Journal articles: 'Deontic logic'

1

Makinson, David, and Lennart Aqvist. "Deontic Logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic 54, no. 4 (1989): 1481. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274831.

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Lokhorst, Gert-Jan C., and Lou Goble. "MALLY’S DEONTIC LOGIC." Grazer Philosophische studien 67, no. 1 (2004): 37–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000823.

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MARES, EDWIN D. "Andersonian deontic logic*." Theoria 58, no. 1 (2008): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1992.tb01152.x.

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Hansson, Sven Ove. "Situationist Deontic Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, no. 4 (1997): 423–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1004233913104.

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Canavotto, Ilaria, and Alessandro Giordani. "Enriching deontic logic." Journal of Logic and Computation 29, no. 2 (2018): 241–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exy007.

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Van De Putte, Frederik. "Coarse deontic logic." Journal of Logic and Computation 29, no. 2 (2018): 285–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exy010.

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Goble, Lou. "Utilitarian deontic logic." Philosophical Studies 82, no. 3 (1996): 317–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00355312.

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Kontopoulos, Efstratios, Nick Bassiliades, Guido Governatori, and Grigoris Antoniou. "A Modal Defeasible Reasoner of Deontic Logic for the Semantic Web." International Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems 7, no. 1 (2011): 18–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jswis.2011010102.

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Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic formalism that deals with incomplete and conflicting information, whereas modal logic deals with the concepts of necessity and possibility. These types of logics play a significant role in the emerging Semantic Web, which enriches the available Web information with meaning, leading to better cooperation between end-users and applications. Defeasible and modal logics, in general, and, particularly, deontic logic provide means for modeling agent communities, where each agent is characterized by its cognitive profile and normative system, as well as policies, which define privacy requirements, access permissions, and individual rights. Toward this direction, this article discusses the extension of DR-DEVICE, a Semantic Web-aware defeasible reasoner, with a mechanism for expressing modal logic operators, while testing the implementation via deontic logic operators, concerned with obligations, permissions, and related concepts. The motivation behind this work is to develop a practical defeasible reasoner for the Semantic Web that takes advantage of the expressive power offered by modal logics, accompanied by the flexibility to define diverse agent behaviours. A further incentive is to study the various motivational notions of deontic logic and discuss the cognitive state of agents, as well as the interactions among them.

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Drofiszyn, Marcin. "Zasada aglomeracji i dylematy moralne." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14, no. 4 (2020): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.14.4.5.

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A Deontic Logic for Normative DilemmasAbstract: Standard deontic logic does not tolerate normative conflicts. If we assume that one ought to do A and ought to do B, but cannot do them both, we get a contradiction within deontic logic. Philosophers who deny that there could be genuine moral dilemmas treat this fact as the proof that dilemmas are logically impossible. At the same time, the advocates of the possibility of moral dilemmas propose to reject or restrict standard deontic principles. What consequences does it have for the resulting logic? Some of them are too strong because they contain the theorem of normative triviality or “deontic explosion,” which says that if there is any case of normative conflict, then everything is obligatory. On the other hand, some of them are too weak, since they are not able to validate more important deontic inferences especially the Smith Argument. Lou Goble introduces three criteria of adequacy that any deontic logic should meet if it is to accommodate normative conflicts successfully. First, I present these conditions and then I introduce a new logic of ought that fully meets all of them.

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Da Costa, Newton C. A., and Walter A. Carnielli. "On paraconsistent deontic logic." Philosophia 16, no. 3-4 (1986): 293–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02379748.

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Gabbay, D. M., and C. Strasser. "Reactive standard deontic logic." Journal of Logic and Computation 25, no. 1 (2012): 117–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043.

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Bentzen, Martin Mose. "Action Type Deontic Logic." Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23, no. 4 (2014): 397–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-014-9205-0.

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Malec. "Deontic Logics as Axiomatic Extensions of First-Order Predicate Logic: An Approach Inspired by Wolniewicz’s Formal Ontology of Situations." Axioms 8, no. 4 (2019): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/axioms8040109.

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The aim of this article is to present a method of creating deontic logics as axiomatic theories built on first-order predicate logic with identity. In the article, these theories are constructed as theories of legal events or as theories of acts. Legal events are understood as sequences (strings) of elementary situations in Wolniewicz′s sense. On the other hand, acts are understood as two-element legal events: the first element of a sequence is a choice situation (a situation that will be changed by an act), and the second element of this sequence is a chosen situation (a situation that arises as a result of that act). In this approach, legal rules (i.e., orders, bans, permits) are treated as sets of legal events. The article presents four deontic systems for legal events: AEP, AEPF, AEPOF, AEPOFI. In the first system, all legal events are permitted; in the second, they are permitted or forbidden; in the third, they are permitted, ordered or forbidden; and in the fourth, they are permitted, ordered, forbidden or irrelevant. Then, we present a deontic logic for acts (AAPOF), in which every act is permitted, ordered or forbidden. The theorems of this logic reflect deontic relations between acts as well as between acts and their parts. The direct inspiration to develop the approach presented in the article was the book Ontology of Situations by Boguslaw Wolniewicz, and indirectly, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

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NISSAN, EPHRAIM. "Special Issue: Temporal Logic in Engineering." Artificial Intelligence for Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacturing 13, no. 2 (1999): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0890060499132013.

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Logic-based models are thriving within artificial intelligence. A great number of new logics have been defined, and their theory investigated. Epistemic logics introduce modal operators for knowledge or belief; deontic logics are about norms, and introduce operators of deontic necessity and possibility (i.e., obligation or prohibition). And then we have a much investigated class—temporal logics—to whose application to engineering this special issue is devoted. This kind of formalism deserves increased widespread recognition and application in engineering, a domain where other kinds of temporal models (e.g., Petri nets) are by now a fairly standard part of the modelling toolbox.

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15

Meyer, J. J. Ch. "A different approach to deontic logic: deontic logic viewed as a variant of dynamic logic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29, no. 1 (1987): 109–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093637776.

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Лисанюк, Е. Н. "Deontic ‘cocktail’ according to E. Mally’s receipt." Logical Investigations 19 (April 9, 2013): 100–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2013-19-0-100-121.

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In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has proposed three fundamental distinctions which proved to be important in the context of the further development of the logic of norms. It is argued that in his philosophical considerations Mally has introduced a number of important distinctions concerning the very concept of norm, but by getting them confused in introducing the subsequent formalisms he failed to formally preserve them. In some of his philosophically made distinctions Mally apparently foresaw contemporary trends in logic of norms. To some extent this particular feature of Mally’s system open wide opportunities to reconstruct –– with the corresponding renovations — his ill-formed Deontik into many nowadays known systems of logic of norms and thus provides a fertile ground for this kind of research.

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Yurkevych, Olena. "EXISTENCE OF NORMS OF LAW AS A PROBLEM IN DEONTIC LOGIC." BULLETIN OF YAROSLAV MUDRYI NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY. SERIES:PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHIES OF LAW, POLITICAL SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY 2020, (VOL 1) 44 (2020): 39–52. https://doi.org/10.21564/2075-7190.44.195765.

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Problem setting. The existence of the rule of law as a problem of deontic logic is defined in the plane of logical and ontological problems of law, its origin is connected with the Jorgensen dilemma. The study of legal norms as existing established their inconsistency with the ideal of rational science. The existence of contradictions and gaps in the law does not correspond to the principles of consistency and completeness. The study of existing legal norms requires the further development of deontic concepts, clarification of the criteria for the existence and logical significance of legal norms, the development of formalization, and so on. Recent research and publications analysis. The origin of deontic logic is associated with the name of Aristotle, later it was systematically investigated by G. V. F. Leibniz, I. Bentham, in the twentieth century it was finally formed. In the works of S. Mali, A. Hoffler, E. Menger, an axiomatic system for describing deontic concepts was created. The problem of the existence of legal norms in deontic logic was posed in the work “Deontic Logic” by G. von Wrigt and later investigated in the writings of K. Alchurron and E. V. Bulygin, who analyzed the completeness and consistency of the legal system, conflicts in legislation and “white spots” “in the right. They first created the formal theory of norms as a secondorder logical theory. In Ukraine, research on deontic logic was carried out by A. E. Konversky, S. I. Maksimov, E. N. Yurkevych and others. Paper objective. The purpose of the study is to reveal the problem of the existence of rules of law in terms of the tasks of logical analytics, the level of development of logical tools in deontic logic, taking into account and deepening knowledge of the logic of practical thinking of lawyers. Paper main body. Modern deontic logic explores logical forms and the rules for their application in normative contexts. These contexts are sets of prescriptive and descriptive statements. The deontic concept connects the content of the utterance with a certain action under certain conditions. This creates the character of the norm. Systems of deontic logic are based on the traditional logic of utterances and the interdependence of deontic concepts (“forbidden”, “obligatory”, “allowed”). In deontic deduction, the conclusion is made by analogy with the action and is evaluated in terms of “justified” / “permissible”, and not “true” / “false”. The basic principles for the deontic system are the principles of deontic completeness and consistency. The existence of rules of law determines their strength and is associated with the establishment or termination of the regulatory relationship, which is the relationship between the authority and the subject of the norm. To consider the various aspects of normative relations, the concepts of different degrees of abstraction are taken: communication, utterance and proposition. The principle of consistency of the norm determines the possibility of its implementation, and hence the possibility of its existence. Conflicting rules issued by different authorities may exist (“conflict of will”). And the contradictory norms formulated by one instance mean the presence of irrational will. The introduction of the ontological criterion of rational / irrational will becomes crucial for the logic of practical thinking regarding the existence of legal norms. Conflicting norms in the same norms corpus cannot be simultaneously enforceable. In the formalization of deontic expressions, propositional norms are reduced to propositions about the existence of norms, provided that the norm is promulgated by a certain authority. Conclusions of the research. The development of the problem of the existence of rules of law in deontic logic has developed a logical methodology by deepening knowledge of ontological topics and logic of practical thinking, expanding the concept of the corpus of rules of law, rethinking the principles of consistency and completeness of the legal system, as well as the possibilities and symbolic instrumentalization, which logistical tools, symbolization of legal instance, clarification of logical meanings with respect to existing norms.

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18

Horty, John F. "Deontic logic as founded on nonmonotonic logic." Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 9, no. 1-2 (1993): 69–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01531262.

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19

Searle, Christopher J. "Logic Oughtn't be Normative." Disputatio philosophica 22, no. 1 (2021): 3–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.32701/dp.22.1.1.

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Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the normative status of logic involves the assumption that the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction between deontic and axiological normativity as applied to logical theory and demonstrate that because deontic sentences are not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic sense. I conclude that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of as normative is axiologically.

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van Benthem, Johan, Davide Grossi, and Fenrong Liu. "Priority Structures in Deontic Logic." Theoria 80, no. 2 (2013): 116–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12028.

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Forrester, Mary, and Risto Hilpinen. "New Studies in Deontic Logic." Noûs 20, no. 3 (1986): 421. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215308.

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Goble, Lou. "Multiplex semantics for deontic logic." Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, no. 2 (2000): 113–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505788.

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Tamminga, Allard. "Deontic Logic for Strategic Games." Erkenntnis 78, no. 1 (2011): 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9349-0.

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Goble, Lou. "A logic for deontic dilemmas." Journal of Applied Logic 3, no. 3-4 (2005): 461–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2005.04.004.

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Ju, Fengkui, and Jan van Eijck. "A temporal dynamic deontic logic." Journal of Logic and Computation 29, no. 2 (2018): 265–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exy008.

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Hugly, Philip, and Charles Sayward. "Moral relativism and deontic logic." Synthese 85, no. 1 (1990): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00873198.

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McNamara, P. "Review: Agency and Deontic Logic." Mind 113, no. 449 (2004): 179–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.449.179.

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Von Wright, Georg Henrik. "Deontic Logic: A Personal View." Ratio Juris 12, no. 1 (1999): 26–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9337.00106.

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Coyle, Sean. "The Possibility of Deontic Logic." Ratio Juris 15, no. 3 (2002): 294–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9337.00210.

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Segerberg, Krister. "DΔL: a dynamic deontic logic". Synthese 185, S1 (2011): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9953-1.

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Loreggia, Andrea, Emiliano Lorini, and Giovanni Sartor. "Modelling Ceteris Paribus Preferences with Deontic Logic." Journal of Logic and Computation 32, no. 2 (2022): 347–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exab088.

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Abstract We present a formal semantics for deontic logic based on the concept of ceteris paribus preferences. We introduce notions of unconditional obligation and permission as well as conditional obligation and permission that are interpreted relative to this semantics. We show that these notions satisfy some intuitive properties and, at the same time, do not encounter some problems and paradoxes that have been extensively discussed in the deontic logic literature. We prove that the satisfiability problem for our logic is in NP. Finally, we show that the fragment of our logic in which the content of a deontic operator is a literal has an equivalent representation based on conditional preference networks (CP-nets).

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Rebuschi, Manuel. "Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-Fledged Modalities." Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (2008): 103–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.07.

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This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in ethical logic.

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Drofiszyn, Marcin. "Dylematy moralne i logika deontyczna." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14, no. 3 (2019): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.14.3.9.

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Moral Dilemmas and Deontic Logic In the paper I discuss an argument of deontic logic concerning the problem of the existence of moral dilemmas. First, I draw attention to the philosophical context of this argument and present three proofs which reveal an inconsistency in the nature of moral dilemmas. These proofs, however, are philosophically and logically controversial. Accordingly, I provide an alternative proof, based on the LP-system of deontic logic. The system is described from syntactic and semantic point of view. Assuming only the noncontroversial axiom K and a certain formulation of Elzenberg’s principle, I argue that, from the point of view of the LP-system, there is an inconsistency in the definition of moral dilemmas.

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Jacquette, Dale. "Forrester's Paradox." Dialogue 25, no. 4 (1986): 761–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049684.

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In “Gentle Murder, Or The Adverbial Samaritan”, James William Forrester presents what he describes as “the most powerful version yet put forward” of Lennart Åqvist's Good Samaritan paradox in deontic logic. Forrester suggests that the paradox may make it necessary to reject the standard deontic inference principle(where “r” is an index for any source of obligation). This desperate conclusion, as Forrester acknowledges, would imply that all of standard deontic logic “must be in a bad way”. But Forrester's “paradox” is not nearly so deep or intractable as he maintains.

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Redmond, Walter. "Logical Analogies: Interpretations, Oppositions, and Probabilism." Philosophies 4, no. 2 (2019): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020013.

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I present two logical systems to show the “analogy of proportionality” common to several interpretations: modality (necessity and possibility), quantification, truth-functional relations, moral attitudes (deontic logic), states of knowledge (epistemic logic), and states of belief (doxastic logic). To display the two underlying analogical relations, I call upon the originally Scholastic convention, recently put to use again, of using squares, hexagons, and octagons “of opposition”. A combined epistemic–deontic logic happens to be found in the traditional “probabilist” theory of the “good conscience”, and I shall then briefly explain how this is so.

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Faroldi, Federico L. G. "Deontic modals and hyperintensionality." Logic Journal of the IGPL 27, no. 4 (2019): 387–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzz011.

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Abstract In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis (that deontic modals are not hyperintensional) leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power (e.g. Ross’s paradox, the Gentle Murderer, The Good Samaritan, Free Choice Permission and the Miners’ Paradox disappear). I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequences. In Section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperintensionality. In Section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are illfitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In Section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.

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Jobczyk, Krystian. "Multi-valued deontic Halpern-Shoham logic for fuzzy deontic-temporal expressions." Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 36, no. 5 (2019): 5091–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/jifs-179054.

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Trelles, Oscar. "Donald Nute (ed.): Defeasible Deontic Logic." Areté 13, no. 2 (2001): 183–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.200102.008.

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Schlesinger, George N. "The Central Principle of Deontic Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, no. 4 (1985): 515. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107562.

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Åqvist, Lennart. "Three characterizability problems in deontic logic." Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, no. 2 (2000): 65–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08066200050505760.

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TRANØY, K. E. "Deontic logic and deontically perfect worlds1." Theoria 36, no. 3 (2008): 221–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00423.x.

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Wansing, Heinrich. "Agency and Deontic Logic, J.F. Horty." Journal of Logic, Language and Information 13, no. 3 (2004): 379–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:jlli.0000028421.66183.6b.

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Goble, L. "Deontic logic (adapted) for normative conflicts." Logic Journal of IGPL 22, no. 2 (2013): 206–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzt022.

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JONES, ANDREW J. I. "Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation." Ratio Juris 3, no. 2 (1990): 237–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1990.tb00060.x.

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OPA?EK, KAZIMIERZ, and JAN WOLEŃSKI. "Normative Systems, Permission and Deontic Logic." Ratio Juris 4, no. 3 (1991): 334–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00103.x.

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JONES, ANDREW J. I. "On the Logic of Deontic Conditionals." Ratio Juris 4, no. 3 (1991): 355–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00105.x.

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Lokhorst, Gert-Jan C. "Mally’s Deontic Logic: Reducibility and Semantics." Journal of Philosophical Logic 44, no. 3 (2014): 309–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-014-9320-z.

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Brown, Mark A. "Rich deontic logic: a preliminary study." Journal of Applied Logic 2, no. 1 (2004): 19–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2004.01.002.

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Hansen, Jörg. "Conflicting imperatives and dyadic deontic logic." Journal of Applied Logic 3, no. 3-4 (2005): 484–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2005.04.005.

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Segerberg, Krister. "Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic." Journal of Applied Logic 7, no. 4 (2009): 388–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2009.04.001.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Deontic logic'

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