Relevant bibliographies by topics / Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 6 September 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)"

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Lerner, Anat, and Rica Gonen. "Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions." International Game Theory Review 18, no. 03 (2016): 1650007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500079.

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The seminal work by Green and Laffont [(1977) characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods, Econometrica 45, 427–438] shows that efficient mechanisms with Vickrey–Clarke–Groves prices satisfy the properties of dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational in the quasilinear utilities model. Nevertheless in many real-world situations some players have a gap between their willingness to pay and their ability to pay, i.e., a budget. We show that once budgets are integrated into the model then Green and Laffont’s theorem c
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Manelli, Alejandro M., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments." Journal of Mathematical Economics 82 (May 2019): 214–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002.

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Gerstgrasser, Matthias, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart De Keijzer, Philip Lazos, and Alexander Skopalik. "Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 1973–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.

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We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units
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Lundy, Taylor, and Hu Fu. "Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (2020): 2136–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5588.

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In the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, a common approach is to enforce incentive compatibility as constraints in programs that optimize over feasible mechanisms. Such constraints are often imposed on sparsified representations of the type spaces, such as their discretizations or samples, in order for the program to be manageable. In this work, we explore limitations of this approach, by studying whether all dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms on a set T of discrete types can be extended to the convex hull of T.Dobzinski, Fu and Kleinberg (2015) answered the question af
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Loertscher, Simon, and Claudio Mezzetti. "A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement." Theoretical Economics 16, no. 3 (2021): 943–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3311.

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The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information fr
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Baisa, Brian. "Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods." Theoretical Economics 15, no. 1 (2020): 361–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3430.

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I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non‐quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single‐dimension
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Gonen, Rica, and Anat Lerner. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings." Games 4, no. 4 (2013): 690–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g4040690.

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Lopomo, Giuseppe, Nicola Persico, and Alessandro T. Villa. "Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns." American Economic Review 113, no. 6 (2023): 1505–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211437.

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Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal pro
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"Book Reviews." Journal of Economic Literature 54, no. 2 (2016): 589–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.2.589.r1.

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Dimitrios Diamantaras of Temple University reviews “An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design,” by Tilman Börgers. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design and examines the frontiers of research in mechanism design in a text written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory. Discusses screening; examples of Bayesian mechanism design; examples of dominant strategy mechanisms; incentive compatibility; Bayesian mechanism design; dominant strategy me
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Witkowski, Jens, Rupert Freeman, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, David M. Pennock, and Andreas Krause. "Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions." Management Science, May 17, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4410.

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We initiate the study of incentive-compatible forecasting competitions in which multiple forecasters make predictions about one or more events and compete for a single prize. We have two objectives: (1) to incentivize forecasters to report truthfully and (2) to award the prize to the most accurate forecaster. Proper scoring rules incentivize truthful reporting if all forecasters are paid according to their scores. However, incentives become distorted if only the best-scoring forecaster wins a prize, since forecasters can often increase their probability of having the highest score by reporting
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)"

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Schlake, Farimehr. "Optimal Consumer-Centric Delay-Efficient Security Management in Multi-Agent Networks: A Game and Mechanism Design Theoretic Approach." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77362.

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The main aspiration behind the contributions of this research work is the achievement of simultaneuos delay-efficiency, autonomy, and security through innovative protocol design to address complex real-life problems. To achieve this, we take a holistic approach. We apply theoretical mathematical modeling implementing implications of social-economic behavioral characteristics to propose a cross-layer network security protocol. We further complement this approach by a layer-specific focus with implementations at two lower OSI layers. For the cross-layer design, we suggest the use of game and mec
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Udaya, Lakshmi L. "Design Of Truthful Allocation Mechanisms For Carbon Footprint Reduction." Thesis, 2012. https://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2322.

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Global warming is currently a major challenge faced by the world. Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. There are widespread ongoing efforts to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving well defined emission targets. In this dissertation, we explore the specific problem faced by a global indust
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Udaya, Lakshmi L. "Design Of Truthful Allocation Mechanisms For Carbon Footprint Reduction." Thesis, 2012. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/2322.

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Global warming is currently a major challenge faced by the world. Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. There are widespread ongoing efforts to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving well defined emission targets. In this dissertation, we explore the specific problem faced by a global industr
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Narayanam, Ramasuri. "Design Of Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols For Ad hoc Wireless Networks : A Game Theoretic Approach." Thesis, 2006. https://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/343.

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An ad hoc wireless network is an infrastructure-less, autonomous system of nodes connected through wireless links. In many current applications of ad hoc wireless networks, individual wireless nodes are autonomous, rational, and intelligent and are often referred to as selfish nodes, following game theoretic terminology. In an ad hoc wireless network, a typical node may be an intermediate node of a route from a source node to a destination node and therefore is often required to forward packets so as to enable communication to be established. Selfish nodes may not always forward the packets sinc
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Narayanam, Ramasuri. "Design Of Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols For Ad hoc Wireless Networks : A Game Theoretic Approach." Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2005/343.

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An ad hoc wireless network is an infrastructure-less, autonomous system of nodes connected through wireless links. In many current applications of ad hoc wireless networks, individual wireless nodes are autonomous, rational, and intelligent and are often referred to as selfish nodes, following game theoretic terminology. In an ad hoc wireless network, a typical node may be an intermediate node of a route from a source node to a destination node and therefore is often required to forward packets so as to enable communication to be established. Selfish nodes may not always forward the packets sinc
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Prakash, Hastagiri. "A Mechanism Design Approach To Resource Procurement In Computational Grids With Rational Resource Providers." Thesis, 2006. https://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/553.

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A computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities. In the presence of grid users who are autonomous, rational, and intelligent, there is an overall degradation of the total efficiency of the computational grid in comparison to what can be achieved when the participating users are centrally coordinated . This loss in efficiency might arise due to an unwillingness on the part of some of the grid resource providers to either not perform completely or not perform to the fullest c
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Prakash, Hastagiri. "A Mechanism Design Approach To Resource Procurement In Computational Grids With Rational Resource Providers." Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2005/553.

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A computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities. In the presence of grid users who are autonomous, rational, and intelligent, there is an overall degradation of the total efficiency of the computational grid in comparison to what can be achieved when the participating users are centrally coordinated . This loss in efficiency might arise due to an unwillingness on the part of some of the grid resource providers to either not perform completely or not perform to the fullest c
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Conference papers on the topic "Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)"

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Li, Bin, Dong Hao, and Dengji Zhao. "Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/33.

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Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentially non-typical multidimensional mechanism design problems and agents' social relations are complicatedly involved with their bids. In such auctions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best for every agent to honestly report her valuation and fully diffuse the sale information to all her neighbo
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Chen, Jing, Bo Li, Yingkai Li, and Pinyan Lu. "Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Extended Abstract)." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/795.

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Designing dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms for a seller to generate (approximately) optimal revenue by selling items to players is a fundamental problem in Bayesian mechanism design. However, most existing studies assume that the seller knows the entire distribution from which the players’ values are drawn. Unfortunately, this assumption may not hold in reality: for example, when the distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct representations. In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexityof Bayesian mechanisms. The seller
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Chen, Jing, Bo Li, and Yingkai Li. "Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/22.

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We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and each buyer has a valuation function over the bundles of the sellers' items. We consider the Bayesian setting where the agents' values/valuations are independently drawn from prior distributions, and aim at designing dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanisms that are approximately optimal. Production-cost markets, where each item has a publicly
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Archbold, Thomas, Bart de Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre. "Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/278.

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Recent work in algorithmic mechanism design focuses on designing mechanisms for agents with bounded rationality, modifying the constraints that must be satisfied in order to achieve incentive compatibility. Starting with Li's strengthening of strategyproofness, obvious strategyproofness (OSP) requires truthtelling to be "obvious" over dishonesty, roughly meaning that the worst outcome from truthful actions must be no worse than the best outcome for dishonest ones. A celebrated result for dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms that allows us to restrict attention to direct mechanisms
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