Academic literature on the topic 'Economic stabilization Debts'
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Journal articles on the topic "Economic stabilization Debts"
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Mijatovic, Bosko. "Economic and financial aspects of Serbia's regionalization." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 112-113 (2002): 69–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn0213069m.
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The paper has two parts: in the first one, economic aspect of regionalization is considered, in the second a financial one. Regionalization, like every type of decentralization, represents a serious reform of a state and brings upon several expected as well as unexpected although significant effects on political, social, and economic life. Its goal is an improvement of political, social, and economic functions of a state, not their deterioration. Unfortunately, experience of other countries does not support overwhelming optimism. Most frequently, regionalization is done due to political considerations; economic considerations are of secondary importance or even neglected. Such a dominance of political reasoning neglects fundamental principles and arguments of the economic science, standards of rational approach to decentralization, and even economic efficiency and equality between citizens. Because of that, the emphasis in this paper is on economic and financial aspects of regionalization in Serbia. In the first part the author explores economic aspects of regionalization; four state functions (regulation, stabilization, redistribution, and allocation) in decentralized setting; relations between regionalization, deregulation, and privatization; vertical distribution of functions (exclusive functions by the state, exclusive functions by regions, shared functions). After that he explores advantages of the selected model of creating regions and distribution of authorities in Serbia, particularly economic authorities of regions (1. land planning, urban land use, housing; 2. development and maintenance of infrastructure of regional importance and coordination of public utilities in municipalities; 3. agriculture; 4. tourism; 5. forestry 6. hunting and fishing; 7. vocational training and employment; 8. ecology; 9. public works). Separate section is devoted to social protection (financial transfers and institutions). In the second part of the paper (Financing the Regions) the author first examines certain issues in principle (fiscal revenues, vertical and horizontal balance, debts and moral hazard) and then considers topics of financing regions in Serbia, such as revenues subsidies, and debts.
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Müller, Klaus, and Rudi Schmidt. "Von der griechischen zur europäischen Krise." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 40, no. 159 (June 1, 2010): 277–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v40i159.396.
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Membership in the Euro-Zone did not help Greece to escape the global financial crisis. To be sure, Greek’s backward economic structure and its corrupt political culture of clientelism and taxevasion as well as an overblown incompetent administration drove the country into deep public debts and deficits. Nevertheless, the actual crisis started with several external shocks and was exacerbated by discord in the euro-zone. Afraid of abetting French ambitions towards an ‘economic government’, the German government delayed common approaches to fend of speculation against ‘deficit sinners’ and invited the IMF - thereby opening the window for speculative attacks against the euro-zone as a whole. It remains to be seen if the recently improvised European Stabilization Mechanism can be a first step towards an overdue economic complement to EMU or if it will generalize IMF-style structural adjustments inside the EU. The latter ‘solution’ of the European crisis would, as already observable in the Baltics, put heavy social costs on deficit countries and undermine the justifications given for European integration, namely to secure convergence, cohesion and solidarity between its members.
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Lampe, John. "Stabilizing southeastern Europe, financial legacies and European lessons from the first world war." Ekonomski anali 59, no. 203 (2014): 7–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1403007l.
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This paper pays brief attention, although more than the recent flood of 1914 centenary books, to economic causes of the First World War before turning to it fateful economic consequences for Southeastern Europe. The Austrian lack of economic leverage over Serbia is cited as a reason for its resort to the military option. At the war?s end, the option of the victorious powers to provide significant economic relief to the region where the conflict had begun was not taken. After tracking the brief, limited assistance provided, the paper reviews to the massive economic problems confronting four of the five of independent states, neglecting Albania as a special case, that could now be called Southeastern Europe. First Greece and then Bulgaria faced forced inflow of refugees. Romania and the Yugoslav Kingdom faced the economic integration of large new, formerly Austro-Hungarian lands. All of them were left not only with war deaths and destruction but also with large war debts, or in Bulgaria?s case, reparations. The paper concentrates on the primary Western response to these four economies, an effort led by the Bank of England to replace immediate postwar inflation with the deflation needed to reestablish currencies with prewar convertibility to gold, now with Pound Sterling added to a gold reserve standard. Independent central banks, the major positive legacy of this initiative, were to lead the way. But the financial stability that all four economies did eventually achieve in the 1920s served only to reduce their war debts. Otherwise, maintaining the fixed and overvalued exchange rates restricted domestic credit, encouraged protective tariffs, and did not attract the foreign capital, especially new state loans, that this emphasis on a single, European financial framework had promised. A concluding section considers the lessons learned from a postwar period that promoted economic disintegration by the 1930s. Looking at the period since the end of the Cold War and then the wars of Yugoslavia?s dissolution, we see EU leadership in the reduction of trade barriers, the promotion of common fiscal practice and the prospect of genuine European integration as Western lessons learned. Within the region, independent central banks have helped the process. But the stabilization of currencies around the overvalued Euro has posed a familiar post- 1918 problem since the European downturn of 2008.
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Nkwatoh, Louis S. "Does ECOWAS Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria Satisfy an Optimum Currency Area?" Journal of Economics and Management Sciences 1, no. 2 (August 29, 2018): p61. http://dx.doi.org/10.30560/jems.v1n2p61.
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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries have expressed their desire to establish a monetary union by the year 2020 based on six macroeconomic convergence criteria. The desire is predicated on a series of strategies and various treaties ratified and signed by various ECOWAS Heads of governments and Central Banks’ Governors with more emphasis on the Maastricht-type set of convergence criteria that must be satisfied by all member countries before they ascend to the envisaged monetary union. Even though the convergence criteria may guarantee macroeconomic stability in a regional grouping, critics assert that the convergence criteria are insufficient and inconsequential to the formation of monetary union. The objective of this study is to ascertain whether ECOWAS countries have met all the macroeconomic convergence criteria making them fit for a monetary union. The analyses indicate that no ECOWAS country has met all the convergence criteria at a given point in time implying that the level of macroeconomic convergence in the region still remains inadequate relative to the set targets. However, WAEMU sub-set economies have met three of the criteria -public debts to GDP Ratio, deficits including grants, annual percentage inflation rate. The simple reason is that WAEMU is an existing monetary union with a common stabilization policy.
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Volkova, Nelia, and Diana Vinhora. "Problem Credit Debt of Ukrainian Banks: Current Status and Ways to overcome it." Modern Economics 23, no. 1 (October 27, 2020): 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31521/modecon.v23(2020)-06.
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Introduction. The article is devoted to the study of problem about credit indebtedness of Ukrainian banks at the present stage and to identifying ways to overcome it. The article analyzes the loan portfolio of Ukrainian banks during 2014-2020. For the last five years, the banking system of Ukraine has been developing in the conditions of military conflict and permanent political and economic crisis. After the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, domestic commercial banks lost part of their assets that remained in the occupied territories. These events forced the National Bank of Ukraine to take measures to stabilize the credit system, which led to the withdrawal of a large number of insolvent banks from the market. Purpose. The purpose of the study is to analyze the current state of credit debt problem of Ukrainian banks and to identify ways to neutralize it. Results. Based on statistical data, the dynamics of individual assets of Ukrainian banks, characterized by the discount rate as the main deterrent to lending, certain factors influencing the emergence of problem loans in a banking institution. Statistical data on the volume of lending to banking institutions by business entities and individuals in Ukraine are presented and analyzed. Based on the analysis, the main factors of increasing creditworthiness are investigated. Based on world experience, we offer ways to overcome the problematic team of domestic banks in the rear stabilization of the credit system. Conclusions. The conducted research confirmed the theoretical expediency and practical significance of the analysis of the current state of credit indebtedness problem of Ukrainian banks, which allows to determine the ways of its neutralization. The assessment of some indicators of banks’ activity revealed a number of factors that negatively affect the work with problem loans, namely: reduction in the number of banks (in particular, banks with foreign capital), reduction in lending, which is directly related to rising interest rates on loans, real incomes, the devaluation of the national currency and more. Each bank must develop a set of measures applicable to a particular category of problem loans, work out algorithms for the interaction of units in the event of certain signs, options for behavior depending on the degree of effectiveness of the measures applied. Implementation of the proposed banks in practice measures to reduce bad debts will be the subject of our further study.
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OSINUBI, TOKUNBO SIMBOWALE, RISIKAT OLADOYIN S. DAUDA, and OLADELE EMMANUEL OLALERU. "BUDGET DEFICITS, EXTERNAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA." Singapore Economic Review 55, no. 03 (September 2010): 491–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590810003869.
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The necessity for governments to borrow in order to finance deficit budgets has led to the development of external debt. This study examines how the use of budget deficits as an instrument of stabilization leads to the accumulation of external debt with the attending effects on growth in Nigeria between 1970 and 2003. By synthesizing a relationship between budget deficits and external debt the study shows the implications on economic growth of conducting a fiscal policy within the contexts of debt stabilization and debt sustainability. The results of the econometric analysis confirm the existence of the debt Laffer curve and the nonlinear effects of external debt on growth in Nigeria. The study concludes that if debt-financed budget deficits are operated in order to stabilize the debt ratio at the optimum sustainable level debt overhang problems would be avoided and the benefits of external borrowing would be maximized.
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Bienen, Henry S., and Mark Gersovitz. "Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability." International Organization 39, no. 4 (1985): 729–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027089.
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IMF conditionality is seldom so important that it dominates all other considerations for political stability. IMF stabilization programs often shift benefits from one group to another. They expose elites to charges of selling the sovereignty of their countries. The imposition of IMF conditions, particularly subsidy cuts, may lead to sharp outbreaks of civil disorder. Nonetheless, the IMF provides resources that make adjustment easier and thus may lessen the chances of political instability for a country. IMF programs are seldom implemented fully as negotiated, and the penalties for partial compliance are not great. Debtor countries have more flexibility in imposing austerity measures, and the economic constraints are less binding than often assumed. The very availability of alternatives to IMF programs results in internal divisions because some favor debt repudiation and others oppose it. Groups now contend over solutions to the debt problems of their countries.
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Kitano, Shigeto. "Nominal debt and inflation stabilization." International Journal of Economic Theory 5, no. 4 (December 2009): 409–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00116.x.
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Dornbusch, Rudiger, Jose Vinals, and Richard Portes. "Mexico: Stabilization, Debt and Growth." Economic Policy 3, no. 7 (October 1988): 231. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1344488.
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Leith, Campbell, Ioana Moldovan, and Simon Wren-Lewis. "DEBT STABILIZATION IN A NON-RICARDIAN ECONOMY." Macroeconomic Dynamics 23, no. 06 (June 28, 2018): 2509–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100517000797.
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In models with a representative infinitely lived household, tax smoothing implies that the steady state of government debt should follow a random walk. This is unlikely to be the case in overlapping generations (OLG) economies, where the equilibrium interest rate may differ from the policy maker's rate of time preference. It may therefore be optimal to reduce debt today to reduce distortionary taxation in the future. In addition, the level of the capital stock in these economies is likely to be suboptimally low, and reducing government debt will crowd in additional capital. Using a version of the Blanchard-Yaari model of perpetual youth, with both public and private capital, we show that it is optimal in steady state for the government to hold assets. However, we also show how and why this level of government assets can fall short of both the level of debt that achieves the optimal capital stock and the level that eliminates income taxes. Finally, we compute the optimal adjustment path to this steady state.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Economic stabilization Debts"
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Yoon, Yeo Hun. "Stabilization program in a small semi-open economy with foreign debts and controlled interest rates." Connect to resource, 1987. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1262692922.
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Barría, Lilian A. "Negotiating economic stabilization measures : the two-level debt game /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9988646.
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Huneau, Mathieu, and Petr Doktor. "Debt and deficit in the Czech Republic and France." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Ekonomihögskolan, ELNU, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-20684.
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This thesis is analyzing the development of debt and deficit situation in the Czech Republic and France. Our main research questions are: why the Czech Republic and France have different debt and deficit? What are the effects and causes of debt and deficit? How Czech Republic and France wants to reduce the level of debt and deficit? These are the central questions we try to answer in this thesis. To pursue a systematic analysis, we start with a theoretical section on we described different theories of debt/deficit and budgetary rules effects on the economy in order to understand characteristics of debt issues. From these findings, we have resulted causes and differences of debt situations in our countries, which is part of empirical analysis. This is done by evolution of debt/deficit and factors that affect level of debt/deficit. We analyzed three mains factors and due to this factors that influence debt/deficit we can clearly see why our countries have different levels in debt problem. Regarding this we can say our countries are different in many respects. The major difference is monetary policy due to French member of Eurozone. Also the way how to get from debt issue and find a compromise between government reforms and interests of citizens will vary in the future.
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Amano, André Tomio Lopes. "A estratégia oculta de continuidade: a política econômica do governo Sarney (1985-1990)." Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8137/tde-29082016-102531/.
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A década de 1980 ficou conhecida no Brasil como a década perdida. Certamente, os anos 1980 expressaram fortemente o que representou a chamada crise da dívida para os países periféricos, especialmente, os latino-americanos. Os governos da Ditadura militar condicionaram as políticas econômicas para o pagamento da dívida externa. A dívida foi internalizada e estatizada ao longo dos anos 1980, o que deixou o país à beira do colapso, com queda do produto interno, altas taxas de inflação e com o Estado paralisado por conta do endividamento externo e interno. O governo Sarney, apesar de ser o primeiro governo civil após a Ditadura, não foi eleito pelo voto do povo. A transição democrática, feita em comum acordo com os grupos que deixavam o poder, levou à mudança somente na aparência, mas a essência permanecia a mesma. Sarney era presidente do partido (PDS) sucessor da Arena e sustentáculo político civil da Ditadura. Deixou o partido em junho de 1984, portanto, menos de um ano antes de tomar posse como presidente da República, em uma coalização aparentemente de oposição. Assim, essa dissertação busca compreender de que forma as políticas econômicas do governo Sarney também representaram uma continuidade em relação aos governos anteriores, apesar dos sucessivos planos de estabilização, que grande parte da historiografia econômica considerou como não-ortodoxos.1980s were recognized as the lost decade. Certainly this period expressed what represented the known debt crisis for underdeveloped countries especially the latin americans. The military government engaged the economical policies to payment of external debt. The debt became public at 1980s and this induced a fall on the internal product, a high inflation rates and had the effect on the State leading to a standstill period caused by the external and internal debts. Sarney was not elected by people vote even he was the first president after military government. The democratic transition period was achieved by pact with the left group power and this fact changed appearance only and not the essence. Sarney was the president of PDS, followed by the Arena witch sustained the military government; he has left this party in June 1984, one year before become president of Republic seeming opposition grouping. This study aim to understand the economical policies of Sarney government is continuing of previous governments although stabilization plans were attempt and that the economical historiography considers as not orthodox.
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Ikanga, A.-Mponga Bakand’Olinga. "Causes et conséquences des programmes d’ajustement structurel en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC)." Thesis, Paris 10, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA100035/document.
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Notre recherche a consisté a nous faire une opinion raisonnée sur les interventions des Institutions de Bretton-Woods en République Démocratique de Congo, en nous appuyant sur une analyse de long terme de l’endettement extérieur du pays, et par conséquent à la mise en œuvre des programmes des stabilisations dans les années 70 et d’ajustement structurel depuis les années 80. Cette analyse nous a permis de mettre en lumière les contraintes économiques et sociales, internes et extérieures, auxquelles le pays a dû faire face. Loin de soulager cette économie rentière, les thérapies de choc préconisées par ces Institutions ont provoqué des coûts ou effets secondaires négatifs, délibérément cherché ou non sur d’autres variables (revenu global, niveau des prix, inflation/hyperinflation…). D’autre part, elles ont eu un coût social élevé, et ont contribuées lourdement à une détérioration de la répartition des revenus entre les diverses couches sociales du pays. L’échec des programmes d’ajustement structurel étant aujourd’hui reconnu, il était devenu donc impératif d’imaginer d’autres types d’approches moins superficielles, qui puissent intégrer non-seulement l’équilibre des variables macro et/ou micro-économiques, mais aussi méso-économique ; et donc l’accent doit être désormais mis sur l’amont (discussions des politiques) et sur l’aval (mis au point des projets ou programmes). C’est ainsi que furent mis en place, depuis le milieu des années 90, les mesures d’allègement ou d’annulation de la dette extérieure. L’austérité préconisée aujourd’hui, face à la crise de la dette dans la zone euro, semble ne pas tenir compte des conséquences que les politiques d’inspiration monétariste ont entraînées partout où elles ont été mises en œuvre, et particulièrement en Afrique. Ainsi, nous-nous demandons si le Libéraux ont-ils retenu les leçons des échecs des programmes d’ajustement structurel (PAS) dans les pays ajustés. Pour ce faire, nous-nous sommes permis de proposer quelques perspectives ou voies de sortie afin d’éviter de retomber dans le cycle de la dette que la RD Congo a connutOur research was to give us a reasoned opinion on the actions of the Bretton-Woods in DR Congo, relying on an analysis of long term external debt of the country, and therefore the implementation of programs stabilization in the 70s and structural adjustment since the 80s. This analysis allowed us to highlight the economic and social constraints, internal and external, that the country faced. Far from alleviating the rentier economy, shock therapies advocated by these institutions have caused costs or negative side effects, deliberately sought or not other variables (total income, inflation/hyperinflation…). On the other hand, they had a high social cost, and contributed heavily to the deterioration of income distribution among different social strata of the country. The failure of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) is regnized today, it has become imperative to imagine other types of less superficial approaches that can integrate not only the balance of macro variables and/or micro-economic, but also meso, and therefore the emphasis should now be placed on the upstream (policy discussion) and downstream (developed projects or programs). Thus were established since the mid 90s, the relief measures or cancellation of the external debt. The austerity advocated today, faced with the debt crisis in the euro area seems to ignore the impact that monetary policies have led to inspiration wherever they have been implemented, particularity in Africa. Thus, we ask whether we Liberals have learned from the failures of adjustment programs (SAPs) in the country originates, the former adjusted. To do this, we have allowed us to propose a few prospects or output channels to avoid failing into the cycle of debt that DR Congo has experienced so far
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Armstrong, Adrienne. "Debt and development the impact of the international financial system on development strategies in the periphery /." 1986. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/19539981.html.
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Drabkin, Eric Joshua. "The political economy of macroeconomic policy implementation lessons from IMF high conditionality programs /." 1993. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/34014322.html.
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Santaella, Julio A. "Stabilization programs, credibility and external enforcement." 1992. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/29750839.html.
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Nwagboso, Emmanuel Chijioke. "The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the global debt crisis a comparative analysis of Brazil and Sierra Leone /." 1991. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/32524802.html.
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Jardim, José Manuel Norberto. "The underground economy and the fiscal stance." Doctoral thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/13548.
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Doutoramento em EconomiaThe inevitability of taxes and regulations, that cause agents to go underground, forces the authorities to tolerate some underground economic activity and grants the underground economy natural features. The natural level of the underground economy is defined as the level of underground economic activity in the decentralized equilibrium, provided that the actual structural characteristics of the economy and social preferences are accounted for by imbedding them in the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations. Its existence is proven using two variants of neoclassical general equilibrium models. The underground economy is found to influence the successfulness of fiscal consolidation programmes, depending on the position of the economy relative to critical fiscal thresholds associated with the natural level of the underground economy. Tax increases yield higher tax proceeds up to the threshold, and lower tax proceeds, passed the threshold, due to a stronger expansion of the natural level of the underground economy. Tax proceeds reach their maximum at the threshold. Tax based programmes are found ineffective in high tax developed economies, operating passed the threshold. In contrast, its successfulness in the developing world, where most economies operate below the threshold with low taxes, is not influenced by the underground economy.
Perante a inevitabilidade de impostos e regulamentação, que estão na origem da economia subterranea, as autoridades vêem-se forçadas a tolerar actividades económicas subterraneas. Isto confere urn carácter natural à economia subterrânea. A existência de uma taxa natural de economia subterranea e provado utilizando dois modelos neoclassicos de equilibrio gereal. A taxa natural de economia subterranea define-se como o nivel de actividade económica subterranea no equilibrio descentralizado, dadas as propriedades estruturais da economia e das preferências sociais, que se incluem no sistema Walrasiano de equações de equilibrio geral. Prova-se que a economia subterranea influencia o resultado de programas de consolidação orçamental. Isto depende da localização da economia face a valores fiscais criticos associados a taxa natural de economia subterranea. A seguir a urn aumento de impostos, as receitas começam por crescer, atingindo o máximo no ponto critico, para a segmr GUt, devido a uma expansão da taxa natural de economia subterrânea. Programas assentes no aumento de impostos não são bern sucedidos em paises desenvolvidos com cargas fiscais elevadas, que operam alem do ponto critico. Já os paises em desenvolvimento, cuja maioria opera abaixo do ponto critico com cargas fiscais baixas, a economia subterranea não parece influenciar a eficácia dos programas.
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Books on the topic "Economic stabilization Debts"
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Cooper, Richard N. Economic stabilization in developing countries. San Francisco, Calif: ICS Press, 1991.
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Stabilization, debt, and reform: Policy analysis for developing countries. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
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Stabilization, debt, and reform: Policy analysis for developing countries. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1993.
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Cooper, Richard N. Economic stabilization and debt in developing countries. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992.
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Sahay, Ratna. Stabilization, debt, and fiscal policy in the Caribbean. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Dept., 2005.
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Girón, Alicia. Fin de siglo y deuda externa: Historia sin fin : Argentina, Brasil y México. México, D.F: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1995.
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Reisen, Helmut. Public debt, north and south. Washington, D.C: Debt and International Finance Division, International Economics Dept., World Bank, 1989.
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Grimpe, Barbara. Ökonomie sichtbar machen: Die Welt nationaler Schulden in Bildschirmgrösse : eine Ethnographie. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010.
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The International Monetary Fund and Latin America: Economic stabilization and class conflict. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Economic stabilization Debts"
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Dabrowski, Marek. "Macroeconomic Stabilization." In The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation, 552–57. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829911.003.0059.
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The aim of macroeconomic stabilization is restoring price stability and reducing monetary, fiscal, and balance-of-payment imbalances. Macroeconomic stabilization is particularly needed when a country suffers from high inflation or hyperinflation. To stop such an inflation one can choose between three types of anti-inflationary programmes: orthodox money-based, orthodox exchange rate-based, and heterodox. Other cases of macrostabilization policy include reducing excessive fiscal deficit and public debt before they become monetized, dealing with the deflationary consequences of the systemic banking crisis, reducing the excessive current account deficit, dealing with the consequences of a sudden stop in capital flows, and fighting chronic moderate inflation. Fiscal rules, and the independence of monetary and fiscal institutions such as central banks, play an important role in preventing macroeconomic instability. National macroeconomic policies are also monitored from outside, for example by the International Monetary Fund and European Commission (in the case of EU member states).
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Costantini, Orsola. "Household debt and the rentier share of income." In Economic Growth and Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in Post-Keynesian Economics, 68–89. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781786439574.00013.
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Kostis, Pantelis C. "Are IMF Stabilization Programs in the European Union Disastrous?" In Handbook of Research on Social and Economic Development in the European Union, 1–21. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1188-6.ch001.
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This chapter examines the effectiveness of Stabilizing Programs in the European Union for the time period from the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to 2013 (the recent bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). A binary logistic model is used which specifies binomial as the distribution and logit as the link function, using an unbalanced panel of annual data. Two main conclusions emerge: a) the probabilities of an economic recession, a high debt to GDP ratio, and a high current account deficit to GDP ratio, are greater when a Stabilization Program is adopted than without one, and b) a Stabilization Program has a negative short-run effect on the GDP growth rate, as well as negative long-run effects (8 years after the adoption) on the debt to GDP ratio and the current account deficit to GDP ratio.
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Bollard, Alan. "Economists at Armistice." In Economists at War, 231–62. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846000.003.0008.
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1946 brought the Armistice and a new economic task: the focus of the economists had to move from the problems of wartime rationing and finance to a new world of economic reconstruction, post-war stabilization, economic growth, and debt reduction. In addition the Cold War brought a new tactic: strategic deterrence. In this year Japan commemorated the anniversary of the death of Takashi Korekiyo, H. H. Kung gathered his wealth and prepared to flee the Chinese Communist forces, Maynard Keynes helped establish the International Monetary Fund, only to die exhausted, and Hjalmar Schacht defended himself from accusations of Nazism and regained his freedom.
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Caetano, José, Isabel Vieira, and Carlos Vieira. "Does the Euro Zone Really Need a Common Budget?" In Handbook of Research on Social and Economic Development in the European Union, 142–56. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1188-6.ch009.
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The implementation of a monetary union in Europe, to take full advantage of the Single Market's potential benefits, has not hitherto delivered the expected results. On the contrary, the euro area has been afflicted by many troubles, including anemic growth, unemployment, and inequality. Many blame the euro's defective design, and especially its incapacity to promote economic convergence and provide adjustment and stabilization mechanisms. Others blame fiscal indiscipline by some of its members. The latter view prevailed when shaping the austerity policies imposed on the countries more affected by the financial and sovereign debt crises, intensifying an economic recession with dramatic social consequences. As a result, citizens' distrust in the European Union's institutions grew, along with support for nationalistic political forces opposing the European integration project. This chapter assesses one of the main deficiencies of the euro's governance model – lack of automatic stabilization – and discusses proposals to overcome it.
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"CHAPTER ONE. International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, 41–88. Princeton University Press, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780691188034-005.
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Reilly, James. "Never Let a Crisis Go to Waste." In Orchestration, 60–88. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197526347.003.0004.
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This chapter examines four Chinese economic statecraft initiatives across Western Europe. It starts with Beijing’s “purchasing diplomacy”: the public presentation of investments and purchases by major Chinese enterprises in the wake of Europe’s financial crisis. It next turns to China’s financial statecraft, examining Beijing’s purchases of euro-denominated debt and support for the EU’s currency stabilization efforts. Despite domestic criticism of both initiatives, Chinese policymakers effectively incentivized and coordinated among banks and economic agencies. The third case examines Beijing’s promotion of RMB internationalization in Europe. Policymakers successfully leveraged competition among Europe’s financial capitals to secure political support for Beijing’s policy objectives. The final case provides an example of infrastructure investment by a state-owned enterprise: COSCO’s massive investment into the Greek port of Piraeus. Despite successful implementation, Beijing’s economic statecraft exacerbated populist anxieties, undermining China’s foreign policy goals in Western Europe.
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Kaufman, Robert R. "Economic Orthodoxy and Political Change in Mexico: The Stabilization and Adjustment Policies of the de la Madrid Administration." In Debt and Democracy in Latin America, 109–26. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429044359-8.
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Razin, Assaf. "Swell and Retreat of High Inflation." In Israel and the World Economy. The MIT Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262037341.003.0001.
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Israel's high inflation calamity amounted to a crisis of political and economic institutions. Failing economic governance made it essential for the government to raise revenue through money expansion. At the time when the newly elected government was catering to populistic demands, the printing press was used to finance the fast-expanding government spending and transfers. The central lesson from the Friedman (1971) is that steady-state seigniorage from revenue maximizing central bank is small. However, Israel, as well as previous historical episodes, offer a counter example. Inflation spikes can be a significant source for government revenue. Following almost 8 years of the hyperinflation economic chaos, the Israeli voters brought about some major political rebalancing towards the political center. Sargent (2009) argues that high inflation can be stopped quickly, and at a low cost. His argument is that inflationary expectations are quick to adjust when the economic regime shifts considerably. The temptation not to stop inflation in its tracks may be irresistible. Similarly, if the government surprise market participants by abrupt stopping of hyperinflation in the presence of entrenched inflation expectations, the fiscal burden of public sector wage bill and subsidies to basic food must rise. Therefore, the government may hesitate to do so. To overcome this difficulty there must be a full-fledged social agreement between the government, savers (who hold government bonds), public sector wage earners, and recipients of food subsidies. To fix the inflated outlays on debt service, wage bill, and subsidies, some major redistribution of income must accompany the inflation-halting step. This is in essence the lesson from Israel’s inflation stabilization policy.
Reports on the topic "Economic stabilization Debts"
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JL Fuller and KM Leek. Debt swapping as a tool for economic and social stabilization in Russia's closed nuclear cities. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), March 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/751988.
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JL Fuller and KM Leek. Debt swapping as a tool for economic and social stabilization in Russia's closed nuclear cities (briefing paper). Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), March 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/751989.
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Financial Stability Report - September 2015. Banco de la República, August 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/rept-estab-fin.sem2.eng-2015.
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From this edition, the Financial Stability Report will have fewer pages with some changes in its structure. The purpose of this change is to present the most relevant facts of the financial system and their implications on the financial stability. This allows displaying the analysis more concisely and clearly, as it will focus on describing the evolution of the variables that have the greatest impact on the performance of the financial system, for estimating then the effect of a possible materialization of these risks on the financial health of the institutions. The changing dynamics of the risks faced by the financial system implies that the content of the Report adopts this new structure; therefore, some analyses and series that were regularly included will not necessarily be in each issue. However, the statistical annex that accompanies the publication of the Report will continue to present the series that were traditionally included, regardless of whether or not they are part of the content of the Report. In this way we expect to contribute in a more comprehensive way to the study and analysis of the stability of the Colombian financial system. Executive Summary During the first half of 2015, the main advanced economies showed a slow recovery on their growth, while emerging economies continued with their slowdown trend. Domestic demand in the United States allowed for stabilization on its average growth for the first half of the year, while other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the euro zone, and Japan showed a more gradual recovery. On the other hand, the Chinese economy exhibited the lowest growth rate in five years, which has resulted in lower global dynamism. This has led to a fall in prices of the main export goods of some Latin American economies, especially oil, whose price has also responded to a larger global supply. The decrease in the terms of trade of the Latin American economies has had an impact on national income, domestic demand, and growth. This scenario has been reflected in increases in sovereign risk spreads, devaluations of stock indices, and depreciation of the exchange rates of most countries in the region. For Colombia, the fall in oil prices has also led to a decline in the terms of trade, resulting in pressure on the dynamics of national income. Additionally, the lower demand for exports helped to widen the current account deficit. This affected the prospects and economic growth of the country during the first half of 2015. This economic context could have an impact on the payment capacity of debtors and on the valuation of investments, affecting the soundness of the financial system. However, the results of the analysis featured in this edition of the Report show that, facing an adverse scenario, the vulnerability of the financial system in terms of solvency and liquidity is low. The analysis of the current situation of credit institutions (CI) shows that growth of the gross loan portfolio remained relatively stable, as well as the loan portfolio quality indicators, except for microcredit, which showed a decrease in these indicators. Regarding liabilities, traditional sources of funding have lost market share versus non-traditional ones (bonds, money market operations and in the interbank market), but still represent more than 70%. Moreover, the solvency indicator remained relatively stable. As for non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the slowdown observed during the first six months of 2015 in the real annual growth of the assets total, both in the proprietary and third party position, stands out. The analysis of the main debtors of the financial system shows that indebtedness of the private corporate sector has increased in the last year, mostly driven by an increase in the debt balance with domestic and foreign financial institutions. However, the increase in this latter source of funding has been influenced by the depreciation of the Colombian peso vis-à-vis the US dollar since mid-2014. The financial indicators reflected a favorable behavior with respect to the historical average, except for the profitability indicators; although they were below the average, they have shown improvement in the last year. By economic sector, it is noted that the firms focused on farming, mining and transportation activities recorded the highest levels of risk perception by credit institutions, and the largest increases in default levels with respect to those observed in December 2014. Meanwhile, households have shown an increase in the financial burden, mainly due to growth in the consumer loan portfolio, in which the modalities of credit card, payroll deductible loan, revolving and vehicle loan are those that have reported greater increases in risk indicators. On the side of investments that could be affected by the devaluation in the portfolio of credit institutions and non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the largest share of public debt securities, variable-yield securities and domestic private debt securities is highlighted. The value of these portfolios fell between February and August 2015, driven by the devaluation in the market of these investments throughout the year. Furthermore, the analysis of the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) shows that all intermediaries showed adequate levels and exhibit a stable behavior. Likewise, the fragility analysis of the financial system associated with the increase in the use of non-traditional funding sources does not evidence a greater exposure to liquidity risk. Stress tests assess the impact of the possible joint materialization of credit and market risks, and reveal that neither the aggregate solvency indicator, nor the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) of the system would be below the established legal limits. The entities that result more individually affected have a low share in the total assets of the credit institutions; therefore, a risk to the financial system as a whole is not observed. José Darío Uribe Governor
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Financial Stability Report - Second Semester of 2020. Banco de la República de Colombia, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/rept-estab-fin.sem2.eng-2020.
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The Colombian financial system has not suffered major structural disruptions during these months of deep economic contraction and has continued to carry out its basic functions as usual, thus facilitating the economy's response to extreme conditions. This is the result of the soundness of financial institutions at the beginning of the crisis, which was reflected in high liquidity and capital adequacy indicators as well as in the timely response of various authorities. Banco de la República lowered its policy interest rates 250 points to 1.75%, the lowest level since the creation of the new independent bank in 1991, and provided ample temporary and permanent liquidity in both pesos and foreign currency. The Office of the Financial Superintendent of Colombia, in turn, adopted prudential measures to facilitate changes in the conditions for loans in effect and temporary rules for rating and loan-loss provisions. Finally, the national government expanded the transfers as well as the guaranteed credit programs for the economy. The supply of real credit (i.e. discounting inflation) in the economy is 4% higher today than it was 12 months ago with especially marked growth in the housing (5.6%) and commercial (4.7%) loan portfolios (2.3% in consumer and -0.1% in microloans), but there have been significant changes over time. During the first few months of the quarantine, firms increased their demands for liquidity sharply while consumers reduced theirs. Since then, the growth of credit to firms has tended to slow down, while consumer and housing credit has grown. The financial system has responded satisfactorily to the changes in the respective demands of each group or sector and loans may grow at high rates in 2021 if GDP grows at rates close to 4.6% as the technical staff at the Bank expects; but the forecasts are highly uncertain. After the strict quarantine implemented by authorities in Colombia, the turmoil seen in March and early April, which was evident in the sudden reddening of macroeconomic variables on the risk heatmap in Graph A,[1] and the drop in crude oil and coal prices (note the high volatility registered in market risk for the region on Graph A) the local financial markets stabilized relatively quickly. Banco de la República’s credible and sustained policy response played a decisive role in this stabilization in terms of liquidity provision through a sharp expansion of repo operations (and changes in amounts, terms, counterparties, and eligible instruments), the purchases of public and private debt, and the reduction in bank reserve requirements. In this respect, there is now abundant aggregate liquidity and significant improvements in the liquidity position of investment funds. In this context, the main vulnerability factor for financial stability in the short term is still the high degree of uncertainty surrounding loan quality. First, the future trajectory of the number of people infected and deceased by the virus and the possible need for additional health measures is uncertain. For that reason, there is also uncertainty about the path for economic recovery in the short and medium term. Second, the degree to which the current shock will be reflected in loan quality once the risk materializes in banks’ financial statements is uncertain. For the time being, the credit risk heatmap (Graph B) indicates that non-performing and risky loans have not shown major deterioration, but past experience indicates that periods of sharp economic slowdown eventually tend to coincide with rises in non-performing loans: the calculations included in this report suggest that the impact of the recession on credit quality could be significant in the short term. This is particularly worrying since the profitability of credit establishments has been declining in recent months, and this could affect their ability to provide credit to the real sector of the economy. In order to adopt a forward-looking approach to this vulnerability, this Report presents several stress tests that evaluate the resilience of the liquidity and capital adequacy of credit institutions and investment funds in the event of a hypothetical scenario that seeks to simulate an extreme version of current macroeconomic conditions. The results suggest that even though there could be strong impacts on the credit institutions’ volume of credit and profitability under such scenarios, aggregate indicators of total and core capital adequacy will probably remain at levels that are above the regulatory limits over the horizon of a year. At the same time, the exercises highlight the high capacity of the system's liquidity to face adverse scenarios. In compliance with its constitutional objectives and in coordination with the financial system's security network, Banco de la República will continue to closely monitor the outlook for financial stability at this juncture and will make the decisions that are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the economy, facilitate the flow of sufficient credit and liquidity resources, and further the smooth operation of the payment systems. Juan José Echavarría Governor