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Baha, Alae. "Essays in microeconomic theory." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2022. http://www.theses.fr/2022TOU10012.
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Cette thèse s’inscrit dans un programme de recherche qui étudie la conception de mécanismes optimaux dans des environnements où le processus de production, et donc l’intensité des asymétries d’information, est endogène. Il se compose de trois articles, chacun étudiant l’effet des choix de mécanismes ex-ante sur l’intensité des asymétries d’information ex-post ainsi que ses effets en terme d’optimalité du mécanisme choisi. Le premier article se consacre à l’étude de l’approvisionnement optimal dans un environnement dans lequel les agents prennent des décisions- d’investissement qui leur permettent de produire uniquement dans un état du monde inconnu ex-ante et a des applications dans l’approvisionnement en présence d’incertitude technologique telles que l’approvisionnement (ex-ante)en vaccins. Le deuxième article étudie les politiques de contrôle optimales dans un environnement dans lequel la capacité du moniteur à détecter la fraude/crime dépend à la fois de ses investissements passés et de ceux de l’agent et a des applications dans la cybersécurité, le trafic de drogue, le blanchiment d’argent, l’évasion fiscale et le dopage. Enfin, le troisième article étudie un problème de production dans lequel la productivité de l’agent dépend d’une allocation de ressources (ou de temps) non observable et trouve des applications en économie du travailThis dissertation is part of a research agenda which studies optimal mechanismdesign in environments in which the production process, an thus the intensityof the asymmetries of information, is endogenous. It consists of three papers,each which studies the effect of ex-ante mechanism choices on the ex-postintensity of the asymmetries of information and its implication in terms ofoptimal mechanisms.The first paper studies the optimal procurement in an environment inwhich agents make investment decisions that allow them to produce onlyin ex-ante unknown state of the world and has applications in procurementunder technology uncertainty such as the procurement of vaccines. Thesecond paper studies the optimal monitoring policies in an environment inwhich the monitor’s ability to detect misbehavior depends on both her andthe agent’s past investments and has applications in cyber security, drugsmuggling, money laundering tax evasion and doping. Finally, the third paperstudies a production problem in which the agent’s productivity depends onan unobservable resource (or time) allocation and has applications in laboreconomics
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Griebeler, Marcelo de Carvalho. "Teorema do envelope generalizado para espaços de tipos multidimensionais." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/26099.
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O principal objetivo desta dissertação é obter um Teorema do Envelope que permita mecanismos não diferenciáveis, preferências arbitrárias e que possa ser aplicado em modelos com múltiplos agentes. Nós alcançamos isto ao expandir a análise de Milgrom e Segal (2002), generalizando seus resultados para espaços de tipos multidimensionais. Dessa forma, continuamos permitindo que a regra de escolha (mecanismo) seja descontínua. Para obter nosso resultado, é necessário o uso do Teorema do Máximo de Berge e, consequentemente, devemos impor compacidade no conjunto de escolha. Inicialmente esta hipótese pode parecer forte, porém argumentamos que em aplicações _e muito improvável termos um conjunto de escolha aberto ou, principalmente, não limitado. Nós também identificamos condições para que a função valor seja absolutamente contínua e mostramos que sua representação integral também é válida para espaços de tipos multidimensionais. Inicialmente propomos uma generalização direta do resultado de Milgrom e Segal (2002), utilizando a hipótese de continuidade absoluta da função de utilidade do agente. Entretanto, esta exigência não possui muito significado econômico e é considerada pouco elegante por parte da literatura. Neste sentido, incorporamos uma hipótese adicional de diferenciabilidade da utilidade em todo o domínio que gera a mesma representação integral e possui uma maior interpretação econômica. Nossos resultados são, em geral, aplicados a modelos com múltiplos agentes, em especial Economia do Setor Público (provisão de bens públicos e taxação ótima) e teoria dos leilões.The main objective of this dissertation is to obtain an Envelope Theorem that allows non-di erentiable mechanisms, arbitrary preferences, and that can be applied to models with multiple agents. We achieve that by expanding the analysis of Milgrom and Segal (2002) and generalizing their results to multidimensional type spaces. Thus, we continue allowing that the choice rule (mechanism) is discontinuous. For our result, it is necessary to use the Berge's Maximum Theorem and therefore we must impose compactness in the choice set. Initially this assumption may seem strong, but we argue that in applications there is an open or unbounded choice set is very unlikely. We also identify conditions for the value function is absolutely continuous and show that its integral representation is also valid for multidimensional type spaces. Firstly we propose a direct generalization of the Milgrom and Segal (2002)'s result, using the assumption of absolute continuity of the agent's utility function. However, this requirement does not have much economic interpretation and it is considered not very elegant in the literature. In this sense, we incorporate an additional assumption of di erentiability of the utility in all range that generates the same integral representation and it possesses a greater economic interpretation. Our results are generally applied to models with multiple agents, in particular Public Economics (public goods supply and optimal taxation) and auction theory.
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Jensen, Brian D. "Identification of Macro- and Micro-Compliant Mechanism Configurations Resulting in Bistable Behavior." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2003. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/83.
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The purpose of this research is to identify the configurations of several mechanism classes which result in bistable behavior. Bistable mechanisms have use in many applications, such as switches, clasps, closures, hinges, and so on. A powerful method for the design of such mechanisms would allow the realization of working designs much more easily than has been possible in the past. A method for the design of bistable mechanisms is especially needed for micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) because fabrication and material constraints often prevent the use of simple, well-known bistable mechanism configurations. In addition, this knowledge allows designers to take advantage of the many benefits of compliant echanisms, especially their ability to store and release energy in their moving segments. Therefore, an analysis of a variety of mechanism classes has been performed to determine the configurations of compliant segments or rigid-body springs in a mechanism which result in bistable behavior. The analysis revealed a relationship between the placement of compliant segments and the stability characteristics of the mechanism which allows either analysis or synthesis of bistable mechanisms to be performed very easily. Using this knowledge, a method of type synthesis for bistable mechanisms has been developed which allows bistable mechanisms to be easily synthesized. Several design examples have been presented which demonstrate the method. The theory has also been applied to the design of several bistable micromechanisms. In the process of searching for usable designs for micro-bistable mechanisms, a mechanism class was defined, known as "Young" mechanisms, which represent a feasible and useful way of achieving micro-mechanism motion similar to that of any four-bar mechanism. Based on this class, several bistable micro-mechanisms were designed and fabricated. Testing demonstrated the ability of the mechanisms to snap between the two stable states. In addition, the mechanisms showed a high degree of repeatability in their stable positions.
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Perkins, David A. "Synthesis Techniques for Coupler-Driven Planar and Spherical Single Degree of Freedom Mechanisms." University of Dayton / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=dayton1317739251.
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Phelps, Stephen George. "Evolutionary Mechanism Design." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.490710.
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The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of all of the components of the system in advance. Rather, we attempt to design infrastructure, such as network protocols, in such a way that the overall system is robust despite the fact that numerous arbitrary, non-certified, third-party components can connect to our system. Economists have long understood this issue, since it is analogous to the design of the rules governing auctions and other marketplaces, in which we attempt to achieve sociallydesirable outcomes despite the impossibility of prescribing the exact behaviour of the market participants, who may attempt to subvert the market for their own personal gain. This field is known as 'mechanism design': the science of designing rules of a game to achieve a specific outcome, even though each participant may be self-interested. Although it originated in economics, mechanism design has become an important foundation of multi-agent systems (MAS) research. In many scenarios mechanism design and auction theory yield clear-cut results; however, there are many situations in which the underlying assumptions of the theory are violated due to the messiness of the real-world. In this thesis I introduce an evolutionary methodology for mechanism design, which is able to incorporate arbitrary design objectives and domain assumptions, and I validate the methodology using empirical techniques.
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Postl, Peter. "Applied mechanism design." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.405859.
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Gong, Haojue. "RESEARCH ON THE GAME MECHANISM OF EDUCATIONAL GAMES – THINK ABOUT HOW TO CHOOSE THE SUITABLE GAME MECHANISMS WHEN DESIGNING EDUCATIONAL GAMES." Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för teknik och samhälle (TS), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-20957.
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With the development of media technology and game evolution, games are endowed with multiple purposes and functions. Some scholars believe that the game is the supplement of the real world, which can affect the players' psychology and behaviour. Numerous studies show that games can make players accept challenges, overcome obstacles, arouse positive emotions and solve problems. Therefore, academia's research on games and related topics in learning has become increasingly popular. In response, different models have emerged to evaluate the design of active educational games.This research discusses how different game mechanisms affect players. Also, this study used a prototype game as output media to examine the impact of various game mechanisms on learning. The purpose of this study is to explore how to choose a more suitable game mechanism in the design of educational games. The research results include that some game mechanisms promote learning motivation and improve learning outcomes. At the same time, some game mechanisms have the risk of reducing learning motivation. Through these findings, the researcher of this study believes that educational games can bring positive influence and help to players' learning. However, how to choose a suitable game mechanism in the design of educational games is worthy of serious consideration for making design decisions.
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Doyle, Matthew Edward. "The Foundation for CADSPAM: Computer Aided Design of SPAtial Mechanisms." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/35730.
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This thesis presents the foundation of a computer program for the unified design of spatial mechanisms. The program will be capable of synthesizing any mechanism that can be described using an equivalent chain containing only revolute and prismatic joints. The supporting analysis routine will be general and will be able to analyze any lower pair mechanism using the iterative approach developed by Sheth and Uicker [1972].
Unlike precision point synthesis methods that allow only a limited number of positions to be specified, optimization will be employed to synthesize a wide variety of mechanisms. This approach will allow the user to interactively monitor and control objectives and constraints, which will yield practical solutions to realistic mechanism design problems.
The creation of this program will provide practicing engineers with the capacity to design many previously intractable spatial mechanisms.Master of Science
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Reinhardt, Markus. "Exploring the limits of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2014. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-147728.
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In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide.
Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.
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Chen, Yan. "Design of structural mechanisms." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6423e5a6-5438-496a-835d-242fe1d5cd97.
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In this dissertation, we explore the possibilities of systematically constructing large structural mechanisms using existing spatial overconstrained linkages with only revolute joints as basic elements. The first part of the dissertation is devoted to structural mechanisms (networks) based on the Bennett linkage, a well-known spatial 4R linkage. This special linkage has been used as the basic element. A particular layout of the structures has been identified allowing unlimited extension of the network by repeating elements. As a result, a family of structural mechanisms has been found which form single-layer structural mechanisms. In general, these structures deploy into profiles of cylindrical surface. Meanwhile, two special cases of the single-layer structures have been extended to form multi-layer structures. In addition, according to the mathematical derivation, the problem of connecting two similar Bennett linkages into a mobile structure, which other researchers were unable to solve, has also been solved. A study into the existence of alternative forms of the Bennett linkage has also been done. The condition for the alternative forms to achieve the compact folding and maximum expansion has been derived. This work has resulted in the creation of the most effective deployable element based on the Bennett linkage. A simple method to build the Bennett linkage in its alternative form has been introduced and verified. The corresponding networks have been obtained following the similar layout of the original Bennett linkage. The second effort has been made to construct large overconstrained structural mechanisms using hybrid Bricard linkages as basic elements. The hybrid Bricard linkage is a special case of the Bricard linkage, which is overconstrained and with a single degree of mobility. Starting with the derivation of the compatibility condition and the study of its deployment behaviour, it has been found that for some particular twists, the hybrid Bricard linkage can be folded completely into a bundle and deployed to a flat triangular profile. Based on this linkage, a network of hybrid Bricard linkages has been produced. Furthermore, in-depth research into the deployment characteristics, including kinematic bifurcation and the alternative forms of the hybrid Bricard linkage, has also been conducted. The final part of the dissertation is a study into tiling techniques in order to develop a systematic approach for determining the layout of mobile assemblies. A general approach to constructing large structural mechanisms has been proposed, which can be divided into three steps: selection of suitable tilings, construction of overconstrained units and validation of compatibility. This approach has been successfully applied to the construction of the structural mechanisms based on Bennett linkages and hybrid Bricard linkages. Several possible configurations are discussed including those described previously. All of the novel structural mechanisms presented in this dissertation contain only revolute joints, have a single degree of mobility and are geometrically overconstrained. Research work reported in this dissertation could lead to substantial advancement in building large spatial deployable structures.
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Kim, Joan. "Folding mechanism in furniture design." Thesis, University of Iowa, 2018. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6159.
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I have an interest in creating furniture with a mechanism that makes the furniture move functionally. Therefore, this paper explains the process and outcomes of designing a chair and a set of furniture with a coatrack, an accent table, and a stackable stool. All the furniture packs flat for storage and shipping purpose with a folding mechanism. The folds happen with fabric hinges that have been experimented with different materials, machinery, and fundamentals.
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Balestrieri, Filippo. "Essays on mechanism design." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43763.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2008.Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of three essays on mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we consider a general Informed Principal Problem in the context of procurement. Both the potential suppliers and the buyer hold some private information: each supplier knows his cost of production, the buyer knows how much each supplier's product fits her technical requirements. We derive the optimal auction in this environment, and analyze the implementation problem with special emphasis on three aspects that are particularly relevant in real practice: privacy protection, dynamic consistency, and simplicity. We design a dynamic mechanism, the Modified English Auction, that implements the optimal auction outcome, is privacy preserving, dynamically consistent, and simple. Chapter 2 is a joint work with Joao Leao. How do mechanisms like hotwire.com work? What is their economic impact on the existing markets of hotel rooms, airplane tickets, and rental cars? We address these questions by investigating whether lotteries over the basic goods can be profitably used by any of the market participants. We consider lotteries in which the buyers win a prize for sure, but they do not know which one. Our main finding is that the perfect cartel always uses lotteries to maximize its profits. Moreover, under specific conditions, the entry of a lottery provider in a competitive market may bring the existing firms closer to the cartel solution. The introduction of lotteries has two effects. First, the firms can use them to price-discriminate their consumers. Second, the firms can use lotteries to cover a larger part of the market. Indeed, the consumers who find the basic goods too expensive may still want to buy cheaper lottery tickets.
(cont.) In Chapter 3 we initiate the formal analysis of the First Price-First Score Auction in a general context where the auctioneer is a seller and two bidders compete to buy one indivisible good. The auctioneer's preferences are assumed to directly depend on the identity of the buyer to whom the good is allocated. In this auction, the bidders submit monetary bids, and then the seller decides which bid to accept after comparing the bidders' scores. A particular class of auction we focus on have simple scoring functions: each bidder's score is given by the summation of his bid and a bidder-specific additional parameter. Our main goal is to obtain the specification of the problem that generates a closed-form analytical solutions for the bidding strategies. The task is complicated as there are at least two sources of asymmetries inherent to the problem that can quickly lead to intractable formulas. The main contribution of this work is to provide closed formulas for the inverse bidding functions. Our results generalize the comparison of bidding strategies in asymmetric first price auctions obtained by Maskin and Riley (2002). Even if the asymmetry between the bidders is exogenously introduced by the auctioneer, in equilibrium the disadvantaged bidder bids more aggressively. We are also able to determine the ranges of bids that can be submitted by the two bidders. They are actually different, and their extremes depend on the extra-bid parameter.
by Filippo Balestrieri.
Ph.D.
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Condorelli, D. "Essays in mechanism design." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2010. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/19411/.
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In chapter one I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are willing to queue to obtain a good. I show that a priority list is optimal when hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing. Instead, queues are optimal in a symmetric setting with decreasing hazard rates. In the second chapter, I study a model in which the use of both market (e.g. auctions) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. lotteries and priority lists) for the allocation of scarce public resources can be rationalized. Agents are risk-neutral and heterogeneous in terms of their monetary value for a good and their opportunity cost of money. The designer wants to allocate a set of goods to the agents with the highest values. The designer screens agents on the basis of their observable characteristics, and extracts information on their willingness to pay using market mechanisms. I show that both market and non-market mechanism can be optimal depending on the prior information. In the last chapter I study a dynamic market model where trade for a single object is bilateral, constrained by an exogenous network structure and conducted under asymmetric information. The model provides a insights into how the position of a player in a network affects his bargaining outcomes. First, traders who provide monopolistic access to valuable portions of the trading network become intermediaries, and obtain a payoff advantage. Second, the earlier an intermediary obtains the object in the trading chain, the higher is his expected payoff. Finally, inefficient outcomes are possible, and are jointly caused by the network structure and by asymmetries of information.
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Rosar, Frank. "Essays in mechanism design." [S.l. : s.n.], 2007. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-21408.
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Olsen, Brian Mark. "A Design Framework that Employs a Classification Scheme and Library for Compliant Mechanism Design." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2010. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/2298.
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Limited resources are currently available to assist engineers in implementing compliant members into mechanical designs. As a result, engineers often have little to no direction incorporating compliant mechanisms. This thesis develops a conceptual design framework and process that utilizes a proposed classification scheme and a library of mechanisms to help engineers incorporate compliant mechanisms into their applications. As the knowledge related to the synthesis and analysis of compliant mechanisms continues to grow and mature, and through the classification scheme established in this thesis, compliant mechanisms may become more extensively used in commercial mechanical designs. This thesis also demonstrates a design approach engineers can use to convert an existing rigid-body mechanism into a compliant mechanism by using the established classification scheme and a library of compliant mechanisms. This approach proposes two possible techniques that use rigid-body replacement synthesis in conjunction with a compliant mechanism classification scheme. One technique replaces rigid-body elements with a respective compliant element. The other technique replaces a complex rigid-body mechanism by decomposing the mechanism into simpler functions and then replacing a respective rigid-body mechanism with a compliant mechanism that has a similar functionality. These techniques are then demonstrated by developing and designing a competitive and feasible compliant road bicycle brake system.
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Pavelka, Roman. "Pojezdová jednotka regálového zakladače." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta strojního inženýrství, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-229734.
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This master thesis deals with the design of stack stackers travel mechanism for height from 10m to 44m. Next it deals with the strength analysis travel unit for one-pillar stacker for hight of pillar 26m. In the first part is done brief introduction to problems of stocking and description basic parts of stack stacker. After that follows structural design, calculation of travel wheel, drive, shaft and bearings. In the second part of thesis is deals travel unit frame, calculation of transport capacity and is done safety concept of stack stackers. An integral part of the thesis is drawing documentation.
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Ma, Huiyuan. "A web based compression spring design calculator /." Compression spring design calculator, 2001. http://wwweng.uwyo.edu/commend/Csdc.
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Can, Fatih Cemal. "Inertial Parameter Design Of Spatial Mechanisms." Master's thesis, METU, 2003. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/1254895/index.pdf.
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In this thesis, the inertial parameters of a spatial mechanism are used in order to optimize various aspects of the dynamic behaviour of the mechanism (such as minimizing actuator torque/ force fluctuations, shaking force/moment balancing, etc.) while the effects of loads are considered as well. Here, inertial parameters refer to the mass, 6 elements of the inertia tensor and coordinates of the center of mass of the links.
The concept of Force Fluctuation Number (FFN) is utilized to optimize the dynamic behaviour of the mechanism. By using the FFN concept, one obtains a number of linear equations to be satisfied by the optimal inertial parameters. In general, the number of such equations is less than the number of the inertial parameters. Therefore, some of the inertial parameters may be selected freely in order to satisfy other design constraints.
Using MATHEMATICA, a program has been developed to obtain the linear equations to be satisfied by the optimal inertial parameters. The developed program includes a kinematic and force analysis module, which
can be used independently for a complete kinematic and dynamic analysis of any one degree of freedom, single loop, spatial mechanism. The different closures of the mechanism may be identified by using the developed package and these analyses can be performed on any selected closure of the mechanism.
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Butler, Jared J. "On Creases and Curved Links: Design Approaches for Predicting and Customizing Behaviors in Origami-Based and Developable Mechanisms." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/8651.
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This work develops models and tools to help designers address the challenges associated with designing origami-based and developable mechanisms. These models utilize strain energy, kinematics, compliant mechanisms, and graphical techniques to make the design of origami-based and developable mechanisms approachable and intuitive. Origami-based design tools are expanded through two methods. First presented is a generalized approach for identifying single-output mechanical advantage for a multiple-input compliant mechanism, such as many origami-based mechanisms. The model is used to predict the force-deflection behavior of an origami-based mechanism (Oriceps) and is verified with experimental data from magnetic actuation of the mechanism. Second is a folding technique for thick-origami, called the regional-sandwiching of compliant sheets (ReCS), which creates flat-foldable, rigid-foldable, and self-deploying thick origami-based mechanisms. The technique is used to create mountain/valley assignments for each fold about a vertex, constraining motion to a single branch of folding. Strain energy in deflected flexible members is used to enable self-deployment. Three physical models, a simple single-fold mechanism, a degree-four vertex mechanism, and a full tessellation, are presented to demonstrate the ReCS technique. Developable mechanism design is further enabled through an exploration of their feasible design space. Terminology is introduced to define the motion of developable mechanisms while interior and exterior to a developable surface. The limits of this motion are identified using defined conditions. It is shown that the more difficult of these conditions may be treated as a non-factor during the design of cylindrical developable mechanisms given certain assumptions. These limits are then applied to create a resource for designing bistable developable mechanisms (BDMs) that reach their second stable positions while exterior or interior to a cylindrical surface. A novel graphical method for identifying stable positions of linkages using a single dominant torsional spring, called the Principle of Reflection, is introduced and implemented. The results are compared with a numerical simulation of 30,000+ mechanisms to identify possible incongruencies. Two tables summarize the results as the guide for designing extramobile and intramobile BDMs. In fulfilling the research objectives, this dissertation contributes to the scientific community of origami-based and developable mechanism design approaches. As a result of this work, practitioners will be better able to approach and design complex origami-based and developable mechanisms.
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Dearden, Jason Lon. "Design and Analysis of Two Compliant Mechanism Designs for Use in Minimally Invasive Surgical Instruments." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/7383.
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Minimally invasive surgery (MIS) has several advantages over traditional methods. Scaling MIS instruments to smaller sizes and increasing their performance will enable surgeons to offer new procedures to a wider range of patients. In this work, two compliant mechanism-based minimally invasive surgical instrument wrist or gripper mechanisms are designed and analyzed.The cylindrical cross-axis flexural pivot (CCAFP) is a single-degree-of-freedom wrist mechanism that could be combined with existing gripper mechanisms to create a multi-degree-of freedom instrument. The simplicity of the CCAFP mechanism facilitates analysis and implementation. The flexures of the CCAFP are integral with the instrument shaft, enabling accessories to be passed through the lumen. The CCAFP is analyzed and determined to be a viable wrist mechanism for MIS instruments based on research results. A finite element (FE) model of the mechanism is created to analyze the force-deflection and strain-deflection relationships. Experimental results are used to verify the FE model. A 3 mm design is created that could undergo an angular deflection of +/- 90 degrees. The addition of cam surfaces to help guide the flexures and limit the maximum stress during deflection is explored. These cam surfaces can be integral to the instrument shaft along with the flexures. A 2 degree-of-freedom (DoF) CCAFP with intersecting axes of rotation is also introduced. The inverted L-Arm gripper compliant mechanism has 2 DoF, one wrist and one gripping. Three challenges associated with using compliant mechanisms in MIS instruments are considered: inadequate performance in compression, large flexure deformations, and a highly variable mechanical advantage. These challenges were resolved in the L-Arm design by inverting the flexures, tailoring flexure geometry and employing nitinol, and integrating pulleys into each jaw of the mechanism. The L-Arm was prototyped at several sizes to demonstrate functionality and scalability. A finite element model of the L-Arm flexure was created to determine the strain-deflection relationship. A fatigue test was completed to characterize nitinol for use in compliant mechanism MIS instruments.These concepts demonstrate the ability of compliant mechanisms to overcome the design and manufacturing challenges associated with MIS instruments at the 3 mm scale. The models and principles included in this work could be used in the application of compliant mechanisms to design new MIS instruments as well as in other areas that employ compliant mechanisms in a cylindrical form factor.
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Delimont, Isaac L. "Compliant Joints Suitable for Use as Surrogate Folds." BYU ScholarsArchive, 2014. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/4231.
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Origami-inspired design is an emerging field capable of producing compact and efficient designs. The object of a surrogate fold is to provide a fold-like motion in a non-paper material without undergoing yielding. Compliant mechanisms provide a means to achieve these objectives as large deflections are achieved. The purpose of this thesis is to present a summary of existing compliant joints suitable for use as surrogate folds. In doing so, motions are characterized which no existing compliant joint provides. A series of compliant joints is proposed which provides many of these motions. The possibility of patterning compliant joints to form an array is discussed. Arrays capable of producing interesting motions are noted.
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Smith, David Rowland. "Design of solvable 6R manipulators." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/18861.
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Douglas, Graeham Rees. "Design of stent expansion mechanisms." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42137.
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Stents are widely used in the treatment of vascular disease and they represent one of the most valuable medical device markets. It has been observed that the mechanical characteristics of a stent influences clinical outcomes.
This thesis is concerned with the design of expansion mechanisms of balloon expandable stents based on the principles of lattice mechanics. Balloon expandable vascular stents are mesh-like, tubular structures used mainly to prop open narrowed arteries, and also to provide sealing and anchorage in a stent-graft for treatment of aneurysms or dissections. Presence of a spatially repeating geometric pattern of a `unit' or a cell is a striking feature of stents. Lattice mechanics deals with such spatially periodic materials and structures.
The focus is on the plastic expansion phase of a stent from the initial crimped configuration. The elastic post-expansion phase is also considered. Eight unit cell-based stent designs are selected for this work. Their expansion characteristics are analyzed and measured. Analytical methods based on kinematics of stent expansion mechanisms are presented first which are then validated with more detailed Finite Element (FE) calculations. Analytical methods developed in this work aid rapid design calculations in selecting appropriate unit cell geometries. Three of the designs are manufactured through laser micromachining and tested for their expansion characteristics.
The analytical methods were validated as they predicted similar expansion characteristics as finite element and experiment. Additionally, the study confirmed that stent designs with positive, negative, or zero axial strain over expansion is possible. Finally, the study suggest that unit cell design can be tailored to obtain desired length-diameter and pressure-diameter characteristics over the expansion phase of stenting.
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Cahill, Daniel. "Utilising information in architectural design drawings." Thesis, Heriot-Watt University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10399/1143.
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Sun, Kun. "Computer-aided creative mechanism design /." [S.l.] : [s.n.], 1994. http://library.epfl.ch/theses/?nr=1271.
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Nath, Swaprava. "Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing." Thesis, Indian Institute of Science, 2013. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/2497.
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This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation technique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem.
(i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which are typically the participants' private information.
(ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests.
(iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer's goal is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals. In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive.
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Long, Yan. "Essays on robust mechanism design." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2016. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7472/.
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Chapter 1: Under the average common value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that gives the seller the largest portion of the true value in the worst situation among all the direct mechanisms that are feasible, ex-post implementable and individually rational. Chapter 2: Strategy-proof, budget balanced, anonymous, envy-free linear mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assigns one object to each of the p−1 agents with the highest valuation, a large probability to the agent with the pth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (p+1)th highest valuation. When “envy freeness” is replaced by the weaker condition “voluntary participation”, the optimal mechanism differs only when p is much less than n. Chapter 3: One group is to be selected among a set of agents. Agents have preferences over the size of the group if they are selected; and preferences over size as well as the “stand-outside” option are single-peaked. We take a mechanism design approach and search for group selection mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational. Two classes of such mechanisms are presented. The proposing mechanism allows agents to either maintain or shrink the group size following a fixed priority, and is characterized by group strategy-proofness. The voting mechanism enlarges the group size in each voting round, and achieves at least half of the maximum group size compatible with individual rationality.
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Lamba, Rohit. "Essays in dynamic mechanism design." Thesis, Princeton University, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3626800.
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Questions of design in real economic situations are often dynamic. Managerial compensation, repeated auctions, and taxation are good examples. These demand the economic theory of mechanism design to be adept to changing underlying environments and evolving information. Adjusting existing static results to the dynamic models and introducing new ones is thus what the doctor orders. This collection of essays is a contribution to the theory and applications of dynamic mechanism design.
Chapter 1 asks the question: when can efficient institutions be made self enforcing? To answer it, the setting of bargaining with two sided asymmetric information is chosen– a buyer has a hidden valuation for a good and a seller can produce the good at a hidden cost, both of which can change over time. The essay provides necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in this bilateral trading problem. In the process of establishing this result, a new notion of budget balance is introduced that allows the budget to be balanced dynamically, borrowing from the future but in a bounded fashion. Through a set of simple examples the comparative statics of the underlying economics forces of discounting and level of asymmetric information are explored.
In chapter 2, a dynamic and history dependent version of the payoff equivalence result is established. It provides an equivalence class of all mechanisms that are incentive compatible. Given two mechanisms that implement the same allocation, expected utility of an agent after any history in one must differ from the other through a history dependent constant. This result is then exploited to unify a host of existing results in efficient dynamic mechanism design. In particular a mechanism, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the implementation of the efficient allocation in a general N-player dynamic mechanism design problem under participation constraints and budget balance.
Finally, in chapter 3 (coauthored with Marco Battaglini), we explore the applicability and limitations of the first-order approach in solving dynamic contracting models, and the nature of contracts when local constraints are not sufficient to characterize the optimum. A dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent's types are serially correlated forms the backbone of the analysis. It is shown that the first-order approach is violated in general environments; when the time horizon is long enough and serial correlation is sufficiently high, global incentive compatibility constraints generically bind. By fully characterizing a simple two period example, we uncover a number of interesting features of the optimal contract that cannot be observed in special environments in which the standard approach works. Finally, we show that even in complex environments, approximately optimal allocations can be easily characterized by focusing on a class of contracts in which the allocation is forced to be monotonic.
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Zhu, Zeyuan Allen. "Mechanism design with approximate types." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/71504.
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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-119).
In mechanism design, we replace the strong assumption that each player knows his own payoff type exactly with the more realistic assumption that he knows it only approximately: each player i only knows that his true type [theta]i; is one among a set [Kappa]i, and adversarially and secretly chosen in Ki at the beginning of the game. This model is closely related to the Knightian [20] notion of uncertainty in economics, but we consider it from purely mechanism design's perspective. In particular, we study the classical problem of maximizing social welfare in auctions when players know their true valuations only within a constant multiplicative factor [delta] [xi] (0,1). For single good auctions, we prove that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee better social welfare than assigning the good to a random player. On the positive side, we provide tight upper and lower bounds for the social welfare achievable in undominated strategies, whether deterministically or probabilistically. For multiple-good auctions, we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms can guarantee only an exponentially small fraction of the maximum social welfare, and the celebrated VCG mechanism (which is no longer dominant-strategy) guarantees, in undominated strategies, at most a doubly exponentially small fraction. For general games beyond auctions, we provide definitional foundations for this new approximate-type model, and provide a universality result showing that all reasonable (including Bayesian or Knightian) models of type uncertainty are equivalent to our set-theoretic one, at least for the setting when the type space is "convex". This work was done in collaboration with Silvio Micali and Alessandro Chiesa.
by Zeyuan Allen Zhu.
S.M.
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Mihut, Anca. "Three Essays on Mechanism Design." Thesis, Lyon, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LYSE2074.
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Les trois essais présentés dans cette thèse se concentrent sur des différents domaines de la conception des mécanismes d'incitation qui visent à aborder des questions environnementales liées aux marchés d'émissions, à la consommation d'électricité et à l'utilisation de l'eau. Utilisant les avantages de l’environnent du laboratoire, cette thèse vise à contribuer au débat en cours sur les mécanismes appropriés destinés à résoudre plusieurs problèmes environnementaux liés à la conception des marchés d'émissions, la gestion des ressource communes et l'impact de la conception de mécanismes tarifaires complexes pour acquérir un bien.Dans le premier essai, nous utilisons les marchés expérimentaux d'échange de droits d'émission pour étudier les effets de deux types d'instruments pour gérer les effets négatifs du risque de prix, résultant des chocs potentiels qui pourraient affecter les coûts de production. Selon les résultats obtenus, le premier mécanisme permettant d’économiser des permis d’émission et d'emprunter d'une période à l'autre, présente des avantages importants en termes de réduction de la volatilité des prix. Le second instrument, en plus de permettre le transfert de permis, considère également une offre ajustable de permis, de sorte que, en plus de stabiliser la trajectoire de prix, on crée également des résultats plus significatifs en termes deconvergence autour d'un niveau de prix cible souhaité.Dans le second essai, nous considérons le dilemme auquel sont souvent confrontés les consommateurs lorsqu'ils doivent faire des choix tarifaires différents (téléphone mobile, électricité, train, avion, gaz, etc.). Il peut être très complexe de choisir parmi ces tarifs, notamment en raison des différents biais cognitifs qui pourraient fausser la perception des consommateurs. Généralement, que faut-il choisir entre une tarification simple et une structure tarifaire non-linéaire plus complexe mais aussi plus avantageuse? Nous montrons qu’en laboratoire, même lorsque les structures tarifaires non-linéaires plus complexes sont50% plus avantageuses, en termes d'espérance de gain, les consommateurs choisissent constamment le tarif avec la structure la plus simple. Les sujets sont réticents à choisir des instruments de tarification contenant un coût fixe et les structures de tarification progressive.Dans le troisième essai, nous examinons la coopération dans le contexte d'un jeu de ressources collectives non-linéaire. Nous introduisons deux types d'instruments politiques dans cet environnement. Un instrument est basé sur deux variantes d'un mécanisme qui taxe l'extraction et redistribue les recettes fiscales aux membres du groupe. L'autre instrument varie l'observabilité sociale des décisions individuelles. Nous constatons que les deux mécanismes fiscaux réduisent l'extraction, augmentent l'efficacité et réduisent les inégalités au sein des groupes. En revanche, l'observabilité n'impacte que la condition de base en facilitant le free-riding au lieu de créer une pression morale sur les membres du groupeThe three essays presented in this thesis, concentrate on different areas of mechanism design that aim to address environmental issues related to permits markets, electricity consumption and water use. Using the advantages of a laboratory setting, this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate mechanisms solutions for solving severalenvironmental issues related to the design of emission markets, the management of common pool resources and the impact of designing complex tariff mechanisms for acquiring a good. In the first essay, we use experimental emissions trading markets to investigate the effects of two types of instruments for dealing with the negative effects of price risk that results from the potential shocks that could affect production costs. As per the results obtained, the first mechanism that allows banking and borrowing permits from one period to another, yields some important benefits in terms of the reduction of price volatility and leading to overall flatter price series. The second instrument, besides allowing for permit transfer, also considers an adjustable supply of permits, such that besides managing to stabilize the price path, it also creates more significant results in terms of settling it around a desired target price level.In the second essay, we consider the dilemma that consumers are often faced with, when dealing with different tariff choices (mobile phone, electricity, train, airplane, gas etc.). It may be very complex to choose among these tariffs, notably because of the so-called cognitive biases that might distort consumers' perception. Typically, what should consumers choose between a simple tariff pricing and a more complex but also more advantageous non-linear tariff structure? We show that, in the lab, even when the more complex non-linear tariff structures are 50% more advantageous, in terms of gain expectancy, consumers constantly stick to the tariff with the most simple structure. Subjects are reluctant to choose pricing instruments containing a fixed cost and increasing block pricing structures.In the third essay, we examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities. We introduce two types of policy instruments in this environment. One instrument is based on two variants of a mechanism that taxes extraction and redistributes the tax revenue to group members. The other instrument varies the social observability of individual decisions. We find that both tax mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency and reduce inequality within groups. In contrast, observability impacts only the Baseline condition by facilitating free-riding instead of creating a moral pressure on group members
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Zhang, Luyao. "Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design." The Ohio State University, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1532692312980569.
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Foncea, Araneda Patricio Tomás. "Optimal stopping in mechanism design." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2017. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/146675.
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Magíster en Gestión de Operaciones.
Ingeniero Civil MatemáticoEn este trabajo estudiamos un par de problemas de la teoría de paradas óptimas, y mostramos cómo aplicar estos resultados en el diseño de mecanismos. Consideramos dos versiones modificadas de la famosa desigualdad del profeta [10, 16, 17]: una no-adaptativa donde la regla de parada debe ser decidida de antemano, y una adaptativa --- que corresponde a la configuración clásica de la desigualdad del profeta ---, pero en el caso restringido cuando las distribuciones de las variables aleatorias están idénticamente distribuidas [13]. Para la primera situación, encontramos un factor de garantía para la regla de parada con respecto al máximo esperado de la secuencia de variables aleatorias y demostramos que es la mejor posible; para el segundo, probamos que una conjetura sobre cuál es el mejor factor posible es verdadera [14]. Cerramos esta tesis extendiendo estos resultados para resolver el problema de un vendedor que enfrenta a muchos compradores potenciales y debe diseñar una subasta secuencial para maximizar sus ingresos. El tipo de mecanismos que consideramos para estudiar este problema de pricing son los mecanismos posted price, y los resultados que obtenemos toman la forma de factores de aproximación con respecto al valor de la subasta óptima [19].
In this work we study a pair of problems in optimal stopping theory, and show how to apply these results in mechanism design. We consider two modified versions of the famous prophet inequality [10, 16, 17]: a non-adaptive where the stop rule must be decided beforehand, and an adaptive one --- which corresponds to the classical prophet inequality setting ---, but when the distributions of the random variables are identical [13]. For the first set-up, we find a new factor guarantee with respect to the expected maximum of the random variables sequence and prove it is the best possible; for the second, we prove that a conjecture about the best possible factor achievable is true [14]. We close this dissertation by extending these results to solve the problem of a seller that faces many potential buyers and must design a sequential auction in order to maximize its revenue. The type of mechanisms we consider to study this pricing problem are the posted price mechanisms, and the results we get are in the form of approximation factors guarantees with respect to the optimal auction [19].
Este trabajo ha sido parcialmente financiado por Conicyt y el Núcleo Milenio Información y Coordinación en Redes
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Lee, Kam-fat Jonathan. "Design and control of a robotic manipulator with an active pneumatic balancing system /." [Hong Kong] : University of Hong Kong, 1992. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13194367.
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Ozsipahi, Mumin. "Design Of A Car Door Window Regulator." Master's thesis, METU, 2009. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12610937/index.pdf.
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In this thesis, design of a car door window regulator is presented. This design comprises a mechanism in order that the car door window makes a specified translational motion. First, conceptual design is carried out to obtain the best suitable concept for the design and best suitable concept comes out to be a scissor mechanism. Afterwards, detailed design of the chosen concept is given. In the detail design stage, kinematic synthesis of the mechanism is performed basically using the Cardan motion. Lastly, implementation of the design on a car door is described.
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Wilson, Thomas Rowe. "The design and construction of a flexible manipulator." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/17354.
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Lou, Yunjiang. "Optimal design of parallel manipulators /." View abstract or full-text, 2006. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ECED%202006%20LOU.
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Chen, Li. "Information and Preferences in Matching Mechanisms." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/235227.
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This thesis consists of three independent essays on the design of matching markets, with a primary goal to understand how information interacts with matching mechanisms especially in the applications to school choice and college admissions. The first chapter compares theoretically the non-strategyproof Boston mechanism and the strategy-proof deferred acceptance mechanism when taking into account that students may face uncertainty about their own priorities when submitting preferences, one important variation from the complete information assumption. The second chapter evaluates the effectiveness of a strategy-proof mechanism when students have to submit preferences before knowing their priorities using both theory and data. The third chapter turns attention to a new mechanism that is sequentially implemented and can encourage truth-telling. Nevertheless, such implementation often faces time constraint. This chapter therefore offers an inquiry of the pros and cons of the time-constrained sequential mechanism.Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Jiang, Pingfei. "Development of a conceptual design tool for mechanism design." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/31370.
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Engineering design can be seen as a problem solving process in which engineers and designers convert their thoughts and ideas into real-life designs satisfying market and customer needs. The conceptual design process is crucial in engineering product design since it determines fundamental design features with respect to design requirements. Any decisions made at this stage have a significant impact on later stages of design. However, connection between system functional requirements and selection of actual mechanical components in mechanism designs is severely lacking. With the purpose filling this gap and assisting engineers and designers to obtain in-depth understanding on commonly seen mechanisms and machine elements a database (MMET) was established and programmed containing detail information of these components including technical functional attributes, movement attributes, pictures/drawings and merit analysis. A conceptual design tool built on MMET was then developed aiming to help the user to explore a broad range of mechanical components regarding system requirements. The database and conceptual design tool were validated and improved through industrial case studies which suggest the addition of Function Means tree and Functional Analysis Diagram. The value of MMET and the new conceptual design tool are indicated via positive outcomes of case studies, asserting their capability of offering assistance in understanding engineering product functions and how these functions are achieved, enabling comparisons regarding same functional requirements and finally providing opportunities for conceptual design improvements based on a cyclic process containing detail functional analysis, function-means tree construction and design optimisation.
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Van, Essen Matthew J. "Implementing Lindahl Allocation - Incorporating Experimental Observations into Mechanism Design Theory." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195026.
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Mechanism design theory has given economists a set of tools for designing institutions to achieve socially desirable outcomes. Unfortunately, the behavioral assumptions that these theories often rest are somewhat unrealistic. Testing these institutions in a laboratory setting gives us insight into what assumptions or properties of institutions make them behaviorally successful. Moreover these insights allow us to create new theories that offer, in principle, better actual performance. Thus, the interplay between experimental economics and economic theory seems vital in mechanism design to insure successful institutions. It is in this spirit that this dissertation precedes focusing entirely with mechanisms that were designed to achieve the Lindahl allocation in a public goods environment. The first chapter experimentally examines three such mechanisms in a laboratory setting. It finds that the mechanism that gets the closest to the Lindahl allocation is the one that induces a game with very strong stability of equilibrium properties. Unfortunately this mechanism also has some clear disadvantages: first, it is very complicated; second, payoffs to consumers while learning to play equilibrium are very low; and last, the mechanism gets more complicated when more people participate. The second chapter uses the insights from the first experiment to create a new institution which avoids some of the concerns outlined above while maintaining the strong stability of equilibrium property. The third chapter contributes a missing stability result into the literature. The final chapter of the dissertation experimentally compares the new mechanism introduced in chapter 2 with the most successful mechanism from the first experiment. The treatments in this experiment are designed to stress the above observed trouble areas.
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Riutort, Kevin T. "Applied design and implementation of straight-line mechanisms." Thesis, This resource online, 1996. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-09182008-063202/.
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Turkkan, Omer Anil. "Rapid Conceptual Design and Analysis of Planar and SpatialCompliant Mechanisms." The Ohio State University, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1512739490296851.
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Mackay, Allen Boyd. "Large-displacement linear-motion compliant mechanisms /." Diss., CLICK HERE for online access, 2007. http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/ETD/image/etd1845.pdf.
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Cary, Matthew. "On profit maximization in mechanism design /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/6980.
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Kveiborg, Ole. "Regulating road transport using mechanism design /." København, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/364082461.pdf.
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Xiang, Xiangzhong, and 項祥中. "Mechanism design for auctions and pricing." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202375.
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Recent years have seen extensive studies on the pricing problem, as well as its many variances. They have found important applications in computational economics. Nowadays typical applications can be found in internet advertising, Google’s Auction for TV ads and many other resource allocation problems in electronic markets. In electronic markets, thousands of trading activities are processed in the internet or done automatically by computer programs. It is highly required that the trading mechanisms are efficient enough. In the thesis, we will study various pricing problems from different perspectives.
The first problem we study is the design of auction mechanism when bidders are unit-demand. It can be applied in internet advertising. Thousand of advertisers bid for space in webpages to show their advertisements. We model the new problem and apply the General Second Price (GSP) mechanism to the problem. GSP is an efficient mechanism with linear time complexity. Moreover, we show that GSP has an envy-free equilibrium which can maximize the profit of advertisers.
Auction mechanisms where bidders can bid for multiple items are also studied. A famous example of such auction is the Dutch flower auction. Such multi-unit auctions are widely studied these years. But budget constraints are not considered in many previous works. We study the scenario that each bidder has a budget on the money paid to the auctioneer and the valuation functions of bidders are non-linear. For the model, we design an adaptive clinching auction mechanism. The mechanism is proved to be incentive-compatible, which encourages bidders to reveal their true values, and Pareto-optimal, which ensures that no bidder can improve her utility without decreasing those of others.
In some auctions, the items on sale are not available at the same time. For example, TV stations sell time-slots for advertisements on a daily basis. The advertisers are arriving and departing online and bidding for a set of timeslots. For the auction, we design a competitive mechanism which is truthful, i.e., all bidders have the incentive to submit their true private values to the auctioneer. Another important property the mechanism achieves is promptness, which makes sure that any advertiser that wins some time-slots could learn her payment immediately after winning these time-slots.
In some pricing problems, upon the arrival of a new buyer, the seller needs to decide immediately whether he will sell his goods or not and what is the price. When buyers are unit-demand and each seller has b items on sale, the online pricing problem can be modelled by online weighted b-matching problem. For the problem, we show a randomized algorithm which achieves near-optimal competitive ratio. When buyers are not unit-demand, things are much more complicated. We consider a general model in which each buyer wants to buy a bundle of items and has a non-increasing valuation function for those items. We design a randomized algorithm which achieves low competitive ratio and derive a non-trivial lower bound on the competitive ratios.published_or_final_version
Computer Science
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
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Anastasiadis, E. "Optimization problems in network mechanism design." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2016. http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3007144/.
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We study approximation algorithms and design truthful mechanisms for optimization problems in networks that have direct applications in smart cities and urban planning. We present new models and new techniques which could be of independent interest. More specifically, in Chapter 2 we introduce a new model for pollution control and propose two applications of this model. This is the first time this problem is studied from the computational perspective. The network is represented by a graph where nodes are the pollutants and edges between pollutants represent the effect of spread of pollution. The government sets bounds on the levels of emitted pollution in both local areas and the whole network. We mainly study the classes of planar graphs and trees which model air and water pollution and design truthful approximate mechanisms. In Chapter 3 we introduce a new mechanism design model for a new model for the budgeted maximum lifetime coverage (BMLC) in wireless sensor networks (wsns). BMLC generalizes the known maximum lifetime coverage problem to the case where sensors are owned by selfish agents, where each agent has a private cost per unit time of how much to be paid for deploying his sensor. We introduce a random instances model for BMLC and design a novel approximate mechanism by reducing BMLC to the fractional knapsack which is truthful under some technical assumptions. For a closely related minimum coverage problem in wsns on unit disk graphs, we generalize a recent PTAS for this problem to obtain a truthful PTAS for the problem where sensors' costs are agents' private data. In Chapter 4 we study approximation algorithms which are based on the primal dual method for network connectivity problems. We then prove that these algorithms are monotone and thus can lead to truthful mechanisms. Finally in Chapter 5 we study the problem of facility location on the real line under non utilitarian objective functions. We extend previous models and derive inapproximability bounds for deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms. As a byproduct we show that the same approximation guarantees hold for the social utility objective.
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Chen, Jing Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/78444.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-66).
In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.
by Jing Chen.
Ph.D.
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Cai, Yang Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82344.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 168-175).
A modern engineering system, e.g. the Internet, faces challenges from both the strategic behavior of its self-interested participants and the inherent computational intractability of large systems. Responding to this challenge, a new field, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, has emerged. One of the most fundamental problems in this field is How to optimize revenue in an auction? In his seminal paper [Mye81], Myerson gives a partial solution to this problem by providing a revenue-optimal auction for a seller who is looking to sell a single item to muLtiple bidders. Extending this auction to simultaneously selling multiple heterogeneous items has been one of the central open problems in Mathematical Economics. We provide such an extension that is also computationally efficient. Our solution proposes a novel framework for mechanism design by reducing mechanism design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "rational inputs" ) to algorithm design problems (where one optimizes an objective function on "honest inputs"). Our reduction is generic and provides a framework for many other mechanism design problems.
by Yang Cai.
Ph.D.
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Tzamos, Christos. "The complexity of optimal mechanism design." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82373.
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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-64).
Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP = P # p. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.
by Christos Tzamos.
S.M.
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Pavan, Alessandro. "Essays on auctions and mechanism design." Toulouse 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001TOU10032.
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Le premier essai introduit un principe de révélation markovien dans des contrats caractérisés par des relations bilatérales multiples avec un agent commun ; le suivant analyse l'échange d'information ; le troisième examine le cas d'un monopole qui vend un bien durable, ensuite échangé sur un marché secondaire ; le dernier traite des enchères de biens divisibles, comme les titres d'ÉtatFour essays in the theory of auctions and mechanism design. Chapter one introduces a Markovian revelation principle for common agency games ; chapter two derives the optimal disclosure policy ; chapter three considers a monopolist who sells a durable good, which is subsequently traded in a secondary market ; chapter four considers auctions for divisible goods, like Treasury securities