Dissertations / Theses: 'Determinism (Philosophy)'

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Bobzien, Susanne. "Determinism and free will in Stoic philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334904.

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Whitney, Eoin. "Compatibilism of Causal Determinism and Free Will." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1017.

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An argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and free will. Draws on recently conducted philosophical experimentation related to intuition and development of the intuition of agent-causal accounts of free will in children. Argues that regardless of the intuition held, the manner in which people arise to these intuitions shows that the working definition of free will is different than people posit. Lays groundwork for why the working definition of free will is compatible with causal determinism.

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Belo, Catarina Carriço Marques de Moura. "Chance and determinism in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2004. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5dce93b3-846f-4110-962b-2f705f57b4e8.

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This thesis analyses the concept of 'chance' as it is understood by two Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sīnā (Lat. Avicenna, CE 980-1037) and Ibn Rushd (Lat. Averroes, CE 1126-1198). On the philosophical plane, I seek to ascertain whether they are determinists, i.e., whether they hold that everything that happens is necessarily conditioned by its causes so that it could not have been otherwise. This analysis discusses chance from a physical and a metaphysical perspective. Physics is here understood in the Aristotelian sense as the study of nature and change, and metaphysics as the study of being qua being (ontology) and of the divine (theology). Hence a particular stress on natural causation and on divine providence and causation. On the historical-philosophical plane I endeavour to determine the historical/philosophical sources of their views, namely the Graeco-Arabic philosophical tradition - Aristotelian and Neoplatonic on the one Band, and the tradition of Islamic theology (kalām) on the other. Particular emphasis is laid upon the original way in which Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd combine these two traditions.

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Davis, Paul. "The cheap tricks of compatibilism and why the problem of free will won't go away." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/18821.

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Seevers, Kiel J. "A comparative look at karma and determinism." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1414434790.

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Chan, Hoi-yee, and 陳凱宜. "Free will and experimental philosophy : when an old debate meets a new movement." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/207187.

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Consider this scenario: A terrorist just bombed the subway in London, which resulted in the casualties of numerous innocent people. His act can be considered well-planned for he fully knew what consequences his act would bring. If determinism is true, is it possible that the terrorist in question bombed the subway out of free will? An incompatibilist would respond to this question with a resounding “no”. A compatibilist, on the other hand, would answer yes, as long as the terrorist possessed certain psychological characteristics, causal histories, etc. This underlies the basis of disputes between the compatibilists and incompatibilists, who appear to hold opposite views on whether it is possible for someone to act out of free will if determinism is true. However, as I shall discuss in Chapter One, this disagreement is partly a verbal one that stems from the diverse meanings of the term “free will”. This thesis aims to transcend the verbal disagreement and explore where the deeper, more substantial disagreements may lie between compatibilists and incompatibilists. One possible sphere where substantial disagreements between compatibilists and incompatibilists may lie is the content of the ordinary concept of free will, or that of the strongest sense of control condition necessary for securing the ordinary concept of moral responsibility. On this view, the metaphysical question and the conceptual question about free will are inseparable; in order to find out the metaphysical satisfaction conditions of free will, one must first identify the conceptual satisfaction conditions of free will. Further, the latter is reflected in everyday free will/ moral responsibility ascriptions about hypothetical or real scenarios. In Chapter Two, I analyze how the recent experimental philosophy movement bears on this issue. By examining the findings of some current experimental philosophy studies, I argue that neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism can sufficiently capture the ordinary concept of free will or moral responsibility. In the light of my discussions in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Three why each of the various traditional accounts of free will (including compatibilism, libertarianism and hard incompatibilism) cannot independently provide an adequate “package deal” of solutions for the problem of free will. Near the end of the chapter, I propose a pluralistic, agnostic account of free will as an alternative solution. Despite its great instrumental value, experimental philosophy is not widely recognized as a philosophically significant methodology. Hence, Chapter Four is devoted to discussing the actual and potential values of experimental philosophy in the light of its contribution to the free will debate. I conclude that the encounter between the free will debate and the experimental philosophy movement is a fruitful one; the former proves the value of the latter by receiving helpful insights from it.
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Philosophy
Master
Master of Philosophy

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Ward, Koral. "In the blink of an eye: an investigation into the concept of the 'decisive moment' (Augenblick) as found in nineteenth and twentieth century western philosophy." Thesis, Ward, Koral (2005) In the blink of an eye: an investigation into the concept of the 'decisive moment' (Augenblick) as found in nineteenth and twentieth century western philosophy. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2005. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/391/.

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'In the blink of an eye' is a figurative expression which, in its most basic interpretation describes the experience of a fleeting but momentous event. It comes, however, to represent an encounter with the 'eternal'. That it can contain these antithetical elements points to the abidingly paradoxical nature of the Augenblick. In this thesis we follow the development of the concept from its roots in the theology of Soren Kierkgaard and the myth of Friedrich Nietzsche, to its existential eludidation nearly a century later in the work of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. In the final two chapters of this thesis, the Augenblick is viewed as an inherited conceptual tool for metaphysical thought. We apply it to the consideration of an historical epoch of great social change and to certain works of art which express its zeitgeist. This well-used metaphor is a living idea, it continues to gather meaning to itself.

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Ward, Koral. "In the blink of an eye : an investigation into the concept of the 'decisive moment' (Augenblick) as found in nineteenth and twentieth century western philosophy /." Ward, Koral (2005) In the blink of an eye: an investigation into the concept of the 'decisive moment' (Augenblick) as found in nineteenth and twentieth century western philosophy. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2005. http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/391/.

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'In the blink of an eye' is a figurative expression which, in its most basic interpretation describes the experience of a fleeting but momentous event. It comes, however, to represent an encounter with the 'eternal'. That it can contain these antithetical elements points to the abidingly paradoxical nature of the Augenblick. In this thesis we follow the development of the concept from its roots in the theology of Soren Kierkgaard and the myth of Friedrich Nietzsche, to its existential eludidation nearly a century later in the work of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. In the final two chapters of this thesis, the Augenblick is viewed as an inherited conceptual tool for metaphysical thought. We apply it to the consideration of an historical epoch of great social change and to certain works of art which express its zeitgeist. This well-used metaphor is a living idea, it continues to gather meaning to itself.

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Bunce, Thomas George. "Causation, realism, determinism, and probability in the science and philosophy of Max Born." Thesis, Durham University, 2018. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12697/.

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In this thesis I will examine the philosophy of the physicist Max Born (1882-1970). As well as his scientific work, Born wrote on a number of philosophical topics: causation, realism, determinism, and probability. They appear as an interest throughout his career, but he particularly concentrates on them from the 1940s onwards. Born is a significant figure in the development of quantum mechanics whose philosophical work has been left largely unexamined. It is the aim of this thesis to elucidate and to critically examine that work. I will give a defence of presentist historiography in the history and philosophy of science and a (relatively) brief biography of Born. With regards to causation, the thesis will argue that he holds that there exist principles regarding causal relations that have guided the development of physics and have, in the modern formulation of the subject, been confirmed as having an empirical status. I will argue that he is a selective realist, initially with regards to invariant properties and, later on, a structural realist. With regards to determinism, I will argue that Born has produced an argument, compatible with modern philosophical definitions of determinism, that we were never entitled to conclude from the success of classical mechanics that the world was deterministic. Finally, I will argue that Born holds an objective interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics which, due to his strong belief in the physical reality of quantum-mechanical probabilities and his apparent disbelief in the superposition of the wave-function, is most likely a long-run propensity theory.

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Greer, Sacha. "Cogs in a Cosmic Machine: A Defense of Free Will Skepticism and its Ethical Implications." Scholar Commons, 2015. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5487.

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Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions, followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom's optimism that a global acceptance of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than those which perpetuate the illusion of free will. Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary. Some object to free will skepticism not because they found something inherently wrong with the logic of the position but because of practical concerns. Their arguments against free will skepticism assert that if such a view is accepted, society will unravel, interpersonal relationships will become compromised, personal identity will be undermined, and life would lose all meaning. However, largely inspired by Derk Pereboom's book "Living without Free Will," I will show why such misgivings are unfounded. Pereboom offers good reasons to believe that not only would society, relationships, identity, and meaning remain intact, but also that society would enjoy practical advantages by accepting free will skepticism. Furthermore, a society based on the belief in free will perpetrates grave injustices on its citizens, and beliefs in desert and blame fuel destructive reactive attitudes inimical to flourishing interpersonal relationships. The social advantages of accepting free will skepticism involve sweeping reforms necessitated by its acceptance. I discuss two such reforms pertaining to the institutions of punishment and parenthood. If those who commit immoral or illegal acts are not to blame for their transgressions, then our current system of punishment is unfair and unjust. There are alternative ways to cultivate a safe society without subjecting wrongdoers to desert-based penalties. Using an alternative model of justice, one that tailors a punitive response to the specific risks and needs of each perpetrator, would be far more effective than mere incarceration. Furthermore, since the root cause of criminality can, in many cases, be traced to childhood abuse or neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent parents are not raising children. Therefore, I advocate a licensing program for parents for the benefit of both future children, and for the safety of society. Building on the arguments of notable free will skeptics, I conclude that free will skepticism is the most scientifically defensible position, that the objections to it are unfounded, and that the benefits of accepting it surpass those of alternative positions. While a discussion of all ethical and practical implications would surpass the space allowed here, I hope that my limited discussion inspires more research and challenges the many misconceptions surrounding free will skepticism.

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Schlosser, Markus Ernst. "The metaphysics of agency /." St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.

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Kaiserman, Alexander. "Cause and context." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a887f7cc-64df-40b5-8587-0eb89bfa5fd5.

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This thesis comprises an introduction and six papers on causation, freedom and responsibility. Though mostly self-standing, the papers are unified by two common goals - to recognise and analyse the role of context in the semantics of causal claims and ascriptions of freedom; and to put metaphysical approaches to causation into closer contact with actual causal reasoning in science and the law. Chapter One defends a contextualist semantics of causal language that combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. Chapter Two extends this approach to ascriptions of freedom, by combining Kratzer's account with the principle that an agent acts freely only if she could have acted otherwise. Chapter Three explores a neglected view which combines David Lewis's counterfactual account of causation with his counterpart-theoretic approach to de re modality. Chapter Four proposes an amendment to the interventionist account of causation in response to a worry raised by John Campbell about causation in psychology. Chapter Five motivates the idea that causation is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees, and defends a novel account of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. Chapter Six then argues, from a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's losses only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant's harm.

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Evans, Blake W. S. "Determined Freedom: On Moral Responsibility Between Chance and Necessitation." Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1619724559950428.

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Wengelin, Grantén Elin. "No Fixed past : A Compatibilist Reply to the Consequence Argument." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-184427.

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Carl Hoeferʼs “freedom from the inside out” is a compatibilist account of freedom that claims that we can have a robust kind of freedom even if the world is deterministic. The key insight is that determinism belongs in tenseless B-series time in the block universe, not in our everyday notions of the world where time is experienced in a tensed way with a past, a present, and a future, where the past is viewed as fixed and the future as open. The block universe is time symmetric, i.e., determination can go in both temporal direction, and no particular part of the block universe is determined or fixed prior to any other part. Therefore,we do not have to think of deterministic logical relations as placing constraints on our actions in advance. Instead, we are free to view our actions as primary explainers that very partially determine both the future and the past. Since our actions are thought to place constraints on the microscopic past, it will be argued that Hoeferʼs account can question the Consequence Argument, the well-known incompatibilist argument that claims that if the past and the laws are not up to us, the consequences of the past and the laws cannot be up to us either, which includes our present actions. Hence, it will be argued that by rejecting that the past is not up to us, Hoeferʼs account can refute the Consequence Argument, which removes one possible threat to our freedom.
Carl Hoefers “frihet från insidan ut” är en kompatibilistisk teori om frihet som hävdar att vi kan ha en robust sorts frihet även om världen är deterministisk. Den centrala idén är att determinism hör hemma i den statiska B-seriens tid i blockuniversumet, inte i världen såsom vi upplever den med ett förflutet, ett nu, och en framtid, där det förflutna upplevs som fixerat och framtiden som öppen. Blockuniversumet är tidssymmetriskt, vilket innebär att determinationen kan gå både framåt och bakåt, och ingen specifik del av blockuniversumet är determinerad eller fixerad före någon annan del. Därför behöver vi inte tänka på de deterministiska logiska relationerna som någonting som i förväg begränsar hur vi kan agera. Vi är istället fria att betrakta våra handlingar som primära förklarare som är delaktiga i att determinera både det förflutna och framtiden. Eftersom Hoefer menar att våra handlingar begränsar hur det mikroskopiska förflutna kan vara, så kommer det att argumenteras för att Hoefers teori kan ifrågasätta konsekvensargumentet, vilket är ett välkänt inkompatibilistiskt argument som säger att eftersom det förflutna och naturlagarna inte är upptill oss, så kan inte heller konsekvenserna av det förflutna och naturlagarna vara upp till oss, således kan inte våra handlingar vara upp till oss. Genom att förneka att det förflutna inte är upp till oss, så kan Hoefers idéer avvisa konsekvensargumentet, vilket tar bort ett möjligt hot mot vår frihet.

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Rydberg, Andreas. "Viljebegreppet och psykologin : En studie av psykologins framväxt som vetenskap i Sverige genom en analys av viljebegreppets betydelseförändring." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of History of Science and Ideas, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-103264.

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The aim of this study is to elucidate the process in which psychology was separated from philosophy and established itself as a distinct academic discipline in Sweden. I argue that the concept of will, as well as the concepts of thinking and emotion, have a lot to tell us about the rise of academic psychology in Sweden. This is done through an analysis of psychology textbooks, encyclopaedia-articles and academic texts on the themes will and psychology, from around 1800 till 1950.

Prior to the establishment of the first chair of psychology in Uppsala 1948, the discipline was above all a part of the philosophical discipline. For psychology to become a science of its own, it was crucial to obtain a position among the empirical sciences. It thus had to distance itself from philosophy, and in particular from metaphysics. In that respect the concept of will, thinking and emotion posed a problem. On the one hand, these concepts seamed necessary for a science of the psyche but on the other, they were traditionally associated with philosophy and especially with metaphysics.

From around 1900, the concept of will underwent an empirisation process in which it distanced itself from the metaphysical content of meaning. The idea of thinking, emotion and will as faculties was criticised and replaced by a way of speaking of them in terms of single acts, able to be analysed in a more empirical manner. This change was in accordance with the new demand on empiricism. Within psychology, however, practicians of the trade still spoke in terms of will, thinking and emotion, as well as of classical philosophical problems such as that of the free will, albeit in a more empirical manner.

A second, more profound change, occurred in the 1940s when the concepts of thinking, emotion and will, as well as the problem of the free will were sorted out from the psychological discourse. In light of their long time as an integral part of the psychological discourse it was a significant change that the human psyche was no longer to be discussed in terms of will, thinking and emotion. The most likely explanation of this change is that the institutional split between psychology and philosophy after 1948 also signified a separation between philosophical and empirical-psychological questions. After 1948 it was possible to pursue scientific studies in psychology without any knowledge of philosophy and hence, without an urge to pose philosophical questions.

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Beckman, Emma. "Augustinus predestinationslära och människans fria vilja." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-5647.

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Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen.

This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.

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Paiva, Mauro Fraga. "Nem tudo que se diz é verdade e nem tudo que é verdade é dito: uma análise crítica da difusão do pensamento genético e evolucionário na contemporaneidade." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2009. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=5347.

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Nos últimos séculos a Ciência vem produzindo uma série de respostas para problemas que afligem a humanidade. São descobertas que procuraram mudar e continuam mudando a relação do ser humano com a Natureza, a divindade e com ele próprio. Mas é inegável que em momentos passados, a crença excessiva no poder da ciência e da razão conduziu a ideias e argumentos de cientificidade questionável, como o darwinismo social, a sociobiologia, o eugenismo e tantas outras. Outros problemas também podem provir de insinuações de estudiosos proeminentes de que os seres humanos são apenas um monte de neurônios ou apenas veículos para a propagação de genes, ou ainda, que somos somente máquinas. Parece que esse tipo de reducionismo presta um desserviço aos seres humanos, à sociedade e à ciência. Como tentaremos mostrar no decorrer desta tese, a propagação do conhecimento científico para o senso comum, nos parece impregnada desta concepção determinista de se pensar e fazer ciência. Encontramos nos mais diferentes campos de saber científico, da psicologia à sociologia, da economia à engenharia, uma série de argumentos comuns, baseados na Biologia genética e evolucionária e que, nas últimas duas décadas, vêm ganhando um espaço surpreendente de argumentação nos saberes acima. É como se houvesse uma determinação biológica para tudo e para todos. Foi da análise do material informativo e formativo circulante no senso comum, e da posterior constatação desta impregnação, que surgiu a necessidade e a inquietação em produzir um estudo crítico e mais aprofundado sobre estas questões, buscando ouvir alguns dos mais reconhecidos pesquisadores do campo para saber se há algum fundamento no que é noticiado e, muitas vezes, publicado oficialmente sobre o tema.

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Friberg, Anna. "Om determinism och fri vilja hos Leibniz : En studie av Leibniz Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8158.

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Den här uppsatsen studerar och analyserar begreppen ”determinism”, ”fri vilja” och ”moraliskt ansvar”, speciellt i Leibniz Theodicy. I uppsatsens första del utreds och preciseras begreppen vilket är nödvändigt för att sedan, i andra delen, kunna analysera Leibniz teori utifrån dem. Leibniz utgår från att Gud som har skapat jorden och i och med detta även bestämt alla dess förlopp (den förutbestämda harmonin), han anser dock att detta är förenligt med människans fria vilja. Enligt Leibniz är frihet att handla i enlighet med sin natur. Trots att Leibniz hävdar att alla förlopp är bestämda av Gud anser han att moraliskt ansvar ändå har en plats i teorin. För att kunna hävda det måste han anse att det räcker med hypotetiska alternativ till den utförda handlingen. Uppsatsen uppfattar Leibniz determinism som teologisk determinism, något som utesluter frihet och fri vilja i det avseende som vi avser då vi talar om begreppen till vardags. Uppsatsen visar på problem i Leibniz teori när det gäller moraliskt ansvar och skuld, dessa blir svåra att förstå och motivera i Leibniz redan förutbestämda harmoni.

This paper studies and analyses the concepts of “determinism”, “free will” and “moral responsibility”, particularly in Leibniz’ Theodicy. In the first part of the paper the concepts are investigated and specified, a necessity in order to use them in the second part. There they are the base of the analysis of Leibniz theory. Leibniz assumes that God has created the world all its and courses of events (the pre-established harmony). He thinks this is possible to combine with human free will. According to Leibniz, people are free when they act as they themselves want to. Even though Leibniz argues that all courses of events are determined by God he still believes that his theory admits of moral responsibility. To say this Leibniz must think that it is enough if there are hypothetical alternatives to the preformed action. This paper understands Leibniz’ determinism as a form of theological determinism, something that rules out the possibility of freedom or free will, at least in the sense that we use the concepts on a daily basis. The paper shows problems in Leibniz’ theory when it comes to moral responsibility and guilt. These concepts are hard to understand and motivate in Leibniz pre-established harmony.

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Johnstone, Michael. "Liberty or death : a practical and theoretical exploration of alternatives to free will and determinism in contemporary historical fiction." Thesis, University of Gloucestershire, 2011. http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/2009/.

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The thesis combines creative and critical work integrated into a single text. The text is presented as the work of a PhD student whose project has been supervised by the disillusioned Professor Thrib. The student plans to write the fictionalised biography of Elsie Stewart, a working class Belfast woman whose life intersected with the defining dramas of twentieth century history. His research diary describes how he and his translator, Lempi, began to reconstruct Elsie's life from archive sources scattered across Europe, and his early output is literary prose of the sort one would expect to find in a historical novel. However, Professor Thrib has built his career on an eccentric form of post-structuralism, and pushed to breaking point by the bureaucracy and double-speak of the university, Thrib demands his student desists from using personal pronouns or any other grammatical structures that imply originative action. As the conclusion of Elsie's story is told in increasingly bizarre fragments, the student looks for answers through close readings of recent historical fictions (In Country, Libra, Midnight's Children, The Passion, Philadelphia Fire, Possession, Star Turn, and Waterland), in the theories of selected modern philosophers (Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard), and in the eccentric publications of Professor Thrib and other imaginary academics. Unable to account for human agency theoretically, he seeks a new writing that effaces the subject as originator of action; at the same time, however, he obsesses over the human drives of emotion, desire, and corporeal experience. As the student struggles with the bureaucracy of the university and his unrequited infatuation with his translator, what emerges is a novel approach to the question of free will and determinism that goes beyond 'death of the subject' literature. Additionally, the thesis uses skills from a range of disciplines including Creative Writing, English Literature, History, Philosophy, and Social Science, and in its interdisciplinary ambition it argues for the value of art and theory in an increasingly mercantile Higher Education sector.

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Brunton, Isabel Charlotte. "From Hell to Utopia : how clinical psychologists who don't believe in free will experience delivering therapy." Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/17215.

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Background: Both Freud (1921) and Skinner (1971) were regarded as 'hard determinists' who saw human thought and action as determined by prior events, and the idea of free will as simply an illusion. While this belief system clearly impacted on the models of therapy they developed, whether such beliefs also had an impact on their ability to develop qualities of effective therapy, such as empathic and genuine therapeutic relationships, is not known. Furthermore, whether there is something about holding this belief system that could affect therapists' abilities to attain and nurture such qualities, remains unclear. Research Question: The research study reported here sought to gain some insight into the above question, and into what it is like to deliver therapy from a hard determinist philosophical frame, by asking how clinical psychologists who hold a hard determinist philosophy, experience delivering therapy. Method: The study made use of a qualitative design methodology. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven hard determinist clinical psychologists, and interview transcripts were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Results: Four super-ordinate themes emerged from the analysis: 'From Hell to Utopia: How it feels to be a hard determinist therapist', 'Hating the sin, loving the sinner: Enhancing the therapeutic relationship', 'Free will: A felt vs reflective understanding', and 'Therapist as thinker'. Implications: The themes to emerge from the data gave rise to a number of implications and recommendations for practice and further research. In particular, it was recommended that the link between hard determinist beliefs and a perceived enhancement of the therapeutic relationship warrants further research. Furthermore, since the philosophy was linked to ideas about power, self-control, therapeutic models, science, and research, discussions of the philosophy may add valuable contributions to clinical psychology's understanding of these issues. In addition, a replication or development of this study with a broader range of therapists is recommended, to establish whether the findings reported here can be generalised to therapists from fields outside clinical psychology.

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Weslake, Bradley. "Asymmetries and saliencies : essays on the causal perspective." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2007. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/28848.

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This thesis is a collection of essays on time and causation. They are concerned primarily with developing an account of how seven different parts of what Wilfrid Sellars (1962) called the manifest and the scientific images of the world fit together.

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22

Olovsson, Magnus. "Fri vilja, determinism, religiositet och oro : Svenska gymnasieelevers attityder till några existentiella begrepp." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Sektionen för lärande och miljö, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-15502.

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The objective was to examine students’ attitudes versus the concepts of free will and determinism, and to juxtapose these to anxiety and religiosity.An online survey was filled in by 162 Swedish students aged between 18 and 20 in an upper secondary high school. To measure the concepts of free will and determinism the Paulhus & Carey FAD-Plus scale (2011) has been used. Anxiety was measured with two types of the short STAI-index.The factor analysis did not support the idea of an extra division of the original FAD-plus index into the factors ‘free will without moral responsibility’ and the fac-tor ‘moral responsibility’. Some minor sex differences were notices in that females scored higher on fatalistic determinism as well as anxiety. The correlation be-tween free will and scientific determinism were very small negative and not sig-nificant, implying that the two concepts are compatible to at least some respond-ents. The same week correspondence were noticed between scientific determin-ism and moral, showing that the dichotomy between the concepts having low support among students.The traditionally seen opposite concepts of fatalistic and scientific determin-ism were surprisingly positively and significant corresponding.Conclusion of the survey results support the view that the question on free will and determinism is more complex than a simple two way street as shown by Paulhus & Carey (2011) and Nichols & Knobe (2007). Moral responsibility is strongly connected to free will, but is not negatively correlated to determinism showing an interesting paradox in the traditional view of these concepts.

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McCauley, Patrick James. "Reading by the light of a burning phoenix an inquiry into faith, deliverance, and despair within humankind's paradoxical suspension between the conditional and the unconditional in the work of Immanuel Kant and Hermann Hesse /." Diss., University of Iowa, 2006. http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/79.

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24

Schlosser, Markus E. "The metaphysics of agency." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.

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Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.

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Ferraz, Marilia Cortes de. "Liberdade e imputabilidade moral em Hume." [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281518.

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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A dissertação examina a análise de Hume dos conceitos de liberdade e imputabilidade moral. O texto de referência para a pesquisa é a seção VIII da Investigação sobre o entendimento humano. Mostro, a partir do estudo dessa seção, em que sentido os conceitos de liberdade e necessidade são compatíveis para Hume. Para tanto, analiso o compatibilismo humeano enfatizando a unidade explicativa que o autor esposa claramente na obra citada. De fato, Hume, em seu exame das noções de liberdade e necessidade anuncia introduzir novidades que prometem ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia entre a doutrina da necessidade e a doutrina da liberdade (da vontade). Ele propõe um 'projeto de reconciliação¿ (reconciling project) que consiste em mostrar que liberdade e necessidade são perfeitamente compatíveis entre si, e que afirmar que as ações humanas são livres não é afirmar que estejam fora do âmbito da necessidade, mas apenas que se realizaram sem constrangimento. Em seguida, esclareço as razões que conduzem à crença na vontade livre, crença esta infundada, segundo Hume. Por fim, procuro estabelecer as conseqüências que o compatibilismo humeano traz para a noção de responsabilidade moral. Hume entende que não só é perfeitamente possível explicar os juízos morais pelo seu compatibilismo, como também que o seu compatibilismo é a única alternativa de fato consistente para dar conta dos ajuizamentos que fazemos acerca da moralidade. Entendo que a explicação dos juízos morais de imputabilidade oferecida por Hume representa uma hipótese altamente persuasiva e com vigor suficiente para responder a objeções geralmente apresentadas pelos incompatibilistas
Abstract: The dissertation examines the analysis of Hume of the concepts of freedom and moral imputability. The text of reference for the research is section VIII of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I show, from the study of this section, how freedom and necessity are compatible for Hume. To this effect, I analyze the humean compatibilism emphasizing the unit of the explanation that the author maintains in the cited work. Hume, in his examination of freedom and necessity, announces a new approach that promises at least some results for the decision of the controversy between the doctrine of the necessity and the doctrine of the freedom (of the will). He proposes a conciliatory project that consists in showing that freedom and necessity are perfectly compatible, and that to say that the human actions are free is not to say that they are out of the scope of the necessity, but only that they are without constraint. After that, I clarify the reasons that lead to the belief in free will, which is baseless according to Hume. Finally, I establish the consequences that humean compatibilism brings for the notion of moral responsibility. Hume understands not only that it is perfectly possible to explain moral judgments by means of his compatibilism, but also that his compatibilism is the only consistent alternative to account for moral judgement. I understand that the explanation of moral judgments of imputability offered by Hume represents a highly persuasive hypothesis, and strong enough to answer the objections generally raised by incompatibilists
Mestrado
Filosofia Moral
Mestre em Filosofia

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Holst, Oscar. "Becoming The Chosen One : The Choice, Identity and Destiny of Harry Potter." Thesis, University of Kalmar, School of Human Sciences, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hik:diva-897.

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The paper examines the philosophical themes of Free Will as opposed to Determinism/Predestination and how they are portrayed in the seven books about Harry Potter. It is discussed whether the character of Harry Potter, but also the world itself in which he acts, seem to be governed primarily by forces of Free Will and/or Determinism. The author concludes that though Harry is indeed strongly tempted to believe in Determinism, influential figures around him direct him towards a different choice - making himself believe in Free Will instead.

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Carlson, Allison Doreen, and University of Lethbridge Faculty of Education. "Free will in the educational theory of Jacques Maritain." Thesis, Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Faculty of Education, 1991, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10133/47.

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In Jacques Maritain's text The Education of Man (1962) a Christian perspective affirming the individual's free will is presented. This study examines the validity of Maritain's argument and speculates upon some consequences for public schooling. The conclusions of the study are as follows: First. Maritain's exposition of the existence of absolute free will is unconvincing as it is not successfully reconciled with his religious world view. Second. if Maritain's views may be assumed to complement the religous educational and institutional objectives of Alberta's Catholic schools, the potential for conflict between these views and the 'secular' (i.e. the common goals, contents and processes of all public and separte schools) objectives of Catholic schools exists.
vi, 81 leaves ; 28 cm.

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Matulovic, Mariana 1980. "Demonstrações na algibeira : polinômios como um método universal de prova." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281059.

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Orientador: Walter Alexandre Carnielli
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo explorar, em diversas vertentes, o caráter universal de uma ferramenta poderosa de prova, apta a ser utilizada em lógicas clássicas e não clássicas, em particular em lógicas multivaloradas proposicionais (determinísticas e não-determinísticas), em lógicas paraconsistentes, em lógicas modais e na Lógica de Primeira Ordem. Trata-se do Método de Prova de Anéis de Polinômios, que também pode, em princípio, ser visto do ponto de vista da semântica algébrica, desenvolvido inicialmente em (Carnielli 2005b). O método traduz fórmulas de uma lógica específica em polinômios (em geral finitos, mas podendo ser infinitos) com coeficientes em corpos finitos, e transforma o problema de se encontrar demonstrações no correlato algébrico da busca de soluções de sistemas de equações polinomiais. Esta universalidade do método possibilita a abertura de diversas linhas de pesquisa, sendo a questão da verofuncionalidade e suas generalizações uma delas. Outras linhas de pesquisa são: possibilidades de se investigar enfoques alternativos da complexidade computacional, prova automática de teoremas, métodos heurísticos em lógica e correlações entre álgebra e lógica. Este trabalho analisa e compara sistemas de anéis de polinômios para sistemas com verofuncionalidade generalizada, como no caso das semânticas não-determinísticas, e ainda em sistemas onde a verofuncionalidade é perdida, tais como em sistemas multivalorados reduzidos a bivalorados através da conhecida redução de Suszko. O método de anéis de polinômios, além de poderoso e elegante em sua aparente simplicidade, constitui ainda um ótimo instrumento pedagógico. Em relação á lógica clássica, definimos um anel de polinômios para a Lógica de Primeira Ordem, fundamentado em um novo domínio que opera com somas e produtos infinitos, o qual se denomina domínio de séries generalizadas fechado por produtos. Finalmente, procuramos avaliar todas as potencialidades do método, principalmente no aspecto inerente á questão de se poder pensar em uma característica unificadora na medida que utiliza o mesmo viés matemático para traduzir diferentes sistemas lógicos em variedades algébricas similares. Além disso, analisamos as interrelações do método com respeito a lógica algébrica (ou álgebra da lógica), e avaliamos suas perspectivas
Abstract: This investigation aims to explore, in various aspects, the universal character of a powerful proof method, able to be used in classical and non-classical logics, in particular in propositional many-valued logics (deterministic and non- deterministic) in paraconsistent logics, in modal logics and in First Order Logic. This is the Method of Polynomial Rings, which can also be considered as an algebraic semantics, initially developed in (Carnielli 2005b). The method translates logical formulas into specific polynomials (usually finite, but sometimes infinite) with coefficients infinite fields, and transforms the problem of finding proofs in the search for solutions of systems of polynomial equations. This universality of the method enables the opening of several research lines, in particular the issue of truth-functionality and its generalizations. Other lines of research are: the possibilities of investigating alternative approaches of computational complexity, automatic theorem proving, heuristic methods in logic and correlations between algebra and logic. This study compares and analyzes the polynomial ring systems for systems with generalized truth-functionality, as in the case of non- deterministic semantic and even in systems where truth-functionality is lost, such as those many-valued systems reduced to bivalued by means of the so-called Suszko reduction. The method of polynomial rings, besides being a powerful and elegant apparatus in its apparent simplicity, is still a great teaching tool. Regarding classical logic, we define the polynomial ring for First Order Logic , based on a new domain that operates on sums and infinite products, called domain of generalized series closed under products. Finally, we evaluate the full potential of the method, especially in what concerns the question of obtaining a unifying feature that uses the same mathematical basis to translate different logical systems on similar algebraic varieties. Furthermore, we address the connections of the method with respect to algebraic logic (algebra of logic), and evaluate their perspectives
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutora em Filosofia

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29

Futter, Dylan Brian. "Involuntary consent." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007846.

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In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements.
KMBT_363
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Cogley, Charles Zachary. "Responsibility and Manipulation." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275370229.

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Durand, Michiel Christoffel. "Vryheid, verantwoordelikheid en selfmoord." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/16317.

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Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Responsibility is either linked to duties and expectations, or it is linked to the freedom of an agent. These links are questionable. It is therefore necessary to investigate the freedom and context of commission and omission. There are numerous difficulties in evaluating suicide: - The problem to distinguish between successful suicide and failed pseudo suicide. - The problem of the mind: The limited accessibility of the emotions and attitudes despite its expressibility And the unexpressibility of the experiences despite its immediate accessibility. And the problem of other minds. - The problem of the freedom of the will. Prove is given that no aspect of the mind is free - despite our illusions of freedom. - The problem of the cause, origin and extent of an act. - The problem of the relation between brain and mind. This problem is important when we consider the origin of acts and the concept of the self. The important issues when solving the difficulties pertaining to suicide are: - Agency: The self is owner of all acts and instances of mind. The self is also the subject of all physical acts and acts of the mind. - The self is an open complex system. The self is entangled in relations of differences, conflict and deferment of meaning. The important conclusions when evaluating suicide are: - The agent is the owner and the subject of his acts. The agent has illusions of freedom. The agent is inseparable from his circumstances. - Acts originate in the context of these circumstances. - Responsibility exists in the context of power in society. - The answers to the questions of Why? Are logical reconstruction and politically correct confabulations - whatever the answer is, it is shared by all participants of the context.The evaluation of suicide: - The self-murderer`s act originates from the context of the circumstances of which he is a participant. - Suicide happens within the context of a pancheiria with aspects of autocheireō and heterocheireō. - The pancheiria started before the autocheireō. - The pancheiria continues after the autocheireō. The autocheireō is but an indication of the seriousness van the larger pancheiria. The self-murderer (autocheir) and his autocheireō persist as a silhouette in our midst. - The possibility of the self-murderer`s illusion of freedom does not liberate us from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither does se sharing of guilt give as relieve from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither will we benefit from any rationalization. Finally we can do nothing but to utter these statements of denial and confession : - Suicide is wrong. - But we have not done it.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verantwoordelikheid word óf aan verpligtinge en verwagtinge, óf aan die vryheid van die agent verbind. Hierdie verbindings word betwyfel. Daarom is dit nodig dat die vryheid van handeling en nie-handeling sowel as die konteks waarin die handeling en nie-handeling gebeur ondersoek word. Verskeie probleme ten opsigte van die beoordeling van die selfmoord word uitgewys: - Die probleem om die werklike geslaagde selfmoord te onderskei van die gefaalde selfmoordpoging. - Die probleme van die verstand. Naamlik die beperkte toeganklikheid van die emosies en houdings, alhoewel dit uitdrukbaar is. En die onmiddelike toeganklikheid van die ervarings wat dit te spyt nie uitdrukbaar is nie. Asook die probleem om ander verstande te ken. - Die probleem van die vryheid van die wil. Dit word aangetoon dat geen aspek van die verstand vry is nie. Dit nie teenstaande het ons steeds die illusie van vryheid. - Die probleem van die oorsaak, die oorsprong en die reikwydte van handelinge. - Die probleem van die verhouding tussen die brein en die verstand. Hierdie probleem is belangrik by die oorwegings van die oorspong van handeling en die siening van die self. Belangrike elemente by die oplossing van die beoordeling van selfmoord is: - Die agentskap: naamlik dat die self die eienaar van alle verstandsitems en handelinge is, en dat die self die subjek van alle verstandshandelinge en sigbare handelinge is. - Die self as `n oop komplekse stelsel wat in wederkerige verhoudings is van verskil, geskil en uitstel van betekenis.Gevolgtrekkings wat belangrik is by die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die agent is eienaar en subjek van sy handelinge, het die illusie van vryheid, is deel van sy omstandighede. - Die handeling ontstaan in die konteks van hierdie omstandighede. - Verantwoordelikheid bestaan in die konteks van mag in die samelewing. - Die antwoord op Hoekom? en Waarom? is logiese herkonstruksies en politiese korrekte konfabulasie - maar wat ookal die antwoord is, dit word gedeel deur al die deelnemers aan die konteks. Die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die selfmoordenaar se handeling ontspring uit die konteks van sy omstandighede waaraan hy `n deelnemer is. - Die selfmoord gebeur eerder binne die konteks van `n pancheiria met aspekte van autocheireō en heterocheireō. - Die pancheiria was reeds voor die autocheireō. - Die pancheiria duur voort na die autocheireō. Die autocheireō toon aan ons die erns van die oorkoepelende pancheiria. Die selfmoordenaar (autocheir) en sy autocheireō bestaan voort as silhoeët in ons midde. - Die moontlike illusie van vryheid van die selfmoordenaar kan ons nie die aanklag deur die silhoeët ontsnapping bied nie. - Net so min kan die verdeling van skuld ons van die aanklag laat ontsnap. - Enige rasionalisering van ons kant is nutteloos. Laastens kan ons net sê: - Selfmoord is verkeerd. - Ons het dit nie gedoen nie. Hierdie stellinge dien as ontkennings sowel as skuldbeleidenisse.

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32

Molander, Fanny. "Situerad Moral : Är det tanken som räknas?" Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för datavetenskap, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-172068.

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Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram.
How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed.

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Mehanovic, Miralem. "FATE ACCORDING TO THE PROSE EDDA NARRATION OF RAGNAROK : A Theological contemplation, elaboration and insight to the Norse pagan concept of fate." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Religionsvetenskap, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-36542.

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The Prose Edda chapter, Ragnarok as recorded by Snorri, was taken as a pivotal point for exploring fate according to the Norse mythology. The eschatological concept of collapsing gods and destruction of the world was explored through the logical and theological fatalist theory, diverging the orientation from standard textual exploration. The thesis examines the concept by employing the methodology of hermeneutics to scrutinise the text. The analysis derived results confirmed the existence of belief in fate embedded in the text; the logical fatalism that polarises statements by their truthfulness, even though it was not found or indicated textually, provided a strong contrast to theological fatalism, evidenced throughout the text. The weak theological fatalism (determinism) was suggested in the findings based on Ragnarok text, by which the inexorable change of aeons as set-in motion by the Universal Force (predicted by the three Volvas), does not entirely compromise the Aesir's free will; such as the cosmic order includes the free will in its mechanism; while Aesir's voluntary choice was dependent on God's forescience, it was still free to operate within the remit of its emission, unperturbed within the cosmic design. The Nietzschean concept of Amor Fati (Love for Fate) in accepting the inevitable, through the cyclicality of time, and as it appears with a reason that is to keep one happy, additionally illuminated our understanding of fate in Ragnarok. To counterbalance this idea and bring it into equilibrium, I reflected upon the notion of "Designer of Destiny", whereby human beings are assumed to run the entirety of their destiny, soon to learn that this human urge clashes with theit biology (over which they do not have complete control) and the cosmic power that has already predetermined the human path.

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Bäcklund, Jimmy Ulf Anti-Krister. "Reciprok egoism, skeptisk empirism och modern fysikalism : Titelförslag på några principer och diskurs kring dessas korrelation." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-96930.

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Denna essä är en ontologisk och epistemologisk undersökning av bland annat etiska och medvetandefilosofiska implikationer av en konsekvent fysikalistisk hållning. I detta kontrasteras mot en transcendentalistisk hållning, som den av T. M. Scanlon, den skeptiska empirismen av David Hume, reciprokt baserade moraliska system (e.g. J. L. Mackies självreferentiella altruism) samt en medvetandesyn i linje med Galen Strawsons kriterier för en realistisk fysikalism som i min mening löser alla så kallade psykofysiska problem.
This paper contains an ontological and epistemic analysis of the implication of a consistently physicalist view of reality. This in polemic contrast with transcendentalist positions as that of T. M. Scanlon. I follow along the lines of a sceptical empiricism that I ascribe to Hume and from which, I argue, consistently follows guidelines as set by for example J. L. Mackie and Galen Strawson on topics of self-referential altruism and realistic physicalism respectively.

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Radcliffe, Nathan W. "Nietzsche’s Naturalism as a Critique of Morality and Freedom." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1350611814.

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McKenzie, Andrew. "Anarchy Is What Individuals Make of It." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1386024107.

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Whiskin, Margaux Elizabeth. "Narrative structure and philosophical debates in Tristram Shandy and Jacques le fataliste." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3113.

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The aim of the present thesis is to analyse how the narrative affects the various philosophical debates in Tristram Shandy and Jacques le fataliste. Contrary to what one expects from a philosophical novel, Sterne and Diderot do not impose upon the reader an authorial and authoritative discourse. Dominant discourses are constantly challenged and contradicted. The philosophical debates in both novels remain open and are left without a conclusion. The author's voice is but one amongst many others, and it is the narrative which maintains the dialogue between them by preventing one particular voice from invalidating the others. My argument hinges on Bakhtinian dialogism, which can be defined as the presence of interacting voices and views. In Tristram Shandy and Jacques le fataliste, dialogism occurs through the narrative structure allowing for the confrontation of the contradictory discourses in the philosophical debates, and enabling them to engage in dialogue, instead of establishing the authorial voice as the sole valid discourse in the text. Through those contradictions, the philosophical content takes on a different form, that of a refusal of systematic discourse. No dogmatic view is forced upon the reader. Sterne and Diderot do not offer a solution to the various philosophical questions debated in their novels. However, they do offer a philosophical method whereby the confrontation of contradictory ideas creates a dynamic for the pursuit of truth.

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Thomas, Russell A. "Bernard Stiegler on a Unified Vision of Humanity and Technology in Education: An Analysis of Human/Technical Ideology in the Writings of Today's Most Influential Educational Leaders." University of Dayton / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=dayton155704919370421.

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Di, Netta James Dominick. "The Mechanics and Fixed Operations of Human Experience." UNF Digital Commons, 2016. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/648.

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This paper will use the natural laws of the universe and amassed evidence to support a dynamic systems theory approach to explain the mechanics and fixed operations of the human experience taking place inside a causally determined universe without the possibility of free will. By reductionary methods, the universe and all its’ contents, including human agents, will be exemplified as complex dynamic systems. In so doing, the human experience is reduced to being comprised of information acting and reacting with other information existing in the universe, specifically ideas. Allowing ideas to take on a physical manifestation shows how the feedback of information directly results in the rise of human consciousness and the sensation of control and volition over actions. Thus, the methods and philosophies used in this paper will set out to rebut metaphysical libertarian views asserting alternative possibilities by way of Rollback Arguments and two other libertarian arguments raised by Alfred R. Mele. This paper aims to provide a description and deeper appreciation for the mechanics and fixed operations of the human experience in a universe where free will is nonexistent.

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40

Li, Lan. "Raymond Aron. De la philosophie critique de l'histoire à l'analyse politique." Phd thesis, Ecole normale supérieure de lyon - ENS LYON, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00787035.

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Notre idée principale est d'essayer de comprendre la pensée politique de Raymond Aron à partir de sa théorie sur l'histoire. Pour nous, derrière sa proclamation d'une politique raisonnable ou progressive existe un support épistémologique, à savoir la proposition d'un déterminisme de probabilité concernant la vérité historique, proposition qui ne peut se constituer que dans le cadre d'une critique de la philosophie spéculative de l'histoire. Dans l'Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire, Aron tente de surmonter l'antinomie du devenir humain entre unité totale du modèle hégélien-marxiste et pluralité irréductible du modèle d'Oswald Spengler, mais sans tomber dans le piège du relativisme absolu. Plus précisément, sa propre critique de la philosophie de l'histoire se constitue à double niveau : au niveau méthodologique, il essaye de réinterpréter la relation entre la compréhension et l'explication pour établir l'objectivité historique. Et au niveau ontologique, pour éviter une conclusion relativiste, il réintroduit l'idée d'une société humanisée au sens kantien, mais d'une manière moins téléologique et plus régulatrice. Dans le domaine politique, corrélativement, il rejette tout type de messianisme garanti d'avance, car, à ses yeux, ce n'est que par choix et décision instantanée que l'homme fait son histoire, tout en gardant l'espoir de la liberté. Et son libéralisme se différencie du libéralisme purement économique et apparaît à la fois conservateur vis-à-vis de la tradition et essentiellement politique. Notre recherche consistera à montrer comment s'est élaboré, en surmontant les philosophies dogmatiques de l'histoire, ce déterminisme de probabilité ; comment il a su appliquer cette conviction historique à son analyse de la société, notamment en tant que libérale et quel rôle doit jouer, selon lui, un intellectuel face à la politique ; nous reprendrons ensuite sa critique vis-à-vis des intellectuels français, pour l'appliquer au débat entre les intellectuels chinois.

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Oertner, Monika. "Vier Bedeutungsebenen von 'Freiheit' in der Philosophie des Benedictus de Spinoza." [S.l. : s.n.], 2001. http://www.bsz-bw.de/cgi-bin/xvms.cgi?SWB9073793.

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Dispersyn, Eléonore. "Kant, Fichte, Schelling: essai sur la nature du mal." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210810.

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Progression d'un concept, le mal radical, dans trois textes :La Religion dans les limites de la simple raison (Kant), Le système de l'Ethique (Fichte), et Le Traité de 1809 (Schelling). Origine ultime du mal :libre arbitre ou détermination ?Responsabilité et liberté du mal. Mal moral et métaphysique du mal/ Advance of a concept: radical evil, in three readings: Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (Kant), System of Ethics (Fichte), and Treatise of 1809 (Schelling).Ultimate origin of evil: free will or determination? Responsibility and freedom to evil. Moral evil and metaphysics of evil.
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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43

Chatué, Jacques. "La figure de descartes dans l'epistemologie francaise contemporaine." Amiens, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997AMIE0009.

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Le champ de l'epistemologie francaise contemporaine peut etre parcouru par plusieurs voies de traverse. Mais il reste necessairement marque par un axe theorique a la fois antithetique et continu : l'axe meyerson-bachelard-althusser, dont on connait le pli rationaliste, ou, a tout le moins, antiempiriste. En premiere approximation, certes, leurs epistemologies s'organisent autour d'une mise en perspective de l'historicite des sciences a partir de ses asperites : le principe de carnot, chez meyerson, les theories relativiste et quantique, chez bachelard, la substitution, a l'economie de la production, de celle de la reproduction, chez althusser. Mais plus profondement, elles tiennent leur originalite - et leur pertinence interne - de la problematique qui les sous-tend, a savoir la problematique, de l'autonomisation du champ cognitif. D'ou la centralite de la rencontre avec descartes. L'ideal "mathesique" de l'auteur des " regulae" s'y trouve alors reactive et reevalue au plus pres des sciences. D'un cote nos auteurs en reconnaissent des resonances dans les sciences en cours, de l'autre ils en delimitent les seuils de validite. Mais en tachant d'en inflechir le mouvement ils en "subissent" les effets. L'objet specifique du present travail est : - de le demontrer, - de determiner lesquels, - d'en esquisser une interpretation qui, au-dela des critiques conjoncturelles, reconnaissent, au moins, la validite du probleme dont procedent ces epistemologies, et qui en justifie la remanence rationaliste.

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Nel, Jan-Derick. "The business of power and the power of business : (determining meta-ethics)." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/21191.

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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: A changing world brings about many different challenges. The same applies to business operating in society. These changes and challenges relate to business ethics in general and how it impacts on the decisions that business makes every day. The ethical challenges that business has to face have a profound effect on meta-ethical concerns. Awareness of this situation can help to direct business and the rest of society to reach positive outcomes. When looking at current cases it is evident how corporate culture and leadership play a very important role in this matter. The cases shows how the power of business is exerted in practice and it can serve a positive purpose in determining meta-ethics.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 'n Veranderende wêreld gee tot baie verskillende uitdagings aanleiding. Dieselfde geld vir besigheid wat in die samelewing funksioneer. Dit hou verband met sake-etiek in die algemeen en watter invloed dit uitoefen op die besluite wat besigheid elke dag moet neem. Die etiese uitdagings wat besigheid elke dag in die gesig staar, het 'n diepgaande uitwerking op meta-etiese kwessies. 'n Bewustheid van hierdie situasie kan help om leiding aan besigheid en die res van die samelewing te bied ten einde positiewe resultate te bereik . As die huidige gevalle in ag geneem word, is dit klaarblyklik dat korporatiewe kultuur en leierskap ’n baie belangrike rol in hierdie verband speel. Dit toon hoe die kragtige invloed van besigheid in die praktyk gebruik word en hoe dit 'n positiewe rol kan speel om meta-etiek te bepaal.

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45

Gonzalez, Ariel. "The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological Physicalism." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1591.

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Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
B.A.
Bachelors
Philosophy
Arts and Humanities

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46

Sprod, L. M. "'Space alone persistently determines' : the roles and relations of time and space in Kant and Meillassoux." Thesis, Kingston University, 2016. http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/37221/.

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This thesis addresses the criticism of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant put forward by Quentin Meillassoux under the charge of ‘correlationism.’ It uses Meillassoux’s interpretation of Kant as a starting point to develop an alternative interpretation in which space plays a central role within Kant’s thought, thus contributing to the wider philosophy of space. The argument progresses through an analysis of the three stages of dogmatism, skepticism and Criticism, which are central to Kant’s thought and which Meillassoux attempts to circumvent. It demonstrates how Kant develops his Critical philosophy through a rejection of dogmatism as a commitment to the principle of sufficient reason, which is reconfigured using the insights of Hume’s skepticism. Thus the system outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason is at heart a temporal philosophy, in which the principle of sufficient reason is reconceptualized in terms of the issue of timedetermination. Meillassoux’s alternative system of ‘speculative materialism,’ it is argued, proceeds along the same path: Criticizing the principle of sufficient reason and reconfiguring it through the insights of Hume’s skeptical problematization of induction, in order to assert a temporal philosophy based upon the ‘hyper-chaos’ of the ‘principle of unreason.’ However, with this unexpected parallel between Kant and Meillassoux in regard to the issue of time, the problematic role of space also becomes apparent. Meillassoux’s temporal philosophy is disrupted by his use of the spatial metaphor to fully express the features of time that he sets out, and thus space becomes a point of tension within his temporal system of ‘speculative materialism.’ Working back through the parallel between Meillassoux and Kant reveals that the role of space and its connection to time is also a problematic point of tension within Kant’s Critical philosophy and one that is central to his reworking of the Critique of Pure Reason for the 1787 B-Edition. Thus, through a detailed interpretation of the Critical philosophy, and especially its role in the Refutation of Idealism added to the B-Edition, the centrality of space within Kant’s system is reasserted and evaluated. This recognition of the importance of space and its relation to time within Kant’s system also provides the means to reassess Meillassoux’s criticism of Kant as a ‘correlationist’ and recast the debate between idealism and realism in the history of post-Kantian philosophy terms of the roles and relations of time and space.

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47

Makhakhe, Simon Shakes Kubutu. "Abstraction and/or separation as the determining factor for the division of speculative sciences in accordance with St. Thomas Aquinas." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7736.

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48

van, Zwol Erik. "Responsibility, spontaneity and liberty." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5763.

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Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.

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Gerent, Wolfgang [Verfasser]. "Handlungsalternativen, Determinismus und Schein-Kompatibilismus : über einige Missverständnisse im Zusammenhang mit unserer Frage nach Willensfreiheit / Wolfgang Gerent." [Lemgo, Lagesche Str. 261] : [W. Gerent], 2000. http://d-nb.info/973181621/34.

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Stroud, Ian Cecil. "Morality's Alpha: A Case Study Determining Whether Morality Must Be the Basis of Capitalism." Walsh University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=walshhonors1588161944422878.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Determinism (Philosophy)'

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