To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Director monitoring.
Journal articles on the topic 'Director monitoring'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Director monitoring.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Liu, Claire, Angie Low, Ronald W. Masulis, and Le Zhang. "Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance." Review of Financial Studies 33, no. 10 (2020): 4489–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa014.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are less likely to discipline ineffective directors with negative votes. Consequently, independent directors face weaker monitoring incentives and exhibit poor board performance; ineffective independent directors are also more frequently appointed. Moreover, we find that the adverse effects of investor distraction on various corporate governance outcomes are stronger among firms with problematic directors. Our findings suggest that institutional investor monitoring creates important director incentives to monitor.
2
Intintoli, Vincent J., Kathleen M. Kahle, and Wanli Zhao. "Director Connectedness: Monitoring Efficacy and Career Prospects." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, no. 1 (2018): 65–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018000017.
Full textAbstract:
We examine a specific channel through which director connectedness may improve monitoring: financial reporting quality. We find that the connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members has a positive effect on financial reporting quality and accounting conservatism. The effect is not significant for non-audit committee or co-opted audit committee members. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate self-selection. Consistent with connected directors being valuable, the market reacts more negatively to the deaths of highly connected directors than to the deaths of less connected directors. Better connected directors also have better career prospects, suggesting they have greater incentives to monitor.
3
Dah, Mustafa, Samira Abi Dames, and Bilal Al Dah. "Director categorisation and monitoring efficiency." International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 1, no. 1 (2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbge.2022.10045351.
Full text
4
Dames, Samira Abi, Bilal Al Dah, and Mustafa Dah. "Director categorisation and monitoring efficiency." International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 17, no. 3 (2023): 310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbge.2023.130097.
Full text
5
Nowland, John, and Andreas Simon. "Is poor director attendance contagious?" Australian Journal of Management 43, no. 1 (2017): 42–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896217702426.
Full textAbstract:
Recent corporate governance guidelines have focused on the structure of the board of directors, with little recognition of the importance of director attendance at board and committee meetings. Director attendance is vital as prior studies show that director absences result in weaker monitoring of management and lower firm performance. This study examines whether directors learn from the attendance behavior of their board colleagues, thereby magnifying the scope and potential consequences of good or poor attendance practices. We find that director attendance is significantly positively related to their board colleagues attendance, including colleagues in the same firm and colleagues in other firms where the director holds other directorships. For policymakers, these results indicate that ongoing attention needs to be paid to the attendance practices of directors, with intervention required to ensure poor attendance practices do not become contagious.
6
Jonsdottir, Thoranna, Val Singh, Siri Terjesen, and Susan Vinnicombe. "Director identity in pre- and post-crisis Iceland: effects of board life stage and gender." Gender in Management: An International Journal 30, no. 7 (2015): 572–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/gm-07-2015-0064.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how directors’ roles and social identities are shaped by gender and board life stage, using pre- and post-crisis Iceland as the setting. Recent theoretical work suggests the importance of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles at certain board life stages; however, there is limited empirical evidence of directors’ identification with these roles as well as social role identification as a member of the board. Design/methodology/approach – The authors contribute empirical evidence from interviews with 23 corporate directors in Iceland on individual identification with the director role of monitoring and resource provision, relational identification with the CEO role and social identification as a member of the board. Findings – Prior to the crisis, male directors identified more strongly with resource provision and with their social roles and less strongly with monitoring roles. Compared to their male counterparts, pre-crisis female directors identified more strongly with monitoring and did not identify with their social roles. After the crisis, mature boards’ male director role identities were little changed; male directors continued to identify with resource provision and social identification, rather than monitoring, roles. Compared to pre-crisis, post-crisis female directors described greater identity with their resource provision roles and reported that male directors resented their attempts to fulfill their monitoring roles. In post-crisis, newly formed diverse boards, male and female directors reported very similar role identities which reflected balanced monitoring and resource provision roles, for example providing the board with ethical individual identities and unblemished reputations. The findings of this paper indicate that board composition and life cycle stage might have more impact on director identity than a pre- or post-crisis setting. These findings suggest implications for theory, practice and future research. Originality/value – This paper provides further empirical evidence of the roles male and female directors identify with on corporate boards. Its originality lies in the context of the board work in terms of newly formed and mature boards, before and after the financial crisis, with differing gender composition (male-dominated and gender-balanced boards).
7
Eichenseher, John W., and David Shields. "Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences." Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4, no. 1 (1985): 13–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(85)90010-9.
Full text
8
McClain, Guy. "Outside Director Equity Compensation And The Monitoring Of Management." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, no. 6 (2012): 1315. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i6.7346.
Full textAbstract:
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Using a sample of firms that are first time users of outside director equity compensation, I examine the effect of outsider director equity compensation on director monitoring by investigating firm performance and earnings management.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>My results, although lagged and not noticeable until year three, show that those firms that compensate outside directors with a higher percentage of equity compensation have higher stock performance, but lower accounting performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These same firms also have lower discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These results suggest that outside directors do increase their monitoring by lowering discretionary accruals and thereby, lowering accounting earnings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In addition, this increased monitoring has a positive effect on stock performance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The results indicate that increased monitoring of accounting earnings results in lower discretionary accruals and thus lower, but more accurate earnings, and stock performance for the same period is not negatively impacted. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>
9
Li, Na, and Aida Sijamic Wahid. "Director Tenure Diversity and Board Monitoring Effectiveness." Contemporary Accounting Research 35, no. 3 (2017): 1363–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12332.
Full text
10
Sandvik, Jason. "Board monitoring, director connections, and credit quality☆." Journal of Corporate Finance 65 (December 2020): 101726. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101726.
Full text
11
Chiu, Peng-Chia, Siew Hong Teoh, and Feng Tian. "Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion." Accounting Review 88, no. 3 (2012): 915–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50369.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACT We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of M&A, industry, and contagion via a common auditor or geographical proximity. These findings support the view that board monitoring plays a key role in the contagion and quality of firms' financial reports. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.
12
Usman, Muhammad, Junrui Zhang, Fangjun Wang, Junqin Sun, and Muhammad Abdul Majid Makki. "Gender diversity in compensation committees and CEO pay: evidence from China." Management Decision 56, no. 5 (2018): 1065–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-09-2017-0815.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to address whether gender diversity on compensation committees ensures objective determination of CEOs’ compensation. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of companies listed in China from 2006 to 2015. The authors use pooled ordinary least square regression as the baseline methodology, and two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching to control for endogeneity. Findings The authors find evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees limit CEOs’ total cash compensation and strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance, but only independent female directors have a significant impact, indicating that the monitoring effect outweighs the executive effect. Moreover, compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors have more impact on CEOs’ total pay and the link between CEO pay and firm performance than do committees with a single female director. Finally, gender-diverse compensation committees are more effective in setting CEOs’ compensation in state-controlled firms, where agency issues are more severe. Practical implications Female directors can improve firm-level governance by monitoring management actions, such as setting CEOs’ compensation. The study contributes to the debate on gender diversity in the boardroom, finding a positive economic effect. The study sheds light on China’s diversity practices at the director level and provides empirical guidance to China’s regulatory bodies. Originality/value The authors extend earlier studies by providing the first empirical evidence that gender-diverse compensation committees strengthen the link between CEO pay and firm performance; that independent female directors are more effective in the monitoring role than executive female directors; that compensation committees with a critical mass of female directors are more effective in setting CEOs’ pay than are committees with a single female director; and that the influence of gender-diverse compensation committees on CEOs’ pay varies by type of ownership.
13
Jarosiewicz, Victor Esteban. "CEO Compensation after Harvester Director Departure." Quarterly Journal of Finance 09, no. 01 (2019): 1940004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010139219400044.
Full textAbstract:
I examine the effects of board member departures on CEO compensation using a sample of high-growth IPO firms. Agency theory predicts that a reduction in board monitoring by harvester directors (VCs and private equity investors) will result in an increase in CEO pay. I find that departures of the last harvester director on a board result in an immediate and lasting increase in CEO equity compensation, while prior departures by other harvester directors are not significant. The results hold even when controlling for other governance mechanisms, such as CEO wealth, CEO turnover, board composition, and external blockholder ownership.
14
Yu, Lei, Daojuan Wang, and Qi Wang. "The Effect of Independent Director Reputation Incentives on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from China." Sustainability 10, no. 9 (2018): 3302. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10093302.
Full textAbstract:
This paper examines the effect of independent director reputation incentives on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using an unbalanced panel of 3765 Chinese-listed firms between 2009 and 2014, this study suggests that independent director reputation incentives improve CSR. Furthermore, it is found that this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, our results also show that the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR is moderated by firm size, and this effect is much stronger in relatively larger firms. Together, these results suggest that reputation is an effective mechanism that can motivate independent directors to fulfill their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially in non-SOEs and relatively larger firms. We add new insights to the research on the topics of independent director system, protection of the stakeholders’ interests, and CSR enhancement.
15
de Villiers, Charl, Vic Naiker, and Chris J. van Staden. "The Effect of Board Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance." Journal of Management 37, no. 6 (2011): 1636–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206311411506.
Full textAbstract:
This study investigates the relationship between strong firm environmental performance and board characteristics that capture boards’ monitoring and resource provision abilities during an era when the natural environment and the related strategic opportunities have increased in importance. The authors relate the proxy for strong environmental performance to board characteristics that represent boards’ monitoring role (i.e., independence, CEO-chair duality, concentration of directors appointed after the CEO, and director shareholding) and resource provision role (i.e., board size, directors on multiple boards, CEOs of other firms on the board, lawyers on the board, and director tenure). The authors provide evidence consistent with both theories of board roles. Specifically, consistent with their agency theory–driven predictions, the authors find evidence of higher environmental performance in firms with higher board independence and lower concentration of directors appointed after the CEO on the board of directors. Consistent with resource dependence theory, they show that environmental performance is higher in firms that have larger boards, larger representation of active CEOs on the board, and more legal experts on the board. Their findings are generally robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. These findings have implications for managers, firms, shareholders, and regulators who act on behalf of shareholders, if they are interested in influencing environmental performance.
16
Bhuiyan, Md Borhan Uddin. "Do problem directors affect firm operating performance?" Asian Review of Accounting 23, no. 2 (2015): 170–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-12-2013-0078.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences of having problem directors on the board with respect to operating performance. Problem directors are directors who have a past history of managerial integrity weakness. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses three measures of operating performance to investigate the impact of problem directors and applies regression analysis to data from S & P 500 companies from 2004 to 2009. Findings – The author found evidence for the problem that director affiliated firms have more board and independent members. The CEO dual firm has a comparatively higher number of problem directors on the board. Firm operating performance is reduced when a board is served by a problem director. The results are consistent for a number of sensitivity tests. Practical implications – Results provide evidence that firms have negative performance consequences when monitored by a director with a lack of managerial integrity. The practical implication of this study is that corporate boards should appoint directors who have a clean professional background so that more vigilant monitoring by directors can be ensured. Originality/value – This study goes beyond the traditional focus on corporate governance and firm performance. The author uses problem directors as an indicator of governance quality to measure firm performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the consequences of firms holding problem directors on the board. This issue has implications for investors, auditors, directors and regulators.
17
Sharif, Saeed Pahlevan, and Ken Kyid Yeoh. "The resource provision capability of independent directors in family-controlled, publicly-listed companies in Malaysia." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 4 (2016): 403–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4c2p11.
Full textAbstract:
To develop a comprehensive measurement index that captures a wide range of independent director characteristics that collectively reflect their overall resource provision capability in the context of Malaysian publicly-listed companies. A detailed content analysis of independent director-related disclosures in the annual reports of 217 family-controlled companies listed on the Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia). Ten distinctive types of ‘resource’ that independent directors bring to their respective companies were identified. These resources (e.g. government contracts, networks, loans, expertise, etc.) are then utilized to develop a resource provision capability index. The resultant index provides a fair indication of independent directors’ contribution to enhancing/sustaining their respective companies’ performance. The developed comprehensive resource provision capability index can be used to explore as well identify the specific nature of independent director contribution to their respective firms. This study makes a contribution to the governance literature by elaborating on independent directors’ resource provision role that has been generally ignored in “Western” studies. More specifically, not only we are proposing that independent directors’ role transcends the classic, Western-inspired monitoring role, we provide evidence of other specific means by which they can contribute to their respective firms and offer a framework to capture all such capability in a concurrent manner
18
Cullen, Margaret M., and Niamh M. Brennan. "Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 30, no. 8 (2017): 1867–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aaaj-12-2015-2345.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology. Findings Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders. Practical implications Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection. Originality/value Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.
19
Friday, Swint, and Stacy Sirmans. "Board of Director Monitoring and Firm Value in REITs." Journal of Real Estate Research 16, no. 3 (1998): 411–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10835547.1998.12090952.
Full text
20
Zahra Anggreini, Syavinda, and Arief Himmawan D. N. "Pentagon theory dan model beneish M-score." Fair Value: Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi dan Keuangan 5, no. 2 (2022): 965–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.32670/fairvalue.v5i2.2342.
Full textAbstract:
Fraudulent financial reporting is defined as fraud committed by the management of a company by providing a false picture of the financial statements, which, of course, harms investors and other related parties. This research aims to analyze the effect of fraud using the pentagon theory. The Pentagon fraud theory is measured by financial targets, financial stability, external pressure, institutional ownership, ineffective monitoring, changes in KAP, changes in directors, and the number of photos of members. President, Director The sampling method used is purposive sampling. The sample consists of 41 companies from 168 manufacturing companies that are the research population for 2018–2020. This study shows that the financial target variable has an effect on financial reporting fraud, while financial stability, external pressure, institutional ownership, ineffective supervision, KAP changes, director changes, and the number of photos of the main director have no effect on fraudulent financial reporting.
21
Noguera, Magdy C. "Characteristics of Directors, Composition of Board Committees, and Firm Performance: The Case of U.S. Equity REITs." International Real Estate Review 27, no. 4 (2024): 471–99. https://doi.org/10.53383/100391.
Full textAbstract:
This paper investigates the composition of REIT board committees in terms of the real estate expertise of the directors, type of director, gender, and tenure and the impact of these characteristics on REIT performance. The sample comprises data at the director level for 65 U.S. equity REITs during the period of 2010-2019. Using chi-square tests and logistic panel regressions, I provide evidence that the profile of REIT board members varies depending on their assignment to different committees and that, overall, the average REIT director does not match the expected director profile of having significant real estate expertise or long board tenure. I also find that finance and investment committee members are directors with very different characteristics despite tat these committees are function-related advisory committees and real estate expertise is associated with investment committee membership only. Furthermore, using panel fixed effects regressions, I find that the composition of REIT committees matters for REIT performance, especially in the case of investment committees for which the presence of outside and inside directors with real estate expertise and long tenure is associated with higher REIT performance. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the composition of REIT board committees and its impact on REIT performance. The findings are of interest to researchers and practitioners as they show the key characteristics of directors for REIT monitoring and advisory committees and their effect on REIT performance, and this information can assist in the understanding of REIT board functioning and the designing of the optimal REIT board.
22
Соловей, Юлія. "Проблема формування здатності майбутнього директора закладу дошкільної освіти до здійснення внутрішнього моніторингу на сучасному етапі розвитку вищої освіти України". Viae Educationis. Studies of Education and Didactics 1, № 4 (2022): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ve.2022.04.11.
Full textAbstract:
At the present stage of changes in the management of preschool education, the issue of conducting a perfect system of control actions aimed at the activities of preschool education is becoming increasingly important. It is quite difficult for a modern director of a preschool institution to achieve a high level of educational activity without carrying out certain control actions. Control over the management of a preschool institution requires an examination of the educational environment, the educational process and the results of the educational process. Accordingly, an inexperienced director needs additional knowledge and skills that he can acquire within higher education. The purpose of the article is to characterize and analyze the peculiarities of forming the ability of the future director of preschool education to carry out internal monitoring at the present stage of development of higher education in Ukraine. The article analyzes the issue of control in the management of preschool education and finds that the formation of a perfect system of internal quality assurance of preschool education directly depends on internal control through which you can monitor the level of educational services in preschool education and prepare for external control; types of control in the theory and practice of preschool education management are characterized; the author’s definition of the term «ability of the future director of the preschool institution to carry out internal monitoring» is given; educational and methodological support was analyzed, namely several special courses that help increase the level of ability of directors of preschool education institutions to carry out internal monitoring; It was clarified that the future director of a preschool institution should be knowledgeable both in the field of management and in various specific areas and be able to apply their knowledge, skills and abilities in practice; the interpretation of the definition of “monitoring” is generalized and defined as a system of measures, which includes: control, observation, forecasting, collection, processing, storage and dissemination of information on the educational process of preschool education. It is established that for effective management the future director of preschool education must be able to organize the teaching staff, parents and children, be able to conduct internal control, perfectly select the latest, specific information, be able to creatively, quickly and thoughtfully make non-standard management decisions. management activities, the ability to encourage the teaching staff, etc. During the analysis of information sources it was found that the priority of the director is the formation of the internal quality assurance system of preschool education and stated that internal inspections are no less important than external, and study the level of training of teachers, analysis of internal violations and their elimination is a prerequisite for preparation for external control.
23
Ari Kharisma and Windy Atmawardani Rachman. "THE EFFECT OF FRAUD DIAMOND ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN FOOD AND BEVERAGE SUB-SECTOR COMPANIES LISTED ON THE INDONESIAN STOCK EXCHANGE." International Journal Management and Economic 3, no. 1 (2024): 01–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.56127/ijme.v3i1.1174.
Full textAbstract:
The research aimed to analyse the effect of fraud diamond components on the occurrence of fraudulent financial statements in food and beverage subsector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). The components of fraud diamond which include as financial stability, ineffective monitoring, change in auditors, and change in directors were independent variables that were suspected to affect the fraudulent financial statement in the company. Population in this research was all financial statements of food and beverage companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange which have been audited and published. Samples were financial statements of food and beverage companies period 2021-2022 taken through purposive sampling as many as nineteen companies. The sampling technique in this research was purposive sampling. The data analysis used is descriptive statistics, classic assumption tests using the normality test, autocorrelation test, multicollinearity test and heteroscedasticity test, multiple linear regression analysis, and hypothesis testing using the partial test (t) and simultaneous test (f). The partial results of the research are that the variables financial stability, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, and change in director have no effect on fraudulent financial statements. The results of the research simultaneously show that the variables financial stability, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, and change in director have no effect on financial statement fraud.
24
Arora, Punit. "Financially Linked Independent Directors and Bankruptcy Reemergence: The Role of Director Effort." Journal of Management 44, no. 7 (2016): 2665–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206316648384.
Full textAbstract:
This study examines if the effort of financially linked independent (FLI) directors enable firms to reemerge from bankruptcy, a major organizational crisis. Using a sample of 307 bankrupt U.S. firms with instrumental variables regression methodology, I find that the efforts of these directors are critical for firm reemergence. FLI directors’ efforts increase the likelihood of reemergence as well as improve access to financial resources. In contrast, I do not find any evidence that non-FLI directors’ efforts are associated with reemergence. I also find that resourceful but uninvolved directors are not helpful for firms trying to navigate their way out of bankruptcy. My study highlights (a) the changing nature of roles played by directors in various lifecycle stages, (b) the greater importance of resource provisioning over monitoring during reemergence, and (c) that efforts of FLI directors, and not others director categories, matter for reemergence. Overall, my study extends research that suggests directors’ motivation may cause differential firm outcomes and provides evidence that directors do not always put in their best effort on behalf of their firms. This, I suggest, has profound implications for corporate governance research and practice.
25
Chen, Chia-Wei, Jang-Shee Barry Lin, and Bingsheng Yi. "Two faces of busy outside directors." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 2 (2008): 467–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i2c4p5.
Full textAbstract:
In this study, we examine how multiple directorships held by outside directors (busy outside directors) influence shareholder wealth in diversifying acquisitions. With a sample of 893 diversifying acquisitions from 1998 to 2004, we find a negative (positive) busy-director effect for diversifying acquisitions of public-targets (private-targets). Busy directors are negatively (positively) associated with the five-day cumulative abnormal returns in acquisitions involving public (private) targets, where merger-related agency problems are more likely. Our evidence support the notion that, in the case of diversifying acquisitions, increased managerial monitoring plays a more important role versus enhanced advising and business connection from busy directors.
26
Sert, O. V. "Role of non-executive directors in corporate governance." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 2, no. 85 (2024): 38–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2024.85.2.5.
Full textAbstract:
In the article there is an analysis of the non-executive director’s legal status and functions, including independent one, within the one-tier corporate governance structure in Ukraine. The study aims to examine the powers of non-executive directors, the scope of their functions, and the criteria for independence, to provide a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance in Ukraine. Author establishes that a director in a one-tier corporate governance structure is an individual elected by the general meeting of shareholders to the board of directors and assumes the official from the moment of election, regardless of the title. The article defines non-executive directors as members of the board of directors who perform control and risk management functions regarding the corporation’s activities and those of the executive directors. The fulfilment of these functions by non-executive directors contributes to balanced corporate governance. Author explores that the independence of a non-executive director involves the absence of any relationship with the corporation and compliance with other independence criteria determined by legislation, the corporation’s charter, and/or board regulations. Author also concludes that a shareholder can be elected to the position of a non-executive director, if this does not contradict the corporation’s charter, and/or board regulations. Author examines the conditions and criteria under which a shareholder elected as a non-executive director can be considered independent. The study demonstrates that the text of Law № 2465-IX contains an error technicus, which complicates the ability of shareholders within a one-tier structure to correctly apply the legal norms regarding independence criteria. Finally, risk management is identified as a key function of non-executive directors, which includes several stages: risk identification, analysis, evaluation, the implementation of risk mitigation measures, and monitoring the effectiveness of these measures. This ensures compliance with legislation and the protection of shareholders’ rights, including minority shareholders, and other stakeholders of the corporation. The article significantly contributes to a better scientific understanding of the role and functions of non-executive directors.
27
Munawarah, Israfil, and M. Khaerul Fadillah. "MONOTORING, AUDITOR CHANGE, CHANGE IN DIRECTOR, CEO DUALITY, DAN POLITICAL CONNECTION (PERSEPSI FRAUD HEXAGON) TERHADAP FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING PT. GARUDA INDONESIA (PERSERO) TBK. YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA PERIODE 2018-2022." Jurnal GICI Jurnal Keuangan dan Bisnis 16, no. 1 (2024): 74–81. https://doi.org/10.58890/jkb.v16i1.266.
Full textAbstract:
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis pengaruh financial stability, ineffectivity monitoring, auditor change, change in director, ceo duality, dan political connection terhadap fraudulent financial reporting PT. Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. Jenis penelitian yang digunakan adalah asosiatif kuantitatif dengan metode penelitian berupa pengumpulan data laporan keuangan PT. Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. periode 2018-2022. Hasil uji regresi menunjukkan bahwa 84,7% sedangkan sisanya 15,3% dijelaskan oleh faktor lain yang tidak diteliti dalam penelitian ini. Sedangkan hasil uji F menunjukkan secara simultan variabel financial stability, ineffectivity monitoring, auditor change, change in director, ceo duality dan political connection bersama-sama berpengaruh signifikan terhadap fraudulent financial reporting. Hasil uji T menunjukkan variabel financial stability menunjukkan secara parsial tidak berpengaruh signifikan, variabel ineffectivity monitoring menunjukan secara parsial berpengaruh signifikan, variabel auditor change menunjukan secara parsial tidak berpengaruh signifikan, variabel change in director menunjukan secara parsial berpengaruh signifikan, variabel ceo duality menunjukan secara parsial tidak berpengaruh signifikan, dan variabel political connection menunjukan secara parsial tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap fraudulent financial reporting.
28
Levesque, Terrence J., Theresa Libby, Robert Mathieu, and Sean W. G. Robb. "The Effect of Director Monitoring on Bid and Ask Spreads." Journal of International Accounting Research 9, no. 2 (2010): 45–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jiar.2010.9.2.45.
Full text
29
Chung, Kee H., and Choonsik Lee. "Voting methods for director election, monitoring costs, and institutional ownership." Journal of Banking & Finance 113 (April 2020): 105738. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105738.
Full text
30
Chen, Chia-Wei, Bingsheng Yi, Meng Zhao, and Qiancheng Zheng. "Even one can make a difference — Female board representation and capital structure: Evidence from Taiwan." Corporate Ownership and Control 19, no. 3 (2022): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i3art8.
Full textAbstract:
This paper investigates whether and how female board representation will affect firms’ capital structure using a sample of 16,477 firm-year observations during the period from 2006 to 2017 obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). While 67% of Taiwanese firms have female directors, most firms have only one female director. We find that firms with female directors use more debt financing, particularly, more short-term debt. Our results support the notion that female board representation is associated with increased monitoring through increased use of debt, particularly short-term debt. Our results remain consistent with various robustness tests using alternative samples, measures, and methodologies.
31
Aminatun, Siti, and Hasan Mukhibad. "Determinants Of Fraudulent Financial Statement On Islamic Banks In The Perspective Of Crowe’s Fraud Pentagon Theory." Gorontalo Accounting Journal 4, no. 1 (2021): 69. http://dx.doi.org/10.32662/gaj.v4i1.1358.
Full textAbstract:
This study aims. to.analyze the determinants of. Fraudulent. financial statements. such us external pressure, financial target, effective monitoring, external auditor quality, Profit Sharing Ratio, Director’s Employee Welfare Ratio, Non Islamic Income Ratio, change in director, dan CEO Duality in thee perspective crowe’s fraud pentagon. theory on Islamic Banking in Indonesia during 2015-2019. The sampling. method used was purposive. sampling and generated 62 units of analysis. The results show that Profit Sharing Ratio has a negative effect and Non Islamic Income Ratio have positive effect on fraudulent financial statements. Meanwhile the external pressure, financial targets, effective monitoring, external auditor quality, change in directors and CEO duality have no effect on fraudulent financial statements.
32
Tri Annisa, Ranti, and Halmawati Halmawati. "Pengaruh Elemen Fraud Diamond Theory Terhadap Financial Statement Fraud." JURNAL EKSPLORASI AKUNTANSI 2, no. 1 (2020): 2263–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/jea.v2i1.211.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this study was to determinate the effect fraud diamond theory in financial statement fraud. The population in this study are manufacturing companies sector consumer goods industry listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2018. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling method and obtained 112 samples. Data analysis using multiple linear regression analysis techniques and processed with IBM SPSS Statistics 25 software. The results showed that the financial target, ineffective monitoring, auditor report and changes in directors had a simultaneous effect on financial statement fraud. Partially, financial target affect financial statement fraud, while ineffective monitoring, auditor report and change of director do not affect the financial statement fraud.
33
Sabaruddin, Sabaruddin. "Kemampuan Fraud Diamond Mendeteksi Kecurangan Pelaporan Keuangan Dimoderasi Ukuran Perusahaan." Jurnal Akuntansi dan Governance 2, no. 2 (2022): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.24853/jago.2.2.130-140.
Full textAbstract:
This study aims to employ fraud diamond analysis to determine the potential of fraudulent financial statements using quantitative method with secondary data. The banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2016 and 2020 are chosen with a purposive sampling technique. The results show that financial stability, ineffective monitoring, and a change in director have no significant negative effect on the potential for fraudulent financial statements. Meanwhile, the change of auditor has no significant positive effect on the potential of fraudulent financial statements. Firm size is unable to moderate the effect of financial stability, ineffective monitoring, changes in the auditor, and changes in the Board of Directors on the potential of fraudulent financial statements.
34
Wang, Yuwei, Shang-Yin Yang, and Chia-Wei Chen. "The impact of directors’ liability insurance on board meeting attendance." Corporate Ownership and Control 19, no. 3 (2022): 92–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i3art6.
Full textAbstract:
We study the relationship between directors’ liability insurance and board meeting attendance. We find that directors’ liability insurance and board meeting attendance are positively associated. This suggests that directors’ liability insurance may actually serve a governance role because an insurer definitely has incentives to thoroughly scrutinize the insured. As a result, director’s board meeting attendance rate increases because more monitoring of directors leads to more responsible behaviors of directors. With 98,524 yearly observations at the director level and 8,968 yearly observations at the firm level of listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2008 to 2015, our empirical findings suggest that, on average, the board meeting attendance rate of insured firms is 2.9 percent higher than that of uninsured firms.
35
De Masi, Sara, and Andrea Zorzi. "Enhancing Board Monitoring Tasks: The Effect of Minority-Elected Directors." International Journal of Business and Management 15, no. 7 (2020): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v15n7p85.
Full textAbstract:
In companies with a controlling shareholder the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders poses significant issue. Managers may pursue, rather than the interests of the company as a whole, the interest of the controlling shareholder. When there is a controlling shareholder, independent directors may not prove sufficient to monitor the management behaviour, given that they are ultimately appointed by the same controlling shareholder whose possible opportunistic behaviour they are meant to constrain. Therefore, minority shareholders may be given appointment rights to the board: directors elected by minority shareholders may work as a corporate governance mechanism that fosters the board&rsquo;s willingness and ability to monitor managers&rsquo; behaviour, on the assumption that managers are appointed by the controlling shareholder. This paper examines empirically whether having a minority-elected director on corporate boards increases the ability of the board to monitor management behaviour. Using a sample of the largest listed Italian companies in years 2008-2017, we find that minority-elected directors have a positive and statistically significant effect on board monitoring tasks. We also document that this effect is higher when they are elected by institutional investors. Our results have important implications for policy makers and, more generally, corporate governance best practice in all contexts in which companies have a concentrated ownership structure.
36
Kusuma, Sherawanti Permata, Melati Oktafiyani, Imang Dapit Pamungkas, and Juli Ratnawati. "The Beneish M-Score Model in Detecting Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The Hexagon Perspective Theory." Jurnal Penelitian Ekonomi dan Bisnis 9, no. 1 (2024): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.33633/jpeb.v9i1.8369.
Full textAbstract:
This research aims to investigate the effect of fraud on fraudulent financial reports (FFR) using the hexagon theory. The seven factors were financial stability, external pressure, ineffective monitoring, auditor changes, director changes, arrogance, and collusion. This study has a population of health companies listed on the IDX in 2018-2021. This study uses a quantitative approach. Based on the logistic regression analysis, the study finds that financial stability, change director, and arrogance affect FFR. On the other hand, external pressure, ineffective monitoring, auditor change, and collusion do not affect FFR. Keywords:Fraudulent financial reporting, Hexagon theory, Beneish M-Score
37
Wulansari, Retno, and Rr Sri Handayani. "Detecting Financial Statement Fraud Using Hexagon Theory: The Role of Effective Monitoring." Jurnal Proaksi 12, no. 2 (2025): 138–55. https://doi.org/10.32534/jpk.v12i2.6989.
Full textAbstract:
Main Purpose - This study investigates the application of the fraud hexagon theory in detecting financial statement fraud and examines effective monitoring as a moderating variable. Method - This research focuses on companies in the Consumer Cyclicals sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2019 to 2023. Logistic regression analysis was conducted using EViews 13. Main Findings - The results show that financial targets and board duality drive financial statement fraud. Industry characteristics, auditor turnover, director turnover, and director arrogance do not have a significant effect. The audit committee serves as a monitoring mechanism that can weaken the influence of financial targets, director arrogance, and board duality on financial statement fraud but is ineffective in mitigating the impact of other factors. Theory and Practical Implications - These findings highlight the importance of strengthening corporate governance with strict oversight of financial targets and board duality. This research can be used by companies and investors to identify fraud using elements of Hexagon Theory. Novelty - This study advances previous research by introducing effective monitoring as a moderating variable in the relationship between fraud hexagon elements and financial statement fraud.
38
Kang, Sang Koo, Haksoon Kim, and Hee Sub Byun. "Testing the Bargaining Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Korean Market." Asia Europe Perspective Association 15, no. 4 (2018): 81–101. https://doi.org/10.31203/aepa.2018.15.4.005.
Full textAbstract:
The agency conflict between the managers of a company and the shareholders of a company is a crucial issue in corporate governance. Many finance researchers have searched for ways to ensure that managers will act in the best interests of shareholders, which are referred to as monitoring mechanisms. There are many well-known monitoring mechanisms identified in the corporate finance literature, such as concentrated ownership by shareholders (block holders), board of director oversight, oversight by the market for corporate control, proxy contests and shareholder activism. Recently, discussions of the failures of corporate boards in company oversight have become popular both in academic and practitioner-focused finance literature. In academia, early models of corporate governance have been challenged by bargaining models. Early models of corporate governance focus on board characteristics and their impact on firm performance or firm-level decision-making (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brickley et al., 1994; Kini et al., 1995; Yermack, 1996; Cotter et al., 1997; Dennis and McConnell, 2003). In contrast, bargaining models are based on the assumptions that there are divergent forces in corporate governance that facilitate or block effective monitoring mechanisms and corporate decision-making (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Raheja, 2005). Especially Hermalin and Weisbach relate existing empirical findings to their theoretical work on bargaining models, including prior firm performance, the relationship between outside directors and CEO tenure, corporate decision-making of a firm, and the measures of firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Weisbach, 1988; Goyal and Park, 2002; Dahya et al., 2002; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). This paper tests the empirical predictions of the bargaining model of corporate governance of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) using Korean Stock Exchange companies. The objective of this paper is to empirically test the predictions of bargaining models including data from the Korean Corporate Governance Index (KCGI) as a proxy for the quality of board monitoring so that this paper can investigate the relationship between firm valuation and CEO tenure. Specifically, following the empirical predictions of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), three hypotheses are examined: H1. The effect of the board quality index on firm performance is positive after controlling for board size and board characteristics. H2. The board quality index of a firm declines over the course of a CEO’s tenure after controlling for the independent director ratio and the persistence of board independence. H3. Accounting measures of performance are better predictors of management turnover than stock price performance. This paper uses a sample of Korean firms for empirical analysis in this paper for several reasons. First, empirical evidence is not enough related to the bargaining model for Korean firms. Second, Korean firms are different from U.S. firms in terms of their board compositions and board characteristics. In Korea, the monitoring role of outside directors is weak (Baek et al., 2006) and the independence of outside directors is also questionable (Kim and Kim, 2008). Moreover, there is a regulation imposing mandatory outside director ratios of 50 percent on large firms with assets greater than two trillion won (Black et al., 2006). The effect of outside director ratios on firm performance or corporate decision-making is questionable and is thus an empirical issue in Korea. Finally, the Korean Corporate Governance Index (KCGI) appears to be a good predictor of the quality of corporate governance for publicly listed companies in Korea (Black et al., 2006; Black et al., 2008; Black and Kim, 2012).
39
Grover, Krishan Lal. "Gender Mainstreaming on the Boards of Directors of Banks: Its impact on Bank Performance." International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology 10, no. 2 (2022): 207–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2022.40226.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract: Gender mainstreaming is an approach to achieve gender equality. It entails incorporating a gender viewpoint into the development, planning, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of policies, regulatory measures, and expenditure plans. While promoting gender equality mainstreaming, alliances between men and women, results in good return which encourages inclusive growth. Corporate governance regulations all over the world encourage the inclusion of women on corporate boards. In 2013, it became mandatory for a company's board of directors to include at least one female director. Board directors play a vital role in any organisation. The primary responsibility of board directors is to increase shareholder wealth. Because of the opacity in banks, the position of board directors is crucial. Their role isn't just to make policies; it also includes putting forth efforts to ensure banking's longterm viability. A well-functioning banking system is regarded as a prerequisite for growth. An attempt is made to investigate the role of female directors in Indian banking, using return on assets and return on equity as performance measures. The panel data is used to examine five public banks and five private banks listed on the BSE. Research articles on the role of gender diversity in the board of directors in affecting bank performance have been collected from several refereed journals to review the related literature. Keywords: Banking, Gender, Director, Performance, Woman
40
Yulianti, Yulianti, Ratna Novita Sari, and Aprih Santoso. "Financial Statement Fraud Detection: The Hexagon Fraud Model Approach." Atestasi : Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi 7, no. 1 (2024): 674–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.57178/atestasi.v7i1.856.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this study is to examine the likelihood of financial statement fraud using the fraud hexagon model, including pressure (financial stability), opportunity (ineffective monitoring), rationalization (auditor change), capability (director change), arrogance (frequent CEO pictures), and conspiracy (connection with government projects) on financial statement fraud. The sample of this study is manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2021, with a total of 73 companies. The data was processed using SPSS 22 software. The results of this study indicate that financial stability has a positive effect on financial statement fraud. However, ineffective monitoring, change of auditor, change of directors, frequent number of CEO pictures, and connection with government projects do not affect financial statement fraud.
41
Eko Sudarmanto, Imam Hidayat, Mohamad Zulman Hakim, Adela Rhiana Novitasari, Anggun Munifatul Afifah, and Pika Yolanda. "HOW DOES THE AUDIT COMMITTEE DETECT FRAUD?" International Journal of Accounting, Management, Economics and Social Sciences (IJAMESC) 2, no. 5 (2024): 1876–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.61990/ijamesc.v2i5.325.
Full textAbstract:
Financial statement fraud is a mismatch between the application of accounting principles and the preparation of financial reports with the aim of deceiving users of financial statements. This research aims to analyze the influence of the Fraud Hexagon on financial statement fraud. There are 10 variables used, namely Financial Target, Financial Stability, External Pressure, ineffective monitoring, nature of industry, collusion, change in director, change in auditor, frequent number of CEO's picture, and political connections. Financial statement fraud is measured using the Beneish M-Score Model. The sample in this research is infrastructure sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2020-2022 with the number of samples used being 29 companies. Data analysis in this study used panel data regression analysis and MRA. The results of this research show that financial stability, collusion, frequent number of ceo' pictures have a negative influence on financial statement fraud. Nature of industry and change in director have a positive influence on financial statement fraud. Meanwhile, financial targets, external pressure, ineffective monitoring, change in auditors, and political connections have no influence on the potential for fraudulent financial statements. In terms of moderating the audit committee, this variable shows that financial stability, collusion, change in directors and frequent number of CEO's pictures are capable of moderate. Meanwhile, financial targets, external pressure, ineffective monitoring, nature of industry, change in auditors and political connections are not able to moderate financial report fraud.
42
Septianda, Harni, Enggar Diah P.A, and Reni Yustien. "PENGARUH FRAUD PENTAGON DALAM MENDETEKSI FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD (STUDI EMPIRIS PADA PERUSAHAAN MANUFAKTUR YANG TERDAFTAR DI BEI TAHUN 2015-2019)." Jambi Accounting Review (JAR) 2, no. 1 (2022): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.22437/jar.v2i1.17253.
Full textAbstract:
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh Fraud Pentagon terhadap Financial Statement Fraud pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) periode 2015-2019. Variabel yang di teliti adalah Financial Target, Financial Stability Pressure, External Pressure, Ineffective Monitoring, Nature of Industry, Change in Auditor , Change in Director, Frequent Number of CEO’s Pictures , Political Connection, dan Dualism Position. Financial Statement Fraud dalam penelitian ini diukur dengan F-Score. Sampel penelitian ditentukan dengan teknik purposive sampling, dan didapatkan 110 perusahaan. Analisis yang digunakan adalah analisis regresi linear berganda. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa secara simultan variabel Financial Target (X1), Financial Stability Pressure (X2), External Pressure (X3), Ineffective Monitoring (X4), Nature of Industry (X5), Change in Auditor (X6), Change in Director (X7), Frequent Number of CEO’s Pictures (X8), Political Connection (X9) dan Dualism Position (X10) berpengaruh terhadap Financial Statement Fraud. Sedangkan secara parsial variabel yang berpengaruh hanya Financial Target (X1), Financial Stability Pressure (X2), External Pressure (X3), Nature of Industry (X5), Change in Director (X7), Political Connection (X9).
43
Ramadan, Greska Redielano. "Board Of Directors Gender Diversity And Real Earnings Management: Does Female Board Of Director Matter?" Jurnal Reviu Akuntansi dan Keuangan 11, no. 2 (2021): 306–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/jrak.v11i2.15915.
Full textAbstract:
The Board of directors' characteristic plays an important role as a monitoring mechanism in corporate governance. Previous research shows that gender could determine the existence of manager opportunistic behavior. The existence of females on the board of directors could reduce agency conflict such as earnings management. This research aimed examine gender diversity in explaining earnings management. The sample of this research is the non-financial company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (Idx) during 2014-2018. The research method conduct quantitative approach. We used multiple regression analysis to examine the association between board of director gender diversity on real earnings management. The result shows that gender diversity is negatively associated with earnings management. Gender diversity indicates that the number and percentage of female directors could reduce the level of real earnings management, especially through abnormal discretionary expenses. Secondly, there is no different level of real earnings management between firms with and without gender diversity in their board structures.
44
Noble, Muara Rizqulloh. "Fraud diamond analysis in detecting financial statement fraud." Indonesian Accounting Review 9, no. 2 (2019): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.14414/tiar.v9i2.1632.
Full textAbstract:
This study aimed to analyze the factors used to detect financial statement fraud from a fraud diamond perspective. It tried to find out the effect of pressure proxied by financial targets, opportunity proxied by ineffective monitoring, rationalization proxied by change in auditors, and capability proxied by director change on financial statement fraud. It used 36 mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) period 2014-2016 as the sample. This sample was taken using a purposive sampling technique and data analysis were analyzed using multiple linear regression. The results indicate that pressure proxied by financial targets and rationalization proxied by change in auditors have an effect on financial statement fraud, whereas opportunity proxied by ineffective monitoring and capability proxied by replacement of directors have no effect on financial statement fraud.
45
Cahyani, Rossy Angga Mustika, Lilis Ardini, and Kurnia Kurnia. "The Effect of Fraud Pentagon on Earnings Management with Audit Committee as Moderating Variable." JASa (Jurnal Akuntansi, Audit dan Sistem Informasi Akuntansi) 8, no. 3 (2024): 627–42. https://doi.org/10.36555/jasa.v8i3.2698.
Full textAbstract:
his study aimed to examine the effect of fraud pentagon, external pressure, financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, change of directors, and a frequent number of CEO’s pictures on earnings management; with the audit committee as moderating variable. The population was State-Owned Enterprises that were listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2015-2019. The Sampling technique used purposive sampling with 12 State-Owned Enterprises as the sample. Furthermore, there were 2 models of analysis, i.e. multiple linear regression and Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) in order to analyze the secondary data in form of companies’ financial statements; . As a result, it concluded that external pressure, financial target, and a frequent number of CEO’s pictures affected earnings management. However, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, and change of directors did not affect earnings management. In contrast, the audit committee was able to moderate the effect of external pressure, financial targets, change of director, and a frequent number of CEO’s pictures on earnings management. On the other hand, the audit committee was not able to moderate the effect of ineffective monitoring and change in auditor on earnings management.
46
Adela Wilantari, Nanu Hasanuh, Sri Suartini, and Hari Sulistiyo. "Pengaruh Fraud Diamond Terhadap Kecurangan Laporan Keuangan." JRAK (Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Bisnis) 10, no. 1 (2024): 8–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.38204/jrak.v10i1.1556.
Full textAbstract:
The aim of this research conducted to examine whether there is a partial or simultaneous influence of the fraud diamond theory, as proxied by financial target, ineffective monitoring, audit opinion, and change in director on fraudulent financial reporting of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2019-2020, the measurement of which is by using the fraud score model (F-Score). Purposive sampling method was used in this study, with sample criteria including manufacturers listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2019-2020, companies that publish their annual reports on the IDX website, companies that presented financial reports in Rupiah, and companies that fully disclose data related to research variables. A sample of 15 companies was obtained based on these parameters. This research was conducted by the quantitative method, and the analysis strategy was multiple regression analysis with an SPSS testing device. According to the results, financial target and ineffective monitoring variables had a partial influence on fraudulent financial reporting, while audit opinion and changes in director had no partial effect. The results also showed that the four independent variables, namely financial targets, ineffective monitoring, audit opinion, and change of director had a simultaneous influence on fraudulent financial reporting.
47
Riany, Meutia, Parassela Pangestu Primadiva, Muhammad Zulvan Dwi Hatmoko, Nur Hidayah Kusumaningrum Fadhilah, and Khairul Mujahidi. "The Effect Of The Fraud Pentagon On Fraudulent Financial Statements And Their Impact On Investment Decisions." EKOMBIS REVIEW: Jurnal Ilmiah Ekonomi dan Bisnis 12, no. 3 (2024): 3033–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.37676/ekombis.v12i3.6099.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this study is to test whether financial targets, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, change in director, frequent number of CEO's pictures affect fraudulent financial statements and their impact on investment decisions in all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and sanctioned by OJK for violating regulation No. VIII.G.7 from 2010 to 2021. The data used in this study are secondary data derived from financial reports published by the company. A total of 54 companies became the population in the study. The sample selection in this study used a purposive sampling technique with certain criteria and 9 companies were selected as research samples. The data analysis technique in this study is using panel data regression with the help of Eviews software version 12. The results of this study indicate that, simultaneously, financial target, ineffective monitoring, change in auditor, change in director and frequent number of CEO's picture have no effect on fraudulent financial statements. Furthermore, fraudulent financial statements have no effect on investment decisions. Partially financial targets, change in director, and frequent number of CEO's picture have no significant effect on fraudulent financial statements. Meanwhile, change in auditor and ineffective monitoring have a negative and significant effect on fraudulent financial statements.
48
Mitchell, Karlyn. "Bank dependency and banker directors." Managerial Finance 41, no. 8 (2015): 825–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-05-2014-0136.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose – Directors play a hard-to-quantify but critical role in the success of corporations. Outside directors supplement the firm-specific knowledge of inside directors by providing expertise and monitoring. Prior research finds that outside directors who are commercial bankers can be both beneficial and costly to large, non-financial corporations. Smaller, bank-dependent corporations should benefit more than large firms from the services banker directors provide, but may also be more prone to the costs they can impose. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of bank dependency on appointments of banker directors. Design/methodology/approach – The author estimates models relating the probability of a first-time banker-director appointment to proxies of bank dependency on data for a matched sample of firms with and without banker directors drawn from a size-representative sample of Compustat firms. Findings – Bank-dependent firms are less likely to appoint bankers as directors than bank-independent firms. Bank-dependent firms are also less likely to appoint bankers whose employers are firms’ creditors (i.e. affiliated bankers). Bank-dependent and bank-independent firms are indistinguishable in their probabilities of appointing unaffiliated bankers as directors. Practical implications – Bank-dependent firms with unexploited growth opportunities appear unable to ameliorate their financial constraints by having banker directors. Appointing retired bankers to boards may give firms the benefits of banker directors without the costs. Originality/value – This paper is the first to: document the prevalence of banker directors at smaller corporations; present econometric evidence on banker-director appointments at firms ranging from small to large; and identify bank dependency as a factor limiting appointments of affiliated banker directors.
49
Dziegielewski, Ben. "Message from the Executive Director." Water International 24, no. 3 (1999): 181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508069908692159.
Full text
50
Malau, Andreas Stephanson, and Titik Aryati. "PENGARUH FRAUD HEXAGON DALAM MENDETEKSI FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD." Jurnal Ekonomi Trisakti 3, no. 2 (2023): 2587–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/jet.v3i2.17298.
Full textAbstract:
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah terdapat pengaruh fraud hexagon yang meliputi Financial Stability, External Pressure, Ineffective Monitoring, Change in Auditor, Change in Director, Arrogance, dan State-Owned Enterprises dalam mendeteksi Financial Statement Fraud. Data yang digunakan pada penelitian ini adalah data sekunder berupa data dari laporan keuangan tahunan perusahaan sector makanan dan minuman yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2020-2022. Penelitian menggunakan metode Purposive Sampling dengan hasil 29 perusahaan serta total pengamatan 87 sampel. Teknik analisis yang digunakan adalah analisis regresi linear berganda. Hasil pengujian menunjukan Financial Stability, External Pressure, Change in Auditor, Change in Director dan State-Owned Enterprises berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Financail Statement Fraud sedangkan Ineffective Monitoring dan Arrogance tidak berpengaruh terhadap Financial Statement Fraud.