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Journal articles on the topic 'Dictatură'
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1
Oleg, URSAN. "CU PRIVIRE LA METODOLOGIA CERCETĂRII PERIOADEI DE TRANZIȚIE: CAZUL REPUBLICII MOLDOVA." STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS MOLDAVIAE Științe Umanistice, no. 10(160) (2022): 57–62. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7473013.
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Studiul fenomenului de tranziție în istoria contemporană este dictat de relevanța acestuia și de lipsa unei formulări și a unei abordări metodologice unice. În cazul Republicii Moldova, stat suveran și independent, unitar și indivizibil, din 1991 aceasta urmează calea trecerii de la vechea ordine sovietică în domeniul economiei și vieții politice, dictată de o dictatură și o singură ideologie comunistă, la o cale democratică de dezvoltare atât în politică, cât și în economie. Tranziția economică a devenit o perioadă dificilă din istoria țării, agravată de confruntarea militară împotriva Rusiei, sub forma unui conflict armat în Transnistria, formarea teritoriului separatist al Găgăuziei etc. Astfel, s-a încercat explicarea me­to­delor de studiere a acestei probleme prin prisma tranziției în toate manifestările și contradicțiile ei.
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Lenormand, Marie. "Sammy, l’enfant dictateur. I. La dictature." Savoirs et clinique 27, no. 2 (2019): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/sc.027.0021.
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Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Philip J. Grossman, and Joo Young Jeon. "Gender differences in giving and the anticipation regarding giving in dictator games*." Oxford Economic Papers 72, no. 3 (2020): 772–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaa002.
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Abstract Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount given in a dictator game, we find that the show-up fee has a positive effect on dictator-giving for both genders. While female dictators are more generous than males, male recipients anticipate higher amounts than the amount male dictators give. As the show-up fee increases, the female dictators become a more generous social type, whereas males do not show this effect. There is no gender difference in anticipation about dictator social type by the recipients.
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Weiß, Martin, Grit Hein, and Johannes Hewig. "Between Joy and Sympathy: Smiling and Sad Recipient Faces Increase Prosocial Behavior in the Dictator Game." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 11 (2021): 6172. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18116172.
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In human interactions, the facial expression of a bargaining partner may contain relevant information that affects prosocial decisions. We were interested in whether facial expressions of the recipient in the dictator game influence dictators’ behavior. To test this, we conducted an online study (n = 106) based on a modified version of a dictator game. The dictators allocated money between themselves and another person (recipient), who had no possibility to respond to the dictator. Importantly, before the allocation decision, the dictator was presented with the facial expression of the recipient (angry, disgusted, sad, smiling, or neutral). The results showed that dictators sent more money to recipients with sad or smiling facial expressions and less to recipients with angry or disgusted facial expressions compared with a neutral facial expression. Moreover, based on the sequential analysis of the decision and the interaction partner in the preceding trial, we found that decision-making depends upon previous interactions.
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Suvorov, Mikhail N. "Dictator Fiction in Yemen." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Asian and African Studies 16, no. 3 (2024): 592–603. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu13.2024.307.
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The dictator novel, a literary sub-genre of Latin American origin, has been developing in Arab literature since the late 1950s, but it was not until the end of the Arab Spring that works of this sub-genre, as well as short stories about the dictatorship appeared in Yemen. This article examines two books of Yemeni dictator fiction, Ali al-Muqri’s novel Land of the Leader (2019) and Wajdi al-Ahdal’s collection of short stories Fatal Arrangements (2020). Ali al-Muqri tells the story of an Egyptian writer who came to another Arab country to write a biography of the country’s dictator. Though the country and the dictator have no real names in the novel, many recognizable details point to the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi. It is not, however, the dictator who is central for the plot, but the community of local intellectuals serving the dictatorship. Wajdi al-Ahdal’s collection comprises fourteen stories about fourteen dictators, from Adolf Hitler to Comorian Mohamed Bacar. The stories al-Ahdal tells may have never happened in reality. For the most part, they are related to the dictators’ intimate lives, to their use of fortune-tellers, sorcerers and clairvoyants, to their behavior with their confidants and courtiers, etc. Grotesque and caricature are more important in these stories than historical truth. Both writers, unlike other Arab authors of dictator fiction, avoid portraying the horrors of the dictatorship and its crimes against humanity and prefer to highlight the dictatorship’s immanent irrationalism bordering on idiocy. Caricature in their narratives clearly prevails over drama, and their dictators are not so much fearful as ridiculous.
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PAPAIOANNOU, KOSTADIS J., and JAN LUITEN VAN ZANDEN. "The dictator effect: how long years in office affect economic development." Journal of Institutional Economics 11, no. 1 (2014): 111–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137414000356.
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AbstractThis paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic development by studying the effects of years in office on economic development. The hypothesis is that dictators who stay in office for a long time period will find it increasingly difficult to carry out sound economic policies. We argue that such economic policies are the result of information asymmetries inherent to dictatorships (known as the ‘dictator dilemma’) and of changes in the personality of dictators (known as the ‘winner effect’). We call the combination of these two terms the ‘dictator effect’. We present evidence to suggest that long years in office impacts on economic growth (which is reduced), inflation (which increases) and the quality of institutions (which deteriorates). The negative effect of long years of tenure (i.e. the ‘dictator effect’) is particularly strong in young states and in Africa and the Near East.
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Aksoy, Billur, Catherine Eckel, and Rick Wilson. "Can I Rely on You?" Games 9, no. 4 (2018): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040081.
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This paper introduces a strategic element into the dictator game by allowing recipients to select their dictator. Recipients are presented with the photographs of two dictators and the envelopes containing their allocations, and are then asked to select which dictator’s gift they would like to receive. The recipient is paid the contents of the envelope they select. The photographs carry information about the gender and race/ethnicity of the dictators, and we ask an independent sample of raters to evaluate the photographs for other characteristics. While gender and ethnicity do not affect the recipient’s choice, one characteristic inferred from the photos makes them significantly more likely to be selected: Their perceived reliability.
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Capraro, Valerio, Andrea Vanzo, and Antonio Cabrales. "Playing with words: Do people exploit loaded language to affect others’ decisions for their own benefit?" Judgment and Decision Making 17, no. 1 (2022): 50–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009025.
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Abstract We report on three pre-registered studies testing whether people in the position of describing a decision problem to decision-makers exploit this opportunity for their benefit, by choosing descriptions that may be potentially beneficial for themselves. In Study 1, recipients of an extreme dictator game (where dictators can either take the whole pie for themselves or give it entirely to the receiver) are asked to choose the instructions used to introduce the game to dictators, from six different instructions known from previous research to affect dictators’ decisions. The results demonstrate that some dictator game recipients tend to choose instructions that make them more likely to receive a higher payoff. Study 2 shows that people who choose descriptions that make them more likely to receive a higher payoff indeed believe that they will receive a higher payoff. Study 3 shows that receivers are more likely than dictators to choose these self-serving descriptions. In sum, our work suggests that some people choose descriptions that are beneficial to themselves; we also found some evidence that deliberative thinking and young age are associated with this tendency.
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Karagözoğlu, Emin, and Elif Tosun. "Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games." Games 13, no. 6 (2022): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13060074.
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We experimentally investigated the effects of the possibility of taking in the dictator game and the choices of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on the distribution decisions of active players. Our main findings support our hypothesis: when the dictator game is not exogenously given but chosen by the receivers (or passive players), this makes them accountable, which leads to less giving by dictators. We also conducted an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants predicted most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explained the factors that might have driven the predicted behavior using reasoning similar to ours. Our results provide a new perspective for the dependence of giving in the dictator game on contextual factors.
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Liou, Bernadette. "Le gouvernement fédéral de la ligue latine sous la royauté romaine : dictateur fédéral, roi fédéral, «hegemôn toû éthnos»." Revue des Études Anciennes 106, no. 2 (2004): 421–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rea.2004.6435.
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Le dictateur latin a servi de modèle au dictateur romain ; il a été plus ou moins confondu avec un officier royal : le magister populi. D’où les incertitudes de la tradition sur la première dictature romaine. On connaît plusieurs rois fédéraux de la Ligue Latine : ce sont apparemment des prêtres. Latinus Silvius, fondateur des Prisci Latini, est l’archétype mythique de ces rois-prêtres, liés à la forêt. Le Rex Nemorensis en est la version aricine. Le roi fédéral latin doit être assez semblable au flamen Dialis romain, double non guerrier du roi. Les trois rois étrusques de Rome, qui deviennent de fait rois de la Ligue, l’élargissent en l’ouvrant à des peuples non-latins et se font saluer du titre nouveau de hegemôn toû éthnous.
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Rodríguez-Alcalá, Carolina. "La construction imaginaire de la nation paraguayenne par le discours sur le guarani langue nationale." Cahiers du Centre de Linguistique et des Sciences du Langage, no. 17 (April 9, 2022): 171–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.26034/la.cdclsl.2004.1603.
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Ce travail porte sur les discours nationalistes concernant la langue guarani au Paraguay pendant les dictatures militaires dans ce pays à partir des années 1940, plus particulièrement pendant la dictature du général Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). Ces discours ont soutenu les formes institutionnelles de «promotion» de cette langue d'origine indienne, clairement opposées aux politiques officielles antérieures, qui avaient toujours exclu cette langue des institutions publiques et avaient eu systématiquement pour but de l' éradiquer même de l'usage oral et informel.
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Magaloni, Beatriz. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313124.
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To survive in office, dictators need to establish power-sharing arrangements with their ruling coalitions, which are often not credible. If dictators cannot commit to not abusing their “loyal friends”—those who choose to invest in the existing autocratic institutions rather than in forming subversive coalitions— they will be in permanent danger of being overthrown, both by members of the ruling elite and by outside rivals. This article explores the role of autocratic political parties and elections (both one-party and multiparty) in mitigating the commitment problem, making power-sharing between the dictator and his ruling coalition possible.
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Wright, Joseph. "To Invest or Insure?" Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 7 (2008): 971–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007308538.
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In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways. First, dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon. Second, dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime; this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth: repression and private pay-offs to political opponents. Third, dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls. Using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001, the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness: Foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short.
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Iriberri, Nagore, and Pedro Rey-Biel. "Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?" Quantitative Economics 4, no. 3 (2013): 515–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/qe135.
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Ferreira, Oscar. "Un défenseur ésotérique de la dictature militaire : Fernando Pessoa." Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques N° 59, no. 1 (2024): 113–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rfhip1.059.0113.
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La pensée du poète moderniste Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) engendre la polémique. Privées du masque opportun de ses hétéronymes, ses rares publications politiques dévoilaient une idéologie nationaliste et mystique, à la fois antidémocratique, anticommuniste, antisocialiste voire antilibérale. Son seul essai publié de son vivant, O Interregno, en est le symbole : rarement lue, cette justification de la dictature militaire installée au Portugal depuis 1926 l’a longtemps classé à l’extrême droite. Pourtant, les archives inédites déposées dans « sa malle pleine de gens » permettent désormais de mieux comprendre l’idéologie de ce nationaliste libéral et sa défense osée de la dictature, clef de voûte de son rêve d’empire. À l’instar de nombreux intellectuels portugais et brésiliens de son temps, y compris de gauche, Pessoa a vu dans le dictateur militaire un rédempteur apte à réconcilier les Portugais et à préparer la transition vers le Quint-Empire annoncé dans Message.
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Liu, Yingjie, Xiaohua Bian, Yu Hu, Ya-Ting Chen, Xuzhou Li, and Baxter Di Fabrizio. "Intergroup Bias Influences Third-Party Punishment and Compensation: In-group Relationships Attenuate Altruistic Punishment." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 46, no. 8 (2018): 1397–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.7193.
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Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group, participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.
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Gao, Jacque. "Democratization in the Shadow of Globalization." International Organization 75, no. 3 (2021): 698–734. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818321000059.
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AbstractIn this article I develop a new theory of how globalization in the form of increasing potential foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows affects democratization. As the level of potential FDI inflows increases, workers become more willing to support democratization because of the large wage benefits from liberalizing FDI under democracy, while capitalists become less willing to support democratization because of their increasing need for protection from the dictator in the form of FDI restrictions. Increased demand for protection allows dictators to extract larger share of rents from capitalists. The effect of increasing potential FDI on democratization is ambiguous because it increases both workers’ incentive to revolt and dictators’ resistance to democratization.
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Baker, Charlotte. "Angry laughter: Postcolonial representations of dictatorial masculinities." International Journal of Francophone Studies 22, no. 3 (2019): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/ijfs_00003_1.
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Abstract Focusing on the representation of the masculinity of dictator figures in Cheik Aliou Ndao's Mbaam dictateur (1997) and Baba Galleh Jallow's Angry Laughter (2004), this article explores the imbrication of social realities, power structures and literary expression that characterizes these texts as dictator-novels. It considers the writers' reappropriation of the border between animal and human as a means by which to level an allegorical political critique in the guise of a fable. In so doing, it emphasizes their representation of the hypermasculine body of the dictator and its centrality to emerging nation states that are defined by class and ethnic relations. Finally, its focus turns to the importance of voice to examine the aesthetic of these two dictator-novels, which is of equal importance to our understanding of these texts as their thematic representation. The article thus takes these two literary works as case studies for the dictator-novel at the turn of the twenty-first century to examine the ways in which African writers use the dictator-novel to express the disenchantment of citizens with the long and faltering process of decolonization that, in many countries across Africa, had seen the emergence not of an ideal postcolonial democracy, but instead of a de-humanizing neo-colonial autocracy.
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Okuhata, Yutaka. "Inheriting the “Unfinished Business”: An Introductory Study of the Dictator Novel Set in Africa." East-West Cultural Passage 22, no. 2 (2022): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ewcp-2022-0017.
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Abstract Whereas so-called dictator fiction in Latin America is already established as a significant literary subgenre, it is only recently that an increasing number of studies have started to deal with its counterpart set in Africa. In fact, both inside and outside the postcolonial African continent, dictator novels have been written in several languages, including English, French, Arabic, and Kikuyu. One of the most outstanding achievements among recent studies of this kind of fiction is Magali Armillas-Tiseyra’s The Dictator Novel: Writers and Politics in the Global South (2019), which examines dictator novels in two different regions – Africa and Latin America – by using the keyword “Global South” to connect them with each other. After taking a genealogical overview of some dictator novels by both African and non-African authors, the present essay will critically investigate Armillas-Tiseyra’s argument in order to reconsider fictional African dictators depicted in contemporary novels, especially those written in English, from a global and transborder perspective. The aim of this essay is to clarify both the challenges and prospects of the current studies of this literary subgenre in/about Africa.
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Muharremi, Ilir. "Art in the architecture of the National and University Library of Kosovo as the most attractive object in Europe." Architecture Image Studies 5, no. 1 (2024): 20–31. https://doi.org/10.62754/ais.v5i1.80.
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This paper deals with the architecture of the national and university library of Kosovo. internal and external image. artistic pages, domes, facade, outer space, contact with this space. The rest of the paper focuses on the exhibition of dictators like Kim Jung, whose photo was exhibited next to the Albanian renaissance. Their photographs were exhibited in the space of this Library. These materials from Korea elicited strong reactions from critics, who mainly saw the exhibition as promotion of a dictatorial system and its leaders. It was noted that this exhibition was held next to the portraits of Albanian National Renaissance figures, who were long-standing residents of the Library hall. On the second floor there were photographs, brochures and other stuff that presented North Korean life. Above all, there were two large photos of two former North Korean dictators: Kim Jong Sung and Kim Jong IL. Ah, and let’s not forget Ismail Kadare’s quote: “The relations of a great writer with a dictator are complex and difficult to explain, because they are both tyrants, but in this confrontation, the dictator is a false tyrant…”
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LEE, DAVID JOHNSON. "De-centring Managua: post-earthquake reconstruction and revolution in Nicaragua." Urban History 42, no. 4 (2015): 663–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963926815000577.
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ABSTRACT:The reconstruction of Managua following the 1972 earthquake laid bare the contradictions of modernization theory that justified the US alliance with Latin American dictators in the name of democracy in the Cold War. Based on an idealized model of urban development, US planners developed a plan to ‘decentralize’ both the city of Managua and the power of the US-backed Somoza dictatorship. In the process, they helped augment the power of the dictator and create a city its inhabitants found intolerable. The collective rejection of the city, the dictator and his alliance with the United States, helped propel Nicaragua toward its 1979 revolution and turned the country into a Cold War battleground.
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Raihani, Nichola J., and Redouan Bshary. "A positive effect of flowers rather than eye images in a large-scale, cross-cultural dictator game." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, no. 1742 (2012): 3556–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.0758.
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People often consider how their behaviour will be viewed by others, and may cooperate to avoid gaining a bad reputation. Sensitivity to reputation may be elicited by subtle social cues of being watched: previous studies have shown that people behave more cooperatively when they see images of eyes rather than control images. Here, we tested whether eye images enhance cooperation in a dictator game, using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). In contrast to our predictions and the results of most previous studies, dictators gave away more money when they saw images of flowers rather than eye images. Donations in response to eye images were not significantly different to donations under control treatments. Dictator donations varied significantly across cultures but there was no systematic variation in responses to different image types across cultures. Unlike most previous studies, players interacting via AMT may feel truly anonymous when making decisions and, as such, may not respond to subtle social cues of being watched. Nevertheless, dictators gave away similar amounts as in previous studies, so anonymity did not erase helpfulness. We suggest that eye images might only promote cooperative behaviour in relatively public settings and that people may ignore these cues when they know their behaviour is truly anonymous.
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Lee, Daniel. "Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?" Games 9, no. 4 (2018): 73. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040073.
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Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself under conditions of implicit bias. In doing so, I pair the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, with a laboratory dictator game with sorting. I find that despite its popularity, the IAT does not predict dictator giving and social pressure does not explain acts of giving from biased dictators. These results are indicative of the meaningful difference between having an implicit bias and acting on one. As such, results can be thought of as a bound on the external validity of the IAT.
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Svetlana, SLUSARENCO, and POZNEACOVA Veronica. "REFLECȚII ASUPRA ESENȚEI REGIMULUI POLITIC DIN PERSPECTIVA FILOSOFILOR MACHIAVELLI ȘI MONTESQUIEU." Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, no. 3(133) (June 9, 2020): 152–56. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3886775.
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Articolul reprezintă un studiu dedicat operelor lui N.Machiavelli și Ch.Montesquieu cu referire la exercitarea puterii de stat și identificarea regimului politic. Lupta între doctrinele marilor filosofi Machiavelli și Montesquieu este veșnică, deoarece în orice societate există pericolul uzurpării puterii de stat. Acești filosofi au încercat să evidențieze valorile fundamentale ale societății și consecințele abaterii de la principiile democratice.
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Janssen, Daniël, and Joost Schilperoord. "Tekstplanning en Tekstproduktie." Schrijven in moedertaal en vreemde taal 40 (January 1, 1991): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ttwia.40.08jan.
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In our article we describe the functions of so-called 'text plans1 in two different processes of text production: (1) dictating business letters and (2) writing governmental policy issue papers. Text plans are defined as: abstract, schematic representations of the text a writer/dictator wants to convey. We look upon dictating business letters and writing policy issue papers as two writing tasks. In our article we explore the differences between the two tasks in terms of the constraints the dictator and the policy writer should meet. Our research makes clear that dictators strive for first-time-final versions and that planning the text is a necessary requirement for effective dictating. While dictating, the dictator follows the exact line of his plan. Writing policy issue papers, however, is mainly a collaborative writing task. Policy issue papers are written in groups which strive for internal consensus about the issues (and the text) at stake. Text plans are uses by policy writers to divide tasks, to guarantee cohesion between the different contributions and as the first negotiation object.
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Herne, Kaisa, Jari K. Hietanen, Olli Lappalainen, and Esa Palosaari. "The influence of role awareness, empathy induction and trait empathy on dictator game giving." PLOS ONE 17, no. 3 (2022): e0262196. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0262196.
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We ask how state empathy, trait empathy, and role awareness influence dictator game giving in a monetarily incentivized experiment. We manipulated two factors: role awareness (role certainty vs. role uncertainty) and state empathy induction (no empathy induction vs. empathy induction). Under role uncertainty, participants did not know their role as a dictator or a recipient when making their choices. State empathy was induced by asking the dictators to consider what the recipient would feel when learning about the decision. Each participant was randomly assigned into one of the four conditions, and in each condition, participants were randomly assigned into dictator and receiver roles. The role assignment took place before or after decisions were made, depending on the condition. We also studied the direct influence of trait empathy on dictator game giving as well as its interaction with the experimental manipulations. Trait empathy was measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE) before the experiment. Of our experimental manipulations, role awareness had an effect on dictator game giving; participants donated more under role uncertainty than under role certainty. Instead, we did not observe an effect of state empathy induction. Of trait empathy subscales, only affective empathy was positively associated with dictator game giving. Finally, role awareness did not influence all participants similarly but had a larger impact on those with low scores on trait empathic concern or trait affective empathy. Our results indicate that specific measures to induce altruistic sharing can be effective but their effect may vary depending on certain personal characteristics.
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Kenfack, Michele. "La Folie, une autre manière de gouverner: La Dictature en question." Nouvelles Études Francophones 39, no. 2 (2024): 72–85. https://doi.org/10.1353/nef.2024.a959742.
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Abstract: La notion de folie demeure peu explorée dans le contexte politique, mais aussi dans l'univers romanesque où l'on trouve une représentation du politique. S'inscrivant dans une perspective comparatiste, cet article examine l'incursion de la folie en milieu politique dans le roman francophone contemporain d'Afrique subsaharienne et des Caraïbes, à partir de la figure du dictateur. L'analyse historico-littéraire croisée de Le Pleurer-rire (1982), d'Henri Lopes, et de La Mémoire aux abois (2010), d'Évelyne Trouillot, révèle une mise en fiction des dictateurs de l'histoire dans le contexte des régimes autocratiques qui ont proliféré en Afrique et dans les Caraïbes au cours des 20e et 21e siècles. Nous mettons l'accent sur deux axes principaux, à savoir la mégalomanie et la pathologie du pouvoir pour montrer comment le dictateur s'inscrit dans une forme de folie politique qui se caractérise par la démesure, l'imposture et l'abus.
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Tanaka, Seiki. "Aging gracefully? Why old autocrats hold competitive elections." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 3, no. 1 (2017): 81–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891117728129.
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This article examines the conditions under which dictators hold competitive elections, and looks specifically at the role played by a dictator’s age. Drawing on previous studies arguing that uncertainty increases the likelihood of competitive elections, I argue that as a dictator ages, uncertainty over the future increases within the regime, because government insiders’ expected payoffs for supporting the incumbent decline as s/he ages. As a result, I argue that older dictators are more likely to hold competitive elections in order to reduce uncertainty. The article also tests an implication of the argument: if uncertainty over the future drives elections, then it should be mitigated in regimes with a clear successor. Using a large-N, cross-national dataset on autocrats and competitive elections between 1960 and 2012, this article examines the argument and finds that as dictators age, they are more likely to hold competitive elections, all else equal. The analysis also finds that the effect of autocrats’ age on competitive elections is mitigated in one-party regimes where there exists an established succession rule, while the effect is more apparent in personalist regimes without such a system.
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Kudryavtsev, Andrey Aleksandrovich. "The specifics of hyperbole in political satire on Adolf Hitler (based on Charlie Chaplin’s feature film “The Great Dictator”)." Philology. Theory & Practice 17, no. 12 (2024): 4388–96. https://doi.org/10.30853/phil20240621.
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The purpose of the study is to determine the role of hyperbole in the formation of the satirical image of Adolf Hitler in the context of the American feature film “The Great Dictator” in 1940. The article analyzes the hyperbole in the replicas of the characters of Charlie Chaplin’s film “The Great Dictator”, and also determines the influence of this technique on the viewer’s perception. It is shown that the exaggeration of cruelty and absurdity in the characters’ remarks contributes to the creation of a caricature image of the dictator. It is revealed that hyperbole not only emphasizes the absurdity of the dictator’s actions, but also serves as a means to reveal the cynical attitude of the totalitarian regime towards human life. It is noted that the exaggeration of aspects of Nazi ideology contributes to the formation of a critical perception of dictatorial power among viewers. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the primary identification and detailed analysis of hyperbole as a key means of forming a satirical image of a dictator, as well as in determining the impact of this technique on the viewer’s perception of a political figure. The results showed that exaggerating the aspects of cruelty, absurdity and cynicism of political actions makes it possible to create a grotesque image of dictators, which contributes to viewers’ understanding of the destructive nature of totalitarian ideologies.
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Horita, Yutaka. "Paranoid thinking and perceived competitive intention." PeerJ 11 (March 10, 2023): e15003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.15003.
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Paranoid thinking, that others are hostile, can be seen even in the general population. Paranoia is considered the expectation that others are competitors who aim to maximize the differences in payoffs rather than maximize their own payoffs. This study examined whether paranoia reflects the irrational belief that others have a competitive intention and is associated with avoiding perceived competition. We recruited 884 US residents via the Internet and conducted a modified Dictator Game, in which monetary allocation was carried out between the Dictator and the Recipient. The Dictator chooses either fair or competitive allocation while selecting the competitive allocation is irrelevant to increasing the Dictator’s payoffs. The Recipient decides whether to accept the Dictator’s decision or receive sure but low rewards. We found that Recipients with high-level paranoid thinking expected their opponent to select competitive allocation more than those with low levels, even when selecting it was costly for Dictators. Paranoid thinking was not associated with selecting sure rewards or competitive allocations. The results suggest that paranoia reflects the belief that others have a competitive intention but is not related to avoidance behavior against perceived threats and unilateral attacks.
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Krawczyk, Michal, and Fabrice Le Lec. "Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Comment." American Economic Review 106, no. 3 (2016): 836–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130779.
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Based on experimental dictator games with probabilistic prospects, Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013) conclude that neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can fully account for observed behavior. We argue that their conclusion that ex ante comparisons cannot explain the data is at best weakly supported by their results, and do so on three grounds: (i) the absence of significant differences between the most relevant treatments, (ii) the implicit assumption of subjects' risk neu trality, and (iii) the asymmetry of treatments regarding the disclosure of dictators' choice. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)
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Di Tella, Rafael, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, and Mariano Sigman. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism." American Economic Review 105, no. 11 (2015): 3416–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141409.
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We present results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's tokens, took more of them. They were also more likely to believe that recipients had accepted side payments, even if there was a prize for accuracy. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others' altruism. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D83)
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BA, Ousseynou. "Dénonciation de l’arme traditionnelle contre progressisme dans Le pleurer-rire d’Henri Lopès." ALTRALANG Journal 5, no. 2 (2023): 76–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.52919/altralang.v5i2.319.
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ABSTRACT: Without any complacency, Henri Lopès exposes the attitude of the dictators of Africa in the aftermath of independence. Incapable of leading their respective countries towards the paths of development, these new elites in power make fun of their populations, sometimes aided in this by recourse to retrograde cultural realities. It is therefore a question in this article of emphasizing the way in which the author concretizes the vision of a Frantz Fanon, Stanislas Adotévi or a Marcin Towa in relation to Negritude. Indeed, if this movement was mainly limited to sing of an Africa which would have been an ideal world before colonization thanks to its traditions and cultures, the writings of the latter have called into question the idea maintained by the cantors of this movement . In the wake of these authors, Henri Lopès shows in his novel Le pleurer-rire the way in which these traditions and cultures served the enterprise of subjugating populations by dictators. Thus, through an excerpt from said novel featuring a meeting of the Council of Ministers, this article shows how African traditions are often manipulated by dictators to stifle in the bud any inclination of populations to claim democracy and freedom. of expression as evidenced by the speech of the character Bwakamabé Na Sakkade dit Tonton
 RÉSUMÉ : Sans complaisance aucune, Henri Lopès met à nu l’attitude des dictateurs de l’Afrique au lendemain des indépendances. Incapables de conduire leur pays respectifs vers les chemins du développement, ces nouvelles élites au pouvoir se jouent de leurs populations, aidées en cela parfois par un recours à des réalités culturelles rétrogrades. Il est donc question dans cet article de mettre l’accent sur la manière dont l’auteur concrétise la vision d’un Frantz Fanon, Stanislas Adotévi ou d’un Marcin Towa par rapport à la Négritude. En effet, si ce mouvement s’est borné principalement à chanter une Afrique qui aurait été, avant la colonisation, un monde idéal grâce à ses traditions et cultures, les écrits de ces derniers ont remis cette idée entretenue par les chantres de ce mouvement. S’inscrivant dans le sillage de ces auteurs, Henri Lopès montre dans son roman Le pleurer-rire la manière dont ces traditions et cultures ont servi l’entreprise de subjugation des populations par les dictateurs. Ainsi, à travers un extrait dudit roman mettant en scène une séance du conseil des ministres, cet article montre comment les traditions africaines sont souvent manipulées par les dictateurs pour étouffer dans l’œuf toute velléité des populations à prétendre à la démocratie et à la liberté d’expression dont le discours du personnage Bwakamabé Na Sakkadé dit Tonton en témoigne.
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FeldmanHall, Oriel, Joseph E. Dunsmoor, Marijn C. W. Kroes, Sandra Lackovic, and Elizabeth A. Phelps. "Associative Learning of Social Value in Dynamic Groups." Psychological Science 28, no. 8 (2017): 1160–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617706394.
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Although humans live in societies that regularly demand engaging with multiple people simultaneously, little is known about social learning in group settings. In two experiments, we combined a Pavlovian learning framework with dyadic economic games to test whether blocking mechanisms support value-based social learning in the gain (altruistic dictators) and loss (greedy robbers) domains. Subjects first learned about an altruistic dictator, who subsequently made altruistic splits collectively with a partner. Results revealed that because the presence of the dictator already predicted the outcome, subjects did not learn to associate value with the partner. This social blocking effect was not observed in the loss domain: A kind robber’s partner, who could steal all the subjects’ money but stole little, acquired highly positive value—which biased subjects’ subsequent behavior. These findings reveal how Pavlovian mechanisms support efficient social learning, while also demonstrating that violations of social expectations can attenuate how readily these mechanisms are recruited.
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Moffatt, Peter G., and Graciela Zevallos. "A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games." Journal of the Economic Science Association 7, no. 2 (2021): 226–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-021-00110-y.
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AbstractWe consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.
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Chao, Matthew. "Intentions-Based Reciprocity to Monetary and Non-Monetary Gifts." Games 9, no. 4 (2018): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040074.
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Social preference models emphasize that perceived intentions motivate reciprocity. However, laboratory tests of this theory typically manipulate perceived intentions through changes in wealth resulting from a sacrifice in pay by another. There is little evidence on whether reciprocity occurs in response to perceived intentions alone, independent of concurrent changes in pay and giver sacrifice (and any associated guilt from that sacrifice). This paper addresses this gap in the literature by implementing a modified dictator game where gifts to dictators are possible, but where gift transactions are also stochastically prevented by nature. This leads to instances of observed gift-giving intentions that yield no sacrifice or change in outcomes. In addition, this study uses both monetary and non-monetary gifts; previous studies typically use only monetary incentives, even though real-world applications of this literature often involve non-monetary incentives such as business or marketing gifts. The results show that on average, dictators reciprocated strongly to just the intention to give a gift, and they also reciprocated similarly to both monetary and non-monetary gifts. These results are consistent with intentions-based models of social preferences and with much of the marketing literature on business gifts.
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Windrich, Ivo, Sabrina Kierspel, Thomas Neumann, Roger Berger, and Bodo Vogt. "Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses." Behavioral Sciences 14, no. 1 (2024): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs14010039.
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Although in everyday life decisions about losses are prevalent (e.g., the climate crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), there is hardly any research on decisions in the loss domain. Therefore, we conducted online experiments with a sample of 672 participants (mostly students), using third-party punishment dictator games (DGs) in the loss domain to explore the impact of losses and punishment threats on the conformity to the fairness norm. Subjects in the treatment condition have to divide a loss of −10 € with the threat of a third-party punishment with different strengths (control: gains, no punishment). Overall, the statistical evidence seems rather weak, but when it comes to losses, subjects are more rational and straightforward with their words and deeds than with gains. Therefore, in the loss domain, subjects are more likely to believe that the fairness norm should be followed, and they subjectively perceive that the others do as well. Furthermore, although dictators’ decisions are more selfish in the loss domain, dictators there react more strongly to the punishment threat by reducing their demands than in the gains domain. This holds as long as the punishment threat is strong enough, as judged from a rational perspective.
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Grigorian, Kamilla, and Stefaniya Kurilo. "The effect of cognitive distortions on human generosity in modified Dictator games." Theoretical economics, no. 7 (September 6, 2024): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.52957/2221-3260-2024-7-121-133.
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Investigation of the influence of social pressure on donation decisions is an essential aspect for understanding the process of building an effective charity system. The purpose of the study is to examine the influence of cognitive distortions on donation decisions. The objectives of the study are to review the literature on the subject, conduct a laboratory experiment of the game Dictator in three variations (the Classic, Bully and Time-Delay versions) and interpret the results obtained with the potential to apply it. The method consists of conducting a laboratory experiment based on the three versions of the Dictator game using the z-Tree program. The sample consists of 18 students aged 19-20 years old, whose rewards were academic course points. Findings demonstrated an increase in endowments among participants with an exacerbation of the introduced cognitive distortions as the game progressed. For example, in the Classic version of the game, Dictators gave an unendowed Victim on average 7.6 tokens out of a possible 20 tokens, as the decision depended solely on the Dictator's willingness to donate. In the Bully version, the Dictator was given the option to change the size of the donation from the already initial fair distribution of the endowment to 10 out of 20 available tokens, causing the average donation to rise to 8.6 tokens. In the Time-Delay version, the Dictator had to explain the chosen allocation of endowment in text format to the Victim, which increased donations to an average of 10.9 tokens. The results of the study may find application in charity: more personal familiarity with the needy person may lead to an increase in the size and frequency of donations. The main limitation of the study is the small sample size, consisting only of students awarded with course points. Future studies should utilize random sampling of participants and monetary reward.
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Secco, Lincoln, and Osvaldo Coggiola. "Cinquante ans depuis la révolution des œillets." Cahiers d’histoire. Revue d’histoire critique 160 (2024): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/122ed.
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La révolution des Œillets a été portugaise et européenne. Les enjeux qui l’ont motivée étaient communs aux sociétés européennes d’après-guerre : décolonisation, démocratie politique (lutte contre l’autoritarisme et les dictatures), intensification des affrontements de classes. Au Portugal, ces différentes tensions convergent et explosent rapidement à l’occasion de la crise des forces armées. Ses acteurs politiques, du MFA à l’extrême gauche, sont contraints d’improviser des réponses politiques à des événements qui les surprennent souvent. En Europe, comme dans le monde, cette révolution a été considérée comme la continuation de la vague amorcée en 1968, de l’est à l’ouest. Son résultat impliqua l’ensemble des forces politiques, à commencer par les États-Unis et les courants de gauche internationaux. Cet article rend compte, d’une manière synthétique, du panorama complexe qui a marqué un processus qui, avec la fin de la « dictature des colonels » en Grèce et la démocratisation espagnole, a conditionné deux des grands enjeux du dernier quart du 20e siècle, l’émergence de l’Union européenne et la vague néolibérale.
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Chang, Shao-Chuan, Li-Yun Lin, Ruey-Yun Horng, and Yau-De Wang. "The Effect of Amount and Tangibility of Endowment and Certainty of Recipients on Selfishness in a Modified Dictator Game." Psychological Reports 114, no. 3 (2014): 720–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/31.01.pr0.114k24w8.
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Taiwanese college students ( N=101) participated in the study to examine the effects of the amount of an endowment, the tangibility of an endowment, and the certainty of the recipient on selfishness in a modified dictator game. Results showed that dictators were more selfish when allocating tangible (money) than less tangible (honor credits) endowments. Selfishness was higher when large amounts of money were involved. The certainty of the recipient was manipulated by whether the recipient was chosen and announced before or after the decision. Unexpectedly, participants were more self-interested in the certain-recipient condition than in the uncertain-recipient condition. In the honor condition, the amount of an endowment and the certainty of the recipient did not affect participants' allocations.
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Aguiar, Fernando, Pablo Brañas-Garza, and Luis M. Miller. "Moral distance in dictator games." Judgment and Decision Making 3, no. 4 (2008): 344–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500000917.
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AbstractWe perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision — to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory.
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Russel, Bertrand. "Une dictature." Commentaire Numéro 55, no. 3 (1991): 563. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.055.0563.
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Heintz, Christophe, Celse Jérémy, Giardini Francesca, and Max Sylvain. "Facing expectations: Those that we prefer to fulfil and those that we disregard." Judgment and Decision Making 10, no. 5 (2015): 442–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500005581.
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AbstractWe argue that people choosing prosocial distribution of goods (e.g., in dictator games) make this choice because they do not want to disappoint their partner rather than because of a direct preference for the chosen prosocial distribution. The chosen distribution is a means to fulfil one’s partner’s expectations. We review the economic experiments that corroborate this hypothesis and the experiments that deny that beliefs about others’ expectations motivate prosocial choice. We then formulate hypotheses about what types of expectation motivate someone to do what is expected: these are justifiable hopeful expectations that are clearly about his own choices. We experimentally investigate how people modulate their prosociality when they face low or unreasonably high expectations. In a version of a dictator game, we provide dictators with the opportunity to modulate their transfer as a function of their partner’s expectations. We observe that a significant portion of the population is willing to fulfil their partner’s expectation provided that this expectation expresses a reasonable hope. We conclude that people are averse to disappointing and we discuss what models of social preferences can account for the role of expectations in determining prosocial choice, with a special attention to models of guilt aversion and social esteem.
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Boas, Taylor C. "Voting for Democracy: Campaign Effects in Chile's Democratic Transition." Latin American Politics and Society 57, no. 2 (2015): 67–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00267.x.
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AbstractIn a global context in which authoritarian regimes often hold elections, defeating dictators at the polls can play a key role in transitions to democracy. When the opposition is allowed to campaign for votes in such elections, there are strong reasons to believe that its efforts will be more persuasive than those of the authoritarian incumbent. This article examines the effect of televised campaign advertising on vote choice in the 1988 plebiscite that inaugurated Chile's transition to democracy. Using matching to analyze postelectoral survey data, it shows that the advertising of the opposition's no campaign made Chileans more likely to vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet, whereas the advertising of the government's yes campaign had no discernible effect. These findings suggest that the no campaign played an important causal role in the change of political regime.
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Barnby, J. M., Q. Deeley, O. Robinson, N. Raihani, V. Bell, and M. A. Mehta. "Paranoia, sensitization and social inference: findings from two large-scale, multi-round behavioural experiments." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 3 (2020): 191525. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191525.
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The sensitization model suggests that paranoia is explained by over-sensitivity to social threat. However, this has been difficult to test experimentally. We report two preregistered social interaction studies that tested (i) whether paranoia predicted overall attribution and peak attribution of harmful intent and (ii) whether anxiety, interpersonal sensitivity and worry predicted the attribution of harmful intent. In Study 1, we recruited a large general population sample ( N = 987) who serially interacted with other participants in multi-round dictator games and matched to fair, partially fair or unfair partners. Participants rated attributions of harmful intent and self-interest after each interaction. In Study 2 ( N = 1011), a new sample of participants completed the same procedure and additionally completed measures of anxiety, worry and interpersonal sensitivity. As predicted, prior paranoid ideation was associated with higher and faster overall harmful intent attributions, whereas attributions of self-interest were unaffected, supporting the sensitization model. Contrary to predictions, neither worry, interpersonal sensitivity nor anxiety was associated with harmful intent attributions. In a third exploratory internal meta-analysis, we combined datasets to examine the effect of paranoia on trial-by-trial attributional changes when playing fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia was associated with a greater reduction in harmful intent attributions when playing a fair but not unfair dictator, suggesting that paranoia may also exaggerate the volatility of beliefs about the harmful intent of others.
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Marchesi, Aldo. "Tupamaros et dictature." Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire 105, no. 1 (2010): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ving.105.0057.
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Debray, Régis, and Marc Fumaroli. "Dictature de l'image ?" Le Débat 74, no. 2 (1993): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/deba.074.0003.
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Holmes, Amanda. "Estética y dictatura." Cuadernos Literarios 2, no. 3 (2004): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.35626/cl.3.2004.198.
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Amanda Holmes indaga por la relación entre el juicio estético y el autoritarismo en el relato “Grafitti”. Su análisis toma en consideración el peliagudo tema del compromiso ideológico que era materia de polémica entre los autores del boom.
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Guntern, Clément. "Combattre en dictature." Le Regard Libre N° 91, no. 11 (2022): 10–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/regli.091.0010.
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André, Michel. "Une dictature consommée." Books Édition du 7 mars 2025, no. 3 (2025): 18–19. https://doi.org/10.3917/books.253.0018.
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