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Delahoossaye, Gerard. "The moderating will in John Duns Scotus." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29094.
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The thesis examines what counts as a moral act for John Duns Scotus when he considers the two innate affections (or propensities) of the will, the affection for the advantageous (affectio commode) and the affection for justice (affectio iustitiae). The affection for the advantageous inclines us to love an object as suitable to us. This affection tends naturally to produce excessive desires. The affection for justice inclines us to love its object for its own sake. In Scotus' various treatments of natural law, he does not indicate that the only moral motives are selfless motives. Selfless motives seem necessary only in certain circumstances. Friendship is one such circumstance. Scotus claims otherwise, however, in his various treatments of the will's two affections. We never act morally from self-interest alone---that is, on motives provided by the affection for the advantageous alone. But since we cannot long choose apart from the affection for the advantageous, living a moral life depends upon using the affection for justice to moderate (or order) the excesses of the propensity for the advantageous. The most sustained application of the will's two affections is found in Ordinatio II, distinction 6, question 2. The first half of the thesis provides a commentary on this crucial text. We discover that moral disorder has three basic moments. The first moment is the decision to love ourselves inordinately; the second, the decision to love a particular good inordinately; the third, the decision to hate God or neighbor as threats to our unjust desires. We also discover that Scotus has two ways of explaining each of the three moments of moral disorder. He can explain them in terms of the will's two affections, but he can also explain them in terms of the will's two positive acts, the love of desire (velle-concupiscentiae ) and the love of friendship (velle-amicitiae). By an act of the love of desire, we want or wish or choose an object for the sake of something else. By an act of the love of friendship, we want or wish or choose the good of an object for its own sake. This explanation better accounts for the first moment of moral disorder, in fact, than does the former. In Chapter Three, we examine the alterations that Scotus would need to make to his conception of natural law morality in order to accommodate it to the two affections. In Chapter Four, we flesh out Scotus' stipulation in Ordinatio II, distinction 6, question 2, that no sin proceeds from the affection for justice. The work done in this thesis is a necessary first step to further critical analysis of Scotus' treatment of the will's two affections.
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Silva, Roberto de Sousa [UNIFESP]. "A existência de Deus em Duns Scotus." Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2014. http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/39263.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
Duns Scotus, teólogo padre franciscano e filósofo do século XIII busca provar a existência de Deus através da questão “se há entre os entes um ente infinito atualmente existente” (Ordinatio I, parte 1, qq. 1-2.). O Doutor Sútil elabora uma prova dentre as mais complexas, por isso, não é uma prova fácil de ser analisada, mesmo porque temos no mínimo quatro versões: na Lectura (I, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 38- 135), na Ordinatio (I, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 1-156), na Reportatio (I, d. 2, q. 1) e no De primo principio. Vê-se que o tema é um dos problemas centrais da filosofia scotista. Nossa pesquisa enxerga na Ordinatio I (d. 2, q. 1) uma versão completa e madura da prova da existência de Deus em Scotus, além de ser uma edição crítica da resposta do mestre franciscano à questão. Por isso, é aquela que em especial exploraremos. Nessa obra, Scotus argumenta sobre a prova da existência de um princípio absolutamente simples, que seria primeiro na ordem de causalidade eficiente e final. Em seguida, demonstra que esse ente absolutamente simples é plenamente primeiro, pois é primaz em eficiência, finalidade e eminência. Também procura provar que essa tríplice primazia cabe a uma única natureza. Portanto refere-se a um único ente descrito como infinito, pois o primeiro em causalidade só pode causar a si mesmo e ser causa por si mesmo, não é causado por nada externo. Esse ente só pode ter a si mesmo como finalidade, pois, do contrário, não seria primeiro. Do mesmo modo, ele só pode ser primaz em eminência, senão não seria primeiro. Uma vez provadas a unidade e simplicidade desse ente, Scotus parte para a demonstração das propriedades absolutas de Deus. Ele as vê em duas partes: na primeira, trata da inteligência e vontade, e na segunda, da infinidade desse primeiro ente. Logo em seguida, iremos explorar os argumentos de Scotus que corroboram a afirmação da Unicidade de Deus que ele trata na Ordinatio I, parte I questão 3.
Duns Scotus, Franciscan Priest Theologian and Philosopher of the Thirteenth Century seeks to prove the existence of God through the question “If there is an infinite being among beings that actually exists" (Ordinatio I, part 1, qq. 1-2 . ). The Subtle Doctor elaborates a proof from among the more complex ones, so it is not an easy proof to analyze. We have at least four versions: in Lectura (I, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 38- 135) in the Ordinatio (I, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 1-156) in Reportatio (I, d. 2, q. 1) and the De primo principio, One sees that the theme is one of the core problems of the Philosophy Scotist. Our research sees in the Ordinatio I (d. 2, q. 1) a complete and mature version of proving the existence of God at Scotus, besides being a critical edition of Master Franciscan to reply the question. Therefore, the one that we will explore. In that work, Scotus proves the existence of a principle simple, that it would be the first about efficient causality and final. Then he demonstrates that this being simple is fully first, as its primacy in efficiency, finality and eminence. In addition, he seeks to prove that this threefold primacy belongs to one nature. He refers to a single entity described as infinite. This being can only have itself as purpose, because otherwise it would not be first. Similarly, it must be the first one in eminence, otherwise would not be the first. Once proven the unity and simplicity of this being, Scotus will demonstrate the absolute properties of God. He sees into two parts: the first deals with the intellect and will, and the second part deals with the infinity of this first being. Next, we will be exploring the arguments from Scotus that backs the Unity of God that he treats in Ordinatio I, Part I Question 3.
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Loiret, François. "Volonté et infini chez Duns Scot /." Paris : Éd. Kimé, 2003. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38957045q.
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Loiret, François. "Volonté et infini chez Duns Scot." Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002STR20009.
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Le présent travail vise à dégager l'articulation de la volonté et de l'infini en acte. Il s'agira de montrer comment seule une pensée de la volonté comme telle permet l'inscription d'un infini en acte, à partir de l'oeuvre du théologien écossais Jean Duns Scot. Il s'agira d'abord d'examiner dans une première partie comment Duns Scot s'efforce de penser la volonté comme volonté. Il l'arrache à son statut traditionnel d'appétit intellectuel et l'identifie à la rationalité. Une logique de la liberté sera dégagée comme logique de la puissance absolue, assurant une réhabilitation de la contingence. La seconde partie montrera comment Duns Scot déduit l'infini en acte de la volonté et comment la logique de la liberté est une logique de l'infini actuel. Cette logique de l'étant est subordonnée à celle de l'infini en acte. Elle demande à être comprise dans une étroite connexion avec le concept de toute-puissance. Avec Duns Scot se défait l'identification de la limite et s'opère une subversion du principeThis present work aims at bringing out the articulation between the will and the infinite in actuality. Our purpose is to show how only a conception of the will as such will allow the inscription of an infinite in actuality, from the works of Scottish theologian John Duns Scot. .
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Hofmeister, Pich Roberto. "Der Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus /." Bonn, 2002. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=968534686.
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Alt, Guido Jos? Rey. "Individua??o e distin??es em J. Duns Scotus." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2018. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/7853.
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Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq
The thesis?s objective is to examine the interconnected problems of the ontological status and the distinction of the principle of individuation, the principle that seeks to explain the numerical identity of individual substances, in the metaphysics of the scholastic philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus (1255/56-1308). The following exposition seeks to argue for the soundness of Scotus?s analysis of the concepts of identity and distinction in the framework of his doctrine of the ?formal distinction?, which grounds his overall approach to this metaphysical principle. Our interpretative purpose is also oriented on the secondary objective of examining the consistency of an important objection posed by Ockham?s Problem.
O objetivo central da presente disserta??o ? examinar os problemas interrelacionados do estatuto ontol?gico e da distin??o do princ?pio de individua??o, a saber, o princ?pio que visa explicar a identidade num?rica de subst?ncias individuais, na metaf?sica do fil?sofo e te?logo escol?stico J. Duns Scotus (c. 1265/6-1308). A exposi??o subsequente visa argumentar pela cog?ncia da an?lise de Scotus dos conceitos de identidade e distin??o no quadro da sua doutrina da ?distin??o formal?, a qual fundamenta a sua abordagem a este princ?pio metaf?sico. Nosso prop?sito interpretativo ? orientado, ademais, pelo exame da consist?ncia de uma obje??o importante a esta an?lise colocada pelo Problema de Ockham.
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Davison, Andrew Paul. "The conceptualisation of finitude in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.607873.
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Cezar, Cesar Ribas. "O conhecimento abstrativo em Duns Escoto." [s.n.], 1995. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281752.
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Orientador: Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do NascimentoDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Abstract: Not informed.
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia
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Chabada, Michal. "Cognitio intuitiva et abstractiva : die ontologischen Implikationen der Erkenntnislehre des Johannes Duns Skotus mit der Gegenüberstellung zu Aristoteles und I. Kant /." Mönchengladbach : B. Kühlen, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb400959826.
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Leite, Thiago Soares. "O estatuto transcendente das perfectiones simpliciter na metafísica de João Duns Scotus." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3424.
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Previous issue date: 2013This PhD thesis aims to defend the transcendent status of pure perfections. In order to confirm our hypothesis, this study adopts the following route: in the introduction, we present the main elements of metaphysics before Duns Scotus that most influenced the Doctor Subtilis’s system. There are three steps: the conception of science and metaphysics of substance put forward by Aristotle; the discussion about the object of study of first philosophy between the medieval Arabs, in particular, in the philosophies of Avicenna and Averroes; the concepts of being and essential order on Henry of Ghent. Holding these elements in mind, the first chapter contextualizes the scotistic conception of metaphysics. It deals with the following themes: the concept and the object of metaphysics according to Duns Scotus; the concept of being as the first object of human intellect; the univocity of being; the so called "second beginning of metaphysics". Since being is the first class of transcendent notions, scotistic metaphysics is configured not only as ontology, but also as a transcendent science. In this sense, it is necessary to clarify the concept of transcendent proposed by Duns Scotus, as well as dealing with transcendent classes too, namely: the coextensive attributes, the disjunctive attributes and the pure perfections. To carry out this task is the goal of our second chapter. As far as is known, the De primo principio is the first philosophical treatise entirely dedicated to prove the existence of God written by a Medieval Latin philosopher. Therefore, we center our discussion in this work which is the aim of the third chapter of the present study. Finally, our fourth and last chapter presents two ways in favor of the transcendent status of pure perfections.
A presente tese de doutoramento tem por finalidade defender o estatuto transcendente das perfeições puras. A fim de confirmarmos nossa hipótese, o presente trabalho adota o seguinte percurso: na Introdução, apresentamos os principais elementos da metafísica pré-scotista que mais influenciaram o sistema do Doctor Subtilis. Três são os passos dados: a concepção de ciência e a de metafísica da substância apresentadas por Aristóteles; a discussão acerca do objeto de estudo da filosofia primeira ocorrida entre os árabes medievais, em especial, nas filosofias de Avicena e Averróis; os conceitos de ente e de ordem essencial em Henrique de Gand. De posse desses elementos, o capítulo primeiro contextualiza a concepção scotista de metafísica. Aborda-se os seguintes temas: o conceito e o objeto da metafísica de acordo com Duns Scotus; o conceito “ente” como primeiro objeto do intelecto humano; a univocidade do termo “ente”; o assim denominado “segundo começo da metafísica”. Visto ser o ente a primeira classe das noções transcendentes, a metafísica scotista se configura não apenas como ontologia, mas também como ciência dos transcendentes. Nesse sentido, torna-se necessário explicitar a noção de transcendente proposta por Duns Scotus, bem como abordar as demais classes de transcendentes, a saber: os atributos coextensíveis com o ente, os atributos disjuntivos e as perfeições puras. Levar a cabo essa tarefa constitui-se no objetivo de nosso segundo capítulo. Até onde se conhece, o De primo principio é o primeiro tratado absolutamente filosófico dedicado a provar a existência de Deus escrito por um filósofo latino medieval. Por conseguinte, essa é a obra de análise mais detida no cerne de nossa tese e que se constitui no terceiro capítulo do presente trabalho. Por fim, nosso quarto e último capítulo apresenta duas vias a favor do estatuto transcendente das perfeições puras.
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Hall, Alexander W. "Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus : natural theology in the high middle ages /." London : Continuum, 2007. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb410165448.
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Massobrio, Simona Emilia. "Aristotelian matter as understood by St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus." Thesis, McGill University, 1991. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=39263.
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The concept of matter as it is treated in the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus is examined, partly to ascertain the influence which the original Aristotelian concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly to determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful to the original Aristotelian concept. An analysis is carried out of the views of the three philosophers regarding the ontological status of matter; the intelligibility of matter; the issue of the real distinction between matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite substances; and its role in defining composite substances and determining their essences. Finally, the views of Aquinas and Scotus regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the plurality of forms are discussed and compared. It is shown that, while most of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Scotus's time was far more influenced by Platonist than by Aristotelian principles, Scotus, though a Franciscan, was much closer to Aristotle than to Plato in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviations from the original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's theory can be ascribed to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus's views on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.
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Cross, Richard Alan. "The doctrine of the hypostatic union in the thought of Duns Scotus." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315029.
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Watts, Jordan D. "Duns Scotus' doctrine of individuation in Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis book VII, q. 13 and Ordinatio II, d. 3 a comparison /." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2006. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p029-0660.
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Oliveira, Iuri Coelho. "A teoria da causalidade no argumento te?sta de Jo?o Duns Scotus." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2017. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/7757.
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Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq
This study aims to develop two key concepts for the theistic argument of John Duns Scotus, namely that of essentially ordered causes (ceo) and that of accidentally ordered causes (cao). These concepts appear in both the different versions of his argument (Lect., Ord., Rep. I-A e TPP) as well as in a passage from his commentary on Aristotle?s Metaphysics. Thus, first of all, it is necessary to treat in a general sense the characteristics of these texts and to say where, in themselves, those concepts are found, besides indicating how the frame of the theistic argument of Scotus leads him to causality. Secondly, it is important to devote a little attention to the doctrinal sources on which Scotus based himself to formulate his own concepts, namely on Aristotle and Avicenna. In this chapter it is also shown in which the Scotistic notions approach and depart from those of his sources. In addition, the differences indicated by Scotus between the ceo and cao, on the one hand, and per se and per accidens causes, on the other, are clarified. Finally, it deals exclusively with ceo and cao, initially, presenting the characteristics of the members of each causal series in their respective processes of action; then, it is studied how these causes are structured as series, where the treatment of the bond of both with the First Cause is initiated through three propositions in which the fineness of the ceo is proved, the possible infinity of the cao and how the First Cause acts in relation to these two causal series. This chapter is finished discussing the exclusive characteristics of the Causa Prima in its relation to the others (ceo and cao), and saying how these two series contribute to a causal theory in theistic argument of Duns Scotus.
Este estudo tem em vista desenvolver dois conceitos-chave para o argumento te?sta de Jo?o Duns Scotus, a saber, o de causas essencialmente ordenadas (ceo) e o de causas acidentalmente ordenadas (cao). Estes conceitos aparecem tanto nas diferentes vers?es de seu argumento (Lect., Ord., Rep. I-A e TPP) quanto em uma passagem de seu coment?rio ? Metaf?sica de Arist?teles. Assim, em primeiro lugar, ? preciso tratar em sentido geral das carater?sticas destes textos e onde, nos mesmos, aqueles conceitos aparecem, al?m de indicar como a estrutura do argumento te?sta de Scotus leva-o ? causalidade. Em segundo, ? importante dedicar um pouco de aten??o ?s fontes doutrinais em que Scotus se baseou para formul?-los, a saber, Arist?teles e Avicena, mostrando em que as no??es scotistas se aproximam e em que se afastam das de suas fontes, al?m de esclarecer as diferen?as indicadas por Scotus entre as ceo e as cao, de um lado, e as causas per se e per accidens, de outro. Por fim, trata-se exclusivamente das ceo e das cao, inicialmente, apresentando as caracter?sticas dos membros de cada s?rie causal em seus respectivos processos de atua??o; a seguir, estuda - se como estas causas se estruturam enquanto s?ries, onde se inicia o tratamento do v?nculo de ambas com a Causa Primeira atrav?s de tr?s proposi??es em que se prova a finidade das ceo, a poss?vel infinidade das cao e como a Causa Primeira atua em rela??o a estas duas s?ries causais. Conclui-se ent?o o cap?tulo tratando das caracter?sticas exclusivas da Causa Prima em sua rela??o com as outras (ceo e cao), e de como estas duas s?ries contribuem para uma teoria causal no argumento te?sta de Duns Scotus.
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Burke, Catherine Margaret. "The possibility of free will: John Duns Scotus and William James on the will." Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3895.
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The two questions that motivate the present inquiry are: is it possible that human beings will freely, and what does free will make possible? John Duns Scotus and William James are two defenders of the possibility of free will, although each has a very different notion of the will. First, I present the accounts of the will articulated by Duns
Scotus and James, with attention to the context in which the accounts were developed and the reasons each philosopher gives for the possibility of free will. Next, I briefly consider the picture of human action each account of the will makes possible. Then, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Finally, in response to a weakness of both accounts, I argue that in order to widen the possibilities of human moral agency, it is necessary to reflect not only on our strengths but also on our physical and moral frailty.
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Antônio, Felipe de Souza [UNIFESP]. "Duns Scotus e o princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro"." Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2012. http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/9345.
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Publico-FelipedeSouzaAntonio.pdf: 522610 bytes, checksum: 2df298fce6c90f3e8bc78d335f550c16 (MD5)Tendo como referência os escritos da Física de Aristóteles, o movimento, para os pensadores do século XIII, não somente diz respeito ao movimento local, mas também às mudanças quantitativa e qualitativa dos entes. A fim de justificar o movimento das coisas, isto é, a passagem da potência ao ato, grande parte dos escolásticos recorreu ao princípio aristotélico que diz: “tudo que se move é movido por outro”. Ademais, para alguns desses pensadores, até mesmo as alterações cognitivas e apetitivas que ocorrem nas potências da alma submetem-se a esse princípio. Às vésperas do século XIV, Duns Scotus rejeita a universalização do princípio aristotélico do movimento e sistematiza uma filosofia em favor do automovimento. Por conseguinte, o propósito desta dissertação é apresentar por que Scotus sustenta que não se pode afirmar a priori, isto é, por meio de princípios de validade universal e independentes da experiência, que toda e qualquer mudança é causada por outro. Tomando por referência as Questões sobre os livros da Metafísica de Aristóteles IX, q. 14, exponho o pensamento de Scotus, o qual diz que o automovimento não só é possível, mas também é a melhor explicação para muitos fatos empíricos: os acidentes simultâneos e não simultâneos; o movimento dos leves e graves; o movimento dos animais; bem como as alterações qualitativa, quantitativa, cognitiva e apetitiva que outrora eram exclusivamente explicadas pelo princípio aristotélico do movimento. Por fim, na conclusão, teço algumas considerações sobre a questão do automovimento e também apresento sucintamente o pensamento de Scotus sobre o automovimento da vontade.
For the 13th century thinkers the study of motion was plainly founded on the writings of Aristotle‟s physics which does not constrain the meaning of motion exclusively to local motion, but it also includes to its meaning the qualitative and quantitative changes of things. In order to explain the movement or changes of things, namely the passage from potency to act, the majority of the scholastic philosophers counted on the aristotelian cinesiological principle that says: “everything which is in motion is moved by another”. Moreover, for some scholastic philosophers even the changes regarding the powers of the soul, that is, alteration in the intellect and in the will, must undergo the cinesiological principle. On the eve of the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus rejects the aristotelian principle and systematizes a philosophy in favor of self-motion. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to present why Scotus sustains we can not state a priori, i.e, through principles of universal scope and independent of experience, that self-motion is impossible; in other words, we can not say that any change is caused by another. Taking as reference the Questions on the metaphysics of Aristotle’s IX, q.14 by John Duns Scotus, I explain the thought of Scotus to whom self-motion is not only possible, but it is also the best explanation to many empirical facts like: coeval and non coeval accidents; the motion of heavy and light things; animals‟ motion, as well as qualitative, quantitative, cognitive and appetitive changes that once were exclusively explained by the aristotelian principle of motion. Finally, in the conclusion, I make some comments about the self-motion issue and also introduce briefly Scotus‟ thought regarding self-motion in volition
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Antonio, Felipe de Souza [UNIFESP]. "Duns Scotus e o princípio “tudo que se move é movido por outro”." Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2013. http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/39336.
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Tendo como referência os escritos da Física de Aristóteles, o movimento, para os pensadores do século XIII, não somente diz respeito ao movimento local, mas também às mudanças quantitativa e qualitativa dos entes. A fim de justificar o movimento das coisas, isto é, a passagem da potência ao ato, grande parte dos escolásticos recorreu ao princípio aristotélico que diz: “tudo que se move é movido por outro”. Ademais, para alguns desses pensadores, até mesmo as alterações cognitivas e apetitivas que ocorrem nas potências da alma submetem-se a esse princípio. Às vésperas do século XIV, Duns Scotus rejeita a universalização do princípio aristotélico do movimento e sistematiza uma filosofia em favor do automovimento. Por conseguinte, o propósito desta dissertação é apresentar por que Scotus sustenta que não se pode afirmar a priori, isto é, por meio de princípios de validade universal e independentes da experiência, que toda e qualquer mudança é causada por outro. Tomando por referência as Questões sobre os livros da Metafísica de Aristóteles IX, q. 14, exponho o pensamento de Scotus, o qual diz que o automovimento não só é possível, mas também é a melhor explicação para muitos fatos empíricos: os acidentes simultâneos e não simultâneos; o movimento dos leves e graves; o movimento dos animais; bem como as alterações qualitativa, quantitativa, cognitiva e apetitiva que outrora eram exclusivamente explicadas pelo princípio aristotélico do movimento. Por fim, na conclusão, teço algumas considerações sobre a questão do automovimento e também apresento sucintamente o pensamento de Scotus sobre o automovimento da vontade.
For the 13th century thinkers the study of motion was plainly founded on the writings of Aristotle‟s physics which does not constrain the meaning of motion exclusively to local motion, but it also includes to its meaning the qualitative and quantitative changes of things. In order to explain the movement or changes of things, namely the passage from potency to act, the majority of the scholastic philosophers counted on the aristotelian cinesiological principle that says: “everything which is in motion is moved by another”. Moreover, for some scholastic philosophers even the changes regarding the powers of the soul, that is, alteration in the intellect and in the will, must undergo the cinesiological principle. On the eve of the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus rejects the aristotelian principle and systematizes a philosophy in favor of self-motion. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to present why Scotus sustains we can not state a priori, i.e, through principles of universal scope and independent of experience, that self-motion is impossible; in other words, we can not say that any change is caused by another. Taking as reference the Questions on the metaphysics of Aristotle’s IX, q.14 by John Duns Scotus, I explain the thought of Scotus to whom selfmotion is not only possible, but it is also the best explanation to many empirical facts like: coeval and non coeval accidents; the motion of heavy and light things; animals‟ motion, as well as qualitative, quantitative, cognitive and appetitive changes that once were exclusively explained by the aristotelian principle of motion. Finally, in the conclusion, I make some comments about the self-motion issue and also introduce briefly Scotus‟ thought regarding self-motion in volition
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Leite, Thiago Soares. "O estatuto transcendente das perfectiones simpliciter na metaf?sica de Jo?o Duns Scotus." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2013. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/2921.
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Previous issue date: 2013-04-03This PhD thesis aims to defend the transcendent status of pure perfections. In order to confirm our hypothesis, this study adopts the following route: in the introduction, we present the main elements of metaphysics before Duns Scotus that most influenced the Doctor Subtilis s system. There are three steps: the conception of science and metaphysics of substance put forward by Aristotle; the discussion about the object of study of first philosophy between the medieval Arabs, in particular, in the philosophies of Avicenna and Averroes; the concepts of being and essential order on Henry of Ghent. Holding these elements in mind, the first chapter contextualizes the scotistic conception of metaphysics. It deals with the following themes: the concept and the object of metaphysics according to Duns Scotus; the concept of being as the first object of human intellect; the univocity of being; the so called "second beginning of metaphysics". Since being is the first class of transcendent notions, scotistic metaphysics is configured not only as ontology, but also as a transcendent science. In this sense, it is necessary to clarify the concept of transcendent proposed by Duns Scotus, as well as dealing with transcendent classes too, namely: the coextensive attributes, the disjunctive attributes and the pure perfections. To carry out this task is the goal of our second chapter. As far as is known, the De primo principio is the first philosophical treatise entirely dedicated to prove the existence of God written by a Medieval Latin philosopher. Therefore, we center our discussion in this work which is the aim of the third chapter of the present study. Finally, our fourth and last chapter presents two ways in favor of the transcendent status of pure perfections.
A presente tese de doutoramento tem por finalidade defender o estatuto transcendente das perfei??es puras. A fim de confirmarmos nossa hip?tese, o presente trabalho adota o seguinte percurso: na Introdu??o, apresentamos os principais elementos da metaf?sica pr?-scotista que mais influenciaram o sistema do Doctor Subtilis. Tr?s s?o os passos dados: a concep??o de ci?ncia e a de metaf?sica da subst?ncia apresentadas por Arist?teles; a discuss?o acerca do objeto de estudo da filosofia primeira ocorrida entre os ?rabes medievais, em especial, nas filosofias de Avicena e Averr?is; os conceitos de ente e de ordem essencial em Henrique de Gand. De posse desses elementos, o cap?tulo primeiro contextualiza a concep??o scotista de metaf?sica. Aborda-se os seguintes temas: o conceito e o objeto da metaf?sica de acordo com Duns Scotus; o conceito ente como primeiro objeto do intelecto humano; a univocidade do termo ente ; o assim denominado segundo come?o da metaf?sica. Visto ser o ente a primeira classe das no??es transcendentes, a metaf?sica scotista se configura n?o apenas como ontologia, mas tamb?m como ci?ncia dos transcendentes. Nesse sentido, torna-se necess?rio explicitar a no??o de transcendente proposta por Duns Scotus, bem como abordar as demais classes de transcendentes, a saber: os atributos coextens?veis com o ente, os atributos disjuntivos e as perfei??es puras. Levar a cabo essa tarefa constitui-se no objetivo de nosso segundo cap?tulo. At? onde se conhece, o De primo principio ? o primeiro tratado absolutamente filos?fico dedicado a provar a exist?ncia de Deus escrito por um fil?sofo latino medieval. Por conseguinte, essa ? a obra de an?lise mais detida no cerne de nossa tese e que se constitui no terceiro cap?tulo do presente trabalho. Por fim, nosso quarto e ?ltimo cap?tulo apresenta duas vias a favor do estatuto transcendente das perfei??es puras.
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Da, Costa Santos Rogério. "L'ontologie du contingent selon Jean Duns Scot : les origines du possible et la représentation en Dieu." Paris 4, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA040012.
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Le présent travail cherche à éclaircir, à travers une analyse historique, le tournant imprimé par Duns Scot à la conception du possible au début du XIVème siècle. La première partie est caractérisée par l'analyse d'un problème précis : c'est en se connaissant soi-même (comme cause), que Dieu connait toutes les choses. Cette formule, dont l'origine est attribuée à Themistius et aussi à Denys l'aréopagite, a eu un essor fulgurant pendant tout le XIIIème siècle. Or, à la fin du XIIIème siècle cette formule semble être épuisée, et c'est là que l'on peut constater l'importance d'Henri de Gand dans ce processus. En effet, sous l'inspiration d’Avicenne, il a infléchi la connaissance divine vers des objets secondaires de l'entendement, auxquels il a attribué un être d'essence. Henri propose que les choses sont maintenant connues par dieu en elles-mêmes, c'est-à-dire, comme des objets qui s'opposent à la pensée divine en lui-même, donc objectivement. Mais c'est avec Duns Scot que la formule de Denys va souffrir son inflexion majeure, c'est-à-dire, au moment où il fait passer la représentation vers la sphère de la pensée divine elle-même. Ceci dit, cela impliquera tout un remaniement des notions, comme celles de l'exemplaire et de l'imitation, mais surtout, elle doit nous ouvrir sur une dimension radicale du possible, un possible qui n'est plus simplement le corrélatif d'une puissance. En effet, en passant par le crible de la représentation (divine et humaine), l'ontologie sera désormais fondée sur l'antériorité de la question : qu'est-ce que l'on peut penser ? Ceci signifie que le caractère de ce qui est pensable passera à constituer le premier registre de l'ontologie, car la question sur l'étant en tant qu'étant sera d'abord, et à partir d'ici, celle de l'étant comme pensée ou comme cogitableThis work is intended to elucidate, through an historical analysis, the modification caused by Duns Scotus in the apprehension of possible at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In part one, a precise problem is analyzed: is only knowing himself (as cause) that god can know all the things. This formulation, which origin is assigned to Themistius and also to pseudo-Dionysius, had a glaring propagation during all the thirteenth century. However, at the end of that century, it seems to be depleted, and it is in this moment that can be verified henry of Ghent's importance in this process. As a matter of fact, under the inspiration of Avicenna, he bent divine knowledge towards the secondary objects of understanding, to which he attributed an essential being. Henry proposes that things are, now, known by god in itselves, that is, as objects that are opposed to the divine understanding in himself, and therefore objectively. Nevertheless, is in Duns Scotus that the pseudo-Dionysius' formulation will suffer a major inflection, that is, at the moment in which he inserts representation in the field of proper divine understanding. Because of this, it will have a reordering of notions like pattern and imitation, but especially, this movement ends by liberates a radical dimension of possible, a possible that is not only the correlative of potentia. In fact, when the ontology passes into the representation sifter (human and divine representation) it will be grounded in the anteriority of the question: what can be thinked? This means that the character of this one can think will constitute the first record of ontology because the question about ens in quantum ens will be, initially and from now on, that of the being as cogitable or thinkable
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Sheppard, James A. "The theory of names according to John Duns Scotus : a study in late thirteenth century semantics." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.301262.
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Demange, Dominique. "Les Seconds analytiques au XIIIe siècle et la théorie de la connaissance de Jean Duns Scot." Paris, EPHE, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005EPHE5019.
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Cette thèse porte sur la théorie de la connaissance scientifique du philosophe et théologien franciscain Jean Duns Scot (1265-1308). Au Moyen-âge, la source principale pour la théorie de la connaissance scientifique est le traité d’Aristote intitulé Seconds analytiques. La première partie de la thèse est consacrée à l’étude de l’interprétation des Seconds analytiques au treizième siècle, chez Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253), Albert Le Grand (1200-1280), Thomas d’Aquin (1224-1274), Gilles de Rome (1245-1316), Simon de Faversham (1260-1306) et Jean Duns Scot. La deuxième partie de la thèse porte sur les fondements de la théorie de la connaissance de Jean Duns Scot. Elle a essentiellement pour but de déterminer ses théories d’expérience et de l’évidence. Le concept d’objet apparaît comme le centre de la théorie scotienne de la connaissance : toute connaissance, toute science est pré-contenue causalement (« virtuellement incluse ») dans un objet. La théorie de l’objet est étudiée dans ses aspects noétiques, ses conséquences épistémologiques, et on établit enfin son importance pour la théorie de la vérité propositionnelle. La troisième partie porte sur la doctrine de la science de Duns Scot. Sont successivement étudiés les rapports entre sciences logique et métaphysique, la théorie de la subalternation et de la division des sciences spéculatives réelles, et la question des rapports entre métaphysique et théologie. En annexe de la thèse on trouvera la première traduction en langue française du livre VI des Questions sur la métaphysique de Duns Scot, livre qui contient des développements importants sur la théorie de la science et de la véritéIn this thesis we consider the theory of scientific knowledge of the Franciscan philosopher John Duns Scotus (1265-1308). In the Middle-Ages, the most important source for the theory of scientific knowledge is the aristotelician treatise Posterior analytics. The first part of the thesis is devoted to the study of the interpretation of the Posterior analytics in the thirteenth century, by Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253), Albert The Great (1200-1280), Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), Giles of Rome (1245-1316), Simon of Faversham (1260-1306) and John Duns Scotus. The second part of the thesis considers the foundations of Scotus theory of knowledge. The main purpose is to determine Scotus theories of experience and evidence. The concept of ‘object’ appears to be the center of Scotus theory of knowledge: all knowledge, all science is causally pre-contained (‘virtually included’) in an object. The theory of object is studied in its noetical aspects, its epistemological consequences, and its importance fir the theory of propositional truth is demonstrated. The third part of the thesis is devoted to Scotus doctrine of science: we consider the relations between logical and metaphysical sciences, the theory of subalternation, the division of the theoretical real sciences, and the question of the relations between metaphysics and theology. The first French translation of book VI of Scotus’s Questions in metaphysics, which includes important material on theory of science and truth, is given as an appendix of the thesis
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Tonner, Philip. "The univocity of being, with special reference to the doctrines of John Duns Scotus and Martin Heidegger." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.433232.
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Barbosa, Filho Domingos. "A vontade salvífica e predestinante de Deus e a questão do cristocentrismo : um estudo sobre a doutrina de João Duns Escoto e seus ecos na teologia contemporânea /." Roma : Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2007. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9788878391079.
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BORACCHI, STEFANO. "ENS INDIFFERENS. HEIDEGGER E DUNS SCOTO (1910 - 1917)." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/20587.
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Il rapporto del giovane Heidegger con Duns Scoto viene analizzato con particolare riferimento alla tesi del 1916 "La dottrina delle categorie e del significato in Duns Scoto". Il pensatore scolastico viene indicato come fonte di primaria importanza per lo sviluppo dell'ontologia heideggeriana matura attraverso alcuni elementi chiave: l'univocità del concetto di essere, la razionalità di principio dell'individuo, la ricerca di un linguaggio descrittivo adatto alla filosofia. Carl Braig risulta uno degli autori il cui contributo determinò maggiormente in Heidegger l'interesse per i problemi dell'ontologia scotista.The young Heidegger’s relationship to Duns Scotus is analysed with particular reference to the thesis on “Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning” (1916). The scholastic thinker is shown to be a source of primary importance for Heidegger’s mature ontology by the means of some key features: the univocity of the concept of Being, the basic intelligibility of the individual, the search for a descriptive language suitable for philosophy. Carl Braig turns out to be one of the authors who contributed the most to determine Heidegger’s interest in the problems of scotist ontology.
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BORACCHI, STEFANO. "ENS INDIFFERENS. HEIDEGGER E DUNS SCOTO (1910 - 1917)." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/20587.
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Il rapporto del giovane Heidegger con Duns Scoto viene analizzato con particolare riferimento alla tesi del 1916 "La dottrina delle categorie e del significato in Duns Scoto". Il pensatore scolastico viene indicato come fonte di primaria importanza per lo sviluppo dell'ontologia heideggeriana matura attraverso alcuni elementi chiave: l'univocità del concetto di essere, la razionalità di principio dell'individuo, la ricerca di un linguaggio descrittivo adatto alla filosofia. Carl Braig risulta uno degli autori il cui contributo determinò maggiormente in Heidegger l'interesse per i problemi dell'ontologia scotista.The young Heidegger’s relationship to Duns Scotus is analysed with particular reference to the thesis on “Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning” (1916). The scholastic thinker is shown to be a source of primary importance for Heidegger’s mature ontology by the means of some key features: the univocity of the concept of Being, the basic intelligibility of the individual, the search for a descriptive language suitable for philosophy. Carl Braig turns out to be one of the authors who contributed the most to determine Heidegger’s interest in the problems of scotist ontology.
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Burton, Simon James Gowan. "Hallowing of logic : the Trinitarian method of Richard Baxter's Methodus Theologiae." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7821.
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While Richard Baxter (1615-91) is well known and rightly held in high esteem for his practical divinity and his evangelistic zeal, he has hitherto been conspicuously neglected as a theologian. In particular there have been no major studies of him with respect to the renewed paradigm of Protestant Scholasticism and none at all of his Methodus Theologiae (1681), which represents the fruit of a lifetime of theological reflection and study and which is arguably, in both scope and vision, one of the last great Summas of English scholastic divinity. This thesis focuses on the Methodus and on Baxter‟s theological method, which he took, though imperfect, to be the closest to the true Scripture method of theology that anyone had yet come. Baxter believed that every level of (active) created reality reflected the impress of God‟s Triune being in metaphysical composition, structure and activity. This he described, following the Italian metaphysicist Tommaso Campanella, in terms of the divine primalities or principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. In the Methodus these insights are systematised into a kind of Trinitarian logic. Baxter held that human reason should be sanctified in order to conform to the Trinitarian structure of created reality, and therefore espoused a method of trichotomising organised according to these same divine principles, derivative of both Ramist and Lullist method. This thesis argues that the whole of Baxter‟s mature thought is structured in a Trinitarian fashion according to his own „hallowed logic‟ and that two themes, often interlinked, are the key to interpreting his thought: the metaphysics of the divine principles and the Christian‟s baptismal covenant with the Triune God. Furthermore it examines Baxter‟s analogical ascent from the general vestigia Trinitatis present in the whole created order through the special vestigium of man‟s soul fashioned in the image of God and finally to the Trinity itself. This detailed exposition provides the basis, in the concluding chapter, for an examination of the whole of the Methodus and a demonstration that this represents a methodological unfolding of the covenant between the believer and God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory. In this way the Methodus may be seen as having taken its inspiration from the Theo-Politica (1659) of Baxter‟s friend George Lawson. Finally this thesis concludes that Baxter‟s thought has pronounced Scotist and Nominalist accents. His Scotism in particular runs deep and has strong ties with his Trinitarian thought, which is especially significant in light of the recent increasingly vocal discussions of the Scotist character of Protestant Scholasticism. Overall therefore it is suggested that Baxter is a neglected figure who deserves to be rediscovered and whose mature theology represents a fascinating reconstrual of biblical ideas according to a Trinitarian and scholastic paradigm.
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Wood, Eric. "The Primacy of Christ: A Theological Foundation." Athenaeum of Ohio / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=athe1490281954783496.
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Paasch, J. T. "God's only Begotten Son : The Metaphysics of Divine Generation in Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.508651.
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Schulz, Michael. "Sein und Trinität : Systematische Erorterungen zur Religionsphilosophie G. W. F. Hegels im ontologiegeschichtlichen Rückblick auf J. Duns Scotus und I. Kant und die Hegel-Rezeption in der Seinsauslegung und Trinitätstheologie bei W. Pannenberg, E. Jüngel, K. Rahner und H. U. v. Balthasar /." St. Ottilien : EOS-Verl, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb36986712s.
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Jaramillo, Maria Jose [Verfasser], Andreas [Gutachter] Speer, Hannes [Gutachter] Möhle, and David [Gutachter] Wirmer. "Species intelligibilis: Die Intentionalität der menschlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus / Maria Jose Jaramillo ; Gutachter: Andreas Speer, Hannes Möhle, David Wirmer." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1219652377/34.
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Irimescu, Ana. "De l'intuition au Moyen Age à la connaissance intuitive chez Duns Scot." Thesis, Paris, EPHE, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015EPHE5073.
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Au Moyen Age, les théories physiologique, psychologique et philosophique de la perception se sont mutuellement influencées jusqu’à aboutir au modèle théorique de la cognition visuelle. Les définitions médiévales de la connaissance intuitive confirment d’ailleurs le « caractère visuel » de la métaphysique occidentale, ainsi que l’influence de l’optique sur l’épistémologie. Jean Duns Scot (1265-1308) est le premier philosophe qui se sert, de manière systématique, de la distinction entre deux modes cognitifs pré-discursifs et pré-judicatifs : abstractif et intuitif. Il donne ainsi une définition rigoureuse au concept d’intuition, qu’il applique de manière univoque à la connaissance du singulier immatériel et matériel. Avant lui, Matthieu d’Aquasparta (1237-1302) avait étendu le concept théologique d’intuition, utilisé traditionnellement pour expliquer la vision béatifique, à la problématique de la connaissance de soi. Il avait utilisé le terme intuitio pour désigner le rapport cognitif direct et immédiat de l’âme à ses propres actes, sans l’appliquer pour autant à la connaissance du singulier matériel. Pour Duns Scot, la connaissance de soi est directe et immédiate et intuitive et garantit la certitude dans le processus cognitifs, le fonctionnement de la mémoire, la conscience de soi et l’identité personnelle. L’intuition intellectuelle du singulier matériel constitue ainsi une des applications possibles de la distinction scotiste entre cognitio intuitiva et cognitio abstractiva, qui s’ajoute à celles représentées par la vision béatifique, la connaissance angélique et la connaissance auto-réflexiveIn the Middle Ages, the physiological, psychological and philosophical theories of perception were mutually influenced to the point where they generated a theoretical model of visual cognition. The medieval definitions of intuitive knowledge confirm the “visual character” of the Western metaphysics, much like the influence of optics on epistemology. John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) is the first philosopher to use in a systematic manner the distinction between the two pre-discursive and pre-judgment cognitive modes: abstractive and intuitive. He also gives a rigorous definition for the concept of intuition that he applies univocally to the knowledge of both the immaterial and material singular. Before him, Matthew of Aquasparta (1237-1302) extended the theological concept of intuition, traditionally used to explain the beatific vision, to the problem of knowledge of the self. He employed the term intuitio to name the direct and immediate cognitive relation between the soul and its own acts, but without applying it to the material singular. For Duns Scotus, the knowledge of the self is direct, immediate, and intuitive and guarantees the certitude in the cognitive process, the operations of the memory, self-consciousness and personal identity. The intellectual intuition of the material singular constitutes yet another one of the possible applications of the Scotist distinction between cognitio intuitiva and cognitio abstractiva that adds to those represented by the beatific vision, the angelic knowledge and the self-knowledge
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Gilon, Odile. "Essentia indifferens: études sur l'antériorité, l'homogénéité et l'unité dans la métaphysique de Jean Duns Scot." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210227.
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Ce travail porte sur l'application et l'utilisation par Jean Duns Scot de la théorie de l'indifférence de l'essence, issue du péripatétisme arabe, et se donne pour enjeu d'en comprendre le fonctionnement conceptuel. Solution conjointe aux questions de la constitution ontologique des choses, des rapports entre le langage et la réalité et du mode d'appréhension des notions générales dans l'abstraction, la théorie de l'indifférence de l'essence sert de sous-bassement à la métaphysique de Duns Scot. C'est au moyen de cette théorie qu'il est possible, comme le montre cette recherche, de relire certains grands thèmes de la métaphysique scotiste: la théorie de la nature commune et de l'haeccéité, la connaissance abstractive (cognitio abstractiva), et la théorie de la non identité formelle. Le travail tente surtout de dégager le caractère proprement méthodologique de la théorie des trois états de l'essence (triplex status essentiae), répondant à la question du statut de l'essence indifférente, à celle des prédicats d'ordre supérieur et au problème de la séparation dans l'abstraction.Doctorat en Philosophie
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Salinas-Leal, Héctor-Hernando. "Dun Scot avant l'univocité de l'étant : études logiques, sémantiques et métaphysiques." Paris, EPHE, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014EPHE5017.
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Ce travail comporte d’abord un effort thématique : celui de rendre visible autant que possible les thèses de Duns Scot avant l’univocité de l’étant à propos d’un certain nombre de sujets qui vont de la logique à la métaphysique (la détermination de l’objet de la science logique, de la nature de l’universel logique, du problème de la signification du nom commun, du traitement du statut logico-sémantique des catégories et, finalement, de l’objet de la métaphysique et de l’univocité de l’étant). Une deuxième dimension du travail montre bien que le projet de déceler les positions du jeun Duns Scot se heurte à la méthode scotiste de retoucher (dans des degrés divers) les textes de la première étape de sa pensée avec les développements d’un Scot plus mûr. Ce travail n’a pas pu donc contourner, comme un effet interne à la pensée de Scot, l’effort de contraster les solutions du début de sa carrière avec celles qui deviendront les siennes dans des étapes postérieures de sa pensée. Ceci est notamment manifeste dans la détermination du sujet de la métaphysique (dans le commentaire à Aristote) où l’on voit se construire un ensemble de thèses correspondant à une période avant l’univocité de l’étant où la substance tient le rôle de sujet de la métaphysique. Ces thèses seront profondément modifiées dans une rédaction postérieure introduite dans la structure de la question initiale, appartenant à un moment de la pensée de Scot après l’univocité de l’étant, où c’est Dieu qui tiendrait le rôle de sujet. Ce travail se situe donc autour de l’univocité scotiste dans son avant et dans son après et montre qu’il faut toujours en tenir compte pour toute interprétation de la pensée de ScotThis dissertation tries to establish Scotus’s positions before the univocity of being concerning some themes from logic to metaphysics (the determination of the object of logic as science, the nature of the logical universal, the problem of the common name meaning, the logico-semantical status of categories and, finally, the problem of the object of metaphysics and the univocity of being). Another dimension of this work shows that the project of establishing the young Scotus’s positions finds an obstacle in the own method of Scotus, who used to rework (with different levels of intensity) the texts of his first period of thought with the remarks of an older Scotus. This dissertation was not able to avoid the effort of comparing the solutions of the young Scotus with those of later moments of his thought. This is quite evident concerning the determination of the object of metaphysics (in Scotus commentary on Aristotle). There you can see a set of positions corresponding to a period of his thougth before the univocity of being, where substance is the object of metaphysics. These positions will be profoundly modified in a second draft introduced in the structure of the original question; this new set of positions belongs to a period of his thought after the univocity of being, where god, instead of substance, would be the object of metaphysics. This work is then situated around the univocity of being in his before and his after and it shows that it is always necessary to take this situation into account for all attempts to interpret Scotus’s thought
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Green, Gerhardus Jakobus. "Die teologiese oorsprong van Ateisme." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/66357.
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Navorsing oor veranderende konsepte van God toon aan dat die oorsprong van ateïsme na die skolastici van die laat-middeleeue teruggevoer kan word. Hierdie ondersoek poog om die verhouding tussen Johannes Duns Scotus se eenduidige konseptualisering van God en die verwerping van God deur moderne ateïste aan te toon. Die verandering van Thomas Aquinas se analogiese teologie na Johannes Duns Scotus se eenduidige ontologiese konseptualisering van God het `n groot invloed op nominalistiese teologie en die moderne realiteitsverstaan gehad. Nominaliste soos William van Occam het hierdie eenduidige konsep van God later kombineer en verder ontwikkel met die gevolg dat God later nie meer ontologiese voorkeur geniet het nie. Waar Aquinas die klem op God se transendensie gelê het, was daar ‘n toenemende neiging om God al hoe meer immanent te verstaan. ʼn God wat op dieselfde wyse as die mens bestaan, word dus ʼn “wese”, ʼn “getemde God”. Scotus en latere nominaliste het God se kwantitatiewe andersheid bo sy kwalitatiewe andersheid beklemtoon. Binne `n akademiese ruimte waarin die waarheid van die Christelike geloof en die outoriteit van die Rooms Katolieke Kerk nie bevraagteken is nie, was die invloed van hierdie teologiese veranderinge klein. Die Reformasie het dit egter verander, en alhoewel dit nie die bedoeling was nie, was die gevolg dat hierdie eenduidige konseptualisering van God deel van moderne teïsme geword het. Duns Scotus se invloed was so groot dat daar ook na hom as die stigter van moderniteit verwys kan word. Na die Reformasie het Descartes se cogito ergo sum daartoe gelei dat die rede alleen as bron van betekenis gegeld het. Hierdie ontwikkeling het voorkeur aan epistemologie bo ontologie gegee. Binne hierdie moderne realiteitsverstaan is daar nie plek vir ʼn eenduidige konseptualisering van God nie. Omdat ateïste juis hierdie konsep van God verwerp, is daar waarde in die bestudering van ateïsme.
Sleutelwoorde: ateïsme, Thomas Aquinas, Johannes Duns Scotus, William van Occam, analogie van syn, eenduidige syn, Descartes, die Reformasie, Amos Funkenstein, Gavin Hyman, Brad Gregory, epistemologie, ontologie, skolastici, nominalisme, moderniteit, moderne teïsme.Dissertation (MTh)--University of Pretoria, 2017.
Dogmatics and Christian Ethics
MTh
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Picon, Marina. "Normes et objets du savoir dans les premiers essais leibniziens." Thesis, Lyon, École normale supérieure, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015ENSL1058.
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La doctrine leibnizienne de la science repose-t-elle sur une théorie de la connaissance? Après avoir montré, dans des travaux préalables, qu’une telle dépendance ne se rencontre pas dans l’œuvre de la maturité, nous nous intéressons ici aux premiers écrits de Leibniz. La Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) dresse, suivant l’exemple de Bacon, un inventaire raisonné des disciplines que doit réunir la nouvelle encyclopédie. Comme dans les projets leibniziens ultérieurs, cet inventaire est précédé de la distinction entre types de savoir en fonction des critères logiques selon lesquels les propositions se répartissent entre histoires, observations et théorèmes. Nous nous attachons en particulier à la définition de ceux-ci comme propositions « démontrables ex terminis ». Cette norme de la science étant posée, quels fondements in re Leibniz entend-t-il donner au savoir démonstratif ? Prenant pour fil conducteur sa polémique avec l’humaniste Marius Nizolius, nous étudions sa tentative pour fonder la validité des propositions de vérité éternelle sur des universaux subsistant indépendamment de l’existence des individus. Ce n’est cependant que dans les premiers écrits parisiens (1672-1673) que se dégage sa réponse définitive à ce problème : apparue d’abord comme un autre nom de la signification qu’« exprime » une définition, la notion d’idée y prend consistance en tant qu’archétype subsistant en Dieu. Les principaux traits de la théorie leibnizienne de la science sont ainsi fixés, indépendamment de toute « doctrine de l’entendement »Does Leibniz’s doctrine of demonstrative knowledge rest upon a theory of cognition? Having shown in previous articles that such was not the case in his mature works, we now turn to his early writings. The Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) contains a reasoned inventory of the disciplines that should constitute the new encyclopaedia. As in later projects, Leibniz precedes this inventory with a classification of the types of knowledge based on the logical criteria according to which propositions are divided in histories, observations and theorems. Particular attention is given to the definition of the latter as propositions « demonstrable ex terminis ».This norm of scientific necessity once defined, what real (in re) foundation does Leibniz give to demonstrative knowledge? Following the various threads offered by his polemic against the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius, we study Leibniz’s attempt to ground the validity of propositions of eternal truth on universals subsisting independently of the existence of individuals. But one has to wait until the first Paris writings (1672-1673) to see the emergence of his mature answer to that problem: first conceived after the model of the significatio which a definition « expresses », the notion of idea reaches its latter ontological status as an archetype subsisting in God’s mind. The principal features of Leibniz’s theory of demonstrative knowledge are thus in place, prior to and independently of what he will later call his « doctrine of the understanding »
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Cirami, Salvatore. "La «relatio transcendens» nel pensiero di Duns Scoto." Doctoral thesis, Universita degli studi di Salerno, 2019. http://elea.unisa.it:8080/xmlui/handle/10556/4302.
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2017 - 2018«Relatio transcendens» is a well-known topic among John Duns Scotus’ scholars. Indeed, Scotus was the very first thinker who made a quite extensive use of this notion throughout his works. However, research on this notion in Scotus’ thought has so far been fragmentary. The present work aims to offer a comprehensive view of «relatio transcendens» by providing a comparative analysis of the texts in which this phrase occurs over the entire production of the author. In order to provide a better understanding of the thought of Scotus on this topic, a historical survey of the evolution of the different theories of relation is offered in chap. 2. Then, chapter 3 presents Scotus’ general theory of relation. Three separate chapters offer an exegesis of the texts on «relatio transcendens» one for each of the following works: The Commentaries on Book I of the Sentences (chap. 4), The Commentaries on Book II of the Sentences (chap. 5), The Commentary on the Metaphysics (chap. 6). From this investigation, there emerges a univocal meaning of «relatio transcendens» throughout the various contexts in which it occurs. This notion denotes a relation whose foundation is being, and the terminus to which it proceeds is some being. Therefore, like other transcendental properties of being, this relation is called «transcendens» because of the transcendence of its foundation, that is, because it is outside any genus. Therefore, it would be preferable to place «relatio transcendens» alongside the other transcendental properties of being rather than considering it as a distinct class of relations opposed to the categorical ones. [abstract by Author]
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Steele, Jeffrey W. "John Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics of Goodness: Adventures in 13th-Century Metaethics." Scholar Commons, 2015. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6029.
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At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas.
After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness.
Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics.
But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act.
Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition.
Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.
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Thornton, Ryan. "Franciscan Poverty and Franciscan Economic Thought : 1209-1444." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0108.
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Pour déterminer s’il y a un rapport entre la pauvreté franciscaine et la pensée économique des franciscains, il faut commencer par définir la première en cherchant son origine dans la vie de François d’Assise et sa formation d’un ordre religieux au sein de l’Église catholique en 1209. Ensuite, il devient possible d’identifier le développement progressif de cette pauvreté dans l’ordre des Frères mineurs par un dialogue avec les papes successifs et au cours des différents évènements impliquant les franciscains. Le cœur de la question est la discussion sur divers sujets économiques (l’échange, les contrats, les prêts, l’usure, le don) par les franciscains Pierre de Jean Olivi, Jean Duns Scot et Giraldus Odonis, car leurs œuvres permettent à établir l’existence de la pensée économique parmi les frères mineurs. En continuant à suivre l’interaction entre l’ordre et la papauté, on voit des changements importants dans la pauvreté franciscaine et, par conséquent, la reprise de la pensée économique d’Olivi, de Scot et d’Odonis dans les sermons de Bernardin de Sienne, qui mourut en 1444 et qui fournit un terme à la présente étudeIn order to determine whether there was a relationship between Franciscan poverty and the economic thought of the Franciscans, one must begin by defining the first as it had its origin in the life of Francis of Assisi and his creation of a religious order within the Catholic Church in 1209. It then becomes possible to identify the progressive development of this poverty within the Order of Friars Minor through a dialogue with successive popes and over the course of different events involving the Franciscans. At the heart of the inquiry is the discussion of various economic subjects (exchange, contracts, loans, usury, the gift) by the Franciscans Peter of John Olivi, John Duns Scotus, and Gerald Odonis, as their works establish the existence of economic thought among the Friars Minor. By continuing to follow the interaction between the Order and the papacy, one sees important changes in Franciscan poverty and, consequently, a reprise of the economic thought of Olivi, Scotus, and Odonis in the sermons of Bernardine of Sienna, who died in 1444 and provides a terminus for the present study
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Taïeb, Hamid. "La relation intentionnelle dans la tradition aristotélicienne : étude de la réception des textes d’Aristote sur les corrélats psychiques." Paris, EPHE, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014EPHE5019.
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Ce travail a pour but d’identifier, dans la tradition aristotélicienne, un type particulier de relation entre les activités psychiques et leurs objets, une relation intentionnelle, exprimant la pure visée, et donc irréductible tant à une relation causale qu’à une relation de conformité (ou « aléthique ») des activités psychiques à la réalité. Après une étude des relations psychiques chez Aristote lui-même, le travail se tourne vers la réception de ses textes, plus précisément vers la réception de Catégories VII et, surtout, de Métaphysique Δ, 15. Durant l’Antiquité déjà, certains aristotéliciens – Alexandre d’Aphrodise, les néoplatoniciens – ont admis, sous l’autorité de Métaphysique Δ, 15, un concept de relation intentionnelle dans leur psychologie. Au Moyen-âge, de nombreux auteurs ont procédé de même. Alors que certains philosophes, à commencer par Thomas d’Aquin, ont réduit la dimension relationnelle du psychisme à la causalité exercée par la réalité sur l’activité psychique ou à la conformité de l’activité psychique à la réalité, d’autres, notamment Duns Scot, ont reconnu, sur la base de Métaphysique Δ, 15, un type de relation à l’objet n’exprimant rien d’autre que la pure visée. À la fin du 19e siècle, Brentano lisait Aristote de la même manière: la relation intentionnelle, irréductible à une relation causale ou à une relation de conformité, a ses origines en Métaphysique Δ, 15. En somme, ce travail analyse, d’Aristote à Brentano, les liens entre intentionnalité, causalité et véritéThe aim of this work is to identify, in the Aristotelian tradition, a specific type of relation between the psychic activities and their objects, an intentional relation, which expresses the pure aiming at, and thus which is irreducible both to a causal relation and to a relation of conformity (or « alethic relation ») from the psychic activities to reality. After a study of the psychic relations in Aristotle himself, the work turns to the reception of his texts, more precisely to the reception of Categories VII and, above all, of Metaphysics Δ, 15. Already during Antiquity, some Aristotelians – Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonists – admitted, under the authority of Metaphysics Δ, 15, a concept of intentional relation in their psychology. In the Middle Ages, many authors proceeded similarly. Whereas some philosophers, starting with Thomas Aquinas, reduced the relational dimension of the psychic to the causality that reality exerts on the psychic activity or to the conformity of the psychic activity to reality, others, notably Duns Scotus, recognized, on the basis of Metaphysics Δ, 15, a type of relation which expresses nothing else than the pure aiming at. At the end of the 19th Century, Brentano read Aristotle in the same manner: the intentional relation, irreducible to a causal relation or to a relation of conformity, has its roots in Metaphysics Δ, 15. In sum, this work analyses, from Aristotle to Brentano, the links between intentionality, causality and truth
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Hernan, Rachael. "An Alternative Woman: Breaking From the Binary Options of Sir Walter Scott's Heroines and Their Successors in Historical Fiction." Cleveland State University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=csu1599610638064843.
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Jeffrey, Johnson Kirstin Elizabeth. "Rooted in all its story, more is meant than meets the ear : a study of the relational and revelational nature of George MacDonald's mythopoeic art." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1887.
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Scholars and storytellers alike have deemed George MacDonald a great mythopoeic writer, an exemplar of the art. Examination of this accolade by those who first applied it to him proves it profoundly theological: for them a mythopoeic tale was a relational medium through which transformation might occur, transcending boundaries of time and space. The implications challenge much contemporary critical study of MacDonald, for they demand that his literary life and his theological life cannot be divorced if either is to be adequately assessed. Yet they prove consistent with the critical methodology MacDonald himself models and promotes. Utilizing MacDonald’s relational methodology evinces his intentional facilitating of Mythopoesis. It also reveals how oversights have impeded critical readings both of MacDonald’s writing and of his character. It evokes a redressing of MacDonald’s relationship with his Scottish cultural, theological, and familial environment – of how his writing is a response that rises out of these, rather than, as has so often been asserted, a mere reaction against them. Consequently it becomes evident that key relationships, both literary and personal, have been neglected in MacDonald scholarship – relationships that confirm MacDonald’s convictions and inform his writing, and the examination of which restores his identity as a literature scholar. Of particular relational import in this reassessment is A.J. Scott, a Scottish visionary intentionally chosen by MacDonald to mentor him in a holistic Weltanschauung. Little has been written on Scott, yet not only was he MacDonald’s prime influence in adulthood, but he forged the literary vocation that became MacDonald’s own. Previously unexamined personal and textual engagement with John Ruskin enables entirely new readings of standard MacDonald texts, as does the textual engagement with Matthew Arnold and F.D. Maurice. These close readings, informed by the established context, demonstrate MacDonald’s emergence, practice, and intent as a mythopoeic writer.
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Rosato, Andrew V. "Duns Scotus on the redemptive work of Christ." 2009. http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12112009-143355/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2009.Thesis directed by Stephen D. Dumont and Joseph P. Wawrykow for the Medieval Institute. "December 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 177-183).
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HAI, TRAN DUC, and 陳德海. "John Duns Scotus’ theo-anthropological Vision of Freedom." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68481606621810702016.
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博士輔仁大學
哲學研究所
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Introduction: “Duns Scotus’ theo-anthropological vision of Freedom” The title of this dissertation may a priori raise a doubt among many people: How can man be free agent, given that God is considered as the cause of all causes, “how is human freedom consistent with God’s providential control of the universe and his foreknowledge of how we will act?” Besides, there exists an important connection between freedom and reason, because a free agent should be “an agent capable of reasoning or deliberating about how to act, and of taking decisions about how to act on the basis of that deliberation.” Put it in another way, our freedom of action is based on a freedom of decision-making. In this case, it seems that not only “God and his nature were seen as posing intellectual difficulties for belief in human freedom,” -that, indeed, has posed a big problem for theology-, but the will-based theory, the one which holds that freedom of action consists in freedom of will , is rather controversial for the modern philosophy, “either by modern compatibilists or by modern incompatibilists.” One important reason making this will-based theory controversial is freedom of action has proved so puzzling an idea – to the point nowadays of often being thought incoherent and impossible- that philosophers have become increasingly inclined just to ignore or abandon the notion when doing moral philosophy. They have tried to make sense of morality without talking about freedom. This above problem of freedom which involves in reality theological belief and philosophical input, was once the main concern of John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), a Franciscan philosopher-theologian of the last decades of the thirteenth century. Like any thinker of his time, Scotus developed his philosophical vision in the framework of theology. And the theological vision of Scotus is primarily based on the Franciscan spirituality giving prominence to God’s love, a God of Revelation who freely took initiative in entering into conversation with human being. This makes Broadie state pertinently no-one philosophizes in a cultural vacuum, and, as is obvious, knowledge of the cultural context of a philosopher helps us to understand his philosophy; it can never hinder us. It is for this reason that I emphasize the fact that Scotus wrote not merely as a Christian, but as a Franciscan. His Order defined the character of his faith, and it was precisely upon love that that faith was focused. Faith was the space of Scotus’ philosophy. Hence, upon this basis, Scotus worked to rethinking the relationship between philosophy and theology in light of a deeper understanding of Aristotle as well as a concern to safeguard key elements of Christian revelation: the possibility for free choice in the will, the contingency of creation and the value of theology as a scientific discipline. In order to grasp the development of Scotus’ thinking, a survey on the historical context should be legitimate, as it provides with “a basic awareness of the historical moment that served as context for his philosophical and theological reflection as well as an awareness of his life and works.” (chap. I) The well known emphasis of Scotus on the primacy of the will could be better understood, if one has a look upon the different understandings of the will within the context of the intense and seemingly endless debate relating the relation between faith and reason, theology and philosophy. In reality, this emphasis is but a consequence of Scotus’ conceiving theology as practical science whose ultimate aim is love. And as he views also the closeness of the relation between love and the will, it is expected that he argues that will is the power within which love is located. Consequently, for him, “love of God has greater value than has knowledge of Him” and accordingly, “the fullest perfection of the human person as rational involves loving in the way God loves, rather than knowing in the way God knows.” Besides, the different points of view of the key thinkers of the medieval period as St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas help clarify the intricate nature of human action within the framework of Christianity. (chap. II) Another consequence of Scotus’ faith in the God of love is his insistence upon the absolute freedom of God in the act of creation ex nihilo. God’s act of creating is primarily a free act of his will which makes possible the existence of free causality. Therefore, for Scotus, human freedom is grounded upon divine freedom and “creative freedom [is] as the expression of the highest and most prefect operation of the will [which] is situated in divine activity and mirrored by human action.” Accordingly, by considering upon the divine will and by describing divine action as the model for human freedom that Scotus comes to understand the structure and the operation of the human will, especially its two affections, affection for the beneficial and affection for justice. It is thanks to the ability to transcend the sphere of nature towards the nobler sphere of values of this affection for justice, and it is by the holding firm to the good in itself of this “libertas innata” or “ingenita libertas” , as so called by Scotus, that human dignity has its foundation in rational freedom. (chap. III) This power of self-transcendence not only makes man “capax infiniti,” but prompts him to develop his potential receptivity, his creativity to mark his signature as a person, “imago Dei,” whose “nobility is not what he can realize by his own powers, but what he can reach as a gift of the benevolence of God.” And since love is from person to person, each individual or “haecceitas”, as a special object of God’s creative love, does not close in upon himself or herself, rather “seeks others in their uniqueness and above all that Eternal Other, Whose uniqueness he or she reflects.” As a man endowed with qualified intellectual and spiritual gifts, Scotus knows how to make use of the intellectual formation and development he receives in the most famous universities of the times (Oxford, Paris, Cologne), especially he not only made of good use of Aristotelian logical and metaphysical categories, but [his] use of logical possibility as an operative methodology for his understanding of creation as contingent and dependent upon the voluntary self-determined act of God, along with his understanding of divine synchronic freedom, opens up the possibility for a new interpretation of the world. Scotus’ vision of the universe and of the human development may help avoid either the scientific materialism or the religious dualism, as states strongly the anthropologist, Michael O’Brien: Don’t make the fundamental mistake of confusing science and belief. […] Do not conflate science as a sense-making system with belief as a sense-making system. They are both valid systems, and they are not exclusionary. (chap. IV) "Sooner or later one has to choose...if one wishes to remain human" These words of Graham Greene may sound provocative and somehow truthful to anyone who wants to make his life meaningful. Because a human life does make sense when man is making an act of free choice. As for Scotus, the fullest human life should be a life of choice based on the love of God.
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Figueiredo, Gonçalo José Gomes. "Liberdade e vontade em João Duns Escoto: leitura da Quodlibética XVI." Master's thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10316/13476.
Full textAbstract:
Dissertação de mestrado em Filosofia, apresentado à Fac. de Letras da Univ. de CoimbraProcurando investigar os temas da vontade e da liberdade no autor medieval João Duns Escoto (c. 1265-1308), começámos por contextualizá-lo na herança do grande século XIII, onde as Universidades tiveram o seu papel importante como lugar de encontro e discussão da Teologia e da Filosofia. Outros dos aspectos a considerar neste panorama cultural foram as traduções das obras de Aristóteles e dos seus comentadores, e o rigor de linguagem que este novo contributo veio trazer à reflexão académica. Situado num contexto histórico, Escoto, filho do seu tempo e membro de uma ordem religiosa, os franciscanos, assumiu plenamente esse património que remonta quer ao santo de Assis quer a Boaventura, entre outros, e filiado em Santo Agostinho, e deu-lhe seguimento ao mesmo tempo que dialogava com os grandes do seu tempo, designadamente Henrique de Gand. Escolhemos dois textos do Doutor Subtil para investigar os temas da liberdade e da vontade: o primeiro, que nos serviu de introdução, foi retirado do comentário às Sentenças de Pedro Lombardo, Ordinatio III, d. 17, q. un (IX, 563-571), e o outro, que nos mereceu maior atenção, do corpo das quodlibéticas, a questão XVI. Sobre o primeiro texto investigámos as temáticas de Deus e do homem, como agentes livres, na particular interpretação que Escoto oferece do Primeiro Princípio como Ser Infinito, e do homem como ser de natureza intelectual e existência incomunicável. Para tentar compreender o que, quanto a nós, neste estado em que nos encontramos, a liberdade e a vontade diz respeito, apresentamos as consequências éticas, lidas pelo mestre franciscano em diálogo com Santo Agostinho e Santo Anselmo, na doutrina das afeições. Na terceira e última parte do nosso trabalho, procuramos fazer uma leitura mais pormenorizada e continuada da já referida questão XVI. Uma vez mais, além dos mestres e autoridades eclesiásticas, temos o Doutor Solene como interlocutor, e Aristóteles como mestre do rigor para os principais conceitos que são, além dos já referidos, necessidade, natureza (e ou natural) e contingência. Escoto, nesta batalha argumentativa, recorrendo prioritariamente aos argumentos de razão (a autoridade bíblica da revelação é referida uma única vez), olhando aquilo que as coisas são na sua evidência, e pela razão de serem o que são, indaga da possibilidade de em Deus e em nós, se compaginar a liberdade com a necessidade, a natureza com a vontade. A queda dos graves, como movimento, é exemplificativa do natural que pode não comprometer em absoluto o querer livre do homem, ao mesmo tempo que ilustra o querer natural de Deus que se ama infinitamente a si mesmo como ser necessário e livre. Oferecemos, ainda, neste nosso trabalho, uma rudimentar proposta de tradução de ambos os textos. O primeiro já editado em edição crítica pela Comissão Escotista, e o segundo, também em edição crítica, pelos investigadores norte-americanos.
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Swinfield, Linda Jane. "Haecceity - family, object and memory." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1423285.
Full textAbstract:
Masters Research - Masters of Fine Art (MFA)Haecceity- Family, Object and Memory is an examination of the layers within familial history, generations, objects collected within lifetimes and their interrelated personal and social memories. This paper links the philosophical thinking of medieval theologian John Duns Scotus, his theories of Haecceity which connect individuation to family our collections gathered in lifetimes and our unique “this- ness” within family. Linked with the Scotus notion of Haecceity each artwork made for the exhibition component of this project contains its own this-ness, using printmaking processes to construct unique objects that contain their own individuation. Each series of art works in this project holds anecdotes of family and oral histories. The art works include many contemporary notions of family, childhood, domesticity, the dwelling as a container and the more abstract depictions of flux that occur through change over lifetimes.
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Pich, Roberto Hofmeister [Verfasser]. "Der Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus / vorgelegt von Roberto Hofmeister Pich." 2002. http://d-nb.info/968534686/34.
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Plouffe, Marc-Antoine. "La connaissance des notions premières selon Avicenne, Thomas d'Aquin et Jean Duns Scot." Thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/25489.
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Ce travail examine et analyse les positions d'Avicenne, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot concernant la connaissance des notions premières, à la lumière de leurs arguments pour cette position et de leurs autres engagements théoriques, en particulier aristotéliciens. Chacun à sa façon, ces philosophes affirment que l'étant ou l'existant est ce premier concept. Ils lui donnent une primauté logique, au sens où l'étant est présupposé par nos autres concepts. Ils lui donnent aussi une primauté cognitive, au sens où il est le premier objet à être conçu par l'intellect.This work reviews and analyzes a view shared by Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus concerning the primary notions, examining their arguments in the light of their other philosophical commitments, especially Aristotelian ones. Each in their own way, these philosophers claim that being is this primary notion. Being has a twofold priority. In the logical order, being is presupposed by all other notions. In the cognitive order, being is the first conceived by the intellect.
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Cezar, Cesar Ribas [Verfasser]. "Das natürliche Gesetz und das konkrete praktische Urteil nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus / vorgelegt von Cesar Ribas Cezar." 2003. http://d-nb.info/966625870/34.
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Pavlorek, David. "Suárezův důkaz Boží existence." Master's thesis, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-324394.
Full textAbstract:
of the Paper The goal of submitted paper is to show Suárez's proof of the existence of God as the main task of his metaphysics and to show the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on his own system of metaphysics. As will be shown, the importance of this preeminent thinker of so called second scholasticism is in his synthesis of relatively incompatible doctrines of thomism and scotism. This paper will therefore deal with main problems of precedening tradition of Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with analogy of being as applied to God and creatures, then with theory of causality and other connected questions. Keywords Suárez - Thomas Aquinas - Duns Scotus - metaphysics - proof of existence of God