relational setting that generalises standard Kripke Semantics. We present new completeness results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K.

This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal (modal) systems for deontic logics, both on the propositional level, and on the first order one. In particular we developed our study the Multi-relational setting that generalises standard Kripke Semantics. We present new completeness results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K.

Orientador: Marcelo Esteban Coniglio<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-12T04:24:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Testa_RafaelRodrigues_M.pdf: 526495 bytes, checksum: 51a1bb2b8ec08b5fab8947cdac7f3ae4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008<br>Resumo: Nosso objetivo neste trabalho é apresentar uma proposta de solução a paradoxos relacionados à lógica deôntica presentes na literatura, reunidos sob o que é chamado de dilemas deônticos - situações nas quais duas obrigações conflitantes estão presentes num mesmo sistema normativo. Situações deste tipo, quando formalizadas (em SDL - standard deontic logic - ou em outras lógicas relacionadas), levam a uma inconsistência. Nossa proposta baseia-se em relações de preferência que geram uma ferramenta de escolha dentre as duas soluções normativas conflitantes, o que evita a inconsistência e permite o pleno cumprimento do sistema. Justificativas filosóficas são fornecidas as ferramentas lógicas, bem como as suas implicações.<br>Abstract: The main purpouse of this dissertation is the proposal of a solution to some paradoxes related to deontic logic presented in the literature, also known as deontic dilemmas - situations in which two conflicting obligations are present in the same normative system. Such situations, when formalized (in SDL - standard deontic logic - or in other related logic), lead to inconsistency. Our proposal is based on preference relations that generate a tool of choice between the two conflicting normative solutions, which avoids the inconsistency and allows the full implementation of the system. Philosophical justifications are given for the logical tools as well as for their implications.<br>Mestrado<br>Filosofia<br>Mestre em Filosofia

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia<br>Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-25T20:50:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 310362.pdf: 568829 bytes, checksum: b1af401127d820b21dfe73ffbfe145ed (MD5)<br>Este trabalho propõe uma busca para o desenvolvimento de uma lógica deôntica mais adequada e mais fiel à linguagem ordinária. Nosso ponto central foi a análise e compreensão acerca do que é um dilema moral e o seu correspondente formal. Uma situação é considerada um dilema moral quando um sujeito deve moralmente fazer A e deve moralmente fazer B, mas não pode fazer ambas. Chegamos à conclusão, durante nossas investigações, de que quando dizemos que um sujeito não pode cumprir ambas obrigações, a impossibilidade envolvida em um dilema não é lógica, mas apenas circunstancial. Em outras palavras, as obrigações A e B não são contraditórias, mas conflitantes devido a uma característica contingente da situação. Nossa proposta é a de que dilemas podem ser traduzidos pela fórmula Op Oq (p q). A formalização de dilemas em uma lógica, na maneira como estamos interpretando, envolve operadores deônticos e aléticos. Para que o dilema pudesse ser representado desta maneira, apresentamos um sistema bimodal não normal, o qual chamamos de EMD-S4 e demonstramos teoremas de correção, completude e decidibilidade.<br>This paper seeks to develop a deontic logic more appropriate and faithful to ordinary language. Our focus was the analysis and understanding of what is a moral dilemma and its formal correspondent. A situation is considered a moral dilemma when a subject should morally do A and should morally do B, but cannot do both. We concluded, during our investigation, that when we say that a subject can not fulfill both obligations, the impossibility involved in a dilemma is not logical, but only circumstantial. In other words, the obligations A and B are not contradictory, but conflict due to a contingent feature of the situation. Our proposal is that dilemmas can be translated by the formula (Op ^ Oq) ^ :^(p ^ q). According to our way, the formalization of dilemmas in logic involves deontic and alethic operators. In order to represent a dilemma in this way, we present a non normal bimodal system, which we called EMD-S4, and prove for it soundness, completeness and decidability theorems.

Orientador : Prof. Dr. Cesar Antonio Serbena<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Jurídicas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito. Defesa: Curitiba, 04/04/2016<br>Inclui referências : f. 125-128<br>Resumo: A lógica deôntica consolidou-se como modelo formal correspondente à função prescritiva da linguagem sobre a base técnica e conceitual da lógica modal alética. Essa derivação, conquanto tenha tornado o sistema-padrão de lógica deôntica (Standard Deontic Logic - SDL) completo e correto, gerou resultados contraintutivos que limitaram sua capacidade de análise da linguagem normativa. Em especial, a opção por atribuir uma matriz exclusivamente proposicional à lógica deôntica, oriunda em grande medida da intensa influência que os sistemas modais exerceram sobre a constituição sintática e semântica dos sistemas deônticos, eliminou uma importante característica já presente no sistema original de Georg Henrik von Wright, o propositor moderno da lógica normativa: a possibilidade de representar formalmente prescrições em termos de agentes e ações (dever-fazer) e não apenas em termos de estados de coisas cuja atualização se pretende (dever-ser). Através da apresentação de alguns sistemas vinculados a esta primeira tradição, também denominada Lógica Deôntica da Ação, e do aparato filosófico correlato, notadamente de alguns dos modelos propostos por von Wright e pelo lógico Héctor- Neri Castañeda, o trabalho pretende sugerir caminhos possíveis para o desenvolvimento de uma lógica deôntica sobre bases agenciais, bem como avaliar o modo como tal opção teórica, nas diferentes vertentes apresentadas, responde aos problemas conceituais mais destacados dos sistemas formais normativos. Palavras-chave: Lógica deôntica, lógica modal, semântica, ação, norma, dever-ser, dever-fazer.<br>Abstract: Deontic logic has established itself as a formal model of ordinary language's prescriptive function upon the technical and conceptual basis of alethic modal logic. Although this derivation had rendered the standard system of deontic logic (SDL) complete and sound, it also gendered counterintuitive results, reducing its analytical sharpness in the scrutiny of normative language. Particularly, opting to assign an exclusively propositional matrix to deontic logic due to the major influence that modal systems exerted over the syntactical and semantical constitution of deontic systems resulted in the elimination of an important feature already present in Georg Henrik von Wright's (the modern proponent of the logic of norms) original system: the formal possibility of depicting norms in terms of agents and actions (ought-to-do), and not only in terms of willingly realizable states of affairs (ought-to-be). Through the introduction of some systems pertaining to the former tradition, also known as Deontic Logic of Action, and the related philosophical aparatus (namely, models proposed by von Wright and the logician Héctor-Neri Castañeda), this work intends to suggest possible ways of developing deontic logic on agential basis, as well as to evaluate how this theoretical option, in the different aspects exhibited, answer to the highlighted conceptual problems of formal normative systems. Keywords: Deontic logic, modal logic, semantics, action, prescription, ought-to-be, ought-to-do.

This Ph. D. thesis is dedicated to two great problems of the logic of norms. The first problem is: Can norms be terms of the relation of logical contradiction? The second problem is: Is it possible to formulate a deontic principle of non-contradiction (i.e. a principle of contradiction valid for norms)? In chapter 1, I examine various philosophical presuppositions of the two questions. In chapter 2, I examine four ways of interpreting the two questions. In chapter 3, I propose my own hypothesis of the possibile formulation of deontic principle of non-contradiction.

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Jurídicas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Florianópolis, 2008.<br>Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-24T05:26:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 267240.pdf: 4201601 bytes, checksum: efef026b8a5051606359995f225c0f53 (MD5)<br>O estágio em que se encontra debate filosófico-jurídico da atualidade ainda se mantém na polêmica entre o positivismo jurídico (postura voluntarista) e os anti-positivismos (posturas racionalistas), em que o positivismo jurídico realça o papel descritivo da atividade do jurista, que ao encarar o Direito como sistema deve tratar de reconhecer o Direito validamente contido no interior de dito sistema e enfrentar seus problemas de redundância, de lacunas, de contradições, de vagueza, de ambigüidade de suas normas e assim por diante; ao passo que as teorias anti-positivistas com maior destaque na atualidade destacam o caráter argumentativo do Direito e esperam fornecer critérios para a otimização na tomada de decisões jurídicas, critérios esses que podem conter inclusive valorações morais. A presente tese não toma partido em favor de uma ou outra posição nessa polêmica, e não o faz porque a aplicação da lógica ao Direito, objeto central da discussão, prescinde de comprometimento com qualquer que seja a teoria do Direito analisada, haja vista que a lógica é de tal modo abstrata que pode estar a serviço de todas elas, como ferramenta de auxílio para o tratamento racional dos problemas que surgirem no interior dessas teorias. Preocupa-se, isto sim, com um aspecto singular da atividade jurídica, que é a utilização da técnica do precedente como regra de razão que exclui ou, ao menos, ajuda a atenuar a discricionariedade na interpretação e aplicação do Direito, técnica essa que pode ser aperfeiçoada com a aplicação de sistemas especialistas legais a partir da proposta e criação de modelos informáticos baseados em lógicas paraconsistentes, independentemente da teoria do Direito que se adote. Diante da crise por que passa a razão desde o início do século XX e as conseqüências dessa crise sobre a filosofia da ciência, constata-se que essa crise foi bastante frutífera para a teoria do conhecimento, sendo que desse contexto se extrai o marco metodológico da tese, em especial a adoção da idéia de verdade pragmática e o acolhimento do método axiomático para lidar com os problemas jurídicos. Sob esse enfoque, trilha-se o caminho percorrido pela história da filosofia do Direito tendo-se como baliza o problema da justiça a fim de que os problemas jurídicos a que se propõe oferecer guias para solução sejam explicitados. Descreve-se, então, o posicionamento teórico das correntes do pensamento jurídico que, ao tratarem da relação entre Direito e moral, apresentaram diversas propostas, desde a forma assumida pelo positivismo jurídico contemporâneo, que admite a discricionariedade e insiste na separação entre Direito e moral; passando pelos formuladores de teorias da argumentação que pretendem fornecer critérios objetivos de verificabilidade de correção de decisões; e chegando mesmo à proposta de que sempre deverá ser possível, em todos os casos, a tomada de uma decisão justa. A partir daí se introduz a idéia de universalização das decisões como um bom critério formal e objetivo de justiça; e dentro dele se lança a idéia de auto-precedente, isto é, a doutrina ou os critérios adotados pelo próprio juiz ou tribunal para a resolução de casos anteriores, em que o respeito ao precedente supõe, nessa concepção, uma exigência de autocongruência, procedimento esse que, em princípio, dirige-se ao passado como fidelidade a casos anteriores, mas que se remete também # e principalmente # ao futuro, neste caso como consciência de que um bom critério de resolução será o que deverá ser aplicado também para resolver casos posteriores, ou seja, o critério que se possa pretender que se transforme em precedente. Para a realização da tarefa acima mencionada, propõe-se a utilização da lógica formal como ferramenta. Para tanto, inicialmente se apresentam aspectos históricos da disciplina da lógica, em especial a criação das lógicas paraconsistentes por Newton da Costa; após o que se parte para a demonstração da possibilidade de aplicação da lógica formal ao Direito; e, por fim, indica-se a aplicação de cálculos lógicos paraconsistentes na construção de sistemas especialistas legais que sirvam como instrumento de controle de racionalidade de auxílio ao intérprete na tomada de suas decisões jurídicas.

<p>Deontic Action Logic Multi Agent System (DALMAS) är en typ av</p><p>multiagentsystem där agenternas handlingar regleras av ett normativt system. Teorin</p><p>för DALMAS bygger på deontisk logik, och normer i det normativa systemet</p><p>uttrycks i termer av Kanger-Lindahls teori om normativa positioner. Syftet med</p><p>detta arbete är att försöka reda ut vilka eventuella fördelar ett normativt system kan</p><p>ge samt hur man ska kunna skapa effektivt sådant. Går det att skapa ett normsystem</p><p>som kan lösa samma problem som ett konventionellt MAS löser? För att kunna</p><p>jämföra de olika normsystemen har kriterier för hög effektivitet tagits fram.</p><p>Testresultaten visar bl.a. att ett enkelt normsystem fungerar bättre än inget alls.</p><p>Tester av den befintliga prologimplementationen har också gjorts vilket har bidragit</p><p>till förslag till förbättringar av DALMAS-arkitekturen och implementationen.</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raquel Kobashi Gallinati.pdf: 412702 bytes, checksum: 2fc8df8533225cbc6d9ca2781ad6127a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-01<br>Deontic Logic to arise in the middle of the 1926, though the thinker Ernest Mally. Years latter, in 1951, George Henrik VON WRIGHT published the article Deontic Logic, stimulating its development. Our goal, on this work, is to show the purposes and convictions of the Deontic Logic of VON WRIGHT and the connection between Finalistic Theory of HANS WELZEL. First of all, we will begin the work, dealing with logic. We will do a brief introduction about logic, with the intention of the enter studies of the Deontic Logic of VON WRIGHT. We will accept yours concepts and theories about the Deontic Logic. This work finish with the connection between causality bordered of the Action Theory of HANS WELZEL and the causality of VON WRIGHT.<br>A lógica deôntica surgiu como estudo em meados de 1926, através do grande pensador Ernest Mally. Anos mais tarde, em 1951, George Henrik VON WRIGHT publicou o artigo Deontic Logic, e a partir daí a lógica deôntica teve maior desenvolvimento. Nosso objetivo, neste trabalho, é o de expor os pressupostos e convicções da lógica deôntica de VON WRIGHT e a relação com a teoria finalista da ação de HANS WELZEL. Iniciaremos o trabalho, discorrendo sobre a origem da lógica. Faremos uma breve introdução sobre à lógica, com o intuito de adentrarmos no estudo da lógica deôntica de VON WRIGHT. Aceitaremos seus conceitos e teorias a respeito da lógica deôntica. O trabalho termina com a relação de causalidade limitada pela teoria da ação de HANS WELZEL e a causalidade de VON WRIGHT

In this work, Kurt Holukoff examines three formal approaches to representing valid inferences in reasoning regarding obligation and its cognates: deontic logic. He argues that an appropriate formalization of deontic logic should take genuine moral dilemmas seriously, be capable of representing trumping-like reasoning, and not make the naturalistic fallacy valid as a matter of logic. The three systems he investigates are, the Standard Deontic logic, a Relevant Deontic logic, and Schotch and Jennings’ multiple moral accessibility relations Deontic logic. The Standard Deontic logic has seemingly insurmountable problems representing both fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, the naturalistic fallacy is valid in the Standard Deontic logic. The Relevant deontic logic that the author examines is capable of representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and does not make valid the naturalistic fallacy. However, the author argues that the Relevant deontic logic needs some revisions in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Likewise, the author finds that Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic is capable of representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations. However, in order to represent trumping-like reasoning, revisions to Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic are apparently required. Similar revisions are seemingly required to block the naturalistic fallacy, which is otherwise valid in Schotch and Jennings’ original system.

Title: Hare's thesis as a logical and philosophical problem Author: Martin Luhan Department: Department of Logic Supervisor: PhDr. Vladimír Svoboda, CSc. Abstract: The present work is aiming to analyse the problem of inferring from impe- rative premisses to an indicative conclusion which goes by the name Hare's Thesis. The logical analysis of the language of morals was the basis of Richard M. Hare's ethical studies. Therefore a brief presentation of his philosophy is given followed by a detailed walkthrough of his way of dealing with impera- tives. Hare states that logic should be interested in dealing with prescriptive sentences. The paper also presents a selection of some of the semantics of logic of imperatives and some of their fundamental problems. Based on this we finally analyse whether the Hare's Thesis which forbids inferring from im- perative premisses to indicative conclusions is acceptable. And we conclude that in most cases it is reasonable to reject it. Keywords: Logic of imperatives, Hare's Thesis, deontic logic, metaethics

Legal texts are typically written in a natural language. However, a legal text that is written in a formal language has the advantage of being subject to automation, at least partially. Such a translation is not easy, and the matter is even more complex because the law changes with time, so if we formalized a legal text that was originally written in natural language, there is a need to keep track of the change. This thesis proposes original developments on these subjects. In order to formalize a legal document, we provide a pipeline for the translation of a legal text from natural to formal language and we apply it to the case of natural resources contracts. In general, adjectives play an important role in a text and they allow to characterize it: for this reason we developed a logical system aimed at reasoning with gradable adjectives. Regarding norm change, we provide an ontology to represent change in a normative system, some basic mechanisms by which an agent may acquire new norms, and a study on the problem of revising a defeasible theory by only changing its facts. Another contribution of this thesis is a general framework for revision that includes the previous points as specific cases.

Thèse par articles.<br>La présente thèse fait état des avancées en logique déontique et propose des outils formels pertinents à l'analyse de la validité des inférences légales. D'emblée, la logique vise l'abstraction de différentes structures. Lorsqu'appliquée en argumentation, la logique permet de déterminer les conditions de validité des inférences, fournissant ainsi un critère afin de distinguer entre les bons et les mauvais raisonnements. Comme le montre la multitude de paradoxes en logique déontique, la modélisation des inférences normatives fait cependant face à divers problèmes. D'un point de vue historique, ces difficultés ont donné lieu à différents courants au sein de la littérature, dont les plus importants à ce jour sont ceux qui traitent de l'action et ceux qui visent la modélisation des obligations conditionnelles. La présente thèse de doctorat, qui a été rédigée par articles, vise le développement d'outils formels pertinents à l'analyse du discours juridique. En première partie, nous proposons une revue de la littérature complémentaire à ce qui a été entamé dans Peterson (2011). La seconde partie comprend la contribution théorique proposée. Dans un premier temps, il s'agit d'introduire une logique déontique alternative au système standard. Sans prétendre aller au-delà de ses limites, le système standard de logique déontique possède plusieurs lacunes. La première contribution de cette thèse est d'offrir un système comparable répondant au différentes objections pouvant être formulées contre ce dernier. Cela fait l'objet de deux articles, dont le premier introduit le formalisme nécessaire et le second vulgarise les résultats et les adapte aux fins de l'étude des raisonnements normatifs. En second lieu, les différents problèmes auxquels la logique déontique fait face sont abordés selon la perspective de la théorie des catégories. En analysant la syntaxe des différents systèmes à l'aide des catégories monoïdales, il est possible de lier certains de ces problèmes avec des propriétés structurelles spécifiques des logiques utilisées. Ainsi, une lecture catégorique de la logique déontique permet de motiver l'introduction d'une nouvelle approche syntaxique, définie dans le cadre des catégories monoïdales, de façon à pallier les problèmes relatifs à la modélisation des inférences normatives. En plus de proposer une analyse des différentes logiques de l'action selon la théorie des catégories, la présente thèse étudie les problèmes relatifs aux inférences normatives conditionnelles et propose un système déductif typé.<br>The present thesis develops formal tools relevant to the analysis of legal discourse. When applied to legal reasoning, logic can be used to model the structure of legal inferences and, as such, it provides a criterion to discriminate between good and bad reasonings. But using logic to model normative reasoning comes with some problems, as shown by the various paradoxes one finds within the literature. From a historical point of view, these paradoxes lead to the introduction of different approaches, such as the ones that emphasize the notion of action and those that try to model conditional normative reasoning. In the first part of this thesis, we provide a review of the literature, which is complementary to the one we did in Peterson (2011). The second part of the thesis concerns our theoretical contribution. First, we propose a monadic deontic logic as an alternative to the standard system, answering many objections that can be made against it. This system is then adapted to model unconditional normative inferences and test their validity. Second, we propose to look at deontic logic from the proof-theoretical perspective of category theory. We begin by proposing a categorical analysis of action logics and then we show that many problems that arise when trying to model conditional normative reasoning come from the structural properties of the logic we use. As such, we show that modeling normative reasoning within the framework of monoidal categories enables us to answer many objections in favour of dyadic and non-monotonic foundations for deontic logic. Finally, we propose a proper typed deontic system to model legal inferences.

The subject matter of master disseration is rational behavior. Its dedicated to the following questions: what kind of behavior can be named “rational”, and how we can model it in strict logical terms (and then in program languages). These questions were raised earlier in Artificial Intelligence researches, and very soon the modeling of human behavior for computers encounters some problems. The general name of these problems is the frame problem.The main aim of the research work is solution of the frame problem from deontic logic point of view. I find this formalism the most suitable for investigation of human (rational) behavior. The work contain historical consideration of the frame problem and its strict definition in terms of basic formalism, as interconnection of two correlated problems: ramification problem and qualification problem. The ramification problem is given an option to solve it by extending the basic formalism (with adding of notion of state constraints, influence information and, most importantly, the laws of causal relationships). To solve the problem of qualification the formalism is extended by introducing possible worlds semantic. We consider the properties of this model and offers a solution to the problem of qualification through valuation by the expectation degree, and introducing normative modal operators on this basis.<br>Общая тема магистерской диссертации - рациональное поведение. Рассмотрение последнего в рамках Искусственного Интеллекта с точки зрения моделирования в строгих логических терминах (для последующего воспроизведения в языках программирования) привело к выявлению ряда трудностей. Общее название им - проблема фреймов. Главная цель данной работы - решение проблемы фреймов с точки зрения логики деонтических модальностей. В диссертации проводится историческое рассмотрение проблемы фреймов, дается строгое её определение для введенного базового формализма (как двух взаимосвязанных проблем — проблемы ветвлений и проблемы квалификации). Рассматривается проблема ветвлений, дается вариант её решения за счет расширения базового формализма (добавляются понятия ограничений состояний, информации о влияниях, и, самое главное, законов причинных связей). Рассматривается проблема квалификации, базовый формализм расширяется посредством введения для него семантики возможных миров, рассматриваются свойства этой модели и предлагается вариант решения проблемы квалификации за счет оценки по степени ожидаемости, и вводящихся на этой основе модальных нормативных операторов.

Ce mémoire se veut une synthèse critique de la littérature portant sur la logique déontique. Le premier objectif est d'y présenter un aperçu historique de son origine et de son évolution. Cet objectif sera principalement atteint par le biais du chapitre 2 portant sur les paradoxes, lequel nous permettra non seulement de voir en réaction à quoi les principales approches se sont développées, mais nous donnera aussi une vue d'ensemble quant aux différents courants que l'on retrouve en logique déontique. En second lieu, cet ouvrage vise à fournir une synthèse de la littérature portant sur l'analyse formelle du discours normatif. Les chapitres 3, 4 et 5 offrent une synthèse des principaux courants qui cherchent à répondre à cet objectif, ce que l'on peut regrouper sous trois banières, à savoir les logiques monadiques, les logiques dyadiques et les logiques temporelles. Finalement, nous proposons une lecture critique de cette littérature. Cette critique, qui repose notamment sur la prémisse à savoir que la logique déontique se doit non pas de rendre compte de l'utilisation du discours normatif mais plutôt de sa structure, vise à montrer que les systèmes actuels ne parviennent pas à rendre compte adéquatement de certaines caractéristiques fondamentales au discours juridique.<br>In this essay we aim to provide a critical analysis of the literature regarding deontic logic. First of all, we wish to give a historical account of deontic logic's evolution, which will be done mainly by chapter 2. This chapter concerns the paradoxes of deontic logic and gives an overview of the usual systems and their origin. Our second objective is to provide a synthesis of the literature regarding the formal analysis of the normative discourse. The chapters 3, 4 and 5 give an account of the three principal ways which deal with deontic operators, that is the monadic deontic logic, the dyadic deontic logic and the temporal deontic logic. Finally, we propose a critical analysis of that literature and we show that these systems do not represent adequately some of the normative discourse's fundamental characteristics. We will accomplish this by providing an analysis of the legal discourse and show that the concept of obligation has some properties and behaves in a way that cannot be represented by the actual systems.<br>Cet ouvrage a été rédigé en LaTeX, ce qui permet d'atteindre directement certaines sections, notes ou références bibliographiques par le biais des hyperliens.