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1
Dance and the lived body: A descriptive aesthetics. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987.
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2
Andrzej, Wierciński, ed. Between description and interpretation: The hermeneutic turn in phenomenology. Toronto, Ont: Hermeneutic Press, 2005.
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3
1968-, Benoist Jocelyn, and Laugier Sandra, eds. Husserl et Wittgenstein: De la description de l'experience a la phenomenologie linguistique. Hildesheim: Olms, 2004.
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4
(France), École normale supérieure, ed. Langages de la phénoménologie: Expression, description et rhétorique, de Husserl à Blumenberg. Paris: Hermann, 2022.
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5
Stubley, Eleanor Victoria. An exploration of verbal description and reflection as a means of exploring how musical meanings are shaped and understood in light of theories of Thomas Clifton and Michael Parsons. [Urbana: s.n.], 1989.
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7
Fisette, Denis. Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.6.
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This chapter is about Husserl’s early phenomenology. It is divided into five parts. The first part is about the young Husserl’s years of study and his encounter with Brentano in Vienna and with Carl Stumpf in Halle. The second and third parts are meant to succinctly describe Husserl’s original contribution to Brentano’s philosophical program prior to the publication of his Logical Investigations in 1900–1. In the fourth part, the chapter examines Husserl’s criticism of Brentano’s criteria in his Psychology for delineating the two classes of phenomena and Husserl’s arguments for the delineation of his phenomenology in the first edition of his Hauptwerk. It concludes on a Stumpfian note about Husserl’s reasons, shortly after the publication of his Logical Investigations, to sharply dissociate phenomenology from descriptive psychology.
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Madary, Michael. Visual Phenomenology. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035453.001.0001.
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The main argument of the book is as follows: (1) The descriptive premise: The phenomenology of vision is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. (2) The empirical premise: There are strong empirical reasons to model vision using the general form of anticipation and fulfillment. (AF) Conclusion: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. The book consists of three parts and an appendix. The first part of the book makes the case for premise (1) based on descriptive claims about the nature of first-person experience. The initial support for (1) in Chapter 2 is based on the fact that visual experience has the general features of being perspectival, temporal, and indeterminate. Chapter 3 includes an argument for (1) based on the possibility of surprise when appearances do not change as we expect, and Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the content of visual anticipations. The second part of the book focuses on empirical support. Chapter 5 covers a range of evidence from perceptual psychology that motivates premise (2). Chapter 6 turns to evidence from neuroscience, including recent work in predictive coding. The seventh chapter shows how evidence for the two-visual systems hypothesis can be re-interpreted in support of (2). The third part of the book turns to general methodological questions (Chapter 8) and the relationship between visual perception and social cognition (Chapter 9). The appendix addresses the ways in which Husserlian phenomenology relates to the main theme of the book.
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Dance and the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
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10
Zahavi, Dan. The transcendental turn. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0004.
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Husserl’s turn from a descriptive phenomenology to a transcendental phenomenology is linked to his methodological employment of the reduction and the epoché. But how should one interpret these notions? Are they crucial to phenomenology, do they enable phenomenology to become metaphysically committed, or are they tools that reveal Husserl’s commitment to a form of methodological solipsism? Chapter 3 offers an interpretation of the reduction and the epoché that makes it clear why Husserl’s transcendental turn does not involve a turning-away from the world, but a suspension of a specific dogmatic attitude towards the world, that for the first time permits a proper understanding of the (constituted) being of the world. Contrary to various existing interpretations, it is consequently argued that whereas Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology was indeed metaphysically neutral, he started to engage with metaphysical questions concerning the mind-dependent character of the world the moment he effectuated his transcendental turn.
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Zahavi, Dan. Metaphysical neutrality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0003.
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What is the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics? Is phenomenology metaphysically neutral, is it a kind of propaedeutic to metaphysics, or does it on the contrary have clear metaphysical implications? Chapter 2 examines Husserl’s answers to these questions, as they are articulated in his early pre-transcendental descriptive phenomenology. It is argued, partially through a criticism of Philipse’s interpretation, that Husserl in Logische Untersuchungen did emphasize the metaphysical neutrality of phenomenology, and that he at that point distanced himself from both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism (phenomenalism). It is also argued, however, that he eventually came to realize the philosophical limitations of this neutrality.
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Zahavi, Dan. Conclusion. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0008.
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In the previous chapters, I have chartered Husserl’s route from descriptive phenomenology to transcendental idealism. I have discussed how the latter is phenomenologically motivated, what kind of transcendental philosophy it amounts to, and what its metaphysical implications are. Let me by way of conclusion return to the last question. In ...
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Zahavi, Dan. Husserl's Legacy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199684830.001.0001.
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What is ultimately at stake in Husserl’s phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness, and if so, must they be classified as psychological contributions of some sort? If Husserl is engaged in a transcendental philosophical project, is phenomenological transcendental philosophy then distinctive in some way, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Is Husserlian phenomenology primarily descriptive in character, is it supposed to capture how matters seem to us, or is it also supposed to capture how things really are? Husserl’s Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretive efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The book argues that Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, nor a phenomenalist, nor an internalist, nor a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues, and not opposed to all forms of naturalism. On a more positive note, Husserl’s Legacy argues that Husserl’s phenomenology is as much about the world as it is about consciousness, and that a proper grasp of Husserl’s transcendental idealism reveals the fundamental importance of facticity and intersubjectivity.
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Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.
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15
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Routledge, 2004.
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Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
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17
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
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18
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Routledge, 2004.
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19
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
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20
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
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21
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2004.
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22
Paul, Sartre Jean. Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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23
Paul, Sartre Jean. The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Routledge, 2004.
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24
Paul, Sartre Jean. The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description. Routledge, 2004.
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25
Sass, Louis A. Jaspers, phenomenology, and the ‘ontological difference’. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199609253.003.0007.
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This paper considers Karl Jaspers’ general position regarding human experience and the study thereof—as expressed in “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology” (1912) and General Psychopathology (first published 1913). After describing Jaspers’ rejection of epistemological objectivism and physicalism, I consider later developments in hermeneutic phenomenology that are absent from his discussion. These include criticism of the “prejudice against prejudices” and also of what Heidegger termed the “forgetting of the ontological difference” (namely, neglect of general qualities of the experiential world and its presencing, in favour of focusing on entity-like phenomena that occur ‘within’ the horizons of this awareness). Jaspers presents phenomenology as a form of pure description, devoid of explanatory relevance, that offers “unprejudiced direct grasp of [experiential] events as they really are.” From a contemporary, hermeneutic standpoint, Jaspers’ vision seems overly modest regarding what phenomenology can offer to psychopathology, yet overly confident about the precision and certitude of the accounts it might provide.
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Webber, Jonathan. Freedom and the Origins of Reasons. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198735908.003.0003.
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This chapter clarifies the core descriptive claim of existentialism that the reasons for action encountered in experience depend on the values at the heart of the agent’s projects. It argues that Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre’s initial form of existentialism fails because it mistakes this for a claim about the meanings encountered in experience. Sartre’s initial form of existentialism agrees with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that experienced meanings are determined by the agent’s physical capabilities and social situation. Sartre adds that the world is experienced as a field of reasons that encourage and discourage specific courses of action and that these reasons reflect the agent’s projects. Sartre’s theory of radical freedom is that projects have no inertia of their own, so one can revise or replace a project without needing any reason to do so or meeting any resistance from that project.
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Brinkmann, Svend. German Philosophies of Qualitative Research. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190247249.003.0004.
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This chapter presents the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophies that have been immensely relevant for qualitative research. Phenomenology began with Husserl and was continued by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and it was developed into tools for qualitative inquiry by scholars such as Giorgi. Hermeneutics dates back to Scheiermacher and Dilthey, and it was in a sense merged with phenomenology by Heidegger and brought up to date by Gadamer in particular. Many qualitative methodologies employ strategies from phenomenology and hermeneutics, which can be condensed to the essential idea of making the obvious obvious. The difference between phenomenology and hermeneutics in their purer forms concerns the extent to which they view interpretation (rather than description) as a necessary component in making that which is implicit in an “obvious” way explicit.
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Mertens, Karl. Phenomenological Methodology. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.39.
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This chapter discusses how the methodological self-understanding outlined in Husserl’s early writings changes in later stages of the Phenomenological Movement. The discussion is guided by Merleau-Ponty’s short remarks in the preface of his Phenomenology of Perception about the ambiguity of the phenomenological method. Against this background, it is shown that the critical examination of the possibility of phenomenological reflection and the explanation of the idea of intentionality lead to relevant modifications and revisions of the initial assumptions concerning the phenomenological method. Particularly, the phenomenological concepts of the a priori, transcendental subjectivity, constitution, and descriptive analysis should be modified by considering the relevance of opposing aspects binding the phenomenological reflection also to facticity, the natural attitude, our life-world, and constructive moments. In addition, it is argued that the phenomenological task of offering an investigation of originary experience as a pre-linguistic and subjective experience should also be revised.
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Brogaard, Berit. The Representational View of Experience. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190495251.003.0004.
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In chapter 3, the author presents two arguments for the view that visual experience is representational. The first shows that phenomenal ‘look’ and ‘seem’ reflect phenomenal, representational properties of visual perception. It follows that experience is representational. This conclusion is consistent with some versions of naive realism, but considerably stronger than the minimal content view that takes content to be a description of what it is like for the subject to have the experience. The second argument establishes that the perceptual relation that obtains between experience and its object in core cases cannot fully explain the phenomenology of experience. In order to explain its phenomenology, we will need to appeal to the experience’s representational nature. The second argument thus shows that visual experience is fundamentally representational and not fundamentally relational, which is the central claim of the representational view.
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Landes, Donald A. Merleau-Ponty from 1945 to 1952. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.23.
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In contrast to the common interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s work as divided into two or three distinct phases, this chapter illustrates a remarkably coherent trajectory of his philosophical style. Although the primary object of study of this chapter is Merleau-Ponty’s “middle” period (1945–52), it argues that this period is emblematic of his deepening understanding of the transcendental force of phenomenological description and of the ontological weight of perception. After establishing a “double origin” of Phenomenology of Perception, the chapter suggests the need to emphasize the methodology and not the content of this book. This allows for a shift from the celebrated analyses of embodiment toward two underappreciated conceptual structures that are named “perception as communication” and “consciousness as trajectory.” The final section explores how Merleau-Ponty’s methodology thus shapes his works that immediately follow Phenomenology of Perception, particularly in terms of political theory, aesthetics, and structuralism.
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Jaaware, Aniket. Practicing Caste. Fordham University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823282265.001.0001.
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This book attempts a fundamental break from the tradition of caste studies, using a version of phenomenology, structuralism, and post-structuralism to give a radical description of touchability and untouchability in terms of a rhetoric and semantics of touch. Written in minimalist style, it attempts to see if regulations on touchability can be seen as generalizable, and not seen merely as an Indian phenomenon. It also argues that, upon examination, several traditional sociological, political, and moral categories do not prove to be useful for understanding touchability and untouchability.
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Hanaway-Oakley, Cleo. A Shared Enterprise. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198768913.003.0001.
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This chapter provides an introduction to the book. First there is a discussion of the meaning of phenomenology and a consideration of whether or not Joyce can be called a ‘phenomenologist’. Joyce and early film-makers are declared ‘phenomenological’ as they share a common enterprise: all are concerned with showing, rather than explaining, the ‘inherence of the self in the world’. Hanaway-Oakley briefly discusses studies closely related to this book, including those by Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman, David Trotter, and Andrew Shail. Finally, the structure of the book is explained, with a description of each chapter.
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Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi. Human Being, Bodily Being. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823629.001.0001.
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This book seeks to make a contribution to contemporary phenomenological theories of body and subjectivity by studying various classical Indian texts that deal with bodily subjectivity (or the ‘bodiliness’ of being human) in ways that engage with the same concerns as contemporary Western philosophy but have different conceptual starting points. Through studies of four texts from different genres, I argue for a ‘phenomenological ecology’ of bodily subjectivity. An ecology is a continuous and dynamic system of interrelationships between elements, in which the salience accorded to some type of relationship clarifies how the elements it relates are to be identified. The paradigm of ecological phenomenology obviates the need to choose between apparently incompatible perspectives of the human. The delineation of body is arrived at by working back phenomenologically from the entire world of experience, with the acknowledgement that the point of arrival—a conception of what counts as body—is dependent upon the exact motivation for attending to experience, the areas of experience attended to, the genre in which the exploration of experience is expressed, and the expressive tools available to the phenomenologist. As a methodology, it is a pluralistic yet integrated approach to the way experience is attended to and studied, that permits apparently inconsistent intuitions about bodiliness to be explored in novel ways. Rather than seeing particular framings of our experience as in tension with each other, we should see each such framing as playing its own role according to the local descriptive and analytic concern of that text.
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Fulford, K. W. M., Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Introduction. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0034.
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Following on from Section IV on summoning concepts, this section of theHandbookpresents theoretically informed descriptions of psychopathologies. The topics of the chapters range from anxiety, depression, and body image disorders, through emotion and affective disorders, to delusion, thought insertion, and the fragmentation of consciousness. These phenomena call, not only for assessment and diagnosis (see Section VI), but also for understanding on the part of both the engaged clinician and the philosophical commentator. They also provide case studies for general philosophical questions about different levels of description and conceptualisation and the relationships between them, and about the contributions to psychological understanding that are made by phenomenology, clinical expert knowledge, and the sciences of the mind.
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Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Phenomenological Investigation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.003.0006.
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Phenomenological investigation involves observation, description, analysis, and evaluation. The phenomenologist observes the phaneron, describes it by making judgments about it, analyzes it into its most basic sorts of constituents, and then evaluates whether the analysis is accurate and adequate. Two kinds of analysis are employed in phenomenological investigation: logical analysis and analysis by inspection. The former consists in the application of Peirce’s reduction thesis and in the framing of scientific definitions. The second consists of both direct and indirect inspective analysis. Direct inspective analysis is either organic or attentional. Indirect inspective analysis is either comparational or experimental. Whereas Peirce restricts the sort of inspective analysis involved in phenomenology to direct attentional inspective analysis, he could have extended it to direct organic analysis and indirect comparational analysis.
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Dreyfus, Hubert L. Background Practices. Edited by Mark A. Wrathall. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796220.001.0001.
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Hubert Dreyfus is one of the foremost advocates of European philosophy in the anglophone world. His clear, jargon-free interpretations of the leading thinkers of the European tradition of philosophy have done a great deal to erase the analytic–Continental divide. But Dreyfus is not just an influential interpreter of Continental philosophers; he is a creative, iconoclastic thinker in his own right. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Kierkegaard, Dreyfus makes significant contributions to contemporary conversations about mind, authenticity, technology, nihilism, modernity and postmodernity, art, scientific realism, and religion. This volume collects thirteen of Dreyfus’s most influential essays, each of which interprets, develops, and extends the insights of his predecessors working in phenomenological and existential philosophy. The essays exemplify a distinctive feature of his approach to philosophy, namely the way his work inextricably intertwines the interpretation of texts with his own analysis and description of the phenomena at issue. In fact, these two tasks—textual exegesis and phenomenological description—are for Dreyfus necessarily dependent on each other. In approaching philosophy in this way, Dreyfus is an heir to Heidegger’s own historically oriented style of phenomenology.
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Waldow, Anik, and Nigel DeSouza. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779650.003.0001.
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This interview explores Charles Taylor’s understanding of philosophical anthropology and its relationship to Herder. Taylor argues that human culture can be properly understood only in a genetic fashion, through hermeneutics and phenomenology, and names Herder as an important precursor here. Taylor illustrates this through the difference between a purely normative political theory and a contextual political philosophy. On the relationship between naturalism and philosophical anthropology, Taylor identifies what he calls a “good naturalism,” associated with Herder, that explains what kind of animal human beings are, and a “bad naturalism” that explains human beings in reductive, natural scientific terms. Finally, Taylor outlines his current work on language, in which a similar opposition arises, between language as necessarily emerging as a rich set of language games/practices and language as pure description. Theories of language that interpret it only in terms of the latter are thus fundamentally flawed and inaccurate.
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Di Paolo, Ezequiel, Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier Barandiaran. Sensorimotor Life. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.001.0001.
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This book elaborates a series of contributions to a non–representational theory of action and perception. It is based on current theoretical developments in the enactive approach to life and mind. These enactive ideas are applied and extended to provide a theoretically rich, naturalistic account of sensorimotor meaning and agency. This account supplies non–representational extensions to the sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience based on the notion of the living body as a self–organizing dynamic system in coupling with the environment. The enactive perspective entails the use of world–involving explanations, in which processes external to an agent co–constitute mental phenomena in ways that cannot be reduced to the supply of information for internal processing. These contributions to sensorimotor theories are a dynamical–systems description of different types of sensorimotor regularities or sensorimotor contingencies, a dynamical interpretation of Piaget's theory of equilibration to ground the concept of sensorimotor mastery, and a theory of agency as organized networks of sensorimotor schemes, with its implications for sensorimotor subjectivity. New tools are provided for examining the organization, development, and operation of networks of sensorimotor schemes that compose regional activities and genres of action with their own situated norms. This permits the exploration of new explanations for the phenomenology of agency experience that are favorably contrasted with traditional computational approaches and lead to new empirical predictions. From these proposals, capabilities once beyond the reach of enactive explanations, such as the possibility of virtual actions and the adoption of socially mediated abstract perceptual attitudes, can be addressed.
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Bernini, Marco. Beckett and the Cognitive Method. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190664350.001.0001.
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How can literature enhance, parallel or reassess the scientific study of the mind? Or is literature instead limited to the ancillary role of representing cognitive processes? Beckett and the Cognitive Method argues that Beckett’s narrative work, rather than just expressing or rendering cognition and mental states, inaugurates an exploratory use of narrative as an introspective modeling technology (defined as “introspection by simulation”). Through a detailed analysis of Beckett’s entire corpus and published volumes of letters, the book argues that Beckett pioneered a new method of writing to construct (in a mode analogous to scientific inquiry) “models” for the exploration of core laws, processes, and dynamics in the human mind. Marco Bernini integrates models, problems, and interpretive frameworks from contemporary narrative theory, cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind to make a case for Beckett’s modeling practice of a vast array of processes including: the (narrative) illusion of a sense of self, the hallucinatory quality of inner speech, the dialogic interaction with memories and felt presences, the synesthetic nature of inner experience and mental imagery, the developmental cooperation of language and locomotion, the role of moods and emotions as cognitive drives, the layered complexity of the mind, and the emergent quality of consciousness. Beckett and the Cognitive Method also reflects on how Beckett’s “fictional cognitive models” are transformed into reading, auditory, or spectatorial experiences generating through narrative devices insights on which the sciences can only discursively or descriptively report. As such, the study advocates for their relevance to the contemporary scientific debate toward an interdisciplinary co-modeling of cognition.