Journal articles on the topic 'Dividend irrelevance theory'

This Article states that dividend policy does not affect the value of the firm. Their argument is that stack holder’s wealth is unaffected whether corporate profits are distributed or retained in the business. Their reasoning is that under an efficient market condition, a firm’s value is determined by its potential earning power and it does not affect the decision on how profits are to be split between dividends and retained earning. Therefore, as per M-M theory a firm’s value is independent of dividend policy.Academic Voices, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2013, Pages 46-49 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/av.v3i1.9988

Many theories have been documented on the relevance and irrelevance of dividend policy. Authors continue to come up with various conclusions with regard to dividend policy from their empirical studies. This paper sought to examine the relationship between dividend policies and financial performance of selected listed firms in Morocco. Data were sourced through secondary means from the annual reports of the sampled quoted firms and was analyzed using panel data regression model. Two models were developed in an attempt to provide a theoretical explanation on the birds-in-hand dividend relevance theory and the Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) dividend irrelevance theory. The findings indicated that Dividend policy is an important factor affecting firm performance. Their relationship was also strong and positive. This therefore showed that dividend policy was relevant. It can be concluded, based on the findings of this research that dividend policy is relevant and that managers should devote adequate time in designing a dividend policy that will enhance firm performance and therefore shareholder value. Management of companies should also invest in projects that give positive Net Present Values, thereby generating huge earnings, which can be partly used to pay dividends to their equity shareholders.

This study empirically tests for the validity of Miller and Modigliani’s dividend irrelevance proposition in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Secondary data were obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange fact book and firms’ annual audited financial statements for fifteen years (2001-2015). Mediation Analyses, was used to measure the direct and indirect effects of dividend on stock price. Correction of the anomalous use of current dividend and current earnings by the use of naive expectation of dividend and earnings revealed that the direct effect of expected dividend on share price is significant but the indirect effect of expected dividend on share price through earnings is not significant. The implication of these results is that expected dividend has its unique (direct) effect on share price beyond the effect on share price which it shares with expected earnings (indirect effect). This conclusion suggests that dividend policy is relevant in valuation of shares in NSE. It was therefore recommended that company management should treat dividend as an active corporate finance decision-making variable and should employ dividend in information signalling to capital market investors.

Announcing dividend pay-out policy by a company will signals market firm’s future prospects and changes its stock prices according to dividend signalling theory. By analysis the effect of special dividend announcements for 5 companies listed in NASDAQ for the period of 2014-2018, this study investigates the stock price reactions to special dividend announcement for 40 days around the event and challenges dividend signalling theory. The empirical results calculated both in discrete and logarithmic forms. Only few disordered significant abnormal returns and average abnormal returns occurred according to the t-test. The results show that shareholders do not gain value from announcement of special dividend in NASDAQ stock exchange market. That Results indicated from adjusted market model in this research do not support dividend-signalling theory Hence do not confirm that the announcement of dividend has significant effect on price of shares. In general the results consistent with the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance hypothesis.

The objective of this study is to inspect dividend policy influence on volatility of share prices. For investigation seven Non-financial segment/sectors have been selected. A sample of 137 firms who paid four dividend payments listed at PSX is analysed for the period of 2007-2017.Proxy for policy of dividend are earning per share, Payout ratio, dividend yield, while assets growth and firm size are taken as control variables. OLS regression model has been initially applied on panel data. The outcomes of fixed effect model are focused. Overall outcomes of the study confirmed that prices of stock is significantly influenced by policy of dividend and reject dividend irrelevance theory.

The article treats a concept of the formalized modeling of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived (stock market position) within neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions as an instrument of the scores analysis and forecasting. The methodology of the research consists of the Dividend Irrelevance theory, Dividend Policy Significance theory and sustainable company development concept. It has been stated that a formalized approach of the dividend policy implementation presumes a construction of the basic relevent scores models characterizing the company dividend policy and its marketing performance as Dividend Payout, Dividend Cover, expected Share Price, Dividend Yield, Price / Earnings Ratio (common stock price/earnings ratio). The formalized models of the scores mentioned are applicable for a forecast-analytical scores evaluation and their variances as well by estimating an impact of the models defining factors exercised by the appropriate factoring analysis method within the neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions. The conclusion is drawn, that the formalized models of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived, having been developed, are an effective instrument for their forecasting and analysis so that proactive decisions to manage the company dividend policy implementation within neutral approach conditions are ensured.

The article treats a concept of the formalized modeling of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived (stock market position) within neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions as an instrument of the scores analysis and forecasting. The methodology of the research consists of the Dividend Irrelevance theory, Dividend Policy Significance theory and sustainable company development concept. It has been stated that a formalized approach of the dividend policy implementation presumes a construction of the basic relevant scores models characterizing the company dividend policy and its marketing performance as Dividend Payout, Dividend Cover, expected Share Price, Dividend Yield, Price / Earnings Ratio (common stock price/earnings ratio). The formalized models of the scores mentioned are applicable for a forecast-analytical scores evaluation and their variances as well by estimating an impact of the models defining factors exercised by the appropriate factoring analysis method within the neutral dividend policy implementation approach conditions. The conclusion is drawn, that the formalized models of the dividend policy scores and company marketing performance scores derived, having been developed, are an effective instrument for their forecasting and analysis so that proactive decisions to manage the company dividend policy implementation within neutral approach conditions are ensured.

This article analyzes the key patterns of the dividend policy and the problem of the “dividend puzzle” in the general context of the development of the stock market in Russia. The article consists of two parts.In the first part we summarize main research trends of dividend policy in modern economic theory (the classical Modigliani—Miller theory of dividend irrelevance, agent and signal hypotheses, the smoothing model, the catering theory, etc.). We emphasize the theoretical analysis of motivation of the largest Russian companies for profit allocation and dividend payout, based on a sample of 236 joint stock companies. Since 2012, a steady increase in dividend payments has been revealed in both private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The bulk of dividend payments from SOEs accounts for only 12 major companies. Along with an increase in the market value, dividends have become an important factor in the total return on shares. Under current conditions, the probability of paying dividends depends not only on the size of the company and indicators of its’ financial stability, but also on the presence of the state in the capital of companies. However, the relationship between the probability of paying dividends and state participation in the ownership structure is not universal and can be explained by specific factors that go beyond the classical dividend theories.In the second part we will analyze the patterns of stock market performance and dividend policy of the largest Russian companies, motivation for dividend payouts and special aspects of SOEs policy.

The aim of this paper is to explore the possible relationship between dividend announcement and stock price reactions upon announcements by the quoted firms in London Stock Exchange (LSE). For the sake of this study, an event-study methodology was employed to calculate any abnormal or excess returns around dividend announcements for 100 firms listed in the LSE over a period of 5 years (2010-2014). The result of the event study indicates that dividend announcements do not convey information to investors (Khan, 2011). The researcher concludes by saying that dividend announcements do not convey any information to share prices, which is in consonance with the M-M Dividend Irrelevance Theory.

This study discusses the relationship between profitability ratios, leverage and dividend policy on firm value in the banking sector on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The banking sector was chosen because the banking sector is one of the fastest growing sectors and has promising long-term business prospects. The high value of the company will affect the level of prosperity of shareholders. Several factors affect firm value, namely profitability, leverage, and dividend policy, which are factors that can be controlled by the company. This study uses Dividend Irrelevance Theory and Bird in The Hand Theory as the main theory in explaining the importance of profitability ratios, leverage ratios and dividend policies in increasing firm value. The analysis technique uses the Path Analysis estimation technique. The results of the study found that leverage has a negative and significant effect on firm value and leverage has a negative effect on dividend policy.

Abstract This paper examines the relation between dividend payments and stock prices of all firms in the German prime standard DAX 30 in the time period from 2012 to 2019. The irrelevance theory introduced by Miller and Modigliani states that dividend payments must not have an impact on stock prices in a perfect market. In contrast, the signaling theory and the dividend puzzle indicate that dividend payments are likely to have a profound impact on the stock price. According to our findings the ex-dividend decrease of stock prices was significantly smaller than the dividend payment. Nevertheless, the results support the impact of the dividend payment on the share price. Firstly, the existence of the ex-dividend markdown is a proof that dividend payments cause share price losses. Secondly, the study explains in particular that high dividend payments result in high share prices over the examined period. Thirdly, our analysis demonstrates a positive correlation between the dividend and the stock price development according to the signaling theory. Considering the above- mentioned results, we can conclude that the share price of a company is highly affected by the decision making of the company regarding the dividend policy.

PurposeThis study will examine the impact of cash dividends on the market value of banks listed in Middle East and North African (MENA) emerging countries during the period 2000–2015.Design/methodology/approachThe current study adopts residual income approach based on Ohlson's (1995) valuation model. By testing different statistical techniques, fixed effect is applied on panel data for (144) banks listed on 11 MENA stock markets over the period 2000–2015. Furthermore, additional tests are applied to confirm the primary results.FindingsThe analysis reveals that current dividend payouts and dividend yield do not provide information relevant to the establishment of market values in MENA emerging markets; thus, they have no material impact on MENA banks' market values. This lack of current dividend payment effect is consistent with Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance assumption: there is no evidence of either an informational or real cash inflow effect of current dividend payments. The findings of this study can be attributed to the fact that MENA banks may be forced to place more emphasis on allocating money for investment instead of paying dividends given them they are subject to liquidity requirements for investment, expansion, general operations and compliance with regulations. Only after all these financial needs are covered can the remaining surplus be distributed as cash dividends. Therefore, cash dividends represent earnings residual rather than an active decision variable that impacts a firm's market value. This is consistent with the residual dividend hypothesis, which is the crux of Miller and Modigliani (1996) irrelevance theory of dividends.Research limitations/implicationsThe current study is restricted to a sample of one type of financial firms, banks, because of the problem of missing data and limited information related to other financial firms for the same period. Therefore, further research could be additional types of financial firms such as insurance firms that play a vital role in MENA emerging economies.Practical implicationsThe results of this study have some important implications for banks' dividend policymakers. Dividend policymakers in MENA emerging markets seem to follow residual dividend policy, in which they distribute dividends according to what is left over after all acceptable investment opportunities have been undertaken. This makes for inconsistent and unstable dividend policy trends, making it difficult for investors to predict future dividend decisions. Further, this practice may deliver information to shareholders about a lack of positive future investment opportunities, and this may negatively affect the share value of banks.Originality/valueThis study is the first of its kind – up to the author's knowledge – that examines a large cross-country sample of MENA banks (144) to cover a long time period in the recent past, and, more importantly, after the banking sector in the region has experienced major transformations during last two decades. In addition, most of the MENA region countries included in this study, namely, banks, operate in tax-free environments (there are neither taxes on dividends nor on capital gains). This feature adds complexity to the ongoing dividend debate.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the dynamic relationships among investment, earnings and dividends for US firms. The sample period is 1950-2006. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a firm-level vector auto-regression (VAR) framework to examine the firm-level dynamics among investment, earnings and dividends. The firm-level VAR yields Granger causality results, impulse response functions, and variance decompositions characterizing the dynamics of these three variables at the firm level. Findings – For the average firm in the sample, Miller and Modigliani dividend policy irrelevance is not supported, even in the long run; the shocks to dividends do have long-run consequences for investment and vice versa. Dividend changes are an ineffective signal of future earnings in both the short and long-term. The cost of an increased dividend is on average an immediate decrease of $3 in investment for every dollar increase in dividends and the effect is persistent up to six years after the increase in dividends. Research limitations/implications – The firm-level VAR used in the study requires that sample firms have long histories of investment, earnings and dividend data. The study addresses the interaction between dividends and investment and therefore necessitates examining dividend-paying firms. By the nature of the research question, the sample firms will not be representative in all respects to the universe of firms. The most striking difference between the sample and the universe of firms is firm size. As such, the study's conclusions are most applicable to larger, stable, dividend-paying firms. The study is also limited to dividend payout. Alternative payout policies, such as share repurchases, are not considered in this work. Practical implications – In theory, increases in dividends can signal higher future earnings; however, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. When capital markets are constrained or incomplete, increases in dividends come at a cost to investment. Firms should consider alternative methods of signaling future earnings that have less of an impact on investment. Investors should carefully evaluate the possible impact of an increase in dividends on investment and future earnings growth. Originality/value – This study is the first to examine the dynamics of earnings, dividends and investment at a firm level and over such a long sample period. By including the dynamics of earnings, the authors emphasize the potential opportunity costs that increasing dividends has on investment when capital markets are imperfect. The dynamic system also allows the authors to consider long-run effects as well as immediate responses to system shocks.

Abstract Previous commentators on Plato’s Republic have relied on mistaken assumptions about the requirements for Plato’s theory of justice: that Plato establishes a bi-conditional between proper psychic rule and the performance of conventionally just acts. They believe that if Plato does not establish this bi-conditional, then his theory of justice as a virtue will succumb to the fallacy of irrelevance. I claim Plato need not meet that requirement. A novel interpretation of the arguments of Book IV concerning justice in the soul suffices to dispense with one aspect of the bi-conditional – that conventional justice must imply justice as psychic harmony. Then, situating the theory of justice as psychic harmony in the context of the divided line, and in the dialectical ascent in the education of the philosopher-rulers, I show that the other conditional requirement – that justice in the soul must imply the performance of conventionally just actions – is also mistaken.

This research aims to test dividend signaling theory in the Jakarta Islamic Index groups. Signaling theory states that dividend policy has information content that can influence to share price. This research usesamples in the form of company allocating dividend for period 2006-2007 which listed on Jakarta Islamic Index. Final samples which are utilized in this research are equal to 12 firms observation. Using the event-study method, the result of our research shows that at the significant level of 5%, there is only one working days which yield the abnormal return that is significant at the dividend announcements. Those are the sixth day before the event date with the value of 0.00889 or around 0.9%. The final conclusion is that stock price will negatively reacted to the announcement of dividend. Overall, the evidence tends to support the dividend irrelevancy hypothesis, but does not provide a support for the signaling theory. Evidence also indicates that dividend payment does not signal any information to the investors, which needs to be further investigated.

This research aims to test dividend signaling theory in the Jakarta Islamic Index groups. Signaling theory states that dividend policy has information content that can influence to share price. This research usesamples in the form of company allocating dividend for period 2006-2007 which listed on Jakarta Islamic Index. Final samples which are utilized in this research are equal to 12 firms observation. Using the event-study method, the result of our research shows that at the significant level of 5%, there is only one working days which yield the abnormal return that is significant at the dividend announcements. Those are the sixth day before the event date with the value of 0.00889 or around 0.9%. The final conclusion is that stock price will negatively reacted to the announcement of dividend. Overall, the evidence tends to support the dividend irrelevancy hypothesis, but does not provide a support for the signaling theory. Evidence also indicates that dividend payment does not signal any information to the investors, which needs to be further investigated.

The purpose of this study is to identify whether the wealth of Shariah-inclined investors is affected by dividend policy. This study is different from other studies because earlier studies do not differentiate between Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah compliant stocks, creating a gap for dividend signaling theory and bird-in-hand theory on Shariah-compliant financial products. This study employs panel data analysis and multiple linear regression with the most recent data representing eight (8) out of twelve (12) sectors in the Malaysian stock market. Dividend per share and retained earnings per share are used as a proxy for dividend policy while market price per share is used as a proxy for shareholders’ wealth. It was found that for Shariah-compliant stocks, both dividend per share and retained earnings per share are insignificant in affecting shareholders’ wealth. Unlike other studies on dividend policy which do not discriminate between Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah compliant stocks, this study finds that dividend policy to be irrelevant to Shariah-inclined investors.

Abstract:This essay discusses and criticizes the claim that normative political theory can be (justifiably and fruitfully) divided into two parts—a part having to do with ideal theory which assumes full compliance and abstracts away from issues having to do with implementation and, contrasting with this, a nonideal part having to do with implementation and with rules and institutions appropriate for conditions of partial compliance. On this conception of ideal theory, empirical facts about human behavior and motivation, connected to issues surrounding compliance and implementation, are irrelevant to ideal theory, although such facts can be relevant to the nonideal part of normative theory. I argue against this conception, holding instead that such empirical facts are relevant to most or all of normative political theory, including “fundamental” normative principles.

The purpose of this article is to empirically estimate the effects of the federal corporate income tax, dividend yield, and inflation on the rate of return in investor-owned electric utilities in the United States. Using data from the period before the seventies, some authors were able to show some evidence toward a partial shifting of the tax burden in regulated utilities. An attempt is made here to reexamine these findings and extend them into the eighties. The results point to a conclusion of a short-run partial shifting of about 60% in contrast to a mere 40% reported earlier. The results do not reject the hypothesis of a significant positive relationship between the dividend yield and the profit rate, contradicting the theory that dividend policy is irrelevant. Finally, there is some indication of a depressing effect of inflation on the rate of return during the most recent inflationary time period, 1974–1984.

In a spacetime divided into two regions U1 and U2 by a hypersurface Σ, a perturbation of the field in U1 is coupled to perturbations in U2 by means of the holographic imprint that it leaves on Σ. The linearized gluing field equation constrains perturbations on the two sides of a dividing hypersurface, and this linear operator may have a nontrivial null space. A nontrivial perturbation of the field leaving a holographic imprint on a dividing hypersurface which does not affect perturbations on the other side should be considered physically irrelevant. This consideration, together with a locality requirement, leads to the notion of gauge equivalence in Lagrangian field theory over confined spacetime domains. Physical observables in a spacetime domain U can be calculated integrating (possibly nonlocal) gauge invariant conserved currents on hypersurfaces such that ∂Σ⊂∂U. The set of observables of this type is sufficient to distinguish gauge inequivalent solutions. The integral of a conserved current on a hypersurface is sensitive only to its homology class [Σ], and if U is homeomorphic to a four ball the homology class is determined by its boundary S=∂Σ. We will see that a result of Anderson and Torre implies that for a class of theories including vacuum general relativity all local observables are holographic in the sense that they can be written as integrals of over the two-dimensional surface S. However, nonholographic observables are needed to distinguish between gauge inequivalent solutions.

In recent years, Text Mining wasan important topic because of the growth of digital text data from many sources such as government document, Email, Social Media, Website, etc. The English poemsare one of the text data to categorization English Poems will use Text categorization, Text categorization is a method in which classify documents into one or more categories that were predefined the category based on the text content in a document .In this paper we will solve the problem of how to categorize the English poem into one of the English Poems categorizations by using text mining technique and Machine learning algorithm, Our data set consist of seven categorizations for poems the data set is divided into two-part training (learning)and testing data. In the proposed model we apply the text preprocessing for the documents file to reduce the number of feature and reduce dimensionality the preprocessing process converts the text poem to features and remove the irrelevant feature by using text mining process (tokenize,remove stop word and stemming), to reduce the feature vector of the remaining feature we usetwo methods for feature selection and use Rough set theory as machine learning algorithm to perform the categorization, and we get 88% success classification of the proposed model.

Humans display a number of puzzling choice patterns that contradict basic principles of rationality. For example, they show preferences that change as a result of task framing or of adding irrelevant alternatives into the choice set. A recent theory has proposed that such choice and risk biases arise from an attentional mechanism that increases the relative weighting of goal-consistent information and protects the decision from noise after the sensory stage. Here, using a divided-attention method based on the dot-probe technique, we showed that attentional selection toward values congruent with the task goal takes place while participants make choices between alternatives that consist of payoff sequences. Moreover, we demonstrated that the magnitude of this attentional selection predicts risk attitudes, indicating a common underlying cognitive process. The results highlight the dynamic interplay between attention and choice mechanisms in producing framing effects and risk biases.

Since the classical seepage theory has limitations in characterizing the heterogeneity of fractured-vuggy tight reservoirs, well test interpretation results are not consistent with actual production by far. Based on the nonlinear percolation theory, a new nonlinear seepage equation considering the boundary layer and yield stress was derived to describe the seepage characteristics of dense matrix blocks and the stress sensitivity and fractal features of fracture systems were characterized by applying the fractal theory. Thus, the nonlinear model of a horizontal well in a fractured-vuggy tight fractal reservoir was established naturally. Then the finite element method was applied to solve the bottom hole pressure based on the processing of internal boundary conditions. After solving the model, the seepage characteristics of different models were summarized by analyzing the bottom hole pressure dynamic curves and the sensitivity analysis of multiple parameters such the nonlinear parameter and fractal index were conducted. Finally, the practicality of the model was proved through a field application. The results show that the pressure dynamic curves can be divided into nine flow stages and the increase of the nonlinear parameter will cause the intensity of the cross flow from matrix blocks to the fracture system to decrease. The fractal index is irrelevant to the intensity of the cross flow while it decides the upwarping degree of the curve at the middle and late flow stages. On the basis of the results of the field application, it can be concluded that the model fits well with actual production and the application of this model can improve the accuracy of well test interpretation.

A re-examination of the theoretical basis of our practice of psychiatry (that is, its epistemology) reveals the insufficiency of the empirical, inductive approach which we have come to regard, too myopically, as the sine qua non of our science. Traditionally in psychiatry, the discipline of philosophy, of which epistemology is one of its major fields of endeavour, has generally come to be regarded as irrelevant or unreliable as a source of true knowledge. But an objective look at our variegated practice of psychiatry — roughly divided into two groups — the biological on the one side and the psychosocial on the other — reveals a glaring lack of integration, cohesion, or synthesis in basic theory. While analysis is the prime modus operandi of science, synthesis is the main objective of philosophy. While we subscribe to various operational theories to explain how our various procedures work, we lack an overarching, unified, general theory to subsume them. Hence we lack a truly holistic concept of the person who is our patient. In this we are much in need of the discipline of philosophy, which promotes clarity of thought, breadth of comprehension, and systematic (logical) reasoning. Psychiatrists acquire more of this philosophic expertise through collaboration with professional philosophers (epistemologists in particular) and through the introduction into our graduate psychiatric training programs of some specific course content from the literature of philosophy. As a preliminary suggestion for this, an “Annotated Reading List” is appended.

In the Opening Remarks Dr. Kudritzki asked what tricks were used in calculating stellar structure. Though many fine models and discussions have been presented, answer has not been given yet to this question. The theory of stellar structure consists of two very much different kinds of building blocks. One is the local physics such as equation of state, opacity, nuclear reaction rate, and so on. They are determined only locally when the values of temperature and density at a point are given, i.e., they are irrelevant to the conditions whether they are considered in the stellar interior or not. Another is the physics of self-gravitating systems in which the global spatial structures are discussed. Characteristics of astrophysics are often said to lie in the fact that it covers much wider parameter ranges than in laboratories. This, however, grasps only one side of the problem, i.e., only local physics. Those which are not encountered in laboratory physics lie mainly in the global physics. It shows characteristics out of common sense; examples are negative specific heat and associated gravothermal catastrophe which are related with the gravitational contraction of the stars, formation of core halo structures which is observed not only in red giant stars but also many celestial objects, and tendencies dividing a system into two sub-systems one with high energy and/or high entropy and the other with low energy in the deep potential well and/or low entropy as seen in supernova explosion of type II and formation of jet in various objects. They behave contrary to the general trend, i.e., against equipartition and thermal equilibration.

Abstract Some theorists on literary interpretation have suggested a connection between Monroe C. Beardsley’s anti-intentionalism and hypothetical intentionalism based on an implied author. However, a full exploration has never been attempted. I undertake this task in this paper. A close reading of Beardsley reveals that he assumes something very similar to the implied author in interpretation. I distinguish five types of fictional works in terms of their narrative mode and show that my claim stands in at least four of the five types. The significance of my argument lies in exposing the above version of authorism in anti-intentionalism. Beardsley is generally perceived as advocating the irrelevance of authorial intention to literary interpretation. The common interpretation of his theory is that work-meaning is generated by linguistic conventions, with intention playing no role in meaning-determination. All the interpreter needs is knowledge of public, linguistic conventions in order to recover textual meaning. Nevertheless, when dealing with the problem of interpretation, Beardsley explicitly talks about attributing textual meaning to a fictional speaker. Although he does not elaborate on the nature of this speaker, clues scattered in his writings point to the striking similarity of this theoretical apparatus to an implied author. The key lies in his presumption that every fictional work must have an ultimate speaker to whom meaning inferred from the text should be attributed. This claim is almost the core of an implied author theory of interpretation. A difficulty in classifying Beardsley’s view as a version of the implied author position is that his characterization of the story’s presenter might apply better to the story’s narrator than to its implied author. To test this, I examine different types of narrative modes to see whether the fictional speaker merges with the implied author in each of these scenarios. The first factor to consider for classifying narrative modes is whether the narrator’s presence is explicit or implicit. The narrative scenario in which the narrator is implicit can be further divided into two sub-types: either the story is told from an omniscient viewpoint or centers on the experience of a third-person character. In either case, the story is not told by any of the characters in the story; rather, it is told by an implicit speaker whose words the work purports to be. It seems reasonable to identify this fictional speaker with the implied author, for both function as the subject to which textual meaning is attributed. As for the narrative mode in which the narrator is explicit, this involves first-person narratives. In these, either the narrator is reliable or unreliable. When the narrator is unreliable, a transcendental perspective is required in determining the text’s meaning, because what is said ultimately in the work is not equivalent to what is literally said by the unreliable narrator. It follows that an implicit speaker has to be assumed and she again coincides with the implied author. Where the narrator is reliable but textual meaning transcends what is literally expressed, an implicit speaker is at play again. This narrative scenario is thus better classified as a case in which the narrator’s presence is implicit. This leaves us with the narrative scenario in which the narrator is a reliable spokesperson for the implied author. The identification of the narrator with the implied author in the case last mentioned is controversial. The crucial difference between them is that the former is dramatized in the story while the latter is not. I accept that the narrator here is not happily called an implied author, though I also point out several similarities between the two. Finally, I discuss four complications to my argument. The first concerns multiple points of view in a story. To accommodate this kind of narrative, Beardsley could argue that an implicit narrator is needed to explain the definite meaning concealed behind what is literally said by different characters. The second complication is about the ontological status accorded to the narrator and the implied author. It might be objected that the two reside in different fictional worlds and this is what makes their merging impossible. But it is questionable whether this is a definitional feature of the implied author; moreover, the interpreter can take the implied author to be an instrumentalist concept and hence avoid talk about the ontological status of fictional entities. The third complication claims that versions of the implied author position developed by philosophers tend to be based on a contextualist ontology of literature; however, Beardsley’s account is acontextual. This is not true, for Beardsley has exhibited contextualist leanings in his writings. Finally, it has been objected that the formalist resources Beardsley has are not enough to guarantee a single right interpretation. But if Beardsley is actually a contextualist, contextual constraints will come into play and raise the chance of getting a single right interpretation. The article concludes by reflecting on the significance of the misrepresentation of anti-intentionalism: it is the intention of the actual author which anti-intentionalism is against. The position in question is actually developed in an intentionalist framework based on the implied author.

Keywords: agency costs, clienteles of dividends, information content of dividends, irrelevance of dividend policy, transaction costsAbstract. This research addresses one of the fundamental decisions of corporate finance: the dividend policy. It is formulated a model whose building blocks are the theory of irrelevance of the dividends of Modigliani and Miller (as a general context), the signaling model of John Lintner, and the model of Michael S. Rozzef of minimization of agency cost and transaction costs. The construction of the theoretical model of optimal dividend policy proposed here highlights the advantages of the axiomatic definition of the theory of Modigliani and Miller, by its logical contribution, and intends to propose a new formulation with respect to the determination of level of payment of dividends in the corporations. Therefore we relax the assumptions specified by Modigliani and Miller related to liquidity indifference, absence of uncertainty, agency costs and transaction cost, also we explore the possibility of presence of asymmetric information. In such circumstances, for the model exposed here and by means of a binary logistic regression analysis is tested the influence of profits, the information content of dividends, the clientele effect and agency costs to define policy dividends of the corporations in Mexico.Palabras clave: clientelas de dividendos, contenido informativo de los dividendos, costos de agencia, costos de transacción, irrelevancia de la política de dividendosResumen. Esta investigación aborda una de las decisiones fundamentales de las finanzas corporativas: la política de dividendos. Se formula un modelo cuyos bloques de construcción son la teoría de irrelevancia de los dividendos de Modigliani y Miller (como contexto general), el modelo de señalización de John Lintner, y el modelo de Michael S. Rozzef de minimización de costos de agencia y de costos de transacción. La construcción del modelo teórico de política óptima de dividendos aquí propuesto pone de relieve las ventajas de la definición axiomática de la teoría de Modigliani y Miller, en cuanto a contribución lógica, con la intención de acercarnos a una nueva formulación respecto de la determinación del nivel de pago de dividendos en las corporaciones. Para ello se relajan las suposiciones especificadas por Modigliani y Miller en relación a la indiferencia por liquidez, ausencia de incertidumbre, costos de agencia y costos de transacción, también se explora la posibilidad de presencia de información asimétrica. En dichas circunstancias, para el modelo aquí expuesto y mediante un análisis de regresión logística binaria se prueba la influencia de las utilidades, el contenido informativo de los dividendos, el efecto clientela y los costos de agencia para definir la política de dividendos de las corporaciones en México.

How dividend policy shakes the price of share of an enterprise` is one of the most significant research issues in the ground of modern investment and finance. This study examines the influence of dividend announcement on the price of the mutual fund those are registered in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). The empirical part of this study uses “event study methodology” to know whether dividend announcement delivers any price sensitive information which creates a movement of the price of mutual funds. Although much studies are made on the topics of dividend policy, it is vague that whether dividend policy effects the stock price. The researcher who supports dividend irrelevance theory, argues that firm’s value should depend on earning power of the company, not on in which way the total earnings are divided into dividend and retained earnings and at what amount dividend are given to the shareholder of the company. This research surveys price of mutual funds those are registered in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) surrounding 44 days of the dividend announcement date. In this study, we examine 13 samples & used event study technique that shows dividend announcement doesn’t convey any price sensitive information immediately after announcement of dividend but price of the mutual fund goes to change dramatically before 7 days of record date which proves that announcement of dividend affects the price of mutual fund registered in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). Finally, T-test also postulates that price of stock responses to dividend announcement is not statistically significant immediately from dividend announcement date to 7 days after the announcement date. However, an opposite result, the T test identifies that price of stock responses to the announcement of dividend is statistically significant from the 7 days before record date to record date.

In autumn 2015, we in the Editorial Board of Contemporary Military Challenges decided to re-publish for our readers the topics, which had been first published between 2012 and 2014 and are related to the development of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The Slovenian versions of these articles have already been published before, while the aim of this issue is to share the views and thoughts of the authors also with others in the international environment. Therefore the articles have been translated into English. For many years, we have been members of various international and security organizations. Over this period, we have gained a lot of experience in the field of international cooperation, both in peacetime structures and in international operations and missions. Looking ahead, it is important to possess abundant knowledge, both theoretical and practical, and to exchange it. In quality exchange of knowledge, writing of articles, first and foremost in one's mother tongue, can also be of assistance. In 2011, I discussed the importance of writing and producing Slovenian military literature in Slovenian language with Dr Ada Vidovič Muha, expert in Slovenian language and the first Head of the Department of Slovenian Studies at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana. She mentioned that the texts of highest quality were always produced in a native language, while those produced in a foreign language never identically depict what the author had said or wanted to say. Certainly, we all agree with her statement. The translations of articles in this issue were first reviewed by Slovenian proof-readers, then by translators employed in the Slovenian Armed Forces (i.e. Ministry of Defence), who have long been closely and carefully taking care of the texts produced in the Slovenian defence system. The authors also did their share of work by thoroughly reading through and authorising the translations of their articles. When articles, which have been written some time ago, are re-published, there is always a question of their topicality. Is a specific topic already irrelevant? Were the author’s predictions for the future when he wrote the article correct or false? After the articles translated for this issue had been published for the first time, we received different responses and comments. But it is also true that none of those commenters ever wrote any articles to substantiate their comments. Therefore, the articles remained written down, while the opinions and comments on them were lost somewhere on air. Now, you, as the readers of this issue, have the opportunity to assess the topicality of the articles yourselves. Igor Kotnik based his article Professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces – a goal or a path on the project “Transition to professional armed forces complemented with contractual reserve” (PROVOJ), which started in 2003. The author defines the present-day situation and wonders how we should proceed in the given circumstances and considering the restrictions which he divides into nine thematic challenges. Viktor Potočnik writes about Slovenian Armed Forces size and character. A lot has already been written, in general, about how many members and which types of units the Slovenian Armed Forces should have. In this paper, the author reveals the truth. His overview and the calculations are very simple and transparent. Just as when the article was first published, we again wonder whether there is anyone among the readers who does not agree with his opinion and would be willing to write an article about it. The article by Mojca Pešec and Uroš Krek Can the process of professional military education create military strategists presents the authors’ views of the education programmes for military strategists in Slovenia both from the theoretical and practical points of view. The authors also substantiate the need for more intensive and better quality strategic theory study programmes. Ivan Žnidar acquaints readers with Transformation challenges to safety and security at Slovenian sea. He states that comprehensive approach, cooperation, coordination and integration of various services for safety at sea provide some of the answers to the question of the rationalisation of the modern security environment. The article Participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in international operations and missions in light of foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia by Branko Podbrežnik highlights international, political and legal frameworks that affect and define the functioning of the Slovenian Armed Forces in the turbulent international environment.

‘Complex(ity)’ is currently fashionable in the humanities. Fashions come and go, but in this article I argue that the interest in complexity connects with something deeper, an intellectual revolution that began before complexity became trendy, and will continue after the spotlight passes on. Yet to make this case, and understand and advance this revolution, we need a better take on ‘complexity’. ‘Complex’ is of course complex. In common use it refers to something ‘composed of many interrelated parts’, or problems ‘so complicated or intricate as to be hard to deal with’. I will call this popular meaning, with its positive and negative values, complexity-1. In science it has a more negative sense, complexity-2, referring to the presenting complexity of problems, which science will strip down to underlying simplicity. But recently it has developed positive meanings in both science and humanities. Complexity-3 marks a revolutionarily more positive attitude to complexity in science that does seek to be reductive. Humanities-style complexity-4, which acknowledges and celebrates the inherent complexity of texts and meanings, is basic in contemporary Media and Cultural studies (MaC for short). The underlying root of complex is plico bend or fold, plus con- together, via complector grasp (something), encompass an idea, or person. The double of ‘complex’ is ‘simple’, from Latin simplex, which less obviously also comes from plico, plus semel once, at the same time. ‘Simple’ and ‘complex’ are closer than people think: only a fold or two apart. A key idea is that these elements are interdependent, parts of a single underlying form. ‘Simple(x)’ is another modality of ‘complex’, dialectically related, different in degree not kind, not absolutely opposite. The idea of ‘holding together’ is stronger in Latin complex, the idea of difficulty more prominent in modern usage, yet the term still includes both. The concept ‘complex’ is untenable apart from ‘simple’. This figure maps the basic structures in ‘complexity’. This complexity contains both positive and negative values, science and non-science, academic and popular meanings, with folds/differences and relationships so dynamically related that no aspect is totally independent. This complex field is the minimum context in which to explore claims about a ‘complexity revolution’. Complexity in Science and Humanities In spite of the apparent similarities between Complexity-3 (sciences) and 4 (humanities), in practice a gulf separates them, policed from both sides. If these sides do not talk to each other, as they often do not, the result is not a complex meaning for ‘complex’, but a semantic war-zone. These two forms of complexity connect and collide because they reach into a new space where discourses of science and non-science are interacting more than they have for many years. For many, in both academic communities, a strong, taken-for-granted mindset declares the difference between them is absolute. They assume that if ‘complexity’ exists in science, it must mean something completely different from what it means in humanities or everyday discourse, so different as to be incomprehensible or unusable by humanists. This terrified defence of the traditional gulf between sciences and humanities is not the clinching argument these critics think. On the contrary, it symptomises what needs to be challenged, via the concept complex. One influential critic of this split was Lord Snow, who talked of ‘two cultures’. Writing in class-conscious post-war Britain he regretted the ignorance of humanities-trained ruling elites about basic science, and scientists’ ignorance of humanities. No-one then or now doubts there is a problem. Most MaC students have a science-light education, and feel vulnerable to critiques which say they do not need to know any science or maths, including complexity science, and could not understand it anyway. To understand how this has happened I go back to the 17th century rise of ‘modern science’. The Royal Society then included the poet Dryden as well as the scientist Newton, but already the fissure between science and humanities was emerging in the elite, re-enforcing existing gaps between both these and technology. The three forms of knowledge and their communities continued to develop over the next 400 years, producing the education system which formed most of us, the structure of academic knowledges in which culture, technology and science form distinct fields. Complexity has been implicated in this three-way split. Influenced by Newton’s wonderful achievement, explaining so much (movements of earthly and heavenly bodies) with so little (three elegant laws of motion, one brief formula), science defined itself as a reductive practice, in which complexity was a challenge. Simplicity was the sign of a successful solution, altering the older reciprocity between simplicity and complexity. The paradox was ignored that proof involved highly complex mathematics, as anyone who reads Newton knows. What science held onto was the outcome, a simplicity then retrospectively attributed to the universe itself, as its true nature. Simplicity became a core quality in the ontology of science, with complexity-2 the imperfection which challenged and provoked science to eliminate it. Humanities remained a refuge for a complexity ontology, in which both problems and solutions were irreducibly complex. Because of the dominance of science as a form of knowing, the social sciences developed a reductivist approach opposing traditional humanities. They also waged bitter struggles against anti-reductionists who emerged in what was called ‘social theory’. Complexity-4 in humanities is often associated with ‘post-structuralism’, as in Derrida, who emphasises the irreducible complexity of every text and process of meaning, or ‘postmodernism’, as in Lyotard’s controversial, influential polemic. Lyotard attempted to take the pulse of contemporary Western thought. Among trends he noted were new forms of science, new relationships between science and humanities, and a new kind of logic pervading all branches of knowledge. Not all Lyotard’s claims have worn well, but his claim that something really important is happening in the relationship between kinds and institutions of knowledge, especially between sciences and humanities, is worth serious attention. Even classic sociologists like Durkheim recognised that the modern world is highly complex. Contemporary sociologists agree that ‘globalisation’ introduces new levels of complexity in its root sense, interconnections on a scale never seen before. Urry argues that the hyper-complexity of the global world requires a complexity approach, combining complexity-3 and 4. Lyotard’s ‘postmodernism’ has too much baggage, including dogmatic hostility to science. Humanities complexity-4 has lost touch with the sceptical side of popular complexity-1, and lacks a dialectic relationship with simplicity. ‘Complexity’, incorporating Complexity-1 and 3, popular and scientific, made more complex by incorporating humanities complexity-4, may prove a better concept for thinking creatively and productively about these momentous changes. Only complex complexity in the approach, flexible and interdisciplinary, can comprehend these highly complex new objects of knowledge. Complexity and the New Condition of Science Some important changes in the way science is done are driven not from above, by new theories or discoveries, but by new developments in social contexts. Gibbons and Nowottny identify new forms of knowledge and practice, which they call ‘mode-2 knowledge’, emerging alongside older forms. Mode-1 is traditional academic knowledge, based in universities, organised in disciplines, relating to real-life problems at one remove, as experts to clients or consultants to employers. Mode-2 is orientated to real life problems, interdisciplinary and collaborative, producing provisional, emergent knowledge. Gibbons and Nowottny do not reference postmodernism but are looking at Lyotard’s trends as they were emerging in practice 10 years later. They do not emphasise complexity, but the new objects of knowledge they address are fluid, dynamic and highly complex. They emphasise a new scale of interdisciplinarity, in collaborations between academics across all disciplines, in science, technology, social sciences and humanities, though they do not see a strong role for humanities. This approach confronts and welcomes irreducible complexity in object and methods. It takes for granted that real-life problems will always be too complex (with too many factors, interrelated in too many ways) to be reduced to the sort of problem that isolated disciplines could handle. The complexity of objects requires equivalent complexity in responses; teamwork, using networks, drawing on relevant knowledge wherever it is to be found. Lyotard famously and foolishly predicted the death of the ‘grand narrative’ of science, but Gibbons and Nowottny offer a more complex picture in which modes-1 and 2 will continue alongside each other in productive dialectic. The linear form of science Lyotard attacked is stronger than ever in some ways, as ‘Big Science’, which delivers wealth and prestige to disciplinary scientists, accessing huge funds to solve highly complex problems with a reductionist mindset. But governments also like the idea of mode-2 knowledge, under whatever name, and try to fund it despite resistance from powerful mode-1 academics. Moreover, non-reductionist science in practice has always been more common than the dominant ideology allowed, whether or not its exponents, some of them eminent scientists, chose to call it ‘complexity’ science. Quantum physics, called ‘the new physics’, consciously departed from the linear, reductionist assumptions of Newtonian physics to project an irreducibly complex picture of the quantum world. Different movements, labelled ‘catastrophe theory’, ‘chaos theory’ and ‘complexity science’, emerged, not a single coherent movement replacing the older reductionist model, but loosely linked by new attitudes to complexity. Instead of seeing chaos and complexity as problems to be removed by analysis, chaos and complexity play a more ambiguous role, as ontologically primary. Disorder and complexity are not later regrettable lapses from underlying essential simplicity and order, but potentially creative resources, to be understood and harnessed, not feared, controlled, eliminated. As a taste of exciting ideas on complexity, barred from humanities MaC students by the general prohibition on ‘consorting with the enemy’ (science), I will outline three ideas, originally developed in complexity-3, which can be described in ways requiring no specialist knowledge or vocabulary, beyond a Mode-2 openness to dynamic, interdisciplinary engagement. Fractals, a term coined by mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, are so popular as striking shapes produced by computer-graphics, circulated on T-shirts, that they may seem superficial, unscientific, trendy. They exist at an intersection between science, media and culture, and their complexity includes transactions across that folded space. The name comes from Latin fractus, broken: irregular shapes like broken shards, which however have their own pattern. Mandelbrot claims that in nature, many such patterns partly repeat on different scales. When this happens, he says, objects on any one scale will have equivalent complexity. Part of this idea is contained in Blake’s famous line: ‘To see the world in a grain of sand’. The importance of the principle is that it fundamentally challenges reductiveness. Nor is it as unscientific as it may sound. Geologists indeed see grains of sand under a microscope as highly complex. In sociology, instead of individuals (literal meaning ‘cannot be divided’) being the minimally simple unit of analysis, individuals can be understood to be as complex (e.g. with multiple identities, linked with many other social beings) as groups, classes or nations. There is no level where complexity disappears. A second concept is ‘fuzzy logic’, invented by an engineer, Zadeh. The basic idea is not unlike the literary critic Empson’s ‘ambiguity’, the sometimes inexhaustible complexity of meanings in great literature. Zadeh’s contribution was to praise the inherent ambiguity and ambiguity of natural languages as a resource for scientists and engineers, making them better, not worse, for programming control systems. Across this apparently simple bridge have flowed many fuzzy machines, more effective than their over-precise brothers. Zadeh crystallised this wisdom in his ‘Principle of incompatibility’: As the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet significant statements about its behaviour decreases until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become almost mutually exclusive characteristics (28) Something along these lines is common wisdom in complexity-1. For instance, under the headline “Law is too complex for juries to understand, says judge” (Dick 4), the Chief Justice of Australia, Murray Gleeson, noted a paradox of complexity, that attempts to improve a system by increasing its complexity make it worse (meaningless or irrelevant, as Zadeh said). The system loses its complexity in another sense, that it no longer holds together. My third concept is the ‘Butterfly Effect’, a name coined by Lorenz. The butterfly was this scientist’s poetic fantasy, an imagined butterfly that flaps its wings somewhere on the Andes, and introduces a small change in the weather system that triggers a hurricane in Montana, or Beijing. This idea is another riff on the idea that complex situations are not reducible to component elements. Every cause is so complex that we can never know in advance just what factor will operate in a given situation, or what its effects might be across a highly complex system. Travels in Complexity I will now explore these issues with reference to a single example, or rather, a nested set of examples, each (as in fractal theory) equivalently complex, yet none identical at any scale. I was travelling in a train from Penrith to Sydney in New South Wales in early 2006 when I read a publicity text from NSW State Rail which asked me: ‘Did you know that delays at Sydenham affect trains to Parramatta? Or that a sick passenger on a train at Berowra can affect trains to Penrith?’ No, I did not know that. As a typical commuter I was impressed, and even more so as an untypical commuter who knows about complexity science. Without ostentatious reference to sources in popular science, NSW Rail was illustrating Lorenz’s ‘butterfly effect’. A sick passenger is prosaic, a realistic illustration of the basic point, that in a highly complex system, a small change in one part, so small that no-one could predict it would matter, can produce a massive, apparently unrelated change in another part. This text was part of a publicity campaign with a scientific complexity-3 subtext, which ran in a variety of forms, in their website, in notices in carriages, on the back of tickets. I will use a complexity framework to suggest different kinds of analysis and project which might interest MaC students, applicable to objects that may not refer to be complexity-3. The text does two distinct things. It describes a planning process, and is part of a publicity program. The first, simplifying movement of Mode-1 analysis would see this difference as projecting two separate objects for two different specialists: a transport expert for the planning, a MaC analyst for the publicity, including the image. Unfortunately, as Zadeh warned, in complex conditions simplification carries an explanatory cost, producing descriptions that are meaningless or irrelevant, even though common sense (complexity-1) says otherwise. What do MaC specialists know about rail systems? What do engineers know about publicity? But collaboration in a mode-2 framework does not need extensive specialist knowledge, only enough to communicate with others. MaC specialists have a fuzzy knowledge of their own and other areas of knowledge, attuned by Humanities complexity-4 to tolerate uncertainty. According to the butterfly principle it would be foolish to wish our University education had equipped us with the necessary other knowledges. We could never predict what precise items of knowledge would be handy from our formal and informal education. The complexity of most mode-2 problems is so great that we cannot predict in advance what we will need to know. MaC is already a complex field, in which ‘Media’ and ‘Culture’ are fuzzy terms which interact in different ways. Media and other organisations we might work with are often imbued with linear forms of thought (complexity-2), and want simple answers to simple questions about complex systems. For instance, MaC researchers might be asked as consultants to determine the effect of this message on typical commuters. That form of analysis is no longer respectable in complexity-4 MaC studies. Old-style (complexity-2) effects-research modelled Senders, Messages and Receivers to measure effects. Standard research methods of complexity-2 social sciences might test effects of the message by a survey instrument, with a large sample to allow statistically significant results. Using this, researchers could claim to know whether the publicity campaign had its desired effect on its targeted demographic: presumably inspiring confidence in NSW Rail. However, each of these elements is complex, and interactions between them, and others that don’t enter into the analysis, create further levels of complexity. To manage this complexity, MaC analysts often draw on Foucault’s authority to use ‘discourse’ to simplify analysis. This does not betray the principle of complexity. Complexity-4 needs a simplicity-complexity dialectic. In this case I propose a ‘complexity discourse’ to encapsulate the complex relations between Senders, Receivers and Messages into a single word, which can then be related to other such elements (e.g. ‘publicity discourse’). In this case complexity-3 can also be produced by attending to details of elements in the S-M-R chain, combining Derridean ‘deconstruction’ with expert knowledge of the situation. This Sender may be some combination of engineers and planners, managers who commissioned the advertisement, media professionals who carried it out. The message likewise loses its unity as its different parts decompose into separate messages, leaving the transaction a fraught, unpredictable encounter between multiple messages and many kinds of reader and sender. Alongside its celebration of complexity-3, this short text runs another message: ‘untangling our complex rail network’. This is complexity-2 from science and engineering, where complexity is only a problem to be removed. A fuller text on the web-site expands this second strand, using bullet points and other signals of a linear approach. In this text, there are 5 uses of ‘reliable’, 6 uses of words for problems of complexity (‘bottlenecks’, ‘delays’, ‘congestion’), and 6 uses of words for the new system (‘simpler’, ‘independent’). ‘Complex’ is used twice, both times negatively. In spite of the impression given by references to complexity-3, this text mostly has a reductionist attitude to complexity. Complexity is the enemy. Then there is the image. Each line is a different colour, and they loop in an attractive way, seeming to celebrate graceful complexity-2. Yet this part of the image is what is going to be eliminated by the new program’s complexity-2. The interesting complexity of the upper part of the image is what the text declares is the problem. What are commuters meant to think? And Railcorp? This media analysis identifies a fissure in the message, which reflects a fissure in the Sender-complex. It also throws up a problem in the culture that produced such interesting allusions to complexity science, but has linear, reductionist attitudes to complexity in its practice. We can ask: where does this cultural problem go, in the organisation, in the interconnected system and bureaucracy it manages? Is this culture implicated in the problems the program is meant to address? These questions are more productive if asked in a collaborative mode-2 framework, with an organisation open to such questions, with complex researchers able to move between different identities, as media analyst, cultural analyst, and commuter, interested in issues of organisation and logistics, engaged with complexity in all senses. I will continue my imaginary mode-2 collaboration with Railcorp by offering them another example of fractal analysis, looking at another instant, captured in a brief media text. On Wednesday 14 March, 2007, two weeks before a State government election, a very small cause triggered a systems failure in the Sydney network. A small carbon strip worth $44 which was not properly attached properly threw Sydney’s transport network into chaos on Wednesday night, causing thousands of commuters to be trapped in trains for hours. (Baker and Davies 7) This is an excellent example of a butterfly effect, but it is not labelled as such, nor regarded positively in this complexity-1 framework. ‘Chaos’ signifies something no-one wants in a transport system. This is popular not scientific reductionism. The article goes on to tell the story of one passenger, Mark MacCauley, a quadriplegic left without power or electricity in a train because the lift was not working. He rang City Rail, and was told that “someone would be in touch in 3 to 5 days” (Baker and Davies 7). He then rang emergency OOO, and was finally rescued by contractors “who happened to be installing a lift at North Sydney” (Baker and Davies 7). My new friends at NSW Rail would be very unhappy with this story. It would not help much to tell them that this is a standard ‘human interest’ article, nor that it is more complex than it looks. For instance, MacCauley is not typical of standard passengers who usually concern complexity-2 planners of rail networks. He is another butterfly, whose specific needs would be hard to predict or cater for. His rescue is similarly unpredictable. Who would have predicted that these contractors, with their specialist equipment, would be in the right place at the right time to rescue him? Complexity provided both problem and solution. The media’s double attitude to complexity, positive and negative, complexity-1 with a touch of complexity-3, is a resource which NSW Rail might learn to use, even though it is presented with such hostility here. One lesson of the complexity is that a tight, linear framing of systems and problems creates or exacerbates problems, and closes off possible solutions. In the problem, different systems didn’t connect: social and material systems, road and rail, which are all ‘media’ in McLuhan’s highly fuzzy sense. NSW Rail communication systems were cumbrously linear, slow (3 to 5 days) and narrow. In the solution, communication cut across institutional divisions, mediated by responsive, fuzzy complex humans. If the problem came from a highly complex system, the solution is a complex response on many fronts: planning, engineering, social and communication systems open to unpredictable input from other surrounding systems. As NSW Rail would have been well aware, the story responded to another context. The page was headed ‘Battle for NSW’, referring to an election in 2 weeks, in which this newspaper editorialised that the incumbent government should be thrown out. This political context is clearly part of the complexity of the newspaper message, which tries to link not just the carbon strip and ‘chaos’, but science and politics, this strip and the government’s credibility. Yet the government was returned with a substantial though reduced majority, not the swingeing defeat that might have been predicted by linear logic (rail chaos = electoral defeat) or by some interpretations of the butterfly effect. But complexity-3 does not say that every small cause produces catastrophic effects. On the contrary, it says that causal situations can be so complex that we can never be entirely sure what effects will follow from any given case. The political situation in all its complexity is an inseparable part of the minimal complex situation which NSW Rail must take into account as it considers how to reform its operations. It must make complexity in all its senses a friend and ally, not just a source of nasty surprises. My relationship with NSW Rail at the moment is purely imaginary, but illustrates positive and negative aspects of complexity as an organising principle for MaC researchers today. The unlimited complexity of Humanities’ complexity-4, Derridean and Foucauldian, can be liberating alongside the sometimes excessive scepticism of Complexity-2, but needs to keep in touch with the ambivalence of popular complexity-1. Complexity-3 connects with complexity-2 and 4 to hold the bundle together, in a more complex, cohesive, yet still unstable dynamic structure. It is this total sprawling, inchoate, contradictory (‘complex’) brand of complexity that I believe will play a key role in the up-coming intellectual revolution. But only time will tell. References Baker, Jordan, and Anne Davies. “Carbon Strip Caused Train Chaos.” Sydney Morning Herald 17 Mar. 2007: 7. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976. Dick, Tim. “Law Is Now Too Complex for Juries to Understand, Says Judge.” Sydney Morning Herald 26 Mar. 2007: 4. Empson, William. Seven Types of Ambiguity. London: Chatto and Windus, 1930. Foucault, Michel. “The Order of Discourse.” In Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock, 1972. Gibbons, Michael. The New Production of Knowledge. London: Sage, 1994. Lorenz, Edward. The Essence of Chaos. London: University College, 1993. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media. London: Routledge, 1964. Mandelbrot, Benoit. “The Fractal Geometry of Nature.” In Nina Hall, ed. The New Scientist Guide to Chaos. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963. Nowottny, Henry. Rethinking Science. London: Polity, 2001. Snow, Charles Percy. The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. London: Faber 1959. Urry, John. Global Complexity. London: Sage, 2003. Zadeh, Lotfi Asker. “Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex Systems and Decision Processes.” ILEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 3.1 (1973): 28-44. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Hodge, Bob. "The Complexity Revolution." M/C Journal 10.3 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/01-hodge.php>. APA Style Hodge, B. (Jun. 2007) "The Complexity Revolution," M/C Journal, 10(3). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/01-hodge.php>.

Boxing is a purely masculine activity and it inhabits a purely masculine world. […] Boxing is for men, and it is about men, and is men. (Joyce Carol Oates) IntroductionWriting about boxing is an intimate, private, and unusual activity. Although a decade has passed since I first “stepped into the ring” (sparring or fighting), I have not engaged with boxing in academic terms. I undertook a doctoral degree from 2012 to 2016, during which I competed and won amateur titles in three different countries. Boxing, in a sense, shadowed my research. My fieldwork, researching heritage foods networks, brought me to various locales, situating my body in reference to participants and academics as well as my textual analysis. My daily interactions and reflections in the boxing gym, though, were marginalised to give priority to my doctorate. In a mirrored journey to Wacquant’s “carnal ethnography of the skilled body” (Habitus 87), I boxed as a hobby. It was a means to escape my life as a doctoral student, my thesis, and the library. Research belonged to the realm of academia; boxing, to the realm of the physical. In this paper, I seek to implode this self-imposed distinction.Practising the “noble art,” as boxing is commonly called, profoundly altered not only my body but also my way of seeing the world, myself, and others. I explore these themes through an autoethnographic account of my experience in the ring. Focusing on sparring, rather than competing, I explore conceptualisations of my face as a material, as well as part of my body, and also as a surface for violence and apprenticeship. Reflecting upon a decade of sparring, the analysis presented in this paper is grounded in the phenomenological tradition whereby knowledge is not an abstract notion that exists over and above felt experience: it is sensed and embodied through practice.I delve into the narratives of my personal “social logic of a bodily craft” of boxing (Wacquant, Habitus 85). More specifically, I reflect upon my experiences of getting hit in the face by men in the ring, and the acclimatisation required, evolving from feelings of intrusion, betrayal, and physical pain to habit, and at times, excitement. As a surface for punching, my face became both material and immaterial. It was a tool that had to be tuned to varying degrees of pain to inform me of my performance as well as my opponent’s. Simultaneously, it was a surface that was abstracted and side-lined in order to put myself purposefully in harm’s way as one does when stepping into the ring. Through reflecting on my face, I consider how the sport offered new embodied experiences through which I became keenly aware of my body as a delineated target for—as well as the source of—violence. In particular, my body boundaries were profoundly reconfigured in the ring: sparring partners demonstrated their respect by hitting me, validating both my body and my skill as a boxer. In this manner, I discuss the spatiality of the ring as eliciting transitions of felt and abstracted pain as well as shaping my self-image as a re-gendered boxer in the ring and out. Throughout my account, I briefly engage with Wacquant’s discussion of “pugilistic habitus” (Body 99) and his claims that boxing is the epitome of masculine valour. In the final section, I conclude with deliberations upon the new bodily awareness(es) I gained through the sport, and the re-materiality I experienced as a strong woman.Methodological and Conceptual FrameworksThe analysis in this paper is based on the hybrid narrative of ethnography and autobiography: autoethnography. In the words of Tami Spry, autoethnography is “a self-narrative that critiques the situatedness of self and others in social context” (710). As such, I take stock in hindsight (Bruner; Denzin) of the evolution of my thoughts on boxing, my stance as a boxer, and the ways the ring has affected my sense of self and my body.Unlike Wacquant's “carnal ethnography” (Habitus 83) whose involvement with boxing was foregrounded in an academic context where he wrote detailed field-notes and conducted participant observation, my involvement was deliberately non-academic until I began to write this paper. Based on hindsight, the data collected through this autoethnography are value-inflected in ways that differ from other modes of data collection. But I have sought to recreate a dialectic between perceptual experience and cultural practices and patterns, in a manner aligned with Csordas’s paradigm of embodiment. My method is to “retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture” (Ellis et al. 276) of boxing. These epiphanies, as sensed and embodied knowledge, were not solely conceptual moments but also physical realisations that my body performed, such as understanding—and executing—a well-timed slip to the side to avoid a punch.Focusing on my embodied experiences in the ring and out, I have sought to uncover “somatic modes of attention:” the “culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others” (Csordas 138). The aim of this engagement is to convey my self-representation as a boxer in the ring, which emerged in part through the inter-subjectivity of interacting with other boxers whilst prioritising representations of my face. As such, my personal narrative is enmeshed with insights gleaned during embodied epiphanies I had in the ring, interweaving storytelling with theory.I have chosen to use the conventions of storytelling (Ellis and Ellingson) to explore the defining moments that shaped the image I hold of myself as a boxer. My personal narrative—where I view myself as the phenomenon—seeks “to produce aesthetic and evocative thick descriptions of personal and interpersonal experience” (Ellis et al. 287) whilst striving to remain accessible to a broader audience than within academia (Bochner). Personal narratives offer an understanding of the “self or aspect of a life as it intersects with a cultural context, connect to other participants as co-researchers, and invite readers to enter the author's world and to use what they learn there to reflect on, understand, and cope with their own lives” (Ellis 14; see also Ellis et al. 289).As the focus of my narrative is my face, I used my body, in Longhurst et al.’s words, as the “primary tool through which all interactions and emotions filter in accessing subjects and their geographies” (208). As “the foundation of the entire pugilistic regimen”, the body is the site of an intimate self-awareness, of the “body-sense” (Heiskanen 26). Taking my body as the starting point of my analysis, my conceptual framework is heavily informed by Thrift’s non-representational theory, enabling me to inquire into the “skills and knowledges [people] get from being embodied beings” (127), and specifically, embodied boxers. The analysis presented here is thus based on an “epistemic reflexivity” (Wacquant, Habitus 89) and responds to what Wacquant coins the “pugilistic habitus” (Body 99): a set of acquired dispositions of the boxer. Bourdieu believes that people are social agents who actively construct social reality through “categories of perception, appreciation and action” (30). The boxing habitus needs to be grasped with one’s body: it intermingles “cognitive categories, bodily skills and desires which together define the competence and appetence specific to the boxer” (Wacquant, Habitus 87). Through this habitus, I construct an image of myself not only as a boxer, but also as a re-gendered being, directly critiquing Wacquant’s arguments of the “pugilist” as fundamentally male.Resistance to Female BoxingMischa Merz’s manuscript on her boxing experience is the most accurate narrative I have yet read on female boxing, as a visceral as well as incorporeal experience, which led Merz to question and reconsider her own identity. When Merz published her manuscript in 2000, six years before I put the gloves on, the boxing world was still resisting the presence of women in the ring. In the UK, licenses for boxing were refused to women until 1998, and in New South Wales, Australia, it was illegal for women to compete until December 2008. It was not until 2012 that female boxing became internationally recognised as a sport in its own right. During the London Olympics, after a sulphurous debate on whether women should be made to box in skirts to “differentiate” them from men, women were finally allowed to compete in three weight categories, compared to ten for men.When I first started training in 2006 at the age of 21, I was unaware of the long list of determined and courageous women who had carved their way—and facilitated mine—into the ring, fighting for their right to practise a sport considered men’s exclusive domain. By the time I started learning the “sweet science” (another popular term used for boxing), my presence was accepted, albeit still unusual. My university had decreed boxing a violent sport that could not be allowed on campus. As a result, I only started boxing when I obtained a driving licence, and could attend training sessions off-campus. My desire to box had been sparked five years before, when I viewed Girlfight, a film depicting a young woman’s journey into the ring. Until then, I had never imagined a woman could box, let alone be inspirational in the use of her strength, aggression, and violence; to be strong was, for me, to be manly—which, as a woman, translated as monstrous or a perversion. I suddenly recognised in boxing a possibility to rid myself of the burden of what I saw as my bulk, and transform my body into a graceful pugilist—a fighter.First Sparring SessionTwo months after I had first thrown a punch in my coach’s pad—the gear coaches wear to protect their hands when a boxer is punching them to train—I was allowed into the ring to spar. Building up to this moment, I had anticipated and dreaded my first steps in the ring as the test of my skill and worthiness as a boxer. This moment would show my physical conditioning: whether I had trained and dieted correctly, if I was strong or resilient enough to fight. More crucially, it would lay bare my personality, the strength of my character, the extent of my willpower and belief in myself: it would reveal, in boxing terminology, if I had “heart.” Needless to say I had fantasised often about this moment. It was my initiation into the art of being punched and I hoped I would prove myself a hardened individual, capable of withstanding pain without flinching or retreating.The memory of the first punch to my face—my nose, to be exact—remains clear and vivid. My sparring partner was my coach, a retired boxer who hit me repeatedly in the head during the entirety of my first round. Getting hit in the face for the first time is a profound moment of rupture. Until then, my face had been a bodily surface reserved for affective gestures by individuals of trust: kisses of greeting on the cheeks or caresses from lovers. Only once had I been slapped, in an act of aggression that had left me paralysed with shock and feeling violated. Now in the ring, being punched in the face by a man I trusted, vastly more experienced and stronger than I, provoked a violent reaction of indignation and betrayal. Feelings of deceit, physical intrusion, and confusion overwhelmed me; pain was an entirely secondary concern. I had, without realising, assumed my coach would “go easy” on me, softening his punches and giving me time to react adequately to his attacks as we had practised on the pads. A couple of endless minutes later, I stepped out of the ring, breathless and staring at the floor to hide my tears of humiliation and overwhelming frustration.It is a common experience amongst novices, when first stepping into the ring, to forget everything they have been taught: footwork, defence, combinations, chin down, guard up … etc. They often freeze, as I did, with the first physical contact. Suddenly and concretely, with the immediacy of pain, they become aware of the extent of the danger they have purposely placed themselves in. The disturbance I felt was matched in part by my belief that I was essentially a coward. In an act condemned by the boxing community, I had turned my face away from punches: I tried to escape the ring instead of dominating it. Merz succinctly describes this experience in the boxing realm: “aspects of my character were frequently tossed in my face for assessment. I saw gaping holes in my tenacity, my resilience, my courage, my athleticism” (49). That night, I felt an unfamiliar sting as I took my jumper off, noticing a slight yet painful bruise on the bridge of my nose. It reminded me of my inadequacy and, I believed at the time, a fundamental failure of character: I lacked heart.My Face: A Tool for Sensing and Ignoring PainTo get as accustomed as a punching bag to repeated hits without flinching I had to mould my face into a mask of impassivity, revealing little to my opponent. My face also became a calibrated tool to measure my opponent’s skill, strength, and intent through the levels of pain it would experience. If an opponent repeatedly targeted my nose, I knew the sparring session was not a “friendly encounter.” Most often though, we would nod at each other in acknowledgement of the other’s successful “contact,” such as when their punches hurt my body. The ring is the only space I know and inhabit where the display of physical violence can be interpreted as a “friendly gesture” (Merz 12).Boxers, like most athletes, are carefully attuned to measuring the degrees of pain they undergo during a fight and training, whilst accomplishing the paradoxical feat—when they are hit—of setting aside that pain lest it be a distraction. In other words, boxers’ bodies are both material and immaterial: they are sites for accessing sensory information, notably pain levels, as well as tools that—at times detrimentally—have learned to abstract pain in the effort to ignore physical limitations, impediments or fatigue. Boxers with “heart,” I believe, are those who inhabit this duality of material and immaterial bodies.I have systematically been questioned whether I fear bruising or scarring my face. It would seem illogical to many that a woman would voluntarily engage in an activity that could blemish her appearance. Beyond this concern lies the issue, as Merz puts it, that “physical prowess and femininity seem to be so fundamentally incompatible” (476). My face used to be solely a source of concern as a medium of beautification and the platform from which I believed the world judged my degree of attractiveness. It also served as a marker of distinction: those I trusted intimately could touch my face, others could not. Throughout my training, my face evolved and also became an instrument that I conditioned and used strategically in the ring. The bruises I received attested to my readiness to exchange punches, a mark of valour I came to relish more than looking “nice.”Boxing has taught me how to feel my body in new ways. I no longer inhabit an “absent body” (Leder). I intimately know the border between my skin and the world, aware of exactly how far my body extends into that world and how much “punishment” (getting hit) it can withstand: boxing—which Oates (26) observed as a spectator rather than boxer—“is an act of consummate self-determination—the constant re-establishment of the parameters of one’s being.” A strong initial allure of boxing was the strict discipline it gave to my eating habits, an anchor—and at times, a torture—for someone who suffered from decade-long eating disorders. Although boxing plagued me with the need to “make weight”—to fight in a designated weight category—I no longer sought to be as petite as I could manage. As a female boxer, I was reminded of my gender, and my “unusual” body, as I am uncommonly big, strong, and heavy compared to most female fighters. I still find it difficult to find women to spar with, let alone fight. Unlike in the world outside the gym, though, my size is something I continuously learn to value as an advantage in the ring, a tool for affirmation, and significantly, a means of acceptance by, and equality with, men.The Ring: A Place of Re-GenderingAs sparring became routine, I had an epiphany: what I had taken as an act of betrayal from my coach was actually one of respect. Opponents who threw “honest” (painful) punches esteemed me as a boxer. I have, to this day, very rarely sparred with women. I often get told that I punch “like a guy,” an ability with which I have sought to impress coaches and boxers alike. As such, I am usually partnered with men who believe, as they have told me, that hitting a “girl”—and even worse, hitting a girl in the face—is simply unacceptable. Many have admitted that they fear hurting me, though some have quickly wanted to after a couple of exchanges. I have found that their views of “acceptable” violence seem unchanged after a session, as I believe they have come to view me as a boxer first and as a woman second.It would be disingenuous to omit that boxing attracted me as much for the novelty status I have gained within and outside of it. I have often walked a thin line between revelling in the sense of belonging that boxing provides me—anchored in a feeling that gender no longer matters—and the acute sense of feeling special because I am a woman performing as a man in what is still considered a man’s world. I have wavered between feeling as though I am shrugging off the very notion of gender in the ring, to deeply reconsidering what my gender means to me and the world, embracing a more fluid and performative understanding of gender than I had before (Messner; Young).In a way, my sense of self is shaped conflictingly by the ways in which boxers behave towards me in the ring, and how others see me outside of the boxing gym. As de Bruin and de Haan suggest, my body, in its active dimension, is open to the other and grounds inter-subjectivity. This inter-subjectivity of embodiment—how other bodies constitute my own sensory and perceptual experience of being-in-the-world—remains ambivalent. It has led me to feel at times genderless—or rather, beyond gender—in the ring and, because of this feeling, I simultaneously question and continuously re-explore more vividly what can be understood as “female masculinity” (Halberstam). As training progressed, I increasingly felt that:If women are going to fight, we have to be reminded, at every chance available, time and again, that they are still feminine or capable, at least, of wearing the costume of femininity, being hobbled by high heels and constrained by tight dresses. All female athletes in a way are burdened with having to re-iterate this same public narrative. (Merz)As I learned to box, I also learned to delineate myself alongside the ring: as I questioned notions of gender inside, I consequently sought to reaffirm a specific and static idea of gender through overt femininity outside the ring, as other female athletes have also been seen to do (Duncan). During my first years of training, I was the only woman at the gyms I trained in. I believed I had to erase any physical reminders of femininity: my sport clothes were loose fitting, my hair short, and I never wore jewellery or make-up. I wanted to be seen as a boxer, not a woman: my physical attractiveness was, for once, irrelevant. Ironically, I could not conceive of myself as a woman in the ring, and did not believe I could be seen as a woman in the ring. Outside the gym, I increasingly sought to reassert a stereotypical feminine appearance, taking pleasure in subverting another set of beliefs. People are usually hesitant to visualise a woman in a skirt, without a broken nose, as a competitive fighter with a mouth guard and headgear. As Wacquant succinctly put it, “I led a sort of Dr. Jekyll-and-Mr. Hyde existence” (Habitus 86), which crystallised when one of my coaches failed to recognise me on three occasions outside the gym, in my “normal” clothes.I have now come to resent profoundly the marginal, sensationalised status that being a boxer denotes for a woman. This is premised on particular social norms surrounding gender, which dictate that if a woman boxes, she is not “your usual” woman. I have striven to re-gender my experience, especially in light of the recent explosion of interest in female boxing, where new norms are being established. As I have trained around the world, including in Cuba, France, and the USA, and competed in the UK, Mexico, and Belgium, I have valued the tacit connection between those who practice the “noble art.” Boxing fashions a particular habitus (Bourdieu), the “pugilistic habitus” (Wacquant, Body 12). Stepping into the ring, and being able to handle getting hit in the face, constitutes a common language that boxers around the world, male and female, understand, value, and share; a language that transcends the tacit everyday embodiments of gender and class. Boxing is habitually said to give access to an upward mobility (Wacquant, Habitus; Heiskanen). In my case, as a white, educated, middle-class woman, boxing has given me access to cross-class associations: I have trained alongside men who had been shot in Coventry, were jobless in Cuba, or dealt with drug gangs in Mexico. The ring is an equalising space, where social, gender—and in my experience, ethnic—divides can be smoothed down to leave the pugilistic valour, the property of boxing excellence, as the main metric of appreciation.The freedom I have found in the ring is one that has allowed my gendered identity to be thought of in new and creative ways that invite continuous revision. I have discovered myself not solely through the prism of a gendered lens, but as an emotive athlete, and as a person desperate to be accepted despite—or because of—her physical strength. I find myself returning to Merz’s eloquence: “boxing cannot help but make you question who you really are. You cannot hide from yourself in a boxing ring. It might seem a crazy path to self-knowledge, but to me it has been the most rich, rewarding, and perhaps, the only true one” (111). Using Wacquant’s own words to disprove his theory that boxing is fundamentally a virile activity that reaffirms specific notions of masculinity, to become a boxer is to “efface the distinction between the physical and the spiritual [...] to defy the border between reason and passion” (Body 20). In my view, it is to implode the oppositional definitions that have kept males inside the ring and females, out. The ring, in ways unrivalled elsewhere, has shown me that I am not reducible, as the world has at times convinced me, to my strength or my gender. I can, and indeed do, coalesce and transcend both.ConclusionAfter having pondered the significance of the ring to my life, I now begin to understand Merz’s journey as “so much more than a mere dalliance on the dark side of masculine culture” (21). When I box, I am always boxing against myself. The ring is the ultimate space of revelation, where one is starkly confronted with one’s own weaknesses and fears. As a naked mirror, the ring is also a place for redemption, where one can overcome flaws, and uncover facets of who one is. Having spent almost as much time at university as I have boxing, it was in the ring that I learned that “thinking otherwise entails being otherwise, relating to oneself, one’s body, and ambient beings in a new way” (Sharp 749). Through the “boxing habitus,” I have simultaneously developed a boxer’s body and habits as well as integrated new notions of gender. As an exercise in re-gendering, sparring has led me to reflect more purposefully on the multiplicity of meanings that gender can espouse, and on the possibilities of negotiating the world as both strong and female. Practising the “noble art” has given me new tools with which to carve out, within the structures of the society I inhabit, liberating possibilities of being a pugilistic woman. However, I have yet to determine if women have fashioned a space within the ring for themselves, or if they still need to reaffirm a gendered identity in the eyes of others to earn the right to get hit in the face.References Bochner, Arthur P. “It’s about Time: Narrative and the Divided Self.” Qualitative Inquiry 3.4 (1997): 418–438.Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 1990.Bruner, Jerome. “The Autobiographical Process.” The Culture of Autobiography: Constructions of Self-Representation. Ed. Robert Folkenflik. Vol. 6. Stanford UP, 1993. 38–56.Csordas, Thomas. “Somatic Modes of Attention.” Cultural Anthropology 8.2 (1993): 135–156.De Bruin, Leon, and Sanneke de Haan. “Enactivism and Social Cognition: In Search of the Whole Story.” Cognitive Semiotics 4.1 (2009): 225–50.Denzin, Norman K. Interpretive Biography. London: Sage, 1989.Duncan, Margaret C. “Gender Warriors in Sport: Women and the Media.” Handbook of Sports and Media. Eds. Arthur A. Raney and Jennings Bryant. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006. 231–252.Ellis, Carolyn. The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel about Autoethnography. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2004.Ellis, Carolyn, Tony E. Adams, and Arthur P. Bochner. “Autoethnography: An Overview.” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung (2011): 273–90.Ellis, Carolyn, and Laura Ellingson. “Qualitative Methods.” Encyclopedia of Sociology. Eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and Rhonda JV Montgomery. Macmillan Library Reference, 2000. 2287–96.Halberstam, Judith. Female Masculinity. Durham: Duke UP, 1998.Heiskanen, Benita. The Urban Geography of Boxing: Race, Class, and Gender in the Ring. Vol. 13. Routledge, 2012.Girlfight. Dir. Karyn Kusama. Screen Gems, 2000.Leder, Drew. The Absent Body. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990.Longhurst, Robyn, Elsie Ho, and Lynda Johnston. “Using ‘the Body’ as an Instrument of Research: Kimch’i and Pavlova.” Area 40.2 (2008): 208–17.Messner, Michael. Out of Play: Critical Essays on Gender and Sport. New York: SUNY Press, 2010.Merz, Mischa. Bruising: A Boxer’s Story. Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2000.Oates, Joyce Carol. On Boxing. Garden City, New York: Harper Collins, 1987.Sharp, Hasana. “The Force of Ideas in Spinoza.” Political Theory 35.6 (2007): 732–55.Spry, Tami. “Performing Autoethnography: An Embodied Methodological Praxis.” Qualitative Inquiry 7.6 (2001): 706–32.Thrift, Nigel. “The Still Point: Resistance, Expressive Embodiment and Dance.” Geographies of Resistance (1997): 124–51.Wacquant, Loïc. Body & Soul. New York: Oxford UP, 2004.———. “Habitus as Topic and Tool: Reflections on Becoming a Prizefighter.” Qualitative Research in Psychology 8.1 (2011): 81–92.Young, Iris Marion. Throwing like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana UP, 1990.

IntroductionThe perception of the archive as the warehouse of tradition is inflected with the notion that what it stores is also removed from the everyday, at once ancient but also irrelevant, standing still outside time. Yet, if the past is of any relevance, the archive cannot maintain a rigid fixity that does not intersect with the present. In the work of the Atlas Group, the fabrication of “archival material” reflects what Hal Foster has termed an “archival impulse” that is constructed of multiple temporalities. The Atlas Group archive interrogates forms that are at once still, excavated from life, while still being in the present. In the process, the reductive singularity of the archive as an immobile monument is opened up to the complexity of a radical stillness through which the past enters the present in a moment of recognition. What is still, and what is still there, intersect in the productivity of a stillness that cuts through an undifferentiated continuity. This juncture echoes the Benjaminian flash which heralds the arrival of past in the presentTo articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. (Benjamin, Theses)Klee’s Angelus Novus stands still between past and future as a momentary suspension of motion brings history and prophecy into the present. For “the historian of the dialectic at a standstill”, Walter Benjamin, historical materialism was not simply a means of accessing the past in the present, but of awakening the potential of the future (Tiedemann 944-945). This, Rolf Tiedemann suggests, was the revolution of historical perception that Benjamin wanted to bring about in his unfinished Arcades Project (941). By carrying the principle of montage into history, Benjamin indicates an intention “to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total event” (Benjamin Arcades 461). This principle had already been alluded to in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” where he had written that a historical materialist cannot do without a present in which time stands still, and later, that it is in the arrest of thought that what has been and what will be “crystallizes into a monad” (Benjamin “Theses” 262-263).Everywhere in Benjamin’s writings on history, there is something of the irreducibility of the phrase “standing still”. Standing still: still as an active, ongoing form of survival and endurance, still as an absence of movement. The duality of stillness is amplified as semantic clarity vacillates between one possibility and another: to endure and to be motionless. Is it possible to reduce “standing still” to a singularity? Benjamin’s counsel to take hold of memory at the “moment of danger” might be an indication of this complexity. The “moment of danger” emerges as the flash of the past in the present, but also the instant at which the past could recede into the inertia of eternity, at once a plea against the reduction of the moment into a “dead time” and recognition of the productivity of stillness.Something of that “flash” surfaces in Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Michel Foucault: “a first light opens up things and brings forth visibilities as flashes and shimmerings, which are the ‘second light’” (Deleuze 50). The first flash makes “visibilities visible” and determines what can be seen in a given historical period, while the second makes “statements articulable” and defines what can be said (Deleuze 50). These visibilities and statements, however, are distributed into the stratum and constitute knowledge as “stratified, archivized, and endowed with a relatively rigid segmentarity” (Deleuze 61). Strata are historically determined, what they constitute of perceptions and discursive formations varies across time and results in the presence of thresholds between the stratum that come to behave as distinct layers subject to splits and changes in direction (Deleuze 44). Despite these temporal variations that account for differences across thresholds, the strata appear as fixed entities, they mimic rock formations shaped over thousands of years of sedimentation (Deleuze and Guattari 45). Reading Deleuze on Foucault in conjunction with his earlier collaborative work with Felix Guattari brings forth distant shadows of another “stratification”. A Thousand Plateaus is notably less interested in discursive formations and more concerned with “striation”, the organisation and arrangement of space by the diagrams of power. Striated space is state space. It is offset by moving in the opposite direction, effectively turning striated space into smooth space (Deleuze and Guattari 524).Whether on striation or stratification, Deleuze’s work exhibits more than a cautionary distrust of processes of classification, regulation, and organization. Despite the flash that brings visibilities and statements into being, stratification, as much as striation, remains a technique of knowledge shaped by the strategies of power. It is interesting however, that Deleuze sees something as indeterminate as a flash, creating structures that are as determined as stratum. Yet perhaps this is a deceptive conjecture since while the strata appear relatively rigid they are also “extremely mobile” (Deleuze and Guattari 553). Foucault had already given an indication that what the archaeological method uncovers is not necessarily suspended, but rather that it suspends the notion of an absolute continuity (Archaeology 169). He suggests that “history is that which transforms documents into monuments” (7). The task of archaeology, it would seem, is to recover documents from monuments by demonstrating rather than reversing the process of sedimentation and without necessarily relying on a motionless past. While there is a relative, albeit interstratically tentative, stillness in the strata, absolute destratification proceeds towards deterritorialisation through incessant movement (Deleuze and Guattari 62-63).If A Thousand Plateaus is any indication, the imperative for the creative thinker today seems to be stirring in this direction: movement, motion, animation. Whatever forms of resistance are to be envisioned, it is motion, rather than stillness, that emerges as a radical form of action (Deleuze and Guattari 561). The question raised by these theoretical interventions is not so much whether such processes are indeed valuable forms of opposition, but rather, whether movement is always the only means, or the most effective means, of resistance? To imagine resistance as “staying in place” seems antithetical to nomadic thinking but is it not possible to imagine moments when the nomad resists not by travelling, but by dwelling? What of all those living a life of forced nomadism, or dying nomadic deaths, those for whom movement is merely displacement and loss? In Metamorphoses Rosi Braidotti reflects upon forced displacement and loss, yet her emphasis nonetheless remains on “figurations”, mappings of identity through time and space, mappings of movement (2-3). Braidotti certainly does not neglect the victims of motion, those who are forced to move, yet she remains committed to nomadism as a form of becoming. Braidotti’s notion of “figurations” finds a deeply poignant expression in Joseph Pugliese’s textual maps of some of these technically “nomadic” bodies and their movement from the North African littoral into the waters of the Mediterranean where they eventually surface on southern European shores as corpses (Pugliese 15). While Braidotti recognizes the tragedy of these involuntary nomads, it is in Pugliese’s work that this tragedy is starkly exposed and given concrete form in the figures of Europe’s refugees. This is movement as death, something akin to what Paul Virilio calls inertia, the product of excessive speed, the uncanny notion of running to stand still (Virilio 16).This tension between motion and stillness surfaces again in Laura Marks’ essay “Asphalt Nomadism.” Despite wanting to embrace the desert as a smooth space Marks retorts that “smooth space seems always to be elsewhere” (Marks 126). She notes the stability of the acacia trees and thorny shrubs in the desert and the way that nomadic people are constantly beset with invitations from the “civilising forces of religion and the soporific of a daily wage” (Marks 126). Emphatically she concludes that “the desert is never really ‘smooth’, for that is death” (Marks 126). On this deviation from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the desert as smooth space she concludes: “we who inherit their thinking need to stay on the ground: both in thought, moving close to the surface of concepts, and literally, remaining alert to signs of life in the sand and the scrub of the desert” (Marks 126). In Marks’ appeal for groundedness the tension between motion and stillness is maintained rather than being resolved through recourse to smoothness or in favour of perpetual movement. The sedentary and still structures that pervade the desert remain: the desert could not exist without them. In turn we might ask whether even the most rigorous abstraction can convince us that the ground between radical nomadism and perpetual displacement does not also need to be rethought. Perhaps this complexity is starkest when we begin to think about war, not only the potentiality of the war-machine to destabilize the state (Deleuze and Guattari 391), but war as the deterritorialisation of bodies, lives and livelihoods. Is the war of nomadism against the state not somehow akin to war as the violence that produces nomadic bodies through forced displacement? One of the questions that strikes me about the work of the Atlas Group, “an imaginary non-profit research foundation established in Beirut to research and document the contemporary history of Lebanon” (Raad 68) through the production and exhibition of “archival” material, is whether their propensity towards still forms in the creation of documentary evidence cannot be directly attributed to war as perpetual movement and territorial flexibility, as the flattening of structure and the creation of “smooth space” (Deleuze and Guattari 389). One need only think of the reigns of terror that begin with destratification – abolishing libraries, destroying documents, burning books. On the work of the Atlas Group, Andre Lepecki offers a very thorough introduction:The Atlas Group is an ongoing visual and performative archival project initiated by Walid Raad …whose main topic and driving force are the multiple and disparate events that history and habit have clustered into one singularity named “The Lebanese Civil Wars of 1975-1991”. (Lepecki 61).While the “inventedness” of the Atlas Group’s archive, its “post-event” status as manufactured evidence, raises a myriad of questions about how to document the trauma of war, its insistence on an “archival” existence, rather than say a purely artistic one, also challenges the presumption that the process of becoming, indeed of producing or even creating, is necessarily akin to movement or animation by insisting on the materiality of producing “documents” as opposed to the abstraction of producing “art”. The Atlas Group archive does not contribute directly to the transformation of visibilities into statements so much as statements into visibilities. Indeed, the “archival impulse” that seems to be present here works against the constitution of discursive formations precisely by making visible those aspects of culture which continue to circulate discursively while not necessarily existing. In other words, if one reads the sedimentary process of stratification as forming knowledge by allowing the relationships between “words” and “things” to settle or to solidify into historical strata, then the Atlas Group project seems to tap into the stillness of these stratified forms in order to reverse the signification of “things” and “words”. Hal Foster’s diagnosis of an “archival impulse” is located in a moment where, as he says, “almost anything goes and almost nothing sticks” in reference to the current obliviousness of contemporary artistic practices to political culture (Foster 2-3). Foster’s observation endows this paper with more than just an appropriate title since what Foster seems to identify are the limitations of the current obsession with speed. What one senses in the Atlas Group’s “archival impulse” and Foster’s detection of an “archival impulse” at play in contemporary cultural practices is a war against the war on form, a war against erasure through speed, and an inclination to dwell once more in the dusty matter of the past, rather than to pass through it. Yet the archive, in the view of nomadology, might simply be what Benjamin Hutchens terms “the dead-letter office of lived memory” (38). Indeed Hutchens’s critical review of the archive is both timely and relevant pointing out that “the preservation of cultural memories eradicated from culture itself” simply establishes the authority of the archive by erasing “the incessant historical violence” through which the archive establishes itself (Hutchens 38). In working his critique through Derrida’s Archive Fever, Hutchens revisits the concealed etymology of the word “archive” which “names at once the commencement and the commandment” (Derrida 1). Derrida’s suggestion that the concept of the archive shelters both the memory of this dual meaning while also sheltering itself from remembering that it shelters such a memory (Derrida 2) leads Hutchens to assert that “the archival ‘act’ opens history to the archive, but it closes politics to its own archivization” (Hutchens 44). The danger that “memory cultures”, archives among them, pose to memory itself has also been explored elsewhere by Andreas Huyssen. Although Huyssen does not necessary hold memory up as something to be protected from memory cultures, he is critical of the excessive saturation of contemporary societies with both (Huyssen 3). Huyssen refers to this as the “hypertrophy of memory” following Nietzsche’s “hypertrophy of history” (Huyssen 2-3). Although Hutchens and Huyssen differ radically in direction, they seem to concur nonetheless that what could be diagnosed as an “archival impulse” in contemporary societies might describe only the stagnation and stiltedness of the remainders of lived experience.To return once more to Foster’s notion of an “archival impulse” in contemporary art practices, rather than the reinstitution of the archive as the warehouse of tradition, what seems to be at stake is not necessarily the agglutination of forms, but the interrogation of formations (Foster 3). One could say that this is the archive interrogated through the eyes of art, art interrogated through the eyes of the archive. Perhaps this is precisely what the Atlas Group does by insisting on manufacturing documents in the form of documentary evidence. “Missing Lebanese Wars”, an Atlas Group project produced in 1998, takes as its point of departure the hypothesisthat the Lebanese civil war is not a self-evident episode, an inert fact of nature. The war is not constituted by unified and coherent objects situated in the world; on the contrary, the Lebanese civil war is constituted by and through various actions, situations, people, and accounts. (Raad 17-18)The project consists of a series of plates made up of pages taken from the notebook of a certain Dr Fadl Fakhouri, “the foremost historian of the civil war in Lebanon” until his death in 1993 (Raad 17). The story goes that Dr Fakhouri belonged to a gathering of “major historians” who were also “avid gamblers” that met at the race track every Sunday – the Marxists and the Islamists bet on the first seven races, while the Maronite nationalists and the socialists bet on the last eight (Raad 17). It was alleged that the historians would bribe the race photographer to take only one shot as the winning horse reached the post. Each historian would bet on exactly “how many fractions of a second before or after the horse crossed the line – the photographer would expose his frame” (Raad 17). The pages from Dr Fakhouri’s notebook are comprised of these precise exposures of film as the winning horse crossed the line – stills, as well as measurements of the distance between the horse and the finish line amid various other calculations, the bets that the historians wagered, and short descriptions of the winning historians given by Dr Fakhouri. The notebook pages, with photographs in the form of newspaper clippings, calculations and descriptions of the winning historians in English, are reproduced one per plate. In producing these documents as archival evidence, the Atlas Group is able to manufacture the “unified and coherent objects” that do not constitute the war as things that are at once irrelevant, incongruous and non-sensical. In other words, presenting material that is, while clearly fictitious, reflective of individual “actions, situations, people, and accounts” as archival material, the Atlas Group opens up discourses about the sanctity of historical evidence to interrogation by producing documentary evidence for circulating cultural discourses.While giving an ironic shape to this singular and complete picture of the war that continues to pervade popular cultural discourses in Lebanon through the media with politicians still calling for a “unified history”, the Atlas Group simultaneously constitute these historical materials as the work of a single person, Dr Fakhouri. Yet it seems that our trustworthy archivist also chooses not to write about the race, but about the winning historian – echoing the refusal to conceive of the war as a self-evident fact (to talk about the race as a race) and to see it rather as an interplay of individuals, actions and narratives (to view the race through the description of the winning historian). Indeed Dr Fakhouri’s descriptions of the winning historians are almost comical for their affinity with descriptions of Lebanon’s various past and present political leaders. A potent shadow, and a legend that has grown into an officially sanctioned cult (Plate 1).Avuncular rather than domineering, he was adept at the well-timed humorous aside to cut tension. (Plate 3).He is 71. But for 6 years he was in prison and for 10 years he was under house arrest and in exile, so those 16 years should be deducted – then he’s 55 (Plate 5). (Raad 20-29)Through these descriptions of the historians, Lebanon’s “missing” wars begin to play themselves out between one race and the next. While all we have are supposed “facts” with neither narrative, movement, nor anything else that could connect one fact to another that is not arbitrary, we are also in the midst of an archive that is as random as these “facts.” This is the archive of the “missing” wars, wars that are not documented and victims that are not known, wars that are “missing” for no good reason.What is different about this archive may not be the way in which order is manufactured and produced, but rather the background against which it is set. In his introduction to The Order of Things Michel Foucault makes reference to “a certain Chinese encyclopaedia” in a passage by Borges whereanimals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable… (xvi)“The uneasiness that makes us laugh when we read Borges”, writes Foucault, is the sense of loss of a “common” name and place (Order, xx). Whereas in Eusethenes, (“I am no longer hungry. Until the morrow, safe from my saliva all the following shall be: Aspics, Acalephs, Acanathocephalates […]”) the randomness of the enumerated species is ordered by their non-location in Eusthenes’ mouth (Foucault, Order xvii), in Borges there is no means through which the enumerated species can belong in a common place except in language (Foucault, Order, xviii). In the same way, the work of the Atlas Group is filtered through the processes of archival classification without belonging to the archives of any real war. There is no common ground against which they can be read except the purported stillness of the archive itself, its ability to put things in place and to keep them there.If the Atlas Group’s archives of Lebanon’s wars are indeed to work against the fluidity of war and its ability to enter and reshape all spaces, then the archival impulse they evoke must be one in which the processes of sedimentation that create archival documents are worked through a radical stillness, tapping into the suspended motion of the singular moment – its stillness, in order to uncover stillness as presence, survival, endurance, to be there still. Indeed, if archives turn “documents into monuments” (Enwezor 23), then the “theatre of statements” that Foucault unearths (Deleuze 47) are not those recovered in the work of the Atlas Group since is not monuments, but documents, that the Atlas Group archive uncovers.It is true that Benjamin urges us to seize hold of memory at the moment of danger, but he does not instruct us as to what to do with it once we have it, yet, what if we were to read this statement in conjunction with another, “for every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably” (Benjamin, “Theses” 255). By turning monuments into documents it is possible that the Atlas Group reconfigure the formations that make up the archive, indeed any archive, by recognizing images of the past as being still in the present. Not still as a past tense, motionless, but still as enduring, remaining. In the work of the Atlas Group the archival impulse is closely aligned to a radical stillness, letting the dust of things settle after its incitation by the madness of war, putting things in place that insist on having a place in language. Against such a background Benjamin’s “moment of danger” is more than the instant of sedimentation, it is the productivity of a radical stillness in which the past opens onto the present, it is this moment that makes possible a radical reconfiguration of the archival impulse.ReferencesBenjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard U Press, 2002.———. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken Books, 2007.Braidotti, Rosi. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: Polity, 2002.Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Trans. Seán Hand. New York: Continuum, 1999.Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. 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