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Sayrak, Akin. "Corporate diversification and governance /." Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Salama, Mohamed Feras. "Diversification strategies, financial leverage, and excess value the role of information asymmetry and corporate governance /." To access this resource online via ProQuest Dissertations and Theses @ UTEP, 2008. http://0-proquest.umi.com.lib.utep.edu/login?COPT=REJTPTU0YmImSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=2515.
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Steensma, Ronald. "Do Acquisitions Generate Abnormal Returns? Evidence from the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-357790.
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From 1992 onwards, the market for corporate control has been changing as a consequence of deregulation in the North American and West European electric utility industry. Motivated by the lack of consensus on the value creation of acquisitions in the deregulated electric utility industry, this study is conducted. Based on a three and eleven-day event window, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 714 acquisition announcements between 1997 and 2017 stemming from North American and West European acquirers, it is found that acquisitions generate on average an insignificant CAR of 0.2%. West European bidders generate a significant return of 0.94% which outperforms the average CAR of -0.02% stemming from North American bidders. For the aggregate sample, it is found that geographic diversification strategies do not outperform each other and that industry-focussed deals outperform industry-diversified deals. North American managers should avoid cross-border deals within the North American region because these deals destruct shareholder value. West European managers should engage in geographic or industry-focussed deals because it is shown the stock market believes that these type of acquisitions generate synergies.
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Stagliano, Raffaele. "Corporate governance, corporate diversification and ownership structure." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011TOU10056.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier le rôle que la diversification des entreprises et la structure de propriété jouent dans le processus de création de valeur. Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à une revue de littérature portant sur les travaux théoriques et empiriques qui analysent l’impact de la structure d’actionnariat et de la diversification des entreprises sur leur valeur de marché. Le troisième chapitre approfondit l'analyse de la diversification des entreprises en étudiant l'effet d'interaction entre diversification des produits et diversification internationale. Ce chapitre considère la relation entre diversification et structure du capital sur un échantillon d’entreprises manufacturières italiennes. Nos conclusions nous permettent de soutenir que cet effet d’interaction a un impact négatif sur la capacité d'endettement. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre étudie l'impact d’une structure d’actionnaires multiples sur la prise de risque des entreprises. L’analyse est menée sur les firmes cotées sur le marché financier américain. La plupart des études antérieures sur la structure de propriété se concentre sur les différences entre les entreprises avec au moins un actionnaire de référence par rapport aux entreprises à l’actionnariat éparpillé, sans tenir compte de l'effet potentiel de l'existence de multiples détenteurs de blocs d’actions sur la volatilité et la performance des titres boursiers. Nous montrons que les détenteurs de blocs jouent un rôle important dans l'atténuation des conflits d'intérêts entre actionnaire majoritaire et actionnaires minoritaires<br>The purpose of this thesis is to examine how corporate diversification and ownership structure affect value creation for firms. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant theoretical models in the field of corporate finance. The chapter also summarizes the empirical results found regarding the relationship between corporate diversification, ownership concentration and the firm’s value. In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis of corporate diversification and consider the effects of the interaction of both product and international diversification on a firm. Empirically, this chapter considers the impact of diversification decisions on the capital structure for a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We find that the interaction of both international and product diversification has a negative impact on debt capacity. Finally, in Chapter 4, we empirically examine the impact of complex ownership structures on the risk choices of U.S. firms. Most previous studies on ownership structure focus on the differences between firms with at least one blockholder and widely held firms, without considering the potential effect that the existence of other blockholders might have on the financial variables. We find that the blockholders with intermediate holdings play a mitigating role in the conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder and the minority shareholders
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Patrisia, Dina. "The relationship between corporate diversification, corporate governance and corporate social performance in Indonesian companies." Thesis, University of Huddersfield, 2016. http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/32622/.
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The effect of corporate diversification on behaviour of business towards stakeholder demands and social concerns has been overlook, especially in product diversification both related and unrelated diversification. This study investigates the relationship between corporate diversification (CD) (i.e. related, unrelated and international diversification) and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) in Indonesian listed companies. It explores the moderating effect of corporate governance (CG) (e.g. independent commissioner and ownership concentration) on the correlation between corporate diversification and CSP. This study takes 203 listed companies from the Indonesian Stock Exchange as the sample. It applied company annual report, Indonesian Capital Market Directory and Osiris database as sourced of data. Moreover, content analysis based on 80 indicators of Global Report Initiative is used to measure CSP, while multiple regression with one-year lag dependent variables is used as the primary data analysis. The result of multi regression analysis shows that related and unrelated diversification produced different outcomes whereby related diversification is negatively correlated with CSP. Unrelated diversification, conversely, reveals a positive relationship with CSP. Moreover, unrelated diversification is more positively correlated to CSP than the related CD, while international diversification also has a positive relationship with CSP. Furthermore, an independent commissioner could strengthen the CD-CSP relationship with regards to unrelated and international diversification. Conversely, ownership concentration could weaken the CD and CSP relationship for related diversification. In conclusion, this study contributes to theoretical development (i.e. it explains the link between product diversification, international diversification and CSP in emerging economies setting. It extends previous studies by considering the role of CG as a moderator, and uses content analysis based on GRI indicators in measuring CSP). Additionally, it has managerial implications, including a manager needs to consider CD and carefully manage the demands of an extensive range of stakeholders to increase CSP. Second, in order to maximise the impact of corporate diversification strategy on CSP, a manager has to think sensibly, based on the CG dimensions in the company, such as the number of independent commissioners and ownership concentration. Third, this study provides input to managers who run their businesses in emerging economies that have some differences with developed economies, for instance local rules, regulations and governmental control. Fourth, it also has an impact on the economy of Indonesia. For example, the government should establish regulations suitable for several types of industry and encourage the listed companies to implement good CG. Finally, limitations and further research directions are discussed.
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Mackey, Tyson Brighton. "Essays on corporate diversification and firm value." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1148177870.
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Bassey, David Nkata. "Corporate Governance Implementation in the Nigerian Banking Industry." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5676.
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The increasing level of fraud, the collapse of banks, and the loss of confidence in the Nigerian banking industry have been attributed to poor corporate governance. The problem of this study was effective implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria where multiple regulations are in place. The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to understand how corporate governance is implemented in the Nigerian banking industry in the face of a multiplicity of regulations. The research question investigated how Nigerian bank managers implement corporate governance regulations in the face of a multiplicity of regulations. The conceptual framework was grounded in stewardship theory. Data collection included document analysis and face-to-face semistructured interviews to gain an understanding of how to implement corporate governance based on the perception of 15 purposefully selected senior managers and directors of the host bank. Data were analyzed using Yin's 5-Stage data analysis approach. Findings revealed that the involvement of senior bank managers and the adoption of global best practices, training, education, and awareness creation are the prerequisites for effective implementation of corporate governance. Findings may be used to reduce corporate failure, improve compliance, and restore confidence in the banking industry through enhancing the understanding of practitioners, investors, and policymakers on how to implement corporate governance in a highly regulated banking environment and contribute to positive social change.
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Akande, Oyebola Bejide. "Corporate Governance Issues in the Nigerian Banking Industry." ScholarWorks, 2016. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/2467.
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Corporate governance issues resulting from bad governance, fraudulent activities, insider abuse, and corruption have attracted the attention of shareholders and regulators in the banking industry. The financial crisis that erupted from the United States affected the financial institutions of both developed and developing countries, among which Nigerian banks belong. The Central Bank of Nigeria removed 8 managing directors and executive directors due to bad governance, nonperforming loans of 61%, and toxic assets of $13.3 billion; the Central Bank injected 620 billion naira into the banks. The purpose of this multiple case study was to develop an understanding of corporate governance strategies needed to ensure regulatory compliance and enhance financial performance from the perspective of senior management of the regulatory authority and corporate financial leaders. Agency theory served as the conceptual framework for the study. The population for this study was10 senior regulatory leaders and corporate financial leaders in Nigeria. The data sources were semistructured interviews, research notes, codes of corporate governance, and financial reports of banks. Member checking was used to improve the credibility and trustworthiness of the data. After compiling, disassembling, reassembling, and coding the data, 5 themes including the need for: improvement on compliance to corporate governance regulations; effective board governance; training education and awareness on best practices, strategic risk management and internal control; and strategic and effective leadership. Potential implications for social change may include knowledge for investors and the public, who have increasingly relied on financial services in Nigeria to support personal and business goals to identify banks with best practices.
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Walters, Geoff. "Corporate governance in the football industry : a stakeholder analysis." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.499055.
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Li, Yuan. "Three essays on corporate governance in the hospitality industry." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103228.
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The hospitality industry, with its dynamic business environment, has experienced unprecedented disruption and reconfiguration due to the emergence and success of sharing economy firms and online travel agencies. This turbulence calls for effective governance structures that can motivate managers to act in their shareholders' best interests. Despite the importance of effective corporate governance for firm performance and the topic receiving extensive scholarly attention in the management and finance literatures, there seem to be several gaps and mixed findings in the hospitality academic field.
To facilitate scholarly advancement, identify gaps in the current knowledge base, and provide direction for future research, in the first essay I undertake a systematic review of research on corporate governance in the hospitality literature. Based on 115 peer-reviewed articles published since 1961, I identify 21 themes explored by scholars, and find that topics related to institutional ownership, executive compensation determinants, board size, and merger and acquisition (MandA) outcomes are commonly examined, whereas topics related to family ownership, debt, and regulation/law are seldom explored. This review contributes to the literature by taking stock of what we know and offering a one-stop-shop for scholars to understand and extend corporate governance literature published in the hospitality field.
While evidence in the general business literature suggests that targets, instead of acquirers, are better off after the acquisition, limited studies in the hospitality industry have shown that both bidders and targets are better off after the merger, suggesting that MandAs are more successful in the hospitality industry than in other industries. In the second essay, I empirically examine whether this is indeed the case and what may explain the potential discrepancy in merger performance. Using a comparative study design and a comprehensive sample over 41 years, I find that overall acquirers gain from MandAs, and hospitality MandAs outperform non-hospitality MandAs. Bidders in the hospitality industry are more likely than non-hospitality bidders to acquire large, related targets, using an all-cash mode of payment. Except for industry relatedness, relative size, cash payment, and unlisted target are all positively related to merger performance. This study contributes to the literature by identifying several factors that can explain the differences in MandA performance between hospitality and non-hospitality firms.
Despite the fact that MandAs are frequently pursued as a growth strategy in the hospitality industry, their effect on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has not been systematically examined. Considering that CEO compensation is an important topic related to firm performance, management, and social responsibility, in the third essay I examine the relationship between MandAs and CEO compensation in a sample of hospitality firms consisting of 1,514 firm-year observations over a period of 27 years. The regression analyses find that CEO compensation is significantly higher in the year after large acquisitions; well-governed firms identified via tenure, the Entrenchment-index, and board independence pay their CEOs higher post-acquisition than poorly-governed firms; the fraction of equity-based compensation is unrelated to MandA propensity; and the fraction of cash-based compensation is negatively related to MandA propensity. The additional analyses indicate that CEOs are rewarded for positive stock returns but not penalized for negative stock returns, and even more so in well-governed firms after acquisition. This study finds that MandAs and corporate governance are determinants of CEO compensation and the form of CEO compensation matters to acquisition decisions in hospitality firms. The findings are of importance for shareholders and the board of directors to design compensation plans that align the interests of managers and shareholders.<br>Doctor of Philosophy<br>The hospitality industry, with its dynamic business environment, has experienced unprecedented disruption and reconfiguration due to the emergence and success of sharing economy firms and online travel agencies. This turbulence calls for effective governance structures that can motivate managers to act in their shareholders' best interests. Despite the importance of effective corporate governance for firm performance and the topic receiving extensive scholarly attention in the management and finance literatures, there seem to be several gaps and mixed findings in the hospitality academic field.
To facilitate scholarly advancement, identify gaps in the current knowledge base, and provide direction for future research, in the first essay I undertake a systematic review of research on corporate governance in the hospitality literature, and find that topics related to institutional ownership, executive compensation determinants, board size, and merger and acquisition (MandA) outcomes are commonly examined, whereas topics related to family ownership, debt, and regulation/law are seldom explored. This review contributes to the literature by taking stock of what we know and offering a one-stop-shop for scholars to understand and extend corporate governance literature published in the hospitality field.
In the second essay, I empirically examine whether MandAs are more successful in the hospitality industry than in other industries and what may explain the potential discrepancy in merger performance. I find that overall acquirers gain from MandAs, and hospitality MandAs outperform non-hospitality MandAs. Bidders in the hospitality industry are more likely than non-hospitality bidders to acquire large, related targets, using an all-cash mode of payment. Except for industry relatedness, relative size, cash payment, and unlisted target are all positively related to merger performance. This study contributes to the literature by identifying several factors that can explain the differences in MandA performance between hospitality and non-hospitality firms.
In the third essay I examine the relationship between MandAs and CEO compensation in a sample of hospitality firms, and find that CEO compensation is significantly higher in the year after large acquisitions; well-governed firms identified via tenure, the Entrenchment-index, and board independence pay their CEOs higher post-acquisition than poorly-governed firms; the fraction of equity-based compensation is unrelated to MandA propensity; and the fraction of cash-based compensation is negatively related to MandA propensity. The additional analyses indicate that CEOs are rewarded for positive stock returns but not penalized for negative stock returns, and even more so in well-governed firms after acquisition. This study finds that MandAs and corporate governance are determinants of CEO compensation and the form of CEO compensation matters to acquisition decisions in hospitality firms. The findings are of importance for shareholders and the board of directors to design compensation plans that align the interests of managers and shareholders.
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Higgs, Roger. "Redefining relatedness in corporate acquisitions and mergers: an alternate view for managing corporate diversification." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38632.
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This dissertation proposes an alternative perspective for studying the relationship between corporate performance and diversification. Extensive research into the relationship between diversification and economic performance has been conducted using two different perspectives. One perspective, pursued mainly by industrial organization economists, examined the effect that a firm's level (or degree) of diversity had on its performance. A second perspective, utilized by strategic management researchers, uses Rumelt's (1974) notion of product-market relatedness to explain performance differences among diversified firms. Rumelt (1974) hypothesized that firms which diversify into areas related to the original business by either products or markets would financially outperform those firms that diversify into areas unrelated (in a product or market sense) to the original business.
Blackburn and Shrader (1990, pg. 1) argue that "a consensus seems to be forming that related corporate acquisitions are superior to unrelated acquisitions." This consensus view is not without its critics, however. Other research results (e.g. Barton, 1988) suggest that unrelated acquisitions need not produce inferior performance. This debate suggests that further research into the nature of the relationship between corporate diversification and its financial performance may be productive, especially if new ways of examining it can be devised.
An alternative perspective for studying the relationship between corporate performance and diversification is proposed. Other dimensions of relatedness, such as the strategic similarity between a corporation's business units, may provide alternative means of defining relatedness. It will be argued that a redefinition of relatedness will prove valuable in expanding our ability to predict the effect corporate diversification strategy has on corporate performance.<br>Ph. D.
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Emm, Ekaterina E. "Efficiency Implications of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Micro Data." restricted, 2005. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-12172005-172429/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005.<br>Title from title screen. Jayant R. Kale, committee chair; Richard D. Phillips, Martin F. Grace, James E. Owers, committee members. Electronic text (98 p. : charts (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed June 7, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-75).
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Isa-Dutse, Mahmoud Mohammed. "Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Banking Industry : An Empirical Investigation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.509064.
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Nilsson, Mattias. "Essays in empirical corporate finance and governance." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-587.
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Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, but that the decrease in firm value is significantly larger for firms with family CMSs than for firms with financial institutions or corporations in control. This indicates that the agency costs of family CMSs are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners.Family Ownership, Control Considerations, and Corporate Financing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis analyzes the relation between concentrated family control and firms’ choice of capital structure for a panel of Swedish listed firms. The results suggest that the capital structure choices made by firms with families in control are influenced by the controlling families’ desire to protect their control, and that the resulting capital structures are likely to increase the agency costs of family control. The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) analyzes the determinants of the choice between rights offerings and private equity placements using a sample of rights offerings and private placements made by listed Swedish firms. The results indicate that control considerations explain why firms make uninsured rights offerings. The evidence also suggest that private placements, and to some extent underwritten rights offerings, are made by potentially undervalued firms in order to overcome underinvestment problems resulting from asymmetric information about firm value. Furthermore, private placements are frequently made in conjunction with the establishment of a product market relationship between purchaser and seller, which is consistent with equity ownership reducing contracting costs in new product market relationships. Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist and Peter Högfeldt) studies diversification within the real estate industry, in which firms can diversify over property types and geographical regions. Similar to previous studies, this essay documents the existence of a diversification discount. However, the major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue non-focusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, and are predominantly family controlled. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs. The Difference in Acquirer Returns between Takeovers of Public Targets and Takeovers of Private Targets shows, for a sample of Swedish takeovers, that the average acquirer abnormal return is positive and significant when the target firm is privately held but insignificant when the target firm is listed on a stock exchange. These results are robust when controlling for sample selection problems and other variables capable of explaining acquirer returns. The evidence is consistent with greater acquirer bargaining power and resolution of information asymmetries in takeovers of private targets.<br>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002
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OSullivan, Jennifer. "Corporate Governance, Performance and Risk-Taking in the U.S. Banking Industry." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2012. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1521.
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In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin’s Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net charge-offs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive effect on firm performance. We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics changed during the crisis. Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. Further, we find that board structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis.
We next examine the relationship between risk-taking of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-taking including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk. We also use three market based proxies for bank risk including market beta, idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation of its stock return. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board reduces both balance sheet and market risk. We further investigate the relationships between risk-taking and board characteristics changed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We find that our results are robust during the crisis.
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Walker, Andress. "Corporate Governance Strategies to Improve Organizational Performance in the Accounting Industry." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5806.
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Corporate governance is a leading factor in organizational performance, financial reporting, and stakeholder satisfaction. The purpose of this multiple case study was to explore strategies that senior managers in the accounting industry implement to enforce corporate governance and improve organizational performance. The conceptual framework for the study was stakeholder theory. The population for this study included 3 senior managers of 3 different organizations in the accounting industry located in western United States. Data were collected through semistructured face-to-face interviews and from review of documented corporate governance strategies. The data analysis consisted of the following steps: compiling the data, disassembling the data, reassembling the data, interpreting the data, and drawing conclusions. Three themes emerged from this study: corporate governance, laws, rules, and regulations; the role of corporate governance in organizational performance; and effective corporate governance strategies. The results of this study may contribute to social change by improving the quality of employees' work lives. With improved quality of employee work life, employers may benefit from higher productivity, and consumers may experience improved services.
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Lopes, Teresa da Silva. "The growth and survival of multinationals in the global alcoholic beverages industry." Thesis, University of Reading, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.250606.
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Khalid, Sharif Mahmud. "Corporate governance in the Ghanaian mining industry : stakeholder perspectives on accountability, transparency and corporate social responsibility." Thesis, University of Reading, 2016. http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/69959/.
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Corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have remained hotly debated subjects since their emergence. Evidence from these debates points to no apparent end in sight in the ongoing sustainability agenda. This research aims to augment the debate by filling existing gaps in research such as site-specific geographical social, environmental and ethical reporting of Ghana‘s high impact mining industry. The research seeks to analyse interviews to assess engagements between stakeholders and multinational mining firms in the context of appreciating accountability and transparency. It is difficult to deny that there has been a modest surge in the field of mainstream social and environmental accounting in the last three decades or so, and it is still considered a growing domain within accounting research. Social and environmental accounting is seen here as a vehicle to reveal intertwined corporate and social events aimed at liberating and guiding society towards a just, accountable, transparent and sustainable pathway. This research applies Habermas‘ theory of communicative action and postcolonial theory in the critical examination of the practice of CG and CSR. Through qualitative content analysis of corporate annual/integrated reports of multinational mining firms with operations in Ghana and analysis of interviews with stakeholders of the mining industry, the research reveals colonised features of the industry by multinational firms and in extreme cases racial issues. These issues represent obstacles to the attainment of accountability and transparency between firms and their stakeholders. The thesis proposes a corporate accountability framework reminiscent of indigenous local and international best practices towards a more stakeholder-centric model of multinational corporate accountability and transparency in the ‗Third-world‘.
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Rydland, Christoffer. "Aspects of Cooperation and Corporate Governance in the Swedish Regional Newspaper Industry." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institutionen för Marknadsföring och strategi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-2098.
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The Swedish newspaper industry was for many years characterized by geographically separated markets. This allowed for open discussions and learning. In addition, economic objectives were often not expressed by the owners of the newspaper companies. This dissertation analyzes two organizations which mirrored these distinctive traits of the industry. The Lindesberg Group (1956-2008) was a secretive group of CEOs. It is described how this group started in a time of crisis to share experiences, how it developed an intricate system of benchmarking, but later transformed into an exclusive personal network with a reputation of power and influence in the media industry. Centertidningar AB (1973-2005) was a group of newspapers owned by the Centre Party. The newspapers were originally acquired to promote a political message, but they soon turned into a profit generator. This dissertation shows that the orientation for profit came from the managers rather than from the owner, and how the managers took complete control from the politicians but made the Party rich. Comparisons to other organizational forms are made, such as the open price associations. Theories of interfirm cooperation and corporate governance are used. An inverse relation between hierarchical integration and open discussions is found. It is shown that many board functions can be replicated by managers. The dissertation is of interest to scholars in business history, media economics, governance, accounting, and organization studies. Christoffer Rydland is a researcher at the Department of Marketing and Strategy (MaST) and EHFF at the Stockholm School of Economics. He is also the illustrator of the cover. A seabird, standing on a small stone, represents the leader's loneliness in the hierarchy. A sea mark on the horizon represents his search for navigation. (Lake Siljan, Midsummer 2009.)<br><p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2013</p>
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Cheng), DJ Cheng (. Also known as Tao Yu, and 鄭道有. "The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Diversification Strategy- A Research on Taiwan Electronic Industry." Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84055384354721170080.
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碩士<br>長庚大學<br>管理學研究所<br>88<br>There are several electronic firms in Taiwan whose products are recently awarded with global recognition. For instance, Acer, Delta, Inventec, Mitac, TSMC, and UMC..etc., are some of the best and leading firms given high credits and regards. Those firms take initiatives to have continuous improvements in product competitiveness, quality enhancement and delivery improvements. From evidence, they do have something in common in areas of strategy development, organization synergy, and operation flexibility. Corporate governance is very important to those firms to undergo diversification. From local perspective, however, grounded analysis associated with corporate governance for Taiwan electronic industry is very limited. Therefore, this drives author's high interests to study what the management composition, board control, and investment mechanism for those top-notch firms are.
This paper reviews field data to verify the relationship between corporate governance and level of diversification with a sample of forty-two electronic firms of Taiwan in 1996. More institutional investors and more external investments by the firm are characterized by this study. In addition, this study also provides suggestions for future research .
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Sun, Libo. "Two essays on the corporate governance for real estate investment trusts (REITs)." Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2969.
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Kim, Hicheon. "The effects of governance systems on strategy and performance among large Japanese firms a comparison of keiretsu versus independent firms /." 1995. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/38187326.html.
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Chen, Ying-Yu, and 陳瀅宇. "A Research of Relationship among Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Information Transparency and Announcement of Diversification-An Empirical Study of Electrical Industry in Taiwan." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84077010951407784330.
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碩士<br>大葉大學<br>會計資訊學系碩士班<br>94<br>The electronics industry in Taiwan falls into decay due to rapid development of technology. Long-term investment of enterprises is increasing obviously on the amount of money or the ratio of investment, so diversification is real something that matters. In the past few days, Corporate Governance Mechanisms has been a talking-point domestically or overseas. Board of Directors is the top Support Decision System in a corporation but often takes advantage of corporation resources and damages minor shareholders’ rights and interests without considering public interests. For this reason, Information Transparency has become a channel for minor shareholders to catch on to what is happening in corporation.
This study adopts the samplings from listed electronics industry in 2004. Getting rid of the invalid samplings, 298 corporations are elected. SEM(Structural Equation Modeling)is employed to do the analysis. The empirical results are summarized as follows:
1.Attributes of Board of Directors has no effect on Announcement of Diversification.
2.Information Transparency has positive effect on Announcement of Diversification.
3.Board structure has negative effect on Information Transparency.
4.With intermediary Information Transparency, Board structure has negative effect on Announcement of Diversification.
5.provide the relative information for the government in its decision making.
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Lai, Wei-Ting, and 賴威廷. "Corporate Diversification, Agency Cost and Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98520293667703316438.
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碩士<br>東海大學<br>企業管理學系碩士班<br>92<br>This study discusses the relationship between corporate diversification, agency cost and corporate governance. First, we examine the effect of diversification type to excess value using Berger & Ofek(1995) procedure and return of asset. To make sure that diversification will result in average valuation discounts. Further, we analyze whether agency cost causes a diversification discount or not. Third, we investigate whether corporate governance structure is different between non-diversified and diversified firms. Finally, we also examine whether diversified firms improve their corporate governance structure solve the situation of value discount or not.
Using a sample of 2560 firm-years between 1994 and 2002, we explore that segment diversification will decrease business value, but geography diversification will increase business value. Further, we find evidence to support that segment diversified firms have more serious agency problem including agency cost of cash flow, managerial incentive, and debt. In addition to, we also use ownership structure and rating system to measure firm’s corporate governance structure. In ownership structure, we find that relative to non-diversified firm, CEOs, block holders, and board of directors in diversified firms have lower stock ownership. Finally, in rating system side we explore that diversified firm enjoys lower corporate governance’s rating. Moreover, we find out that diversified firms can improve business value by corporate governance.
In conclusion, we explore that agency costs and downgrading corporate governance will cause diversified discount. Moreover, we also find that diversified firm urgently requires upgrade of corporate governance to improve this situation.
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Lee, Fang-Wei, and 李芳瑋. "Diversification, Corporate Governance and Bank Performance." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84613444954395430690.
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碩士<br>國立高雄大學<br>金融管理學系碩士班<br>99<br>This paper examines the linkage between diversification and bank performance under different corporate governance circumstances. Our study focuses on listed commercial banks, cooperative banks, savings banks and bank holding companies around the world from 2004 to 2009. Our sample contains 1,162 banks and 4,735 observations in 104 countries.
Our main conclusion is that asset diversity doesn’t significantly increase bank performance. Oppositely, banks should concentrate their assets on loans and other earning assets, instead of spreading into fixed assets and non-earning assets. Asset concentration on loans and earning assets can effectively benefit bank on risk adjusted performance. The results of bank revenue diversity show significant diversification premium even though non-interest income increases bank risk.
Taking internal corporate governance into consideration, we find that when the bank with concentrated ownership structure, controlling shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders’ benefit by increasing the degree of asset diversification, especially by increasing the loan and other earning assets. This result supports the entrenchment effect of Haw et al. (2010). After controlling internal and external corporate governance, we also find that higher product market competition, official supervisory power and activities restriction, can be as effective external monitoring mechanisms to reduce the entrenchment effect of concentrated control. Overall, corporate governance issue plays an important role on bank performance.
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張媛婷. "Diversification, Corporate Governance, and Financial Distress." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/23736833137956227029.
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碩士<br>國立政治大學<br>會計研究所<br>95<br>This study employs discrete-time hazard model to investigate how the distress-diversification sensitivity is moderated depending on the level of corporate governance in nested models which sequentially incorporate diversification and then corporate governance as a moderator. The findings show that diversification reduces the possibility of financial distress while corporate governance moderates the diversification effect on financial distress.
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LAI, WEN-SHIOU, and 賴玟秀. "Corporate Governance and Business Group Strategy of Corporate Diversification." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gmc5g3.
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碩士<br>國立中正大學<br>會計與資訊科技研究所<br>106<br>The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether the quality of the corporate governance mechanism will have a significant impact on the group's diversification strategy. Therefore, four corporate governance variables are included: CV, INST, BOARD and DUAL, and two indicators of industrial relevance: the vertical correlation and complementarity proposed by Fan and Lang (2000) as a measure of the degree of enterprise diversification strategy. This study takes the group companies listed above from 2002 to 2016 as a research sample.
Empirical results showe that the higher the deviation of the equity of the group companies. It implies that the more serious the agency problem, the more diversified the strategy will be adopted. While the proportion of institutional investors in a group enterprise is higher, the stronger the supervision power, the management will not adopt a diversification strategy; the size of the board of directors of the group and the diversification strategy also showed a significant negative relationship; in the case of the chairman is the same as the general manager that is a positive relationship with the diversification strategy, but it is not significant statistically. The study suggests that it may dilute its significance because of the checks and balances of both positive and negative forces.
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Chi, Ting-chu, and 姬亭竹. "Corporate Governance and Diversification: The Agency Theory." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05614484755452015249.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>國際企業研究所碩博士班<br>95<br>Diversification is becoming a trend these days. Investigating the relationship between diversification and firm’s performance over 2001-2005, this paper indicates that diversification impairs firm value. We would like to know why management pursues this value reduction strategy, especially focusing on the agency cost theory. From the empirical evidence, we find the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the proportion of outside directors. Besides, there exists no relationship between CEO duality and the magnitude of corporate diversification. Holding double positions of board of directors and CEO has no significant influence on firm’s diversification strategy. In conclusion, these findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining diversification. Finally, the study reveals that CEO’s compensation will increase as the level of diversification increases because of CEO entrenchment and ability matching.
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Lin, Nan-ching, and 林楠慶. "Corporate Governance and Diversification Discount：Evidence from Taiwan." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38961860422717456195.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>96<br>This study investigates how diversification strategies and corporate governance mechanism affect firm value. After collecting the industrial and financial information of listed companies in Taiwan, we obtain a totally 12-year data over the period during 1995 to 2006. With the help of Standard Industrial Classification System of the Republic of China (CSIC) and our sample selection rules, we complete the necessary database. Therefore, we base on the fundamental of agency cost, trying to analyze the relationship among diversification strategies, corporate governance and firm value during the period over 12 years.
This study applies descriptive statistics, t tests for mean, Wilcoxon tests for median and multiple regression analysis when we investigates the re-lationship among diversification strategies, corporate governance and the firm value. The mainly empirical evidences are as follows:
1.The more diversified the firm is, the higher value the firm is.
We find that single-segment firms are always discount on firm value but multi-segment firms are always premium on firm value. This means diver-sification has value-enhancing effect.
2.Carrying out corporate governance effectively, it will reduce the cost caused by the agency problem and increase firm value.
After empirical study, single-segment firms have the phenomenon of value discount. When the cash flow rights increases the discount will decrease; but when the separation of voting right and cash flow rights increases the discount will aggravate. In contrast with multi-segment firms, multi-segment firms have value premium. When the cash flow rights increases the premium will also increase; but when the separation of voting right and cash flow rights increases the premium will decrease.
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Chen, YI-Chen, and 陳儀蓁. "Diversification and Firm Value－ A Corporate Governance Perspective." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88a2v7.
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碩士<br>國立臺中科技大學<br>企業管理系碩士班<br>106<br>Business model diversification has been a persistent topic of concern for the government, industry, and academia. Diversification refers to a firm’s expansion of its services to other fields to seek possibilities for development or synergistic benefits. However, despite these advantages, some aspects of diversification remain dubious. For instance, in the diversification process, firms may disperse resources or overinvest, which impedes operational performance. Therefore, this study further examines whether diversification can increase corporate value. This study assumes that the supervisory function of corporate governance can assist firms in reaching more favorable investment decisions. Thus, the relationship between diversification and corporate value is examined from the perspective of corporate governance. Additionally, because conglomerates may be presented with more incentives for diversification, additional testing for conglomerates is performed in this study. The empirical results indicate that diversification cannot significantly explain corporate value without considerations of corporate governance. After corporate governance is factored into analysis, the relationship between diversification and corporate value changes; under favorable corporate governance, diversification facilitates an increase in corporate value. Finally, this study also reveals that when a firm is a conglomerate, corporate governance is an even more critical factor in determining the relationship between diversification and corporate value.
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Lin, Chia-Chi, and 林家齊. "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Business Diversification." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30709655848445440203.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>會計學系碩博士班<br>93<br>Diversification becomes more and more popular in market. Although that not every diverse firm gets the benefit from it. According to the explanation by agency theory, we intend to examine the impacts of corporate governance on the magnitude of diversification. We want to know what kind of governance structure would enhance the magnitude of diversification. Our result shows that CEO option grants and the structure of board of directors are significantly related to the magnitude of business diversification. In addition, the sensitivity of diversification to explanatory variables is further examined. The change of CEO option grants and cash compensation would increase the change of diversification. Finally, we would like to discuss the influence of economic changes on the business diversification. We have examined the sensitivity of diversification to the explanatory variables for the samples before year 2000 and after year 2000. The impact of governance variables on the change of diversification is different between the two groups of samples.
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Lai, Hsueh-Chin, and 賴學勤. "Diversification, Corporate Governance, and Firm’s Earnings Forecast Error." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72921327767942056406.
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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>財務金融學研究所<br>103<br>Recent evidence on the relationship between diversification and information asymmetry is mixed. Some studies document positive association, while others show insignificant results. Also, studies have demonstrated that worse information asymmetry results from poor governance. Empirically, diversification also results in poor corporate governance. By combining the above ideas and using analyst earnings forecast errors, I investigate how diversification and corporate governance would affect analyst earnings forecast error when taking them into consideration at the same time. I find that diversification is not a main driver of information asymmetry while corporate governance is. The empirical results also show that board holding and CEO duality has positive relationship with analyst earnings forecast error. Institutional shareholding is negatively associated with analyst earnings forecast error.
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Lin, Pei-Hua, and 林蓓華. "Does Better Corporate Governance Portfolio Provide Better Diversification Benefits？." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08699314576687241092.
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碩士<br>國立交通大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>96<br>Previous researches indicate that the firms with few antitakeover provisions will have better firm value, stock return, and operating performance. The hedge portfolio that long a better corporate governance portfolio and short a worse corporate governance portfolio generates the abnormal return of 8.5% per year during the 1990 to 1999 (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Firms with fewer antitakeover provisions decrease the asymmetric information to the investors. The market quickly reflects the information and adjusts the stock price to equilibrium. Thus, better corporate governance has higher idiosyncratic risk. We can reduce the portfolio risk by included the well-governed portfolio.
We assume that the international investors have already hold country funds or country equity market indices. And discuss the influence of different corporate governance on original asset. Our empirical results indicate that we can gain the diversification benefits from adding the U.S assets, but better corporate governance cannot provide more diversification benefits than worse corporate governance portfolio.
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Wang, Yu, and 王于. "The Relationship among Corporate Governance, Diversification and Financial Distress." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/45968788028161488380.
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碩士<br>銘傳大學<br>企業管理學系碩士在職專班<br>99<br>Although Taiwan’s current laws and regulations on the listed and OTC companies are more comprehensive and rigorous, financial distresses due to manager’s decision-making still occur recently. The main reason probably is because of failure of corporate governance mechanisms. Besides, while facing the shock of globalization and liberalization, firms must seek diversification to expand business fields and pursue sustenance. That also increases the chance of financial distress. The objective of this study is to investigate the possible key factors of corporate governance and diversification strategy and to analyze relationships with financial distress.
The sample consists of 103 financial-distress listed and OTC companies from 2004 to 2009 with 206 normal companies. The binary logistic regression is employed to investigate the relations mentioned above. The empirical results are as follows. Firstly, in terms of corporate-governance related variables, both of shareholding percentages of the director and the institutional investors are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of financial distress. The variables of the pledged share of directors and supervisors, dual appointment of board chairman and CEO, and financial report reedit have significantly positive correlation with the probability of financial distress. Secondly, with respect to diversification-related variables, industrial diversification and the degree of diversification have significantly positive correlation with the probability of financial distress.
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Hsieh, Yi-chun, and 謝宜君. "Corporate Governance, Degree of International Diversification, and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08314105436857696111.
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碩士<br>靜宜大學<br>國際企業學系研究所<br>99<br>In recent years, because of the emergence of globalization, and intense competition among enterprises, diversification strategy is very important for firms to growth. This research aims to investigate how corporate governance influences the diversification strategy, and to study the moderating effects of firm performance on the relationship between managers and diversification decisions. We use multiple regression model to test the proposed hypotheses and the result showed that the variables of the outside ratio and managerial stock ownership would have directly influence on the degree of international diversification. Performance has a significant moderating effects on the relationship between the outside ratio, managerial stock ownership and the degree of international diversification.
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Yu-ShiangHuang and 黃郁翔. "Geographic Diversification, Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity Capital." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76183915899245926339.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>103<br>This study mainly examines the effect of geographic diversification and corporate governance on firm’s cost of equity capital. We use the data of global corporations across over 33 countries from 2002 through 2012, and firm samples are classified into those from the United States, Japan and other countries. The results show regardless of country, increases in geographic diversification increases firm cost of equity capital, while the better the corporate governance, the lower the cost of equity capital. Therefore, this study further examines the interaction effect of geographic diversification and corporate governance on firm cost of equity capital. The results show that the interaction effect is inconsistent in every country. We find the cost of equity capital to decrease in Japan and to increase in United States. One specific explanation for this result is because both the organization and scale of United States multinational firms are larger and more complex, this may result in large coordination costs between corporate policies and monitoring costs when diversifying overseas, thereby increasing firm cost of equity capital.
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Tao, Lin Chun, and 林春桃. "The Relationship among earnings quality, corporate governance and diversification discount." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40879359360039173033.
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碩士<br>輔仁大學<br>會計學系碩士班<br>95<br>The thesis examines the relationship among earnings quality, corporate governance strength and diversification discount. I use the concept of excess value, first develop by Berger and Ofek (1995) to measure the diversification discount and use the accrual quality metric develop by Ball and Shivakumar (2006) to proxy for earnings quality. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the -counter companies in Taiwan from 2000 to 2005. The empirical results are summarized as follows.
First, it shows that relative to single industrial segment and domestic firms, global diversification alone, make earnings quality worse. But industrial diversification may improve earnings quality for globally diversified firms.
Second, I find that the good of corporate governance can improve earnings quality for single industrial segment and globally diversified firms. This result demonstrate corporate governance may mitigate the agency problem for global diversification.
Third, it shows that single industrial segment and globally diversified firms suffer diversification discount. But, it fail to document diversification discount for other types of diversification.
Finally, I find the diversification discount is associated with earnings quality for single industrial segment and globally diversified firms. Specifically, as earnings quality gets worse, the diversification discount gets large. Besides, after partitioned sample by the strength of corporate governance, it shows that the association between exist only for firms with weaker corporate governance but no longer for firms with strong corporate governance.
In sum, the thesis show that globally diversified firms suffer diversification discount, because investors are considered for the poor earnings quality, and in turn require higher risk premium. However, globally diversified firms can decrease the diversification discount by improve the corporate governance structure.
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Chen, Bo-Shu, and 陳柏修. "The Effects of Corporate Governance and Diversification Strategyon Employment Stability." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69310871007819000437.
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碩士<br>銘傳大學<br>會計學系碩士班<br>100<br>This study examines the effects of corporate governance and diversification strategy on
company employment stability. The reference to past literature suggests when the company has the
high employment stability, and it can bring the competitive advantage for the company. Such as
enhancing the company''s performance, innovation and persistence of competitive advantage and
improve the organization''s commitment to employment. However, the capital market and corporate
governance mechanisms may have an impact on long-term human resource practices. About
employment stability, most of studies investigate the effect of employment bonus on the employment
stability. This study focus on the board monitoring effect, executive incentives and corporate
diversification strategy will affect the company''s human resources policies. In this study, empirical
research data of Taiwan''s listed companies from 2006 to 2010 and analyze the results. The empirical
results showed the proportion of outside directors is higher, the employment stability is lower, but
when the company with the higher profitability, then the employment stability is higher. On the other
hand, the company''s profitability and the proportion of executive incentives compensation are higher,
the employment stability is lower. The company''s diversification level is higher, and employment
stability is higher.
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Schoar, Antoinette. "Effects of corporate diversification on productivity /." 2000. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:9965154.
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Kang, Wei-Jen, and 康唯珍. "The Effects of Corporate Governance, Competition and Diversification on Firm Values." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94593363453585622948.
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碩士<br>淡江大學<br>管理科學研究所碩士班<br>98<br>Abstract:
The importance of corporate governance would be more and more stressed by enterprises after the huge loss caused by subprime mortgage markets. Thus, whether corporate governance, enterprising competition, and diversification linked by the idea of portfolio will raise the firm values is a vital topic for this research.
This study’s sample is listed company in Taiwan from 2005 to 2008, our study use the regression model and Panel Data Model to analysis the relationship between corporate governance, core competitive, corporate diversification and firm value. The empirical results show as follows: First of all, the pledged shares of directors has significant negative impact on Tobins’Q and ROE that we infer the pledged shares of directors is higher, maybe the firm value is lower. When investor decide the investment object, they can take the notice of it. Secondly, The information transparency, paten and brand value have significant positive impact on firm value. The patent is a result of research and development, the firm respect the research and development that means firm know importance of innovation. And the successful brand is useful increase the firm value. How to build the successful brand is the direction of firms. Thirdly, the market share has no significant impact, maybe the firm use the price stratagem to increase the market share. However, if firm can increase the market share and maintain the net profit, it could get the positive impact on firm value. Thus firm should consider how to increase the market share and do not decrease the net profit. Forthly, industry diversification and business group have negative impact on firm value, maybe over investment can not promote the firm value more. Finally, this study use the corporate governance as mediator, the result infer that can increase the impact of financial variable to firm value.
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Wu, Ai-Shan, and 吳艾珊. "The Relationship between Corporate Diversification and Corporate Value-A Study of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69282156438812900807.
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碩士<br>國立嘉義大學<br>管理研究所<br>93<br>This study investigates the relationship between corporate diversification and corporate value, and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms to the relationship. The corporate governance mechanisms include the ownership structure, which measure the separation of ownership and control. The empirical results find that diversification positively affects corporate value. The results also find that the separation of ownership and control will negatively affect the relationship between diversification and corporate value. When the separation of ownership and control becomes more serious, the incentive effects become much slighter and the entrenchment effects will dominate its influence to the corporate value. Thus, the positive relationship between diversification and corporate value will be discounted by the badly structured corporate governance mechanisms.
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CHEN, WEI-CHEN, and 陳韋臻. "Corporate Governance、Diversification Strategy and Company's Financial Performance: Pension Fund Stock Selection." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4x2rxv.
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Liu, Ching Lun, and 劉經綸. "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Diversification-Evidence from listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83013457465722254280.
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碩士<br>中國文化大學<br>國際企業管理研究所<br>99<br>This paper examines the effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on corporate diversification. Using a sample of listed firms in Shanghai from 2003 to 2009 and the Tobit regression model, we find that ownership structure is associated with cor-porate diversification. Legal person shareholders and Foreign Legal person which incur higher monitor are less likely to engage in corporate diversification. We also find that corporate governance has less impact on the level of corporate diversification. After Split Share Structure Reform, the relationship between ownership and corporate governance on corporate diversification is significant higher than before. This finding shows that Split Share Structure Reform lowers the negative impact of agency problems. Overall, our results indicated that corporate governance in China is still inefficiency.
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Chang, Che-Chen, and 張哲誠. "Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Electronic Industry." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40610836479102688753.
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碩士<br>國防管理學院<br>國防財務資源研究所<br>96<br>Under the environment that Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance are being more important than before, we want to investigate that whether Intellectual Capital has a significant effect on Corporate Governance and whether Corporate Governance has a significant effect on Corporate Performance. So, the relationship among Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance is one of this study’s main purposes.
This research collects statistic data from “Taiwan Economics Journal” and takes evidence on electronic industry. The study time was from 2002 to 2006. According to relevant references about Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance, we select variable elements and construct the performance models between Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance to interpret the association between Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance and Corporate performance. The method we use to measure the Intellectual Capital is VAIC proposed by Pulic (2000).
The empirical results can define the association among Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance and Corporate performance distinctly. Intellectual Capital and Corporate Governance both have impact on Corporate Performance. The Capital Employed Efficiency and Human Capital Efficiency have positive impact on interior performance; the Structural Capital Efficiency has negative impact on interior performance. The interior performance is negatively influenced by president who also serves as a CEO; the interior performance is positively influenced by the percentage of ownership hold by managers; the interior performance is positively influenced by the percentage of directors. The empirical results show that the association among Intellectual Capital, Corporate Governance and Corporate performance has mediating effect and interference effect as well.
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Lin, Tian-Shin, and 林恬欣. "Corporate governance, Corporate social responsibility and Operation performance in Banking Industry." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63085519589810312465.
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碩士<br>銘傳大學<br>財務金融學系碩士在職專班<br>105<br>The concession of the banking industry, belonging to the need to establish good corporate governance system to maintain a strict standard of corporate social responsibility is the corporate image of the look and feel of this paper will explore the associativity between the banking corporate governance and corporate social responsibility and the performance.
In this document the use of appropriate measurement regression model to carry out empirical study. During the study and for 2010 to 2015 Taiwan financial holding bank listing cabinet and separate bank total sample of 22, the total number of the samples for 132 data of 6 years.
This document types in accordance with their respective national bank, divided into financial holding bank and non-bank financial holdings, through empirical analysis, summarized in the following conclusions:
(1) The gold controls management achievements the bank to be able to receive the director to own stocks the ratio, the manager owns stocks the ratio, the board of directors scale size and whether variable influences and so on friendly its enterprise society responsibility. Director owns stocks the ratio, the manager owns stocks the ratio and whether obtains the world CSR enterprise citizens to reward to ROA presents relations the remarkable correlation; But board of directors scale then presents relations the remarkable inverse correlation with ROA; Only the director pawns the ratio to be unable to explain whether can have the influence to its management achievements.
(2) The non-gold controls management achievements the bank only to be able to receive the director to pawn influence the ratio, presents the remarkable inverse correlation with ROA between. But the director owns stocks the ratio, the manager owns stocks the ratio, the board of directors scale size and whether variables and so on friendly its enterprise society responsibility, if then has not been able to use to explain the management achievements whether is connected.
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Szu-YuLiu and 劉思妤. "Industry Competition and Stock Market Reaction to Announcement of Corporate Diversification." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08346619789979107331.
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碩士<br>國立成功大學<br>國際企業研究所碩博士班<br>100<br>Previous studies focus on the whether M＆As influence the corporate value or not. Lang and Stulz (1994) point out that diversification may destroys the firm value. However, Villalonga (2004b) finds evidence of a diversification premium by using different measurement. Santalo and Becerra (2008) find that firms enjoy a premium in those industries in which only a few focus firms compete. To measure whether the argument that firms diversifying into industries with more diversified rivals are expected to experience greater stock market reactions than those into industries with more focused rivals is considered by investors or not. I follow the Santalo and Becerra (2008) idea to interpret and discuss the results. Moreover I highlight the theoretical and practical implications in my findings. The result shows that firms diversifying into new industry, the number of focus firms are significantly and negatively correlated with abnormal return of acquiring firm. The evidence is robust to different event windows and different measure of control variables. The result supports the idea of Santalo and Becerra (2008).
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Lu, Chiu-Mei, and 盧秋美. "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Performance: Evidence from Electronics Industry." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/a9tgj6.
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碩士<br>大葉大學<br>管理學院碩士在職專班<br>106<br>The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on corporate performance. The sample of the study consists of public electronics companies in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2015. The study explore the relation between corporate governance and corporate performance. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance can reduce agency problem and the efficient corporate governance can increase corporate performance.
The empirical results indicate as follows: First, the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance has a significantly positive correlation and hence supports convergence of interest hypothesis. Second, the relationship between pledged share ratio of directors and corporate performance has a significantly negative correlation. Third, the relationship between the shares of institutional investor and corporate performance has a significantly positive correlation. Fourth, the relationship between the number of board directors and corporate performance has a significantly negative correlation. Finally, the ratio of independent directors has positive relationship with corporate performance, but the ratio of busy independent directors have negative relationship with corporate performance.
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CHEN, CHAO-CHIH, and 陳昭志. "The Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Performance: Evidence from Biotechnology Industry." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xd7n49.
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碩士<br>大葉大學<br>管理學院碩士在職專班<br>106<br>The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on corporate performance.The sample of the study consists of public biotechnology companies in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2016, total 191 companies to explore the relation between different corporate governance and corporate performance.
In this paper, the author hopes to show whether the biotechnology industry can promote the overall corporate performance by strengthening the corporate governance. The empirical results indicate as follows: (1) The ratio of independent directors is positively correlated with the performance of the company. (2) The ratio of busy independent directors have negative relationship with corporate performance.(3) The board size has a significant negative correlation with the corporate performance. (4) The relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance has a significantly positive correlation and hence supports convergence of interest hypothesis. (5) The relationship between pledged share ratio of directors and corporate performance has a significantly negative correlation. (6) The relationship between the shares of institutional investor and corporate performance has a significantly positive correlation.
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Wu, Ying-Liang, and 吳英亮. "A Study on Corporate Governance in the Construction Industry." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46018473876142471515.
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博士<br>國立中央大學<br>土木工程研究所<br>100<br>This work starts with the examination on the basic theory and legal system associated with corporate governance. Next, this work found that there is no denying a trend to incline to Anglo-American model under the pressure of globalization. However, this work found that many factors will influence the convergence process through comparative legal study. The dominant factor to the reform of corporate governance is not based on the consideration on efficiency only. Rather, the theory of path dependence indicates that each country has its unique governance culture, political and societal background. There is a trend to present inclination to Anglo-American model, however, the tension between convergence and persistence exists eventually.
A comparative legal analysis on fiduciary duty is to be undertaken following the above discovery. It reveals that while a director’s duties under UK’s company law presents categorized clauses, precedents are complementary to the abstract legal clauses in the US. Still, the statute of Taiwan’s corporate business law remains in an abstract manner. The characteristic of corporate governance in the construction industry and the implication behind the corporate failure case then are presented. Another point of this work is an empirical study on construction industry. This work intends to develop core agenda to corporate governance for construction firms through exploring the annual reports of the top 100 worldwide construction firms posted in ENR 2010. It is revealed that a total of six issues including ownership structure, governance structure, governance ethics, information disclosure, sustainable development and stakeholder engagement constitute the core agenda to corporate governance. Based on the 100 construction firms and 39 publicly listed companies in Taiwan, a comparative analysis has been conducted on the enforcement of corporate governance through such core agenda.
This work mainly found that the fact the insignificant degree of separation between ownership and control may be resulted in the lack of incentive to reducing agency cost through corporate governance. Thus, although a construction firm’s annual reports indicates that while the implementation to corporate governance is complied with its legal requirement, there still is room for better enhancement to the dimension of self-regulation. In the last, such core agenda with top level involvement will be implemented by management objective. This study further provides solid action plan to be adopted by the construction industry as reference.
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Liao, Chang-Sheng, and 廖振盛. "Three Essays on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Banking Industry." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98154937813121043316.
Full textAbstract:
博士<br>國立臺灣科技大學<br>財務金融研究所<br>101<br>The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how corporate governance mechanism affects bank efficiency and performance, such as ownership structure, ownership concentration and executive turnover. Corporate governance is an oncoming topic over four decade, an efficient corporate governance system characterises a multiplicity of mechanisms to ensure that the interests of shareholder are protected against the agency behaviour of managers. This dissertation contains three essays on corporate governance.
First, this part is to examine whether the banks efficiency and ownership structure for banking industries is related to their stock performance in China and Taiwan. The DEA and DFA estimated the efficiency score is 0.3229 and 0.5048, respectively. The mean efficiency from the DFA method is more than cost efficiency derived from the DEA. Is there a relationship? This find show that banks have a greater efficiency then this directly reflected in enhances expectations for the performance of the banks in stock market, using the DFA efficiency estimates have a more valuable function reflected in the stock return when compared with the DEA efficiency estimates and traditional financial ratio.
Second, this part is to investigate the effect of ownership structure and concentration on bank efficiency for case of Taiwan, we consider the non-linear relationship between ownership and efficiency, using the panel threshold model technique to test whether a non-linear relationship is significant. Empirical findings indicate that managerial ownership has a negative relation to efficiency and ownership concentration and state-ownership have no relation to bank efficiency. The results show that threshold effect is significant, which implies a significant non-linear relationship between board ownership and efficiency. This supports the form of non-linear relation as found in previous literature.
Thirdly, this part examined how ownership structure and risk-taking dictate the efficiency of banks operating in emerging Asian countries, and examines the relationship between CEO turnover and a given bank’s efficiency, performance, and risk-taking. The empirical results show that the Basel II risk is a determinant of bank efficiency and that bank managers have an affinity for risk whenever they are working within a high degree of ownership concentration. Our findings suggest that the top executives who are operating in emerging countries will not compromise their positions even for the sake of their banks’ efficiency, because bureaucratic power and family-controlled boards still play an important role in management decisions in these countries.