Academic literature on the topic 'Earnings management. Auditing'

This paper examines whether external auditing minimizes the propensity for manipulation of accounting information (MAI) by health maintenance organizations (HMOs), with respect to financial information disclosed to the Brazilian Health Care Agency (ANS). The results of univariate and multivariate analyses and robustness tests indicated no statistically significant differences in the propensity to MAI between audited and unaudited financial reports in the analyzed information. The empirical regularities shown in this study provide useful insights to foreign regulators and international auditors. Our study sheds light on the effectiveness of the recent reporting and auditing regulations in Brazil, suggesting that – in regard to the HMO industry – auditing has not begun to play a more effective role yet.

The main purpose of this research is to determine the link between internal auditing quality and earnings management in Omani companies. In this research, a sample size of 80 was designated from two sectors (Industrial, and Service) in Muscat Securities Market (MSM) in Sultanate of Oman. The secondary data collected is examined with Smart PLS 3.0. The findings of the research show a positive link between Internal audit quality and earnings management in both sectors (industrial and service). This finding indicates that the increase in audit quality will affect to enhance and improve the earning management in Omani listed firms.

This study focuses on South African listed companies and investigates the relation between Big 4 auditing companies, earnings management and earnings conservatism. It shows that companies audited by a Big 4 auditor leads to a more timely recognition of large losses and to lower levels of earnings manipulation and higher conditional conservatism. The findings report that the conditional form of conservatism is negatively related to unconditional conservatism. Higher conservatism is also reported for firms with high leverage and those that convey bad news. The opposite has been found for firms with high growth. The findings, in general support the notion that the new Companies’ Act in South Africa and the King III are effective corporate governance tools and the observed cases of corporate failure may be due to other factors, including management hubris.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of board characteristics and external audit quality on earnings management among major Tunisian banks over the period 2003-2007. Design/methodology/approach – Multivariate regressions are employed to test the effect of board structure and external audit quality on discretionary provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Findings – Results indicate that among the characteristics of the board, CEO duality is associated with higher levels of discretionary provisions. However, the presence of directors affiliated to the largest shareholder tends to constrain earnings management practices. The results reveal also that a co-audit belonging to the BIG 4 provides incentives to manage earnings while the capacity of the external auditor to disclose reservations impacts negatively the manager's discretion. Practical implications – First, it is not desirable to appoint a co-audit both belonging to the BIG 4. Second, the presence of affiliated directors reduces the discretionary practices except in cases where directors are affiliated to families. In this case, banks should strengthen the presence of independent directors. Finally, the delineation of the leeway left in the Tunisian accounting standards would provide more transparent financial information. Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on governance and its impact on earnings management among Tunisian banks by introducing two variables that have not been tested before which are affiliated directors and co-audit. The paper will be of value to banks willing to comply with the Governance Good Practice Guide adopted recently in Tunisia.

This study investigates the effect of two-tier board characteristics, audit committee, and external auditors on earnings management in China. This study contributes to the empirical literature of corporate governance in China that remarkably differs from the Anglo-Saxon structure in terms of boards’ features and auditing. Using a sample of 622 listed Chinese company-years, this study finds that independent directors on the board of directors are negatively related to earnings management while employee supervisors on the supervisory board are not related to earnings management. The results of empirical analysis also show that the presence of audit committees and the brand auditors are negatively associated with earnings management. Finally, the relationship between qualified audit opinions and the level of earnings management are examined. The results show that qualified audit opinion is associated with a higher level of earnings management. Implications of these findings are discussed with regard to the characteristics of corporate governance and auditing settings in Chinese listed companies. In particular, higher proportion of independent directors on the board can improve the quality of reported earnings. However, it indicates that the role of supervisory board to restrain earnings management is limited with the increase of employee members. In addition, the existence of an audit committee improves the quality of reported earnings. Moreover, external audit play a monitoring role in mitigating earnings management in Chinese listed companies.

Objective - This study aims to determine the effect of earning management and corporate governance mechanisms on corporate tax avoidance. Methodology/Technique - Corporate governance mechanisms use institutional ownership, the size of the board of commissioners, the percentage of independent commissioners, auditing committees, and audit quality as proxies. Meanwhile, earnings management uses the modified Jones model. The sample of this study include non-financial companies that are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2014 and 2016. Findings - Corporate tax avoidance can be detected by using the effective tax rate (ETR), which is the ratio of income to tax expenses. This sample was chosen using a purposive sampling method, resulting in 871 firms. The results suggest that earnings management has a significant impact on ETR. Novelty - This study identifies that only independent commissioners and audit quality have a significant influence on ETR. Type of Paper - Empirical Keywords: Tax Avoidance; Earnings Management; Corporate Governance; Effective Tax Rate; Audit Quality. JEL Classification: G3, G39, G39.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether firms engage more intensively in earnings management in a period of financial crisis. In particular, we examined a sample of 10.139 observations from 19 European Union countries for the period 2005-2014. Earnings management had been examined on both accrual and real earnings management basis. It appears that in the period of financial crisis firms are less inclined to use accruals for earnings management purposes, while real earnings management is not affected by financial crisis. Yet it seems that the more profitable firms and the firms audited by big auditing firms are less likely to adopt real earnings management practices. In addition, we found that firms’ size and leverage are factors that affect firms’ decision to manage their earnings, either on accrual or real earnings management basis.

ABSTRACT: Internal auditors perform work that is relevant to their host entities' financial reporting processes; yet, little research attention has focused on the effects of internal auditing on companies' external financial reporting. Using a unique and previously unavailable data set, we investigate the relation between internal audit function (IAF) quality and earnings management. We measure IAF quality using a composite measure comprising six individual components of IAF quality based on SAS No. 65, which guides external auditors in assessing the quality of an IAF with respect to its role in financial reporting. Earnings management is measured using two separate proxies: (1) abnormal accruals and (2) the propensity to meet or barely beat analysts' earnings forecasts. We find evidence that IAF quality is associated with a moderation in the level of earnings management as measured by both proxies.

Although corporate environmental accountability is receiving unprecedented attention in the United States from policy makers, the capital market, and the public at large, extant research is limited in its examination of the implications of strategic corporate environmental initiatives on accounting and auditing. The purpose of my dissertation is to address these implications by examining the association between firm environmental initiatives and audit fees, capital expenditures, and earnings quality using multivariate regression analysis. I find that firms engaged in more strategic environmental initiatives tend to have significantly higher audit fees and capital expenditures, and significantly lower levels of earnings manipulation measured using discretionary accruals. These results support the notion that auditors do recognize the importance of environmental initiatives when conducting the year-end financial statement audit, an idea that positively reflects upon the auditor’s monitoring role. The results also demonstrate the increased amount of capital resources required to participate in strategic environmental initiatives, an anecdotal notion that had yet to be empirically supported. This empirical support provides valuable insights on how environmental initiatives materially impact corporate financial statements. Finally, my results extend the extant literature by demonstrating that the superior financial performance reported by environmentally active firms is less likely driven by earnings manipulation by management, and by implication, more likely a result of real economic gains. Taken together, my dissertation establishes a strong and timely foundation for current and future research to explore corporate environmental initiatives in the United States and globally, a topic increasingly gaining momentum in today’s more eco-conscious world.

Insider trading and earnings management (EM) have traditionally been associated with fraud and corporate scandals. Corporations involved in fraudulent financial reporting or earnings manipulations were assumed to have used insider trading patterns to manipulate earnings, thereby concealing information from investors. The purpose of this quantitative, non-experimental study was to examine the association between insider trading patterns and EM citations among a randomly selected sample of publicly traded companies. The research question pertained to the association between the number of EM citations and whether a firm exhibited patterns of insider trading among publicly traded firms. The theoretical framework was based on accounting, auditing and financial theories. Archival data were collected in the form of financial statements from annual reports of 77 companies submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission. A multiple linear regression was used to answer the research question to determine whether there was an association between insider trading patterns and EM. Results of descriptive statistics and regression analysis revealed that, after controlling for the firm size, a significant association existed between the number of EM citations and patterns of insider trading in the sample of publicly traded firms. A positive relationship, wherein firms with patterns of insider trading had more EM citations as indicated from the regression results. These findings may encourage investors, regulators, auditors, the public, and other interested parties to work with researchers to foster confidence in financial markets and the accounting profession, and to redeem the mistakes made by companies in the past.

This thesis reviews the evolution of interim reporting in New Zealand. The attempts to regulate interim reporting by the stock Exchange Association of New Zealand and the lobbying behaviour of affected parties are documented. The regulation of interim reporting is interpreted as a series of self-interest actions by the affected parties. In 1973 semiannual reports were mandated for all firms listed on the New Zealand stock Exchange. However, the content of these reports, was not specified until 1976. The extent of voluntary reporting practice prior to 1973 is recorded. The major empirical analysis of the thesis examines the association between corporate characteristics and the voluntary disclosure of semiannual earnings during the period 1973 to 1976. The analysis shows that firms with high semiannual earnings disclosures have more shares issued, have paid an interim dividend, carry relatively less inventory, are in a more seasonal industry and have a greater earnings forecast error. Assets in place, political costs of disclosure and competitive costs of disclosure are not found to be associated with the level of semiannual earnings disclosure. Sensitivity analysis indicates that the significance of the explanatory variables depends on firm size and upon the threshold level of disclosure.

This is a study of earnings quality, examining whether components of earnings based on New Zealand (N.Z.) accounting classification systems have different information parameters. The N.Z. environment provides a unique opportunity to examine a period with no legislative backing of accounting standards and a flexible accounting standard. Combined, this gave mangers the ability to clearly identify earnings components they considered to be differentially informative. Informativeness is assessed by the ability of current period earnings to predict next period earnings and the contemporaneous relation between returns and earnings. The results indicate that disaggregated reported earnings are more informative than aggregated earnings in a non-trivial way. In one of the sample periods disaggregated earnings explained 29% of the variance in returns, more than twice the explanatory power of aggregated earnings. N.Z. accounting standard setters replaced SSAP7 with FRS7 in 1994 contending that the discretion available to mangers reduced the informativeness of earnings. Not only do the results not support that contention but earnings informativeness has fallen since FRS7 came into effect, suggesting that standard setters should revisit that decision. The results also have implications for the content and form of the N.Z. Stock Exchange (NZSE) preliminary announcement. "Unusual earnings" reported to the NZSE by companies are shown to be differentially informative to investors yet the NZSE does not always identify these components when the preliminary announcement is summarised and disseminated to market participants. To summarise, the effective codification of earnings brought about by FRS7 has reduced the informativeness of earnings – locking differences between components into total earnings. The N.Z. results beg the question as to whether similar economic events are locked into the COMPUSTAT summary earnings variables for U.S. data.

The thesis processes the auditor’s role and whether it can constrain possible earnings management in smaller Swedish private corporates. The removed auditing obligation that was abolished in Sweden 2010 with the reason to reduce the administrative burden faced by smaller corporates, contributed to an important discussion regarding the auditor’s actual importance. In addition, the corporate tax in Sweden was significantly reduced from 26.3 percent to 22 percent, which gave Swedish corporates incentives to reduce their earnings before the tax reduction, and therefore pay less taxes. This phenomenon is used in the thesis as an excellent opportunity to measure earnings management since there were significantly strong incentives for corporates to manipulate their earnings at that time. The thesis aims to increase understanding among these corporates accounting, and whether the auditor can strengthen the accounting- and audit quality, and therefore constrain earnings management. Through the use of a quantitative method where statistical tests have been performed on underlying data gathered from the corporates annual reports, the thesis research question has been answered. The formulation of the research questions is “Does the degree of earnings management differ between audited and unaudited corporates?”, which has been investigated by measuring the degree of earnings management through unexpected accruals, but also through SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the thesis aims to provide the research area with arguments regarding the appropriateness of the audit exemption. The result obtained in the thesis indicates that audited corporates have less negative unexpected accruals, and hence a minor degree of earnings management in comparison with unaudited corporates. However, no significance is shown in the result, at a five percent significance level, which means that it’s not possible to say with certainty that there’s a difference between these two groups in terms of negative unexpected accruals. Instead, there is evidence that there’s a significant difference between audited and unaudited corporates in terms of cost stickiness, where unaudited corporates showed more cost stickiness and thus also a higher degree of earnings management. With an additional test the thesis also demonstrates that there are corporates that don’t follow the Swedish laws regarding audit exemption. This is when it’s discovered that there are corporates that aren’t covered by the audit exemption, and thus don’t meet the required limits, but still don’t provide an auditor. These corporates also prove to have a higher degree of earnings management since the thesis received a significant result in terms of negative unexpected accruals. To sum up, the thesis highlights that the auditor’s role is of great importance in several aspects, and for this reason there are motives for legislators to review the audit exemption in Sweden.

This study investigates whether auditors respond to earnings management pressure created by analyst forecasts. Analyst forecasts create an important earnings target for management, and professional standards direct auditors to consider how this pressure could affect their clients. Using annual analyst forecasts available during the planning phase of the audit, I examine whether this form of earnings management pressure affects clients’ financial statement misstatements. Next, I investigate whether auditors respond to earnings forecast pressure through audit fees and reporting delay. I find that higher levels of analyst forecast pressure increase the likelihood of client restatement. I also find that auditors charge higher audit fees and delay the issuance of the audit report in response to pressure from analyst expectations. Finally, I find that when audit clients are subject to high analyst forecast pressure, a high audit fee response by auditors mitigates the likelihood of client misstatements.

碩士
中原大學
會計研究所
102
Recent years, many companies gradually operate as group companies in order to integrate resources to improve their competitiveness. There are many researches exploring the association of earnings management and audit quality. However, few literature investigate in earnings management using related-party transactions, neither few examine the association among earnings management using related-party transaction, auditors’ industry expertise and auditor tenure. So we investigate how auditors’ industry expertise, auditor tenure and industry experience influence earnings management using related-party transaction through related-party sales and related-party accounts receivables. In this study, we explore all listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2012 to investigate earnings management using related-party transaction. Empirical results indicate that auditors’ industry expertise would mitigate enterprises’ earnings management using related-party accounts receivable. We also find that auditors’ industrial experience can also mitigate companies’ earnings management using related-party transactions. The results show that auditor quality can be improved through audit experience year by year. However, our results indicate that the association between auditor tenure and earning management is not significant. In summary, we find out a comprehensive result that auditors’ industrial experience and expertise are important to supervise enterprises’ earnings management using related-party transactions. Key words: Auditors’ industry expertise, Auditor tenure, Industry experience, Earnings management

A presente dissertação efetua uma revisão de literatura sobre a manipulação de resultados nas empresas portuguesas não cotadas, que consequentemente afeta a qualidade de informação das suas demonstrações financeiras. O fenómeno de manipulação de resultados é complexo e de difícil deteção, o que torna este tema controverso e de análise relevante, principalmente para os leitores das demonstrações financeiras. As razões porque os indivíduos cometem fraude ou manipulam as demonstrações financeiras podem ser várias. Para tentar explicar este acontecimento Donald Cressey criou o chamado “Triângulo da Fraude”. Em que o primeiro vértice contempla a necessidade financeira sentida pelo indivíduo, caracterizada pela pressão própria sentida quer por necessidade de liquidez financeira quer por integração num grupo social cujo somatório entre as possíveis perdas e ganhos e a justificação para os seus atos (racionalização) o leva a decidir pela prática ou não de atos fraudulentos. Neste triângulo também se encontra considerada a oportunidade que pode ser caracterizada através de falhas do controlo interno. Desta forma, esta dissertação pretende averiguar de acordo com diferentes graus de rentabilidade as empresas que tendem mais a manipular os seus resultados, tendo em conta os diferentes objetivos destas empresas e dos seus gestores. De entre vários métodos de deteção de manipulação de resultados foi escolhido o que se aplica melhor a análise em questão, sendo que alguns deles são de difícil aplicação para grande nº de empresas e contextos diferentes. O modelo utilizado, elaborado por Francis (2004), parte de outros modelos já criados para estabelecer uma ligação entre sete atributos, entre os quais a qualidade dos accruals, para verificar a qualidade de informação das demonstrações financeiras e o impacto que tem nas decisões dos investidores. Através de um modelo econométrico que vamos utilizar para calcular a qualidade dos accruals na nossa amostra, este chega a conclusões sobre as influências dos atributos como iremos explicar de seguida. As empresas que têm uma melhor rentabilidade têm assim um incentivo maior de fuga aos impostos enquanto, as empresas que apresentam uma rentabilidade mais reduzida necessitam de maior financiamento e desse modo vão ter um conflito de incentivos quando chega a hora de tomar decisões. Isto porque, estas precisam de apresentar melhores resultados para obterem melhores taxas de financiamento mas ao mesmo tempo querem pagar menos imposto. Daqui pode-se esperar que as empresas manipulem mais quando têm uma rentabilidade mais elevada, de forma a reduzirem o valor a entregar ao Estado. Através da análise das regressões concluímos que as empresas que têm mais tendência a manipular são as que têm rentabilidades mais elevadas e mais reduzidas de acordo com o esperado.
This thesis makes a literature review on the results of manipulation in unlisted Portuguese companies, which consequently affects the quality of information in its financial statements. The phenomenon of earning management is complex and difficult detection, which makes this controversial and relevant analysis theme, especially for readers of the financial statements. Within the earning management definition exists manipulation of actual transactions and handling of accrued expenses and revenues. The results consist of cash flows and accruals of expenses and revenues, and the handling of each of these components will affect the results. A manager can make operational decisions with an impact on financial numbers - cash flows, such as offering products with high discounts in the end of the year in order to anticipate sales to reach a goal or cut spending on research and development. The second form of managers achieve the desired results is to handle the increases in spending and revenues. In this method, the company does not change its activity, but rather opportunistically recorded profit of its existing activities. Examples that increase the results are the reduction of provisions, capitalize expenses and avoid depreciation of assets. Accrued expenses and revenues create the opportunity to manipulate results because there is a need for estimates, forecasts and judgments. This type of manipulation is derived from selective interpretation of accounting rules, since the company is free to choose between the existing methods in the standards. The reasons why individuals commit fraud can be several. To try to explain this event Donald Cressey created the so-called "Triangle of Fraud." In the first vertex includes financial need felt by the individual, characterized by felt own pressure or by need for financial liquidity either by integration into a social group whose sum of the possible gains and losses and the justification for their acts (rationalization) takes to decide to practice or not fraudulent acts. In this triangle is also considered that the opportunity may be characterized by internal control failures. Thus, this dissertation seeks to ascertain according to different degrees of profitability companies that are more likely to manipulate the results, taking into account the different objectives of these companies and their managers. Among several match-fixing detection methods was chosen that best applies the analysis in question, some of which are difficult to apply to large number of companies and different contexts. The model developed by Francis, La Fond, Olsson, Schipper 2004 from other models already created to establish a link between seven attributes, including the quality of accruals and deferrals, to check the quality of information in the financial statements and the impact it has on investor’s decisions. Through an econometric model that we use to calculate the quality of accruals and deferrals in our sample, this draws conclusions about the influence of the attributes as we explain below. Companies that have a better profitability thus have a greater incentive for tax evasion while, companies that have a lower profitability require increased funding and thus will have an incentive conflict when it comes time to make decisions. This is because they need to deliver better results to get better financing rates but at the same time want to pay less tax. It can be expected that most businesses to manipulate when they have a high yield in order to reduce the amount to deliver to the state. Through the analysis of regressions we concluded that companies are more likely to handle are those that have higher yields and lower in line with expectations.

Earnings management and corporate governance relationships are examined for a sample of 49 Portuguese listed firms considering an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2017, using panel corrected standard errors models and considering the family ownership effect. Empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between corporate board independence and earnings management and that the presence of women on board decreases earnings management practices. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management practices are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. Size, being audited by the Big 4 companies, return on assets, loss, and the existence of an audit committee on board influence positively earnings management, but leverage, age, and ownership control are negatively related to earnings management. Results indicate that further auditing and control is necessary for Portuguese listed companies leading to strict recommendations to be followed by policymakers regarding control of these firms.

Earnings management and corporate governance relationships are examined for a sample of 49 Portuguese listed firms considering an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2017, using panel corrected standard errors models and considering the family ownership effect. Empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between corporate board independence and earnings management and that the presence of women on board decreases earnings management practices. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management practices are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. Size, being audited by the Big 4 companies, return on assets, loss, and the existence of an audit committee on board influence positively earnings management, but leverage, age, and ownership control are negatively related to earnings management. Results indicate that further auditing and control is necessary for Portuguese listed companies leading to strict recommendations to be followed by policymakers regarding control of these firms.

The “Big-Four” accounting firms dominate the global accounting/auditing industry, and the big-seven consulting firms (Bain; McKinsey; Booz; Deloitte; PwC; KPMG and E&Y) dominate the global business/management consulting industry and stifle competition. During 1990-2017, the global auditing/accounting industry and the global management consulting industry experienced significant structural changes that have implications for Financial Stability, systemic risk and the proper functioning of capital markets. Some of the results included the collapses of stock prices and bond prices of firms suspected of earnings management; and substantial litigation against auditing firms, CRAs and board of directors. Accounting/audit firms and consulting firms have always been key elements in the fight against earnings management, securities fraud, corruption and asset quality management because of their unique position as external auditors and advisors. This chapter introduces some efficient Auditor allocation and Compensation Mechanisms. These new “Learning Business Models” and contracts can solve the conflicts of interest, Antitrust, greed, Regret, Deadweight-Losses, complexity and industrial organization problems inherent in the Auditing/consulting industry; and each such model contravenes Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Sen's Impossibility Theorem, Gibbard's Theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem, and the Green-Laffont Impossibility Theorem. These issues have implications for international trade and international capital flows given the prevalence of accounting and management consulting in almost all aspects of modern business.

Attention to safety and health are of ever-increasing priority to industrial organizations. Good Safety is demanded by stockholders, employees, and the community while increasing injury costs provide additional motivation for safety and health excellence. Safety has always been a strong corporate value of DuPont and a vital part of its culture. As a result, DuPont has become a benchmark in safety and health performance. Since 1990, DuPont has re-engineered itself to meet global competition and address future vision. In the new re-engineered organizational structures, DuPont has also had to re-engineer its safety management systems. A special Discovery Team was chartered by DuPont senior management to determine the “best practices’ for safety and health being used in DuPont best-performing sites. A summary of the findings is presented, and five of the practices are discussed. Excellence in safety and health management is more important today than ever. Public awareness, federal and state regulations, and enlightened management have resulted in a widespread conviction that all employees have the right to work in an environment that will not adversely affect their safety and health. In DuPont, we believe that excellence in safety and health is necessary to achieve global competitiveness, maintain employee loyalty, and be an accepted member of the communities in which we make, handle, use, and transport products. Safety can also be the “catalyst” to achieving excellence in other important business parameters. The organizational and communication skills developed by management, individuals, and teams in safety can be directly applied to other company initiatives. As we look into the 21st Century, we must also recognize that new organizational structures (flatter with empowered teams) will require new safety management techniques and systems in order to maintain continuous improvement in safety performance. Injury costs, which have risen dramatically in the past twenty years, provide another incentive for safety and health excellence. Shown in the Figure 1, injury costs have increased even after correcting for inflation. Many companies have found these costs to be an “invisible drain” on earnings and profitability. In some organizations, significant initiatives have been launched to better manage the workers’ compensation systems. We have found that the ultimate solution is to prevent injuries and incidents before they occur. A globally-respected company, DuPont is regarded as a well-managed, extremely ethical firm that is the benchmark in industrial safety performance. Like many other companies, DuPont has re-engineered itself and downsized its operations since 1985. Through these changes, we have maintained dedication to our principles and developed new techniques to manage in these organizational environments. As a diversified company, our operations involve chemical process facilities, production line operations, field activities, and sales and distribution of materials. Our customer base is almost entirely industrial and yet we still maintain a high level of consumer awareness and positive perception. The DuPont concern for safety dates back to the early 1800s and the first days of the company. In 1802 E.I. DuPont, a Frenchman, began manufacturing quality grade explosives to fill America’s growing need to build roads, clear fields, increase mining output, and protect its recently won independence. Because explosives production is such a hazardous industry, DuPont recognized and accepted the need for an effective safety effort. The building walls of the first powder mill near Wilmington, Delaware, were built three stones thick on three sides. The back remained open to the Brandywine River to direct any explosive forces away from other buildings and employees. To set the safety example, DuPont also built his home and the homes of his managers next to the powder yard. An effective safety program was a necessity. It represented the first defense against instant corporate liquidation. Safety needs more than a well-designed plant, however. In 1811, work rules were posted in the mill to guide employee work habits. Though not nearly as sophisticated as the safety standards of today, they did introduce an important basic concept — that safety must be a line management responsibility. Later, DuPont introduced an employee health program and hired a company doctor. An early step taken in 1912 was the keeping of safety statistics, approximately 60 years before the federal requirement to do so. We had a visible measure of our safety performance and were determined that we were going to improve it. When the nation entered World War I, the DuPont Company supplied 40 percent of the explosives used by the Allied Forces, more than 1.5 billion pounds. To accomplish this task, over 30,000 new employees were hired and trained to build and operate many plants. Among these facilities was the largest smokeless powder plant the world had ever seen. The new plant was producing granulated powder in a record 116 days after ground breaking. The trends on the safety performance chart reflect the problems that a large new work force can pose until the employees fully accept the company’s safety philosophy. The first arrow reflects the World War I scale-up, and the second arrow represents rapid diversification into new businesses during the 1920s. These instances of significant deterioration in safety performance reinforced DuPont’s commitment to reduce the unsafe acts that were causing 96 percent of our injuries. Only 4 percent of injuries result from unsafe conditions or equipment — the remainder result from the unsafe acts of people. This is an important concept if we are to focus our attention on reducing injuries and incidents within the work environment. World War II brought on a similar set of demands. The story was similar to World War I but the numbers were even more astonishing: one billion dollars in capital expenditures, 54 new plants, 75,000 additional employees, and 4.5 billion pounds of explosives produced — 20 percent of the volume used by the Allied Forces. Yet, the performance during the war years showed no significant deviation from the pre-war years. In 1941, the DuPont Company was 10 times safer than all industry and 9 times safer than the Chemical Industry. Management and the line organization were finally working as they should to control the real causes of injuries. Today, DuPont is about 50 times safer than US industrial safety performance averages. Comparing performance to other industries, it is interesting to note that seemingly “hazard-free” industries seem to have extraordinarily high injury rates. This is because, as DuPont has found out, performance is a function of injury prevention and safety management systems, not hazard exposure. Our success in safety results from a sound safety management philosophy. Each of the 125 DuPont facilities is responsible for its own safety program, progress, and performance. However, management at each of these facilities approaches safety from the same fundamental and sound philosophy. This philosophy can be expressed in eleven straightforward principles. The first principle is that all injuries can be prevented. That statement may seem a bit optimistic. In fact, we believe that this is a realistic goal and not just a theoretical objective. Our safety performance proves that the objective is achievable. We have plants with over 2,000 employees that have operated for over 10 years without a lost time injury. As injuries and incidents are investigated, we can always identify actions that could have prevented that incident. If we manage safety in a proactive — rather than reactive — manner, we will eliminate injuries by reducing the acts and conditions that cause them. The second principle is that management, which includes all levels through first-line supervisors, is responsible and accountable for preventing injuries. Only when senior management exerts sustained and consistent leadership in establishing safety goals, demanding accountability for safety performance and providing the necessary resources, can a safety program be effective in an industrial environment. The third principle states that, while recognizing management responsibility, it takes the combined energy of the entire organization to reach sustained, continuous improvement in safety and health performance. Creating an environment in which employees feel ownership for the safety effort and make significant contributions is an essential task for management, and one that needs deliberate and ongoing attention. The fourth principle is a corollary to the first principle that all injuries are preventable. It holds that all operating exposures that may result in injuries or illnesses can be controlled. No matter what the exposure, an effective safeguard can be provided. It is preferable, of course, to eliminate sources of danger, but when this is not reasonable or practical, supervision must specify measures such as special training, safety devices, and protective clothing. Our fifth safety principle states that safety is a condition of employment. Conscientious assumption of safety responsibility is required from all employees from their first day on the job. Each employee must be convinced that he or she has a responsibility for working safely. The sixth safety principle: Employees must be trained to work safely. We have found that an awareness for safety does not come naturally and that people have to be trained to work safely. With effective training programs to teach, motivate, and sustain safety knowledge, all injuries and illnesses can be eliminated. Our seventh principle holds that management must audit performance on the workplace to assess safety program success. Comprehensive inspections of both facilities and programs not only confirm their effectiveness in achieving the desired performance, but also detect specific problems and help to identify weaknesses in the safety effort. The Company’s eighth principle states that all deficiencies must be corrected promptly. Without prompt action, risk of injuries will increase and, even more important, the credibility of management’s safety efforts will suffer. Our ninth principle is a statement that off-the-job safety is an important part of the overall safety effort. We do not expect nor want employees to “turn safety on” as they come to work and “turn it off” when they go home. The company safety culture truly becomes of the individual employee’s way of thinking. The tenth principle recognizes that it’s good business to prevent injuries. Injuries cost money. However, hidden or indirect costs usually exceed the direct cost. Our last principle is the most important. Safety must be integrated as core business and personal value. There are two reasons for this. First, we’ve learned from almost 200 years of experience that 96 percent of safety incidents are directly caused by the action of people, not by faulty equipment or inadequate safety standards. But conversely, it is our people who provide the solutions to our safety problems. They are the one essential ingredient in the recipe for a safe workplace. Intelligent, trained, and motivated employees are any company’s greatest resource. Our success in safety depends upon the men and women in our plants following procedures, participating actively in training, and identifying and alerting each other and management to potential hazards. By demonstrating a real concern for each employee, management helps establish a mutual respect, and the foundation is laid for a solid safety program. This, of course, is also the foundation for good employee relations. An important lesson learned in DuPont is that the majority of injuries are caused by unsafe acts and at-risk behaviors rather than unsafe equipment or conditions. In fact, in several DuPont studies it was estimated that 96 percent of injuries are caused by unsafe acts. This was particularly revealing when considering safety audits — if audits were only focused on conditions, at best we could only prevent four percent of our injuries. By establishing management systems for safety auditing that focus on people, including audit training, techniques, and plans, all incidents are preventable. Of course, employee contribution and involvement in auditing leads to sustainability through stakeholdership in the system. Management safety audits help to make manage the “behavioral balance.” Every job and task performed at a site can do be done at-risk or safely. The essence of a good safety system ensures that safe behavior is the accepted norm amongst employees, and that it is the expected and respected way of doing things. Shifting employees norms contributes mightily to changing culture. The management safety audit provides a way to quantify these norms. DuPont safety performance has continued to improve since we began keeping records in 1911 until about 1990. In the 1990–1994 time frame, performance deteriorated as shown in the chart that follows: This increase in injuries caused great concern to senior DuPont management as well as employees. It occurred while the corporation was undergoing changes in organization. In order to sustain our technological, competitive, and business leadership positions, DuPont began re-engineering itself beginning in about 1990. New streamlined organizational structures and collaborative work processes eliminated many positions and levels of management and supervision. The total employment of the company was reduced about 25 percent during these four years. In our traditional hierarchical organization structures, every level of supervision and management knew exactly what they were expected to do with safety, and all had important roles. As many of these levels were eliminated, new systems needed to be identified for these new organizations. In early 1995, Edgar S. Woolard, DuPont Chairman, chartered a Corporate Discovery Team to look for processes that will put DuPont on a consistent path toward a goal of zero injuries and occupational illnesses. The cross-functional team used a mode of “discovery through learning” from as many DuPont employees and sites around the world. The Discovery Team fostered the rapid sharing and leveraging of “best practices” and innovative approaches being pursued at DuPont’s plants, field sites, laboratories, and office locations. In short, the team examined the company’s current state, described the future state, identified barriers between the two, and recommended key ways to overcome these barriers. After reporting back to executive management in April, 1995, the Discovery Team was realigned to help organizations implement their recommendations. The Discovery Team reconfirmed key values in DuPont — in short, that all injuries, incidents, and occupational illnesses are preventable and that safety is a source of competitive advantage. As such, the steps taken to improve safety performance also improve overall competitiveness. Senior management made this belief clear: “We will strengthen our business by making safety excellence an integral part of all business activities.” One of the key findings of the Discovery Team was the identification of the best practices used within the company, which are listed below: ▪ Felt Leadership – Management Commitment ▪ Business Integration ▪ Responsibility and Accountability ▪ Individual/Team Involvement and Influence ▪ Contractor Safety ▪ Metrics and Measurements ▪ Communications ▪ Rewards and Recognition ▪ Caring Interdependent Culture; Team-Based Work Process and Systems ▪ Performance Standards and Operating Discipline ▪ Training/Capability ▪ Technology ▪ Safety and Health Resources ▪ Management and Team Audits ▪ Deviation Investigation ▪ Risk Management and Emergency Response ▪ Process Safety ▪ Off-the-Job Safety and Health Education Attention to each of these best practices is essential to achieve sustained improvements in safety and health. The Discovery Implementation in conjunction with DuPont Safety and Environmental Management Services has developed a Safety Self-Assessment around these systems. In this presentation, we will discuss a few of these practices and learn what they mean. Paper published with permission.