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Journal articles on the topic 'Divine Command Theory'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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1

Rahimi, Simin. "Divine Command Theory in the Passage of History." Forum Philosophicum 14, no. 2 (November 1, 2009): 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2009.1402.23.

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Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so (e.g., by commanding them)? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right (wrong) solely because he commands (forbids) it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality". This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory.

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2

Rooney, Paul. "Divine Commands and Arbitrariness." Religious Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1995): 149–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023465.

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According to the divine command theory of morality, what is right or wrong, good or bad, is entirely dependent on the will and command of God: what He commands is right and what He forbids is wrong just because He commands or forbids it. It is argued here that the principal religious objection to this theory – that if it were true, moral precepts would be arbitrary – is rendered ineffective when due consideration is given to the consequences of God's omnipotence, and in particular, to His rationality and to His responsibility for deciding, in creation, what the characteristics of human nature are to be.

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3

ALMEIDA, MICHAEL J. "Supervenience and property-identical divine-command theory." Religious Studies 40, no. 3 (August 11, 2004): 323–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007085.

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Property-identical divine-command theory (PDCT) is the view that being obligatory is identical to being commanded by God in just the way that being water is identical to being H2O. If these identity statements are true, then they express necessary a posteriori truths. PDCT has been defended in Robert M. Adams (1987) and William Alston (1990). More recently Mark C. Murphy (2002) has argued that property-identical divine-command theory is inconsistent with two well-known and well-received theses: the free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis. I show that Murphy's argument is vitiated by mistaken assumptions about the substitutivity of metaphysical identicals in contexts of supervenience. The free-command thesis and the supervenience thesis therefore pose no serious threat to PDCT.

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4

WIELENBERG, ERIK J. "Divine command theory and psychopathy." Religious Studies 56, no. 4 (November 27, 2018): 542–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000781.

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AbstractI advance a novel challenge for Divine Command Theory based on the existence of psychopaths. The challenge, in a nutshell, is that Divine Command Theory has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible. After explaining this argument, I respond to three objections to it and then critically examine the prospect that Divine Command Theorists might bite the bullet and accept that psychopaths can do no wrong. I conclude that the Psychopathy Objection constitutes a serious and novel challenge for Divine Command Theory.

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5

CARSON, THOMAS L. "Divine will/divine command moral theories and the problem of arbitrariness." Religious Studies 48, no. 4 (February 27, 2012): 445–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441251100031x.

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AbstractA well-known objection to divine will/divine command moral theories is that they commit us to the view that God's will is arbitrary. I argue that several versions of divine will/divine command moral theories, including two of Robert Adams's versions of the DCT and my own divine preference theory, can be successfully defended against this objection. I argue that, even if God's preferences are somewhat arbitrary, we have reasons to conform our wills to them. It is not a fatal objection to divine will/divine command moral theories if they imply that God's will/God's commands is/are arbitrary, to some extent.

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6

OSBORNE, THOMAS M. "Ockham as a divine-command theorist." Religious Studies 41, no. 1 (February 18, 2005): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007218.

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Although this thesis is denied by much recent scholarship, Ockham holds that the ultimate ground of a moral judgement's truth is a divine command, rather than natural or non-natural properties. God could assign a different moral value not only to every exterior act, but also to loving God. Ockham does allow that someone who has not had access to revelation can make correct moral judgements. Although her right reason dictates what God in fact commands, she need not know that God so commands. Ockham's divine-command theory plays an important role in the shift away from a nature-based ethics, and it anticipates contemporary problems concerning truth in meta-ethics.

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7

Murphy, Mark C. "A Trilemma for Divine Command Theory." Faith and Philosophy 19, no. 1 (2002): 22–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20021914.

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8

Yoon, Young-Don. "Genealogical Research of Divine Command Theory." Journal of Ethics Education Studies 50 (October 31, 2018): 43–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.18850/jees.2018.50.02.

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9

McAllister, Blake. "Divine Command Theory and Moral Supervenience." Philosophia Christi 18, no. 1 (2016): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20161815.

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10

Li, Yong. "The Divine Command Theory of Mozi1." Asian Philosophy 16, no. 3 (November 2006): 237–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09552360600979471.

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11

Rahimi, Simin. "Divine Command Theory and Theistic Activism." Heythrop Journal 53, no. 4 (March 16, 2012): 551–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2012.00752.x.

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12

Kavka, Martin, and Randi Rashkover. "A Jewish Modified Divine Command Theory." Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 2 (June 2004): 387–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2004.00170.x.

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13

MORRISTON, WES. "What if God commanded something terrible? A worry for divine-command meta-ethics." Religious Studies 45, no. 3 (July 27, 2009): 249–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990011.

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AbstractIf God commanded something that was obviously evil, would we have a moral obligation to do it? I critically examine three radically different approaches divine-command theorists may take to the problem posed by this question: (1) reject the possibility of such a command by appealing to God's essential goodness; (2) avoid the implication that we should obey such a command by modifying the divine-command theory; and (3) accept the implication that we should obey such a command by appealing to divine transcendence and mystery. I show that each approach faces significant challenges, and that none is completely satisfying.

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14

JORDAN, MATTHEW CAREY. "Divine attitudes, divine commands, and the modal status of moral truths." Religious Studies 48, no. 1 (March 31, 2011): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412511000011.

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AbstractThis essay presents a theistic account of deontic properties that can lay claim to many of the advantages of divine command theory but which avoids its flaws. The account, divine attitude theory, asserts that moral properties should be understood in terms of divine attitudes, such that an action is morally wrong just in case God would be displeased with the performance of that action. Among the virtues of this account is its ability to explain the modal status of fundamental moral truths, something that divine command theory cannot do.

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15

Koons, Jeremy. "Can God's Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro?" European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (March 21, 2012): 177–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i1.313.

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Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although God’s commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, God’s nature is the standard of moral goodness, and God’s commands are the source of all obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips God’s nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible. An adequate solution to the Euthyphro dilemma may require that God be constrained by a standard of goodness that is external to Himself – itself a problematic proposal for many theists.

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16

Coulter, Chan L. "Moral Autonomy and Divine Commands." Religious Studies 25, no. 1 (March 1989): 117–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500019764.

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A Divine Command Theory of Ethics is sometimes rejected on the grounds that such a theory is incompatible with human moral autonomy. If we assume that human beings are morally autonomous, the argument goes, then no human being can be obligated to perform any action simply because God (or any other agent) has commanded it. The incompatibility between a Divine Command Ethic and moral autonomy is a corollary of an argument James Rachels uses to deny the very existence of God. He argues that any being which can be denoted by the term God must be a being worthy of worship. But, in order to be a being worthy of worship it must be such that other beings owe it unconditional obedience. Since human beings are morally autonomous and cannot owe unconditional obedience to any other being, nothing can meet the criterion for being God. Hence, there is no possible state of affairs which includes both a being worthy of worship and morally autonomous human agents.

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17

Harrison, Gerald K. "The Euthyphro, Divine Command Theory and Moral Realism." Philosophy 90, no. 1 (September 19, 2014): 107–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819114000424.

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AbstractDivine command theories of metaethics are commonly rejected on the basis of the Euthyphro problem. In this paper, I argue that the Euthyphro can be raised for all forms of moral realism. I go on to argue that this does not matter as the Euthyphro is not really a problem after all. I then briefly outline some of the attractions of a divine command theory of metaethics. I suggest that given one of the major reasons for rejecting such an analysis has been found to be unsound divine command theories deserve to be taken more seriously in contemporary metaethics.

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18

MANIS, R. ZACHARY. "Kierkegaard and divine-command theory: replies to Quinn and Evans." Religious Studies 45, no. 3 (April 27, 2009): 289–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509009925.

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AbstractOne of the most important recent developments in the discussion of Kierkegaard's ethics is an interpretation defended, in different forms, by Philip Quinn and Stephen Evans. Both argue that a divine-command theory of moral obligation (DCT) is to be found in Works of Love. Against this view, I argue that, despite significant overlap between DCT and the view of moral obligation found in Works of Love, there is at least one essential difference between the two: the former, but not the latter, is committed to the claim that, necessarily, p is morally obligatory only if God commands that p.

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19

김상돈. "Socrates's Refutation of Euthyphro's Divine Command Theory." Journal of Ethics 1, no. 74 (September 2009): 125–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.15801/je.1.74.200909.125.

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20

Tuggy, Dale. "Necessity, control, and the divine command theory." Sophia 44, no. 1 (May 2005): 53–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02780482.

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21

Johnson, Jeffery L. "Procedure, substance, and the divine command theory." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 35, no. 1 (February 1994): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01540519.

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22

Levine, Michael. "Adam's modified divine command theory of ethics." Sophia 33, no. 2 (July 1994): 63–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02800539.

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23

Faber, Paul. "The Euthyphro Objection to Divine Normative Theories: A Response." Religious Studies 21, no. 4 (December 1985): 559–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500017753.

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The ethical theories often called divine command theories have a long philosphical history. As early as Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, persons – in this case, Euthyphro – were advocating theories that claim such things as whatever is morally obligatory is obligatory because and only because God commands it. There is a range of such theories, however, and offering one description that adequately characterizes them all is very difficult. Some theorists focus on the moral obligatoriness of actions, others on the moral virtue of traits of character, and still others on the moral goodness of states of affairs. Some theorists take God's commanding as creating the obligation (or whatever), others think God's willing an action creates the obligation. Theories concentrating on God's loving, his preferring, and perhaps other states, too, could be advanced. Paul Helm in the introduction to his anthology Divine Commands and Morality regards this sort of theory as holding’…that God does issue commands and that these commands are to form the basis of a believer's morality.…’ And Janine Marie Idziak in the introduction to her Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings writes, ‘Generally speaking, a ‘divine command moralist’ is one who maintains that the content of morality (i.e. what is right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, and the like) is directly and solely dependent upon the commands and prohibitions of God.’ Rather than spend much time attempting to develop necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing all such theories, however, let us label them all ‘divine normative theories’ and hope that the basic nature of divine normative theories is relatively clear.

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24

Pfeiffer, Karl. "Towards a Relocation of the Divine Command Theory." Cogito 6, no. 2 (1992): 67–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cogito19926223.

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25

Rahimi, Simin. "Divine Command Theory in the Passage of History." Forum Philosophicum 14, no. 2 (2009): 307–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/forphil20091428.

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26

Yöney, Ferhat. "Islam, the Divine Command Theory, and Religious Fundamentalism." Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 30, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 413–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2019.1696024.

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27

Stepanova, Elena. "Divine command theory: logical refutation and theological justification." St. Tikhons' University Review 87 (February 28, 2020): 70–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.15382/sturi202087.70-86.

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28

Plaisted, Dennis. "On justifying one’s acceptance of divine command theory." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 315–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9572-3.

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29

DAVIS, RICHARD BRIAN, and W. PAUL FRANKS. "Counterpossibles and the ‘terrible’ divine command deity." Religious Studies 51, no. 1 (June 9, 2014): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441251400016x.

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AbstractIn a series of articles in this journal, Wes Morriston has launched what can only be considered a full-scale assault on the divine command theory (DCT) of morality. According to Morriston, proponents of this theory are committed to an alarming counterpossible: that if God did command an annual human sacrifice, it would be morally obligatory. Since only a ‘terrible’ deity would do such a ‘terrible’ thing, we should reject DCT. Indeed, if there were such a deity, the world would be a terrible place – certainly far worse than it is. We argue that Morriston's non-standard method for assessing counterpossibles of this sort is flawed. Not only is the savvy DCT-ist at liberty to reject it, but Morriston's method badly misfires in the face of theistic activism – a metaphysical platform available to DCT-ists, according to which if God didn't exist, neither would anything else.

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30

Hill, Scott. "Richard Joyce's New Objections to the Divine Command Theory." Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no. 1 (January 27, 2010): 189–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2009.00419.x.

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31

Sliti, Abdullah. "Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought." Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 25, no. 1 (October 15, 2013): 132–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2013.842089.

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32

Koehn, Glen. "Divine Command and Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(2) (February 27, 2018): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2011.1.1.

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While Socrates was in his own way a deeply religious man, the Euthyphro is often thought to provide a refutation of the divine command theory of morality: the theory that what is morally good is good because it is divinely approved. Socrates seems to suggest that what is holy or pious (ὅσιος) is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, and not holy because it pleases them. Thus the dialogue is sometimes presented as showing that what is morally good and bad must be independent of the divine will. I argue that matters are not so simple, since there are several ways in which the gods could help determine which acts are good, for instance, by disposing certain human affairs which are relevant to moral decisions. Moreover, Socrates suggests that he has obligations to the gods themselves, and these obligations would have to depend in part on what pleases them. It follows that the dilemma which Socrates poses to Euthyphro (pious because loved by the gods, or loved by the gods because pious) does not offer two mutually exclusive alternatives. There are various ways for the preferences of such gods to help determine which acts are adequate for moral praise or blame. It could therefore hardly be the case that religious doctrines, if true, are irrelevant to the content of morality. Knowledge of the gods’ preferences, if such knowledge were available, would be of importance to moral theory. Socrates himself does not deny this, nor should we.

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33

Forrest, Peter. "An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action." Sophia 28, no. 1 (April 1989): 2–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02789850.

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34

Danaher, John. "In Defence of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory." Sophia 58, no. 3 (October 19, 2017): 381–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0622-9.

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35

Harrison, Gerald K. "Divine Command Theory and Horrendous Deeds: a Reply to Wielenberg." Sophia 57, no. 1 (March 2018): 173–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0631-8.

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36

Rahimi, Simin. "Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma. Can Supervenience Save Him?" Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2008): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.02.

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Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths.

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37

Sullivan, Stephen J. "“Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time”." Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 1 (1994): 72–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199411110.

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38

Purdy, Laura M. "How Many Gods Does it Take? (To Discredit the Divine Command Theory)." Teaching Philosophy 11, no. 2 (1988): 112–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198811260.

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39

Clanton, J. Caleb, and Kraig Martin. "William of Ockham, Andrew of Neufchateau, and the Origins of Divine Command Theory." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2020): 405–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq202069205.

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William of Ockham is often thought to be the medieval progenitor of divine command theory (hereafter DCT). This paper contends that the origin of a thoroughgoing and fully reductive DCT position is perhaps more appropriately laid at the feet of Andrew of Neufchateau. We begin with a brief recapitulation of an interpretive dispute surrounding Ockham in order to highlight how there is enough ambiguity in his work about the metaphysical foundations of morality to warrant suspicion about whether he actually stands at the origin of DCT. We then show how all such ambiguity is jettisoned in the work of Andrew, who explicitly rejects a position similar to one plausibly attributable to Ockham and also articulates a fully reductive DCT.

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40

Schumacher, Lydia. "Divine Command Theory in Early Franciscan Thought: A Response to the Autonomy Objection." Studies in Christian Ethics 29, no. 4 (August 2016): 461–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946816658722.

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41

Nuyen, A. T. "The "Mandate of Heaven": Mencius and the Divine Command Theory of Political Legitimacy." Philosophy East and West 63, no. 2 (2013): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2013.0014.

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42

Ward, Thomas M. "A Most Mitigated Friar." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2019): 385–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2019514178.

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In his ethical writings, Duns Scotus emphasized both divine freedom and natural goodness, and these seem to conflict with each other in various ways. I offer an interpretation of Scotus which takes seriously these twin emphases and shows how they cohere. I argue that, for Scotus, all natural laws obtain just by the natures of actual things. Divine commands, such as the Ten Commandments, contingently track natural laws but do not make natural laws to be natural laws. I present textual evidence for this claim. I also show how this view of Scotus on the natural law is consistent with a number of troubling passages. Scotus’s ethical theory implies that there are genuinely moral reasons for acting which are not absolutely binding (because subject to a divine command or permission otherwise) and also some moral reasons for acting which are absolutely binding (because not thus subject).

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43

Choo, Frederick. "The Prior Obligations Objection to Theological Stateism." Faith and Philosophy 36, no. 3 (2019): 372–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201981126.

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Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection.

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44

Hemmingsen, Michael. "The Tension Between Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism in Mozi and George Berkeley: A Comparison." Philosophy East and West 70, no. 3 (2020): 740–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2020.0052.

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45

Clanton, J., and Kraig Martin. "Aquinas and Scotus on the Metaphysical Foundations of Morality." Religions 10, no. 2 (February 14, 2019): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10020107.

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This paper retraces some of the contrast between Aquinas and Scotus with respect to the metaphysical foundations of morality in order to highlight how subtle differences pertaining to the relationship between the divine will and the divine intellect can tip a thinker toward either an unalloyed natural law theory (NLT) or something that at least starts to move in the direction of divine command theory (DCT). The paper opens with a brief consideration of three distinct elements in Aquinas’s work that might tempt one to view him in a DCT light, namely: his discussion of the divine law in addition to the natural law; his position on the so-called immoralities of the patriarchs; and some of his assertions about the divine will in relation to justice. We then respond to each of those considerations. In the second and third of these cases, following Craig Boyd, we illustrate how Aquinas’s conviction that the divine will follows the ordering of the divine intellect can help inform the interpretive disputes in question. We then turn our attention to Scotus’s concern about the freedom of the divine will, before turning to his discussion of the natural law in relation to the Decalogue as a way of stressing how his two-source theory of the metaphysical foundations of morality represents a clear departure from Aquinas in the direction of DCT.

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46

Huebner, Chris K. "Can a Gift Be Commanded? Theological Ethics without Theory by Way of Barth, Milbank and Yoder." Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 4 (November 2000): 472–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930600056982.

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In a recent series of essays, John Milbank has continued his impressive project of narrating a theological path beyond secular reason in both its modern and postmodern versions by attempting to develop an ‘ontology of the gift.’ In order to overcome the ontology of violence in which he claims that secular rationality is rooted, Milbank argues for the need to reclaim a specifically Christian understanding of ethics, and suggests that the best resources for doing so can be found in the logic of gift and gift-exchange. Among other things, he claims that the logic of gift involves a rejection of the notion of command, a notion whose theological significance has perhaps been expressed most forcefully by Karl Barth. It is therefore appropriate to examine Milbank's appeal to the ontology of the gift as an objection to Barth's divine command ethics. Given his construal of ethics in terms of command and obligation, it might be suggested that Barth's ethics is problematic to the extent that it retains the structure of the Kantian categorical imperative. At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that Barth develops his account of the command of God in the context of gift, and in particular the specifically theological context of the gracious gift of God in Jesus Christ. Such a combination of command and gift has led some to suggest that Barth's ethics is actually significantly anti-Kantian in structure.

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47

Martin, Kraig, and J. Caleb Clanton. "On Moral-Natural and Moral-Positive Duties: A Combination Metaethical Theory in the Restoration Tradition." Studies in Christian Ethics 30, no. 4 (November 30, 2016): 429–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946816680138.

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This article elucidates a unique metaethical theory implicit in the work of several thinkers associated with the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement. After positioning that theory within a broader landscape of metaethical positions endorsed by several prominent contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians, we address the concern that, when attending to the Euthyphro dilemma, the Restoration-inspired combination metaethical theory inevitably collapses into either an unalloyed divine command theory or an unalloyed natural law theory. In explaining how this sort of worry can be mitigated, we offer reason to think that the nonreductive, combination metaethical theory in question constitutes potentially fertile territory for further scholarly work in Christian ethics.

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Herring, Stephen. "A “Transubstantiated” Humanity: The Relationship between the Divine Image and the Presence of God in Genesis i 26f." Vetus Testamentum 58, no. 4 (2008): 480–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853308x348213.

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AbstractSince the 1960's the consensus in Old Testament research regarding humanity's role as image of God has been along the lines of a functional or propagandistic interpretation. Thus, humanity represents the deity by functioning like him: they rule over the earth by his command and in his stead. This interpretation, however, often overlooks the ontological worldview of the ancient Near East where the distinction between object and referent was not as clear as it is today. The image functioned to make present the referent, be it god or king. In this way, the priestly conception of humanity as divine image is more than mere function but concerns the manifestation of divine presence as well.

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Cahn, Steven M. "WHY WORSHIP GOD?" Think 16, no. 46 (2017): 9–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175617000021.

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Assuming God exists, should we worship God? This article contends that even if God is omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent, and created and sustains the world, we should adopt the attitude towards God exhibited by Abraham in Chapter 18 of Genesis. There, having been informed of God's willingness to destroy Sodom, Abraham persuades God that if the city contains ten innocent inhabitants, justice requires the plan to be altered. The story undermines the divine command theory of morality, demonstrates that God is subject to change, and suggests that God is prepared to be challenged rather than worshipped.

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MURPHY, MARK C. "Reply to Almeida." Religious Studies 40, no. 3 (August 11, 2004): 335–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007097.

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Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely untenable. The second of his criticisms casts doubt on my argument, a doubt that I can mitigate but not entirely dispel.

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