Academic literature on the topic 'Divergent incentive'
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Journal articles on the topic "Divergent incentive"
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Huo, Kun. "Performance Incentives, Divergent Thinking Training, and Creative Problem Solving." Journal of Management Accounting Research 32, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 159–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-52479.
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ABSTRACT Creativity theory suggests that effective solutions to creative problems depend on both divergent and convergent thinking (Cropley 2006). Using an experiment in which participants solve insight problems, I investigate the effect of incentive schemes on creative problem-solving performance. I find that both piece-rate pay and a flat wage plus public recognition generate higher performance with divergent thinking training than without. Consistent with the idea that incentives may promote more convergent thinking than divergent thinking, piece-rate pay generates lower creative problem-solving performance than the flat wage in the absence of divergent thinking training (flat wage plus recognition has a neutral effect). The study suggests that when employee performance depends on creative problem solving, firms should implement incentive schemes and/or control systems that promote both divergent and convergent thinking.
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Tang, Yongli, Xinyue Hu, Claudio Petti, and Matthias Thürer. "Institutional incentives and pressures in Chinese manufacturing firms’ innovation." Management Decision 58, no. 5 (June 17, 2019): 812–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-08-2018-0933.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ innovation is related to their perceived incentives and pressures from the transitioning institutional environment. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 166 manufacturing firms located in Guangdong Province (China) is analyzed using binomial and moderated multiple regression models. Findings The results show that institutional incentives are more effective in promoting incremental innovations than radical ones, whereas institutional pressures are more pronounced in facilitating radical innovations than incremental ones. In addition, the interaction between the two divergent institutional forces is negatively related to innovation performance. Practical implications The findings inform managers and policy makers in institutional transition environments to consider and balance the effects of institutional forces. Firms should match the institutional incentives and pressures with their own innovation objectives in terms of incremental or radical goals, and take caution to deal with the divergent institutional directions, so as to avoid the negative interaction effects. Policy makers should take a systems approach when considering the incentive-based and/or command-and-control designs of innovation policies and regulations. Originality/value The study contributes to existing literature on institutions and innovation by disentangling incentive and pressure effects of institutions, regulation and innovation policies, as well as the combined and interaction effects intrinsic within institutional mixes.
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KRAFT, ALELI D., JOSEPH J. CAPUNO, STELLA A. QUIMBO, and CARLOS ANTONIO R. TAN. "INFORMATION, INCENTIVES AND PRACTICE PATTERNS: THE CASE OF TB DOTS SERVICES AND PRIVATE PHYSICIANS IN THE PHILIPPINES." Singapore Economic Review 53, no. 01 (April 2008): 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590808002835.
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To explain divergent physician practices, studies focus on either differences in education and training or in financial incentives. The policy challenge is to identify the most cost-effective interventions to encourage adherence to practice guidelines. Utilizing private physician data in major cities in the Philippines, we show the effects of training and financial incentives in physician adoption of the TB DOTS protocol. Training seems to be more important when the new protocol is a significant departure from the old know-how, while financial incentives seem to work better on those who are already clinically competent. These imply that uniform application of information-based and incentive-based interventions may not be cost-effective.
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Kachelmeier, Steven J., Laura W. Wang, and Michael G. Williamson. "Incentivizing the Creative Process: From Initial Quantity to Eventual Creativity." Accounting Review 94, no. 2 (July 1, 2018): 249–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52196.
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ABSTRACT In two experiments, we examine whether performance-contingent incentives facilitate the creative process by enhancing the initial preparation that precedes creative incubation. The defining characteristic of both experiments is a second-stage task that is separated in time from the first-stage implementation of different incentive schemes. In Experiment 1, the second stage takes place ten days after we implement conditions with quantity incentives, high-creativity incentives, incentives with a minimum-creativity threshold, and a fixed-pay control condition. In Experiment 2, we test the effects of incentives with an incubation period of 20 minutes, during which an experimenter escorts participants on a walk between compensated work periods. In both experiments, we find that participants with quantity incentives outperform the high-creativity production of their fixed-pay counterparts only in the second-stage task. Mediation analyses suggest that quantity-incentivized participants' propensity to try more divergent ideas in the first stage sparks their creativity advantage in the second stage. JEL Classifications: D24; D91; M11; M41.
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Keefer, Sara E., Utsav Gyawali, and Donna J. Calu. "Choose your path: Divergent basolateral amygdala efferents differentially mediate incentive motivation, flexibility and decision-making." Behavioural Brain Research 409 (July 2021): 113306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2021.113306.
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Maria-Rios, Cristina, Christopher Fitzpatrick, and Jonathan D. Morrow. "Manipulation of Predictive and Incentive Value Have Divergent Effects on Sign- and Goal-Tracking Behavior." Biological Psychiatry 89, no. 9 (May 2021): S292—S293. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2021.02.728.
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Zhan, Jing Vivian. "Natural Resources, Local Governance and Social Instability: A Comparison of Two Counties in China." China Quarterly 213 (March 2013): 78–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741013000040.
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AbstractThis article compares two neighbouring underdeveloped counties in south-west China. They share many similarities in economic, political and demographic structures, but experience divergent levels of social instability. The comparison suggests that, under China's political system and cadre incentive structure, the endowment of mineral resources in one county, and the lack thereof in the other, significantly influences the modes of economic development and local governance in these two counties, and thus contributes to their different levels of social instability.
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Ferris, James M. "School-Based Decision Making: A Principal-Agent Perspective." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 14, no. 4 (December 1992): 333–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/01623737014004333.
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A principal-agent framework is used to examine the potential gains to educational performance and the potential threats to public accountability that school-based decision-making proposals pose. Options for minimizing problems arising from divergent objectives and information asymmetry, such as incentive-based contracts, limited school discretion, and school councils, are examined. The analysis underscores the need to tailor the design of decentralized decision making to the sources of poor educational performance and potential threats to school opportunism.
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DelDonno, Sophie R., Aimee James Karstens, Brian Cerny, Leah R. Kling, Lisanne M. Jenkins, Jonathan P. Stange, Robin Nusslock, Stewart A. Shankman, and Scott A. Langenecker. "The Titrated Monetary Incentive Delay Task: Sensitivity, convergent and divergent validity, and neural correlates in an RDoC sample." Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 41, no. 5 (March 26, 2019): 512–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13803395.2019.1585519.
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Massoc, Elsa. "Banks, power, and political institutions: the divergent priorities of European states towards “too-big-to-fail” banks: The cases of competition in retail banking and the banking structural reform." Business and Politics 22, no. 1 (August 22, 2019): 135–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bap.2019.18.
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AbstractThis article examines how two dynamics, one global and one domestic, have interacted to shape the politics of banking in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, European governments were subject to renewed structural incentive to promote TBTF banks: in financialized economies, the growth of these banks is perceived as an essential element of a national economy's global competitiveness. Yet, this incentive was subject to enhanced political contention at home. Factions—often led by actors from within the state itself—have opposed governments’ impetus to promote TBTF banks. The specific identity, preferences and resources of these factions are determined by distinctive political institutions and vary across countries. Through the comparative analysis of banking structural reform and banking competition policies in the UK, France and Germany, I argue that varieties of regulatory outcomes are explained by the differentiated institutional capacity of “anti-TBTF” factions to carry weight in policymaking processes across jurisdictions.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Divergent incentive"
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Miranda, Davi Veiga. "Fatores de decisão em situações de incentivos divergentes: seleção de projetos de eficiência pelas concessionárias de energia elétrica." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8631.
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Normalmente, o processo de tomada de decisão para seleção de um novo projeto considera o retorno financeiro e estratégico por meio de indicadores e métodos diversos. Porém, no caso abordado aqui, há uma situação atípica: uma verba mínima estabelecida, e de uso obrigatório, para implementação de projetos antagônicos aos objetivos da empresa. Por força de lei, todas as concessionárias distribuidoras de energia elétrica no Brasil devem direcionar recursos para projetos de eficiência energética a serem aplicados em seus clientes, ou seja, aqueles que consomem e geram lucro para as empresas. A existência deste tipo de situação não é comum no meio empresarial. Ou seja, enfrentar um processo decisório onde o que se busca são resultados contrários ao objetivo das empresas em questão. Assim, o principal objetivo desta pesquisa é compreender os fatores de decisão em situações de incentivos divergentes. Este trabalho mostra que a existência da situação de incentivo divergente alterou os fatores considerados pelos decisores no processo de tomada de decisões. No lugar de fatores financeiros normalmente adotados em projetos em situação normal e mesmo em projetos de eficiência energética, obtiveram maior importância os fatores diretamente ligados ao sucesso e resultados específicos dos projetos, minimizando a importância de buscar conexão com as diretrizes de governança das organizações.
Normally, the decision-making process for selecting a new project considers the strategic and financial return using multiple indicators and methods. However, in the case discussed here, there is an atypical situation: a minimum amount of obligatory use, for implementation of projects contrary to business objectives. By law, all electricity distribution utilities in Brazil should direct resources to energy efficiency projects to be invested in its customers, those who consume and generate profit for companies. This type of situation is not common on business. That is, a decision process which goal is contrary to the objective of the companies concerned. Thus, the main objective of this research is to understand the decision factors in situations of conflicting incentives. This paper shows that the existence of divergent incentive situation changed the factors considered by decision makers in making decisions. Instead of financial factors normally adopted in projects in normal conditions and energy efficiency projects, the most important factors directly linked specifically to the success and outcomes of projects, minimizing the importance of seeking connection with the governance guidelines of the organizations.
Books on the topic "Divergent incentive"
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Jayne, Thomas S. Cash cropping incentives, food marketing performance, and the divergence between national and household comparative advantage evidence from Zimbabwe. Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe: Dept. of Agricultural Economics and Extension, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zimbabwe, 1992.
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Eibl, Ferdinand. Social Dictatorships. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198834274.001.0001.
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Why have social spending levels and social policy trajectories diverged so drastically across labour-abundant MENA regimes? And how can we explain the persistence of social spending after divergence? This books sets out to answer both questions. Itdevelops a theory about the emergence of authoritarian welfare states, arguing that autocratic leaders need both the incentives and the abilities to distribute welfare for authoritarian welfare states to emerge. The former are shaped by coalition-building dynamics at the onset of regime formation while the latter are conditioned by the external environment. At the level of incentives, broad coalitions emerge in the presence of intra-elite conflict and the absence of salient communal cleavages and, if present jointly, provide a strong incentive for welfare provision. Conversely, a cohesive elite or salient communal divisions entail small coalitions with few incentives to distribute welfare broadly. At the level of abilities, a strong external threat to regime survival is expected to undermine the ability to provide social welfare in broad coalitions. Facing a ‘butter or guns’ trade-off, elites shiflpriority to security expenditures; only fiscal surpluses from an abundant resource endowment can provide the necessary resources to avert this trade-off. To explain the persistence of social policy trajectories, the author relies on two important mechanisms in the welfare state literature: ‘constituency politics’ where beneficiaries of social policies avert deviations from the spending path in the form of systemic reforms or large-scale spending cuts; and spill-over effects to unintended beneficiaries who can become important gatekeepers against path divergence.
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Karakoç, Ekrem. Divergent Paths of Inequality in Turkey and Spain. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826927.003.0005.
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Using most similar design and process-tracing methodology, this chapter investigates the divergent outcomes in income inequality in Turkey and Spain. Even though social-security systems in both countries have been hierarchical, benefiting civil servants, the security apparatus, and workers in key sectors and others in formal sectors at the expense of the rest, they have adopted different social policies over time. This chapter discusses how Turkish governments, with a focus on 1983 to the present time, have designed contributory and noncontributory pensions, healthcare, and other social programs that have affected household income differently. In democratic Spain, however, pension-related policies and unemployment benefits have been dominant forms of social policy, but the Spanish party system has not created major incentives for political parties to utilize these policies in electoral campaigns until recently. This chapter ends with a discussion of how social policies in Turkey and Spain have affected inequality since the two nations transitioned to democracy.
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Sánchez-Jankowski, Martín. Youth Unemployment and the Illicit Economy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190685898.003.0008.
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This chapter focuses on factors that led youth to initially participate in the illicit economy, stay involved, or decide to leave. Part of the cultural landscape that directly applies to employment has changed and will likely continue to change. Presently, there are individuals in both the lower and middle classes who think it is only acceptable to work at a job worthy of their labor. Therefore, it is now considered more acceptable to forgo working and assume the unemployment designation while waiting for the best job fit. This culture shift has expanded to such an extent as to currently allow individuals from divergent income groups the ability to justify their participation in the illicit economy. Ultimately, clear economic incentives pull individuals into this economy, but additional social and psychological factors influence involvement as well.
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Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. A Structural-Institutional Explanation of the Eurozone Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807971.003.0010.
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This chapter presents an argument about the underlying reasons for the persistent economic troubles in the Eurozone based on the two different and divergent growth models in the Eurozone’s member states: the export-oriented, skill-intensive, coordinated model of the northern and continental welfare economies and the demand-driven model with strong public sector unions in southern Europe. The chapter then argues that the interactions between macroeconomic policies and national institutions render policies that are appropriate for southern Europe dysfunctional for northern Europe, and vice versa. Is goes on to discuss different reform scenarios for the Eurozone, emphasizing that all reforms come at a considerable political cost, as the same political-economic institutions that would have to be reformed have strong stakes in the status quo in both political economy models. As there are no political incentives for structural change in either model, crises will persist.
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Adelstein, Richard. To Encourage the Others. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190694272.003.0008.
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This chapter reveals a central feature of liability by showing the divergence of the outcomes of exchange governed by corrective justice from systemically efficient allocation of resources, and discusses the role of norms in liability systems. The modern economic approach to externality is traced to Pigou, whose normative objective of allocating all resources efficiently across an entire system has been almost universally adopted by contemporary economists. When the actual imposition of a liability price is uncertain, Pigou prescribes probability scaling, increasing the liability price imposed on tortfeasors who do pay far beyond the costs of their torts to create incentives for efficient cost imposition in the future, but this is shown to conflict with corrective justice, with the consequence that far more than the systemically efficient number of torts are committed. Deontological norms against cost imposition are illustrated and identified as a practical bulwark of the liability system.
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Bisarya, Sumit, and Thibaut Noel. Constitutional Negotations: Dynamics, Deadlicks and Solutions. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31752/idea.2021.42.
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Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict. Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups. While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.
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Jones, Emily, ed. The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841999.001.0001.
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Why do governments in some developing countries implement international standards, while others do not? Focusing on the politics of bank regulation, this book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Regulatory interdependence is generated by relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions. We explain why it is that some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory politics in the periphery, and the ways in which peripheral governments and firms manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization.
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Peña Dix, Beatriz, Isabel Tejada Sánchez, and Anne-Marie Truscott de Mejía. Interculturalidad y formación de profesores. Perspectivas pedagógicas y multilingües. Universidad de los Andes, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.30778/2019.57.
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Interculturalidad y formación de profesores. Perspectivas pedagógicas y multilingües tiene como objetivo principal revisar el concepto de interculturalidad en espacios de enseñanza-aprendizaje de lenguas extranjeras y segundas. Bajo una óptica diversa y multifocal, esta compilación reúne voces de docentes que le apuestan a la interculturalidad como un escenario natural para el desarrollo de las lenguas. En este proceso se establecen relaciones intencionales entre culturas y se incentiva el diálogo entre ellas a partir del respeto, de la aceptación por la diversidad, del reconocimiento mutuo y de la búsqueda de consensos, pero también de la apreciación de puntos de vista divergentes, lo que permite relaciones sociales más democráticas y armoniosas, coedificadas con las lenguas que se enseñan-aprenden. Este libro, con sus nueve investigaciones —escritas en español, inglés, portugués y francés—, se suma a la discusión nacional e internacional y contribuye a los trabajos colombianos que buscan posicionarse con una voz propia que represente los intereses y las necesidades de la comunidad que se desenvuelve en la enseñanza-aprendizaje de lenguas.
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Vallier, Kevin. Must Politics Be War? Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190632830.001.0001.
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Americans are far less likely to trust their institutions, and one another, than in decades past. This collapse in social and political trust arguably inspires our increasingly ferocious ideological conflicts and hardened partisanship. Many believe that our previously high levels of trust and bipartisanship were a pleasant anomaly and that today we live under the historic norm. For politics itself is nothing more than a struggle for power between groups with irreconcilable aims. Contemporary American politics is war because political life as such is war. This book argues that our shared liberal democratic institutions have the unique capacity to sustain social and political trust between diverse persons. Constitutional rights and democratic governance prevent any one faith or ideology from dominating the rest, and so protect each person’s freedom to live according to her values and principles. Illiberal arrangements, where one group’s faith or ideology reigns, turn those who disagree into unwilling subversives, persons with little reason to trust their regime or to be trustworthy in obeying it. Liberal arrangements, in contrast, incentivize trust and trustworthiness because they protect the conscience of all, and so allow people with diverse and divergent ends to act from conviction. Diverse people become trustworthy because they can all obey the rules of their society without acting against their ideals. A liberal society is thereby one at moral peace with a politics that is not war.
Book chapters on the topic "Divergent incentive"
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Eibl, Ferdinand. "Divergent Paths." In Social Dictatorships, 90–138. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198834274.003.0003.
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The chapter is macro-comparative in nature and examines to what extent the theoretical framework is in line with the historical patterns of authoritarian regime formation. Drawing on historical case accounts, Arabic language secondary liter ature, and autobiographical material written by actors involved in the early elite struggles, the chapter spotlights how intra-elite conflict and communal cleavages shaped elites’ incentives for welfare provision. In addition, the chapter maps out the geostrategic environment in which regime formation took place, highlighting differences in the exposure to external threat and the endowment with resources as key constraining factors on welfare distribution. It does so in the form of comparative narratives of coalition formation and the geostrategic context, and demonstrates how the combination of elite competition, communal cleavages, and the geostrategic context widened or narrowed the authoritarian support coalitions.
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Doner, Richard F., Gregory W. Noble, and John Ravenhill. "Institutions, Politics, and Developmental Divergence." In The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia, 43–92. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197520253.003.0003.
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Variation in automotive industrial performance across seven East Asian countries reflects differences in firm competencies, but those differences are largely cross-national: common national environments are central influences on firms’ incentives to develop competencies. Factors emphasized in neoclassical accounts, such as market size, macroeconomic policy, and openness to foreign investment, are weak predictors of cross-national variation. Extensive development requires measures that facilitate capital mobilization and allocation, such as sector-specific FDI incentives and specialized infrastructure. Successful intensive growth cases are distinguished by effective sectoral institutes for collective training, testing, and research. Three sets of pressures push political leaders to pursue the long-term development of institutions: claims on resources (security threats and domestic pressures for welfare improvement) in the absence of easily accessible resources to satisfy such needs. These arguments are consistent with but go well beyond other prominent approaches to development: national innovation systems, global value chains, and developmental states.
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Jones, Emily. "The Politics of Regulatory Convergence and Divergence." In The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation, 68–102. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841999.003.0003.
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This chapter sets out an analytical framework that explains why regulators in peripheral developing countries respond in different ways to international banking standards. It identifies four factors that generate incentives for convergence on international standards: politicians seeking to integrate their countries into global finance and expand financial services sectors; domestic banks looking to enhance their reputation as they expand into international markets; regulators with strong connections to peer regulators and transnational policy networks; and sustained engagement with the IMF and World Bank. It also identifies four factors that generate incentives for divergence: politicians pursuing interventionist financial policies; politicians and business oligarchs using banks to direct credit to political allies; regulators who are sceptical about the applicability of Basel standards for their local context; and banks with business models focused on the domestic market for whom there are high costs and few benefits. The chapter identifies specific pathways to regulatory convergence and divergence, and salient features of each.
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Colyvas, Jeannette A., and Spiro Maroulis. "Academic Laboratories and the Reproduction of Proprietary Science." In The Emergence of Organizations and Markets. Princeton University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691148670.003.0016.
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This chapter extends previous work analyzing the origins of academic entrepreneurship at Stanford with an agent-based model that simulates the rise and spread of patenting by research faculty, drawing on archival analysis of divergent approaches taken by different lab directors. In so doing, this chapter builds on the formal model of autocatalysis developed in Chapter 3, which enables this chapter to disentangle competing explanations. The results are quite surprising. Incentives or mimicry alone are less likely to account for academic embrace of patenting, whereas preemptive efforts to preserve scientific autonomy do play a large role. The pursuit of safeguards from commercial co-optation by other researchers has the transformative effect of making the emergence of proprietary science more likely.
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"From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism: Divergent Incentives and Economic Reform in Developing Nations." In Federalism and the Market, 17–52. Cambridge University Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511510441.002.
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Waterhouse, Benjamin C. "A Tale of Two Tax Cuts." In Lobbying America. Princeton University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691149165.003.0008.
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This chapter analyzes how the interlocking problems of taxation and the federal budget set the stage for the contentious politics of business in the 1980s. During the Reagan administration, ideological small-government conservatives clashed openly with the heads of manufacturing and other traditional capital-intensive business firms. In spite of their superficial common opposition to Keynesian demand stimulus and organized labor, these disparate groups of conservatives held sharply divergent priorities. Their struggle produced a tale of two tax cuts. One, supported by industrialists, aimed to revitalize manufacturing by providing incentives for investment and savings. The other, an antistatist quest to lower all taxes, garnered greater populist appeal. Although not mutually exclusive—both found a way into Reagan's tax reduction legislation in the summer of 1981—these competing visions marked an emerging schism within the ranks of conservatism.
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Eibl, Ferdinand. "Welfare States in the Middle East and North Africa: Puzzles and Answers." In Social Dictatorships, 1–51. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198834274.003.0001.
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Chapter 1 sets out the main empirical puzzles of the book, which are (i) the early divergence of welfare trajectories in the region and (ii) their long persistence over time. Drawing on literature from authoritarianism studies and political economy, it lays out the theoretical argument explaining this empirical pattern by developing a novel analytical framework focused on elite incentives at the moment of regime formation and geostrategic constraints limiting their abilities to provide welfare. It also outlines the author’s explanation for the persistence of social policies over time and broadly describes the three types of welfare regime in the region. It sbows the limitations of existing theories in explaining this divergence and bigbligbts the book’s contribution to the literature. The theoretical argument is stated in general terms and sbould thus be of relevance to political economy and authoritarianism scholars more broadly. The chapter ends with an outline of the chapters to come.
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Jones, Emily. "Conclusion." In The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation, 351–76. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841999.003.0015.
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This chapter distils key findings from the case studies, highlights areas for further research, and makes a series of policy recommendations. Overall the case studies provide compelling evidence of the powerful reputational, competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that lead regulators to adopt international standards. They also show that some domestic political economy dynamics generate incentives to diverge from international standards, particularly interventionist financial policies, political lending, and regulators sceptical about the appropriateness of international standards for their local context. Our findings speak to wider debates in the literature, including over the agency of actors from peripheral developing countries in the global economy; the importance of policy ideas such as the role of the financial sector, in economic development; and the inner workings of bureaucracies in developing countries. We highlight areas for future research and make policy recommendations on how to reform international standards to better reflect the interests of peripheral developing countries.
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Crawford, Timothy W. "The Theory of Selective Accommodation." In The Power to Divide, 9–25. Cornell University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754715.003.0002.
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This chapter presents a theory of selective accommodation, which comprises two elements. The first, the core theory, contains the general conceptual model of selective accommodation and its basic influence formula — the use of positive incentives (e.g., promises, rewards, and concessions) to create divergent pressures on members or potential members of an opposing alliance. It describes how selective accommodation works (when it works) and suggests conditions under which states are likely to attempt it (initiation conditions). Meanwhile, the second consists of propositions about contingent conditions, and associated mechanisms, conducive to the success or failure of attempts. Like the initiation conditions, these are probabilistic. Combined, these elements offer an overarching framework to explain selective accommodation attempts and outcomes, one that is geared to the priorities of policy-applicable theory. It thus furnishes two kinds of “usable” theoretical insight: (1) a general conceptual model of the strategy of selective accommodation, and (2) generic knowledge about the conditions that favor its success. The chapter then sets up the methods — of structured focus comparison and qualitative analysis — that organize the historical case studies in the following chapters.
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Jones, Emily. "The Puzzle." In The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation, 3–33. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841999.003.0001.
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This chapter sets out the puzzle at the heart of this book: why do governments in many developing countries choose to regulate their banks on the basis of international standards they did not design, and which are costly to implement? Country case studies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America provide compelling evidence of the reputational, competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that lead regulators to adopt international standards. The chapter summarizes the book’s core argument about the channels of regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and periphery of the global financial system, and the conditions under which we find that regulators to converge on, or diverge from, international banking standards.
Reports on the topic "Divergent incentive"
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Eaton, Charlie, Sabrina Howell, and Constantine Yannelis. When Investor Incentives and Consumer Interests Diverge: Private Equity in Higher Education. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24976.
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