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1

Subedi, Surya P. "The Road From Doha: The Issues for the Development Round of the Wto and the Future of International Trade." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52, no. 2 (April 2003): 425–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/52.2.425.

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After the debacle in Seattle in December 1999, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of WTO members took place successfully under tight security in the capital city, Doha, of the small Arabian state of Qatar in November 2001. The Doha conference did not adopt any new treaty or protocoll to add to the network of WTO agreements already in place. It did, however, approve a ‘broad and balance ’ work programme in the form of two declarations—a main declaration and one on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public health, plus a decision on implementation designed to alleviate the difficulties of developing countries in implementing the existing WTO agreements. In other words, the Doha conference agreed on the nature and scope of the next round of trade negttiations, named as the ‘Development Round’. Although some least-developed countries had argued that ‘no new round should be started until there has been full implementation of the agreements concluded in the last Round, and an evaluation of their effects done’, the Doha Conference decided to start a new round of trade negotiations. How development oriented is the agenda of the new round of trade negotiations? What is going to be negotiated during th e negotiations? Is it indeed going to be a ‘Development Round’ in more than name? The object of this article is to analyse the background to the Doha conference, to assess the nature of negotiations at the conference and to evaluate its outcome.
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2

Ann Elliott, Kimberly. "Does the Doha Round Matter?" Current History 108, no. 714 (January 1, 2009): 39–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2009.108.714.39.

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3

Deitos, Marc Antoni. "Antidumping e a Organização Mundial do Comércio: da emergência à incerteza da regulação internacional/Anti-dumping and the World Trade Organization: from the emergency to the uncertainty of the international regulation." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (December 21, 2015): 608–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2015.v4n3.08.p608.

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Esse artigo tem como objetivo analisar a mudança de padrão do comportamento dos Estados nas negociações dos sucessivos acordos antidumping do sistema multilateral de comércio desde Bretton Woods. Parte-se do estudo histórico do comportamento dos Estados em relação aos códigos antidumping, após o fechamento das Rodadas Kennedy, Tóquio e Uruguai, e as reformas que se seguiram nas legislações domésticas dos signatários. Demonstra-se que, historicamente, os países aproximaram as práticas internas aos acordos multilaterais. Contudo, o mandato de abertura para negociar um novo acordo antidumping em Doha inseriu um componente desestabilizador na evolução histórica da regulação multilateral das medidas antidumping. Os membros, diante das incertezas de Doha, se anteciparam ao fechamento da rodada, alterando as legislações nacionais para adaptá-las aos novos desafios do comércio internacional, em movimento contrário ao historicamente verificado. Esse comportamento tende a dificultar ainda mais o fechamento da Rodada de Doha, uma vez que os membros limitaram, antecipadamente, em suas legislações nacionais antidumping, grande parte dos temas que poderiam transigir nas negociações internacionais.Palavras-chave: antidumping; Organização Mundial do Comércio; Rodada de Doha. Abstract: This article analyses the change in the pattern of State behavior throughout the successive antidumping agreements at the multilateral trade regime since Bretton Woods. It analyses the historic pattern of State behavior related to the antidumping agreements after each round of negotiation – Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Round. It suggests that, historically, the signatories have brought together national and international regulations. On the other hand, it also suggests that the Doha Round has made a change in this historic pattern of State behavior. Confronted with Doha Round uncertainties, WTO members issued new anti-dumping regulations to face the challenges imposed by the actual international economic context. This behavior difficult even more to reach a final say on the new antidumping agreement negotiated during the Doha Round. The signatories have already written down their international position, when they passed new antidumping regulations at home. This behavior constraints the natural bargain that occurs in international negotiations, since it implicates changes in brand new national legislation. Key-words: antidumping; World Trade Organization; Doha Round. DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n3p608-627
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4

GRYNBERG, ROMAN. "Towards Doha-lite." World Trade Review 3, no. 3 (November 2004): 427–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745604002022.

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The works of Winters and Martins (W&M) and Mattoo and Subramanian (M&S) are two serious and innovative papers that begin to analyse not only what the WTO means for small states but now, just as significantly, what the numerical preponderance of small states might mean for the WTO. This latter issue is especially significant as members grapple with increasingly complex web of interests that need to be accommodated in order to arrive at a consensus in the Doha round. While neither papers represents the position of the World Bank and IMF, what they both have in common is that they approach the current round from the possibility that some WTO members, the smallest, poorest and most trade preference dependent – for example, Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Jamaica – may only benefit from Doha round trade liberalisation in geological time! The research, while not representing official Bretton Woods views, constitutes a dramatic shift in thinking inside the beltway from that which existed at the end of the Uruguay round when the dominant position was that ‘all members would benefit’.
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5

Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. "Alternatives to the Doha Round." Journal of Policy Modeling 31, no. 4 (July 2009): 526–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2009.05.014.

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6

Koopmann, Georg. "Doha Round—Squaring the Triangles." Intereconomics 41, no. 3 (May 2006): 122–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-006-0182-7.

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7

Yang, Yongzheng. "Africa in the Doha Round." IMF Policy Discussion Papers 2005, no. 008 (November 2005): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451975796.003.

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8

Gootiiz, Batshur. "Services in Doha: What’s on the Table?" Journal of World Trade 43, Issue 5 (October 1, 2009): 1013–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2009039.

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Services trade reform matters, but what is Doha doing about it? It has been hard to judge because of the opaqueness of services policies and the opaqueness of the request-offer negotiating process. This paper attempts to assess what is on the table. It presents the results of the first survey of applied trade policies in the major services sectors of fifty-six industrial and developing countries. These policies are then compared with these countries’ Uruguay Round (UR) commitments in services and the best offers that they have made in the current Doha negotiations. The paper finds that at this stage, Doha promises greater security of access to markets but not any additional liberalization. Uruguay Round commitments are on average 2.3 times more restrictive than current policies. The best offers submitted so far as part of the Doha negotiations improve on Uruguay Round commitments by about 13% but remain on average 1.9 times more restrictive than actual policies. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Hong Kong Ministerial had set out ambitious goals for services, but the analysis here shows that much remains to be done to achieve them.
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9

Messerlin, Patrick. "Agricultural Liberalization in the Doha Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850049. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1136.

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Agriculture is an urgent and vital problem for developing countries, and even more so for the poorest countries that are often dependent on a very small set of commodities, many of which are highly subsidized and protected in the OECD countries. The Uruguay Round brought agriculture into the WTO legal framework, but did not lower the effective level of OECD farm protection after 1995 and granted many exceptions to WTO rules that reinforced agricultural protection. While there are a number of diverging forces that are potential sources of change in the levels and patterns of agricultural protection, the recent farm policies adopted by the U.S. and EU reflect an absence of significant domestic reform and appear to be going in the wrong direction. The analysis of agricultural liberalization reveals very large potential gains for both developed and developing countries that will come especially from own-country liberalization as well as from inter-country trade, significant benefits that may be realized by the poorest developing countries, and limited benefits from existing preferential agricultural arrangements. An ideal program for agricultural liberalization in the Doha Round would involve substantial reductions in the high tariffs that exist in both developed and developing countries using the Swiss formula approach and limiting exceptions and special and differential treatment, elimination of agricultural export subsidies, and making meaningful reductions in domestic supports. The negotiations should not get hung up on issues of food security and the effects of higher prices for low-income consumers, and a special safeguard for agriculture is not recommended. It is imperative that agricultural liberalization should be combined with appropriate domestic policies and actions and international assistance, if needed, to help finance emergency food inventories and aid to disadvantaged groups. Patrick A. Messerlin is Professor of Economics at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and director of the Groupe d'Economie Mondiale de Sciences Po (GEM) which is an independent research center seeking to improve the performance of French and European public policies in a global world. In 2002-2005, he was co-chairman with Dr Ernesto Zedillo, Former President of Mexico, Director of the Yale Center for the Study on Globalization, of the Task Force on Trade in the UN Millenium Development Goals Project, which produced a Report on Trade for Development released in May 2005. In 2001-2002, he was special advisor to Mike Moore, WTO Director General. He has published a dozen books and a hundred papers on trade theory and policy. His most recent book is Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s, Institute for International Economics (Washington) 2001.
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10

Howse, Robert. "WTO Governance and the Doha Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850064. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1151.

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WTO jurisprudence and governance will not be explicit subjects of discussion or negotiation at the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, with the partial exception of dispute settlement review. Nonetheless, governance questions are at the heart of debates about the WTO’s legitimacy and deserve serious consideration. With this mind, a checklist and a series of questions are provided that are deemed to be relevant to the immediate future of the WTO and the ultimate fate of the Doha Round negotiations. Several issues are raised, as follows. The architecture of the WTO as represented in the “Single Undertaking” requires all WTO Members to adhere to the WTO Agreement even when doing so may not always be in a country’s interest. Decision-making in the WTO is based on consensus, and there may be a need for the design of more effective procedures and for better representation of the different views of Members. The accountability of the WTO as an institution may be at issue insofar as it relates to the roles of different members and the relationships with civil society. There is a clear need for technical assistance, policy development, and policy surveillance to make the WTO a more open, transparent, efficient, equitable, and socially responsible institution. Robert Howse is Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. His research and teaching interests are focused on international economic law (trade, investment and finance) and legal and political philosophy (theorizing law and governance beyond the state, and especially the thought of Alexandre Kojeve and Leo Strauss). His recent books include The Regulation of International Trade, Third Edition, co-authored with Michael J. Trebilcock, to be released this month in the US; The Federal Vision, co-edited with Kalypso Nicolaidis (2001); and Alexandre Kojeve Outline of a Phenomenology of Right (2000), co-translator with Bryan Frost and principal author of the interpretative commentary. Howse has also authored or co-authored opinion essays in general interest publications such as The Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Policy Review, and Legal Affairs. He is series editor of the Oxford Commentaries on WTO Law and serves on the editorial advisory board of the European Journal of International Law. He has also been a reporter on WTO law for the American Law Institute. For part of the fall 2005 semester, Howse has been a visiting instructor at the University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne).
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11

Cone, Sydney M. "Legal Services in the Doha Round." Journal of World Trade 37, Issue 1 (February 1, 2003): 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2003009.

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12

Kakkar, Anurag. "Dynamics of the Doha Development Round." RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary 5, no. 8 (August 17, 2020): 6–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.31305/rrijm.2020.v05.i08.002.

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13

Pankaj, Prabhat K. "Whither WTO: Future of Doha Round." Asia Pacific Business Review 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097324700600200212.

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14

Tokarick, Stephen. "Trade Issues in the Doha Round." IMF Policy Discussion Papers 2006, no. 004 (August 2006): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451946161.003.

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15

MARGULIS, MATIAS E. "The Forgotten History of Food Security in Multilateral Trade Negotiations." World Trade Review 16, no. 1 (November 2, 2016): 25–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745616000410.

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AbstractFood security emerged as a major source of political deadlock in the WTO Doha Round negotiations. Concerns about food security only intensified at the WTO following the 2008 Global Food Crisis, with the Bali and Nairobi Ministerials revealing polarized views between the US and India on the financing of public food stockholding. These ‘food fights’ at the WTO have attracted significant international media, civil society, and scholarly attention. In this article, I argue that inter-state disagreement on food security is not new or specific to the Doha Round but instead has been a recurrent phenomenon in the multilateral trade system for decades. Employing an historical approach, I show that food security has repeatedly been an item of negotiation in successive GATT negotiating rounds and has been steadily codified in international trade law over time. Today, food security is deeply integrated into the rules of the trade regime, making the WTO an important yet largely unacknowledged institution in global food security governance.
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16

Gil, Juan Manuel. "FROM MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BILATERAL AND REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: THE EFFECT OF DOHA STALLING." Revista Civilizar de Empresa y Economía 2, no. 3 (June 10, 2011): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22518/2462909x.68.

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This article argues that the stalling of the Doha Round negotiations is a forsaken opportunity for developing countries. Since the first deadline of Doha Round was missed in 2005, developed countries have changed their strategy of achieving free trade through multilateral negotiations, towards achieving it in regional or bilateral negotiations. Therefore, developing countries have had to stop bargaining in a considerable less hierarchical system and being compelled to bargain in a scenario characterized by power asymmetries. They have also swapped free trade based on non-discriminative multilateral principles, for preferential and discriminative trade treatment.
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17

Sjöstedt, Gunnar. "NGOs in WTO Talks: Patterns of Performance and What They Mean." International Negotiation 17, no. 1 (2012): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630947.

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AbstractNon-governmental organizations (NGOs) have remained outside all the GATT rounds since the 1950s. In contrast, hundreds of NGOs have taken part in the current WTO round. This article maps the formal participation of NGOs in five ministerial conferences during the Doha round. It also analyzes various forms of NGO involvement in the WTO trade talks, such as lobbying and capacity-building of developing countries. An assessment of the current and potential capacities of NGOs in the Doha round requires that their performance be seen from an explicit negotiation perspective. Both NGO participation and involvement, as well the interaction between these two forms of NGO performance need to be considered. An assessment of how NGOs may have an impact on negotiation effectiveness and efficiency in WTO rounds should be approached from a long-term perspective and should consider other kinds of outcomes than formal final agreements. NGO performance in WTO may increase the complexity of negotiations or the significance of non-trade issues. NGO activities outside the WTO may disturb multilateral trade negotiations in the short term, such as during ongoing Ministerial Conferences. On the other hand, NGOs may also help to pave the way for constructive long-term changes in the WTO regime, which, in turn, may have a favorable impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall WTO negotiation system.
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18

Bhagwati, Jagdish. "From Seattle to Hong Kong: Are We Getting Anywhere?" Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850063. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1150.

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With agricultural trade negotiations deadlocked, the Doha round of trade talks may appear dead in the water. But every round of trade talks in recent memory has oscillated between near breakthroughs and near breakdowns. Trade negotiations can be like a ride on a roller coaster but, while the roller coaster returns to where it started, multilateral trade negotiations have generally gone on to close successfully. Will this happen with the Doha round? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. Prospects for concluding the round in Hong Kong next month, at the World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting, are indeed bleak; but not the prospects for finishing later. While the initial attempt to launch the WTO's first round of multilateral trade negotiations in Seattle in November 1999 collapsed, the round was finally launched in Doha, Qatar, two years later, with reaffirmation of the twin virtues of democracy and openness to the world economy. While there was a lot of dissent in September 2003 at the next WTO meeting in Cancun, which also collapsed because of the lack of consensus especially on agricultural liberalization, there were nonetheless some important accomplishments in the tabling of most of the “Singapore issues” and an agreement to relax the TRIPS Agreement to permit developing country access to low-cost pharmaceuticals. Cancun was also a turning point insofar as the major developing countries coalesced in the Group of 20 to provide greater balance in the WTO membership and the design of the negotiating agenda. While it appears that agricultural liberalization is still a significant stumbling block facing the Hong Kong Ministerial, it is likely that the EU can be squeezed if there are reciprocal offers in manufactures and services that are forthcoming especially from some of the major developing countries that can be induced to liberalize in their own interests. It will also be helpful if a program of adjustment assistance can be devised in the form of “aid for trade” especially for low-income countries. The outlines of a deal to close the Doha Round are therefore clear. With forceful leadership on the part of Pascal Lamy to rescue the Doha Round in Hong Kong and to convince the WTO member states to follow with an extraordinary meeting within six months, it should be possible to take the penultimate steps to bring the Doha Round to a final conclusion by the end of 2006 and to obtain its approval by early 2007 before the U.S. fast-track negotiating authority expires. Jagdish Bhagwati is Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and University Professor, Economics and Law at Columbia University. He was Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General of GATT and of the WTO-appointed expert group that recently reported on The Future of the WTO. He is currently a member of the Eminent Persons Panel on Enhancing UNCTAD’s Impact and of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Advisory Group on the NEPAD process in Africa. His latest books are Free Trade Today (Princeton, 2002) and In Defense of Globalization (Oxford, 2004).
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19

Cunha, Luís Pedro. "The failure of the Doha Round and the development issue." Boletim de Ciências Económicas 57, no. 1 (2014): 1267–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/0870-4260_57-1_35.

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20

Andersson, Erik. "Who Needs Effective Doha Negotiations, and Why?" International Negotiation 17, no. 1 (2012): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630983.

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AbstractThe growth and resilience of world trade indicate that the original aim of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been largely fulfilled. This success makes the economic interest of parties in the Doha Development Round (DDR) less clear. This article analyzes how countries express their interests in the Doha round, based on their reactions to the breakdown in Geneva in July 2008. A qualitative analysis of these reactions reveals that the interests of the actors differ considerably. Only a minority of the member countries express an interest in negotiations congruent with the Ricardian logic of the original mandate of GATT and the WTO. The interests of other parties seem to be furthered by stalling negotiations. An increasingly important dimension of the DDR is the negotiation and institutionalization of norms, but this dimension hitherto has not been overtly handled. Unless they are productively dealt with, this difference in actors’ interests, and the opaque negotiation of norms, will decrease the effectiveness of the Doha negotiations.
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21

Hills, Carla A. "WTO: Toward the Hong Kong, China Ministerial and Beyond." Asian Development Review 22, no. 01 (January 2005): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0116110505000011.

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A successful Doha Development Round has the potential to raise standards of living worldwide, alleviate grinding global poverty, remove inequities in the trading system, and enhance international stability. With it, the well-being of Asia, which is home to most of the world’s poor, would be substantially enhanced. Yet there are huge risks that the prospective benefits will not be achieved. Over the past 4 years governments from 148 nations have been negotiating whether and how to open markets for agricultural products, industrial goods, and services. On 8 July 2005 in addressing the heads of country delegations Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi declared, “these negotiations are in trouble”, primarily for lack of political support. That suggests that people worldwide are unaware of the tremendous gains that would be captured from successfully concluding the Doha negotiations and the worrisome implications if they fail. Governments need to get the message out regarding why the Doha Development Round is absolutely vital to our future economic growth and political stability.
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22

Lim, Chin Leng. "China and the Doha Development Agenda." Journal of World Trade 44, Issue 6 (December 1, 2010): 1309–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2010050.

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In contrast to early predictions during its accession, China has not sought to play a leadership role in the Doha Round negotiations or to rewrite WTO rules in a systemic manner. However, China’s role in the negotiations came into prominence during the ‘mini-ministerial’ held in Geneva in July 2008. Now included in the seven-member group (G-7), China came under fire from the United States and the European Union for failing to demonstrate greater leadership. This article seeks to explain the nature of that criticism and argues that over-reliance on the question of ‘Chinese leadership’ as an explanatory concept could aggravate broader misperceptions about China’s position in the Doha Round. According to these misperceptions, China has ‘broken cover’ and that it has become more ‘assertive’ while becoming more ‘protectionist’. In other words, there is the view today that China has emerged as a fresh obstacle to the conclusion of the Doha Round talks. This article analyses that misreading and argues that an analysis of China’s position in the negotiations must be tempered by a more nuanced understanding of certain tensions and mixed positions within China’s overall approach. The article seeks to explain China’s current position in the goods negotiations, on agriculture and non-agricultural market access, and in the services and rules negotiations. It also tries to explain the complexities of China’s alignment with developing country members and how that is likely to translate into various negotiating positions on specific issues. Finally, the article discusses a range of factors that are likely to play an important, continuing role in shaping China’s perception of specific trade issues and, more importantly, its perception of the overall worth of an eventual outcome to the Doha Round. These range from China’s reflections on the success of the 2001 accession process, its domestic political constraints, the emergence of a successful FTA programme, and resort to out-of- WTO aid for developing country nations, as well as the potential longer term impact of the current global economic crisis.
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Steger, Debra P. "Commentary on the Doha Round: Institutional Issues." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850065. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1152.

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Commentary on Robert Howse's article "WTO Governance and the Doha Round." Debra Steger is Executive in Residence at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law where she is working to establish a new institute for international law, economy and security in Canada. Previously, she was Senior Counsel with Thomas & Partners, a law firm specializing in international trade and investment matters. From 1995-2001, she served as the founding Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, during which time she helped to establish the Appellate Body as the first appellate tribunal in international trade. She is Chair of the Trade and Customs Law Committee of the International Bar Association, and has been on the executive of the Trade Committee of the International Law Association for the past 10 years. She is also a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal for International Economic Law. She participates on the Advisory Council of the UNCTAD Project on Building Capacity through Training in Dispute Settlement in International Trade Investment and Intellectual Property as well as the Governing Council of the World Trade Law Association. During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, she was the Senior Negotiator for Canada on Dispute Settlement and the Establishment of the World Trade Organization as well as the Principal Legal Counsel to the Government of Canada for all of the Uruguay Round agreements. From 1991—1995, she was General Counsel of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal in Ottawa, the agency responsible for administering the antidumping, countervail, safeguards, and government procurement legislation in Canada. Her most recent book is entitled: “Peace Through Trade: Building the WTO” which was published by Cameron May International Legal Publishers in 2004. Steger holds an LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School, an LL.B. from the University of Victoria Faculty of Law, and a B.A. (Honours) in History from the University of British Columbia.
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24

Brown, Andrew, and Robert M. Stern. "Achieving Fairness in the Doha Development Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850071. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1158.

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The question addressed in this article is how the fairness of the global trading system as embodied in the GATT/WTO is to be assessed. Opinions about what constitutes fairness differ widely, and there is surely no incontrovertible yardstick. But it should be possible to be clearer about the criteria that are appropriate and what they mean in more operational terms. Why fairness is a condition of the agreements among governments that form the global trading system is first discussed. It is then suggested that fairness can best be considered within the framework of two concepts: equality of opportunity and distributive equity. It is argued that the criterion of maximum economic efficiency is not a primary yardstick of fairness, and though it is relevant in choosing among alternative ways of realizing fairness, it is not without its own limitations. There is a discussion of what equality of opportunity and distributive equity mean when applied to the commitments that governments make in the global trading system. For this purpose, these commitments are divided into four categories: those relating directly to market access; those concerning supporting rules designed to prevent cheating in market access commitments or to facilitate trade flows; those relating to procedures for the settlement of disputes or the use of trade remedy measures; and those relating to governance of the system. Finally, some comments are offered about fairness in the Doha Development Round, focusing in particular on the central issue of market access. Andrew G. Brown was formerly Director in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations. He was responsible for analysis of international economic and social issues, and for staff support of UN committees and expert groups. He served earlier as chief economist or economic advisor in governments of developing countries. He is the author of History of Multilateral Trade Cooperation since 1850 and co-author of papers on the global trading system. Robert M. Stern is Professor of Economics and Public Policy (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.
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Cone, Sydney M. "Legal Services and the Doha Round Dilemma." Journal of World Trade 41, Issue 2 (April 1, 2007): 245–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2007010.

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Hindley, Brian. "The Draft Doha Round Anti–Dumping Agreement." Global Trade and Customs Journal 3, Issue 7/8 (July 1, 2008): 231–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2008033.

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Das, Dilip K. "Intellectual Property Rights and the Doha Round." Journal of World Intellectual Property 8, no. 1 (November 1, 2005): 33–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2005.tb00236.x.

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28

Evenett, Simon J. "The Doha Round impasse: A graphical account." Review of International Organizations 9, no. 2 (May 27, 2014): 143–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9195-3.

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29

Francois, J., H. Van Meijl, and F. Van Tongeren. "Trade liberalization in the Doha Development Round." Economic Policy 20, no. 42 (April 1, 2005): 350–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2005.00141.x.

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30

Arndt, Sven W. "DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: REACHING BEYOND TRADE LIBERALIZATION." Pacific Economic Review 12, no. 3 (August 2007): 381–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2007.00361.x.

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31

Scott, James, and Sophie Harman. "Beyondtrips: Why thewto‘s Doha Round is unhealthy." Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 2013): 1361–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831539.

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32

Schott, Jeffrey J. "Does the WTO Need to Change?" Current History 109, no. 730 (November 1, 2010): 355–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2010.109.730.355.

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33

ODELL, JOHN S. "How Should the WTO Launch and Negotiate a Future Round?" World Trade Review 14, no. 1 (January 2015): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147474561400038x.

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AbstractIf WTO Members wish to launch a new round to follow Doha, setting the agenda will require a complex negotiation as in the past, however Doha ends. To reduce the serious information problems they face and prepare the way, advocates should commission an independent research team to produce a comprehensive negotiation analysis before they decide to move further. Reaching an agreement on an agenda will depend on the procedural rules that apply in the agenda negotiation and the subsequent Round. They should consider four rules that seem legitimate today and most likely to help Members find a joint-gain agenda. Reaching an agenda agreement could also depend in part on decisions by WTO chairs during this negotiation. Experience illustrates the potentials and possible pitfalls for them to avoid.
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34

Cardwell, Michael, and Fiona Smith. "RENEGOTIATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: ACCOMMODATING THE NEW BIG ISSUES." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 62, no. 4 (October 2013): 865–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589313000341.

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AbstractThe WTO Agreement on Agriculture was designed to maximize trade flows at a time of surplus agricultural production. It required Members to open markets and to reduce domestic and export subsidies. Proposals for reform in the Doha Round negotiations largely adopt the same pattern. Yet, as surplus is replaced by shortage, Members are increasingly concerned about food security and the impact of agriculture on climate change. And contemporary agricultural policies crystallize around ‘sustainable intensification’, where domestic production is promoted, but not at the expense of future production. This article suggests that, although both the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha Round proposals do provide some scope for measures to address this new policy paradigm, there are instances where they may work actively against it.
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35

Leal-Arcas, Rafael. "Services as Key for the Conclusion of the Doha Round." Legal Issues of Economic Integration 35, Issue 4 (November 1, 2008): 301–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/leie2008023.

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This article aims to stress the importance of services negotiations for the conclusion of the Doha Round. It is argued in the article that trade in services is of high importance for the economies of both developed and developing countries, and that there remains substantial scope for many World Trade Organization (WTO) countries to make further commitments towards greater liberalization within the services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After an explanation of the notion of trade in services, the article analyzes the GATS, the progressive liberalization of trade in services in the framework of the Doha Round, the request/offer method of negotiations in services trade viewed from the perspective of the European Communities, and the July 2008 WTO Mini-Ministerial Conference in relation to services.
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36

Prekajac, Zora. "Agriculture and developing countries in the new round of negotiations within WTO." Privredna izgradnja 48, no. 1-2 (2005): 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/priz0502053p.

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The Ministerial Conference held in Doha (Qatar) launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in World Trade Organization. It is called the development round because the interests and needs of developing countries are in the focus of negotiations. One of the most important (and controversial) questions is the liberalization of international trade in agricultural products. The beginning of that process was the conclusion of the Agreement on agriculture during the Uruguay Round which was followed by the negotiations initiated in 2000. The negotiations are supposed to finish until the end of the year 2006. Analyzing the recent results of negotiations, we can conclude that a lot of questions are not harmonized and that in front of the negotiators is a very difficult and complex task to overcome the existing differences and find compromise solutions. The results of the Doha negotiations (including agriculture) are very important for the future of the multilateral trading system.
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37

Peng, Junlei. "Sino-US Trade Frictions on Non-automatic Export Licensing under the WTO Sino-US Trade Frictions on NAEL under the WTO." Global Trade and Customs Journal 4, Issue 6 (June 1, 2009): 195–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/gtcj2009024.

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Though fruitful, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations seem to be reaching a deadlock. It is hard to say when and how the next ministerial conference is to resume. The Doha Round negotiations appear extremely difficult, especially with regard to more substantial issues such as those concerning agricultural trade. This paper therefore attempts to introduce and analyze another relatively rarely touched issue in the WTO negotiations, that of non-automatic export licensing (NAEL). In the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO forum, these issues have been raised before, but divergence still exists in most fields. My argument is that these issues could serve as an alternative to current hot but difficult topics for the next round of negotiations in the WTO. Hopefully, a new consensus on the disciplines as to some aspects of NAEL is more likely to be achievable, and this would facilitate the further development of the WTO negotiations.
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Singh, J. P., and Surupa Gupta. "Agriculture and Its Discontents: Coalitional Politics at the wto with Special Reference to India’s Food Security Interests." International Negotiation 21, no. 2 (June 2, 2016): 295–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341334.

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The demise of the Doha round of trade negotiations is often attributed to deadlocks in agricultural negotiations between the developed and the developing world. Why has agriculture been so difficult to negotiate? This article explains North-South agricultural negotiations through the lens of coalition politics, especially the shift from bloc to issue-based diplomacy from the developing world. We argue against the proposition in the negotiation literature that multiple coalitions at the international level allow negotiators room to maneuver. Our study shows that bloc coalitions in fact allowed for compromise more than issue-based coalitions in agriculture, which are often supported by strong domestic constituencies. Empirically, the article focuses on the Uruguay Round when the North and South struck an agreement on agriculture and the Doha Round, which remains deadlocked. The article also provides an in-depth case study of India’s agricultural interests and its food security program in the context of thewto.
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BOUET, ANTOINE, and David Laborde. "Assessing the potential cost of a failed Doha Round." World Trade Review 9, no. 2 (April 2010): 319–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745609990267.

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AbstractThis study offers new conclusions on the economic cost of a failed Doha Development Agenda (DDA). We assess potential outcome of the Doha Round as well as four protectionist scenarios using the MIRAGE Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. In a scenario where applied tariffs of World Trade Organization (WTO) economies would go up to currently bound tariff rates, world trade would decrease by 9.9% and world welfare by US$353 billion. The economic cost of a failed DDA is here evaluated by the difference between a cooperative scenario (DDA) and a protectionist one (US$412 billion in terms of welfare). Another point of view is to compare a resort to protectionism when the DDA is implemented with a resort to protectionism when the DDA is not implemented. The findings show that this trade agreement could prevent the potential reduction of US$809 billion of trade and, therefore, acts as an efficient multilateral ‘preventive’ scheme against the adverse consequences of trade ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies.
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40

Parízek, Michal. "An Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations in the World Trade Organization." Czech Journal of International Relations 49, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 5–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/cjir.293.

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The Doha round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO)constitutes one of the prime cases of current multilateral negotiations. Butin the more than twelve years of the negotiations, little progress has beenachieved. Given this, I ask whether there is at all any zone of possibleagreement in the Doha round. To answer the question, I present a largenew dataset on the negotiation positions of the almost fifty largest WTOmembers. The dataset is based on a manual coding of the statements bythe member states’ ministers at the ministerial conferences in the years1996–2011. After the aggregation and quantification of these data, a game-theoretical analysis is performed on them. On the basis of this analysis, Ifind a relatively large zone of agreement among the states and the Nashbargaining solution of their negotiations.
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41

Surendra Bhandari. "Developing Countries in the WTO and Doha Round." Seoul Law Review 20, no. 1 (May 2012): 411–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15821/slr.2012.20.1.012.

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42

Bombelles, Thomas. "Commentary: A Merck Perspective on the Doha Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850073. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1160.

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Commentary on the Doha Development Round from a representative of Merck. Thomas Bombelles is Director, International Government Relations, for Merck & Co., Inc. His responsibilities include definition and advocacy on important international business and policy issues for the company focusing on government agencies and other institutions in Washington, DC. Prior to joining Merck, Bombelles was the Assistant Vice President International at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the professional association representing the American research-based pharmaceutical industry globally. He has also worked as a private sector consultant, as a trade analyst in the Department of Commerce, and in the US Congress. He received an M.A. degree from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a B.A. degree from the honors program at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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43

YAGI, NOBUYUKI. "Negotiation on fisheries subsidies at WTO Doha round." NIPPON SUISAN GAKKAISHI 74, no. 5 (2008): 776–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2331/suisan.74.776.

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44

Laborde, David, and Will Martin. "Agricultural Trade: What Matters in the Doha Round?" Annual Review of Resource Economics 4, no. 1 (August 2012): 265–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-110811-114449.

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45

Jensen, Michael Friis, and Peter Gibbon. "Africa and the WTO Doha Round: An Overview." Development Policy Review 25, no. 1 (January 2007): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00357.x.

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46

Srivastava, Monika. "WTO, RTAs and the Collapse of Doha Round." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (April 2007): 96–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492840706300205.

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47

Romalis, John, and Mary Amiti. "Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion?" IMF Working Papers 06, no. 10 (2006): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451862706.001.

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48

Amiti, Mary, and John Romalis. "Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference Erosion?" IMF Staff Papers 54, no. 2 (June 2007): 338–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.imfsp.9450009.

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49

Gallagher, Kevin P. "Understanding developing country resistance to the Doha Round." Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 1 (December 13, 2007): 62–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290701751308.

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50

Reinert, Kenneth A. "The European Union, the Doha Round, and Asia." Asia Europe Journal 5, no. 3 (June 14, 2007): 317–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10308-007-0128-0.

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