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1
OLIVEIRA, Emerson Ademir Borges de, and Marisa ROSSIGNOLI. "FEDERALISMO FISCAL NO BRASIL: DA TEORIA FEDERALISTA À CRISE ECONÔMICA." Revista Juridica 1, no. 54 (March 29, 2019): 395. http://dx.doi.org/10.21902/revistajur.2316-753x.v1i54.3315.
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RESUMOEste trabalho objetiva discutir importantes momentos do federalismo brasileiro e apontar alguns elementos para o debate sobre as questões federativas em momentos de crise e queda da arrecadação conforme o vivenciado pelo Brasil. Primeiramente, prima por explorar a teoria federalista, seguida de um aprofundamento quanto ao federalismo fiscal brasileiro. Oportunamente, passa a estabelecer críticas ao modelo de federalismo fiscal centrífugo, mormente no contexto atual de crise econômica. Reconhece no sistema fiscal brasileiro um significativo impeditivo a um federalismo de equilíbrio, com a necessidade de busca de recursos pelos entes federativos em relação à União, situação geradora de distúrbios democráticos e problemas institucionais. O método é o dedutivo e a pesquisa bibliográfica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Crise econômica; Distribuição vertical de recursos; Federalismo Fiscal. ABSTRACTThis paper aims to discuss important moments of Brazilian federalism and to point out some elements for the debate on federative issues in times of crisis and fall in revenue as experienced by Brazil. First of all, it is necessary to explore federalist theory, followed by a deepening of Brazilian fiscal federalism. It is expanded by considerations of revenue breakdowns, revenue unbundling, contribution creation, fiscal warfare, corrupting effects of the federal tax system, and taxpayer legal uncertainty. It recognizes in the Brazilian tax system a significant impediment to a balanced federalism, with the need to seek resources from the federative entities in relation to the Union, a situation that generates democratic disturbances and institutional problems. Opportunely, it begins to criticize the centrifugal fiscal federalism model, especially in the current context of economic crisis. The method is deductive and bibliographic research.KEYWORDS: Economic crisis; Vertical distribution of resources; Fiscal Federalism.
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Slavinskaite, Neringa. "Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Theory." Review of Business and Legal Sciences, no. 26 (July 24, 2017): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.26537/rebules.v0i26.1005.
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There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and Fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: "first generation of theories" and "second generation of theories".
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Oates, Wallace E. "On the Development of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Essay in the History of (Recent) Economic Thought." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 29, no. 1 (April 1, 2011): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569211x15665367493599.
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Abstract This paper explores the origins and evolution of the theory of fiscal federalism. A relatively recent sub-field of public finance, fiscal federalism addresses the economics of multilevel government including the economic roles of different levels of government and the fiscal instruments they employ. Its evolution has been influenced both by some real-world financial crises and by the application of new analytical approaches in the discipline of economics.
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Alekhin, B. I. "Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Regional Economic Growth." Financial Journal 12, no. 6 (2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2020-6-39-53.
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This study examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional economic growth using panel data for 82 subjects of the Russian Federation for the period 2005-2018. General theoretical framework was drawn from the second-generation theory of fiscal federalism, and panel data econometrics suggested the appropriate empirical model and estimation method. The pooled mean group method was used to estimate an autoregressive distributed lags model based on Solow-Swan theory of economic growth. The results indicate that vertical fiscal gap has a negative and significant long-term impact on regional economic growth while vertical fiscal imbalance has a positive and significant long-term effect. The study is consistent with the modern theory of fiscal federalism, W.E. Oates’ matching hypothesis and previous empirical work using Russian data. The study also found evidence of conditional convergence of regional economies.
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Donguiz, Renebeth G. "The Perspective Of The Cordilleran People On The Political, Economic And Socio-Cultural Advantages Of Federalism." Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education (TURCOMAT) 12, no. 4 (April 11, 2021): 1481–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.17762/turcomat.v12i4.1388.
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The government's ideal focus is to prioritize the citizenry's welfare when they intend to implement governance changes. This would include sustainable political, social, and economic development. In terms of political development, the officials must have a robust value system that motivates them to pursue equality, peace, justice, and overall development and implement policies against hostility and abuse. In terms of social development, the country must pursue the advancement of education, health, culture, information, and the environment. In terms of economic, the government must promote trade, employment, investment, infrastructure, technology, and inclusive growth. And Federalism is recently perceived in the Philippines as an ideal form of governance to eliminate dissidence in the country.
Federalism is being scrutinized in the Philippines since it has advantages, as observed among first-world countries like the USA, Australia, and Canada and developing countries like Mexico, India, and Brazil. Among these advantages include political advantages in which the regions or states could act independently in constitutionally drawn governance areas. Several social and economic drivers include technology, employment, and efficient use of resources pressing the government to change governance. These would require the regions or states to immediately cope with changes that confront them without relying on the government's bureaucratic system. In this manner, the government becomes closer to the constituents, allowing them to govern themselves, rule based on their own beliefs, culture, and joint problems, and pursue their advancement. For example, the states could issue licenses, provide for public health, conduct elections and form local governments, and look after intra-state trade (Tayeb, 2016).
This paper aims to measure the level of agreement of the constituents in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) on the political, social, and economic advantages of Federalism. Moreover, this paper provides theoretical contributions on Federalism since there has been limited literature on Federalism in the Philippines. The study would also provide empirical evidence and findings on Federalism's advantages, particularly in the case of the Cordillera Administrative Region.
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Garzarelli, Giampaolo. "Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Organizational Design Problems, and Tiebout." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 22, no. 1 (April 1, 2004): 91–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569204x15668904587133.
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Abstract This work intends to contribute to the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism that studies fiscal federalism through contemporary economic and industrial organization theory. First, it establishes context by introducing the two classic motivations in support of federalism, namely, incentives and knowledge. Second, it succinctly discusses the incentive-based organizational approach of the SGT. Third, it shows that the Tiebout model already embeds an organizational approach, which instead rests on a knowledge motivation.
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Kong, Hoi. "Toward A Federal Legal Theory of the City." McGill Law Journal 57, no. 3 (May 4, 2012): 473–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1009065ar.
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This paper offers a federal legal theory of the city. Debates about federalism give rise to questions of economic efficiency, regulatory coordination, and democratic legitimacy that arise in circumstances where political authority is divided, typically along overlapping geographic lines. Furthermore, particularly in the legal academy, federalism debates tend to raise questions of institutional design, including some that involve the configurations of legislative or administrative bodies. This paper will offer an account of cities that addresses these kinds of questions. Part I will present debates in the local government law literature between localists and regionalists and show that they sound in the language of federalism. The underlying theoretical claims of the positions in those debates will be subject to close examination. Part II will argue for a particular kind of institution that accommodates and is responsive to the range of concerns expressed in the localist-regionalist debate. Part II will further argue that British Columbia’s regional district system resolves many of the contested issues in the localist-regionalist debate and that that system can be conceived of in federalism terms.
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Faggini, Marisa, and Anna Parziale. "Fitness Landscape and Tax Planning: NK Model for Fiscal Federalism." International Journal of Economics and Finance 9, no. 7 (June 2, 2017): 14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v9n7p14.
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This paper rises from the idea to highlight how traditional models of Fiscal Federalism are not be able to capture adequately the behavioral dynamics of economic systems. We stress the innovative aspects of complexity theory and the premises on which to base the analysis of Fiscal Federalism in this perspective. For this purpose, we consider Fiscal Federalism as a network of economic relationships between different complex adaptive and co-evolving systems, the jurisdictions, linked by strong interdependencies. We will proceed to model a landscape in which co-evolving jurisdictions have to find the optimal path to organize the local tax planning and to optimize their local economy.
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Tzagkarakis, Stylianos Ioannis. "The role of federalism in European integration in the context of contemporary multifaceted challenges." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 8, no. 8 (August 11, 2021): 76–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.88.10585.
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Federalism is a theory which has largely affected the European integration process and it remains important today. From the financial crisis and the requests for the creation either of Eurobonds or of a unified banking sector, to the current health crisis and the request for a common health policy approach and a common recovery mechanism for the elimination of the negative economic and social consequences of the pandemic, the theoretical and empirical discussion about the direction that European integration should follow are yet active. In this essay we will firstly outline some basic aspects of the theory of federalism as well as a brief comparison with other theories and secondly, we conduct an analysis on the contemporary importance of federalism. Accordingly, an evaluation of the theory with real examples-challenges offers lucrative ground in order to reach some tentative conclusions on the current and future role of federalism to the European integration process.
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Bell, David, and David Eiser. "The economic case for further fiscal decentralisation to Scotland: theoretical and empirical perspectives." National Institute Economic Review 233 (August 2015): R27—R36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002795011523300104.
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This paper examines the background to calls for further fiscal decentralisation in Scotland in the light of theories of fiscal federalism. In particular, it examines whether spatial differences in preferences, which are central to ‘first generation’ theories of fiscal federalism can be argued to play a central role in the case for granting Scotland further tax and spending powers. ‘Second generation’ theories of fiscal federalism draw attention to the political economy of allocating tax powers to different levels of government. Some of the authors in this strand of theory argue that the case for allocating tax powers to subnational governments can be made in terms of ‘accountability’ – the notion that local politicians can be better held to account for the outcomes of policy actions. Our empirical analysis suggests that there is no clear difference in preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK along a number of key political dimensions. However, the Scottish parliament enjoys substantially higher levels of trust among the Scottish electorate than does the UK parliament.
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Oates, Wallace E. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism." Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 1120–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.3.1120.
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This paper is a selective survey of fiscal federalism. It begins with a brief review and some reflections on the traditional theory of fiscal federalism: the assignment of functions to levels of government, the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization, and the use of fiscal instruments. It then explores a series of important topics that are the subject of current research: laboratory federalism, interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism, the political economy of fiscal federalism, market-preserving federalism, and fiscal decentralization in the developing and transitional economies.
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Antić, Dinka. "Fiscal Coordinationasthe Key Issue for Functioning Fiscal Federalisam in Multi-Level Countries / Fiskalna koordincija kao ključni faktor funkcioniranja fiskalnog federalizma u složenim državama." Годишњак факултета правних наука - АПЕИРОН 4, no. 4 (July 30, 2014): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.7251/gfp1404168a.
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According to theory of fiscal federalism the optimum efficiency of the government sector can be ensured only by balancing the degree of centralization and decentralization of fiscal responsibilities between the central and local governments, where a fair distribution of income and economic stability can be provided by the central government, and the efficient use of resources by the local governments. Comparative analysis of the effects of the fiscal decentralization process in the world showed that a different balance of power between central and local governments can threaten the macroeconomic stability of complex countries. In conditions of week central government and strong regional governments, which is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fiscal coordination between governments becomes a critical issue of functioning fiscal federalism in complex countries. Theoreticians of the new theory of fiscal federalism, called ‘a second generation theory’, believe that it is necessary to establish an institutional structure that will ensure smooth functioning of fiscal federalism. In that sense fiscal coordination between levels of government is seen as a key tool for running prudent fiscal management in complex countries that can bring the fiscal policy of middle levels of government in line with national fiscal goals.
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Breton, Albert. "Towards a theory of competitive federalism." European Journal of Political Economy 3, no. 1-2 (January 1987): 263–329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(87)80014-9.
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Baykov, Andrey A. "Economic Regionalism as a Planetary Phenomenon. Theory And Methodology of Comparison." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 10, no. 4 (November 28, 2017): 38–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-4-38-53.
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Nowadays integration could be considered as worldwide-political phenomenon with its multielement structure. The growing integratedness allows the little and medium states to build a constructive conversation with important players, equalize the growth rates, life quality as well as to contribute to settlement of international conflicts. This article deals with the theory and methodology of Economic Integration in Europe. The author investigates the roots of integration processes in after-war period in Europe. With establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 the integration became a key element of international policy. The author revises the evolution of the Integration theory from implementing of “federalism” term till development of comparative integration area in international relations science. The author used original foreign and Russian sources for preparing the current article.
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Gamper, Anna. "A “Global Theory of Federalism”: The Nature and Challenges of a Federal State." German Law Journal 6, no. 10 (October 1, 2005): 1297–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200014334.
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Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.
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Kaufman, Allen, and Ernie Englander. "Behavioral Economics, Federalism, and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory." Journal of Business Ethics 102, no. 3 (February 25, 2011): 421–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0822-0.
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Van den Bergh, Roger. "Farewell Utopia?" Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23, no. 6 (December 2016): 937–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1023263x1602300603.
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Following the Brexit vote, the European Union (EU) is experiencing a deep institutional crisis. The economic theory of federalism may explain the causes of this crisis and suggest ways to overcome it. The core of the problem is that the EU has taken action in areas where it would have been preferable to leave the initiative to the Member States and that it has neglected to act in fields where the central level enjoys a comparative advantage compared to lower levels of government. The paper presents the economic criteria that may be used to decide the appropriate level of decision-making in a (quasi) federal union. It argues that political distortions have inhibited the use of these arguments and have consequently led to the current institutional crisis. Both market integration and the monetary union have become a goal in itself and are no longer connected to the original ambition of the Treaty to increase social welfare and guarantee a peaceful coexistence between the Member States. This article suggests a deregulation of market integration legislation and a reform of the Euro system, which are in conformity with the basic lessons of the economics of federalism.
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Thiessen, Ulrich. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Theory, Comparisons, Evaluations." Post-Soviet Affairs 22, no. 3 (January 2006): 189–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1060-586x.22.3.189.
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Oates, Wallace E. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism." International Tax and Public Finance 12, no. 4 (August 2005): 349–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-005-1619-9.
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Blais, André, Pierre Martin, and Richard Nadeau. "Attentes économiques et linguistiques et appui à la souveraineté du Québec: une analyse prospective et comparative." Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (December 1995): 637–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900019338.
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AbstractWhy are Quebeckers favourably disposed or opposed to sovereignty? This choice partly depends upon the prospective evaluation of the costs and benefits of sovereignty and federalism. What are the relative contributions of economic and linguistic expectations in this choice? Does the impact of these expectations vary according to the time horizon in which they are set? The authors approach these questions from the perspective of the economic theory of voting and with the help of original measures of the determinants of support for sovereignty. They compare expectations of what would occur to the economy and to the French language were Quebec to become a sovereign country with expectations of what would occur if Quebec remained a province of Canada. These measures are taken from a survey of university students. Our logistic regression analysis shows that the implicit calculation of costs and benefits plays a significant role in the choice between sovereignty and federalism, and that economic expectations influence the formation of opinion to a somewhat greater degree than do linguistic expectations. Moreover, medium-term expectations are more important than short-term economic expectations and more important than long-term expectations about the situation of the French language in Quebec.
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Mebane, Walter R. "Analyzing the Effects of Local Government Fiscal Activity I: Sampling Model and Basic Econometrics." Political Analysis 4 (1992): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/4.1.1.
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At the intersection of urban politics, fiscal federalism, and political economy in the United States, probably the most important theoretical development in political science in the past 15 years has been the argument put forth by Paul Peterson in City Limits (1981). Informed by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), and Lowi (1964), Peterson uses the incidence of local government taxes and spending to develop an interest-driven theory of federalism and local politics. Peterson proposes a typology of local government expenditures, based on the degree to which the expenditures tend to be directed toward above-average or below-average taxpayers. Peterson assumes that expenditures of the former kind are beneficial for local economic well-being, while expenditures of the latter sort are, in general, harmful. These two kinds of expenditures he refers to as, respectively, “developmental” and “redistributive.” Expenditures of neutral incidence, and according to Peterson also of neutral economic consequence, are referred to as “allocational” (1981, 34-46).
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Gervasoni, Carlos. "A Rentier Theory of Subnational Regimes: Fiscal Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Argentine Provinces." World Politics 62, no. 2 (March 23, 2010): 302–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887110000067.
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Levels of subnational democracy vary significantly within countries around the world. Drawing on fiscal theories of the state, the author argues that this variance is often explained by a type of rentierism that is not geographically determined by natural resources but politically created by certain fiscal federalism arrangements. He posits that less democratic regimes are more likely in rentier provinces—those that receive disproportionately large central government transfers and practically forgo local taxation. Intergovernmental revenue-sharing rules that produce large vertical fiscal imbalances and favor the economically smaller districts provide their incumbents with generous “fiscal federalism rents” that allow them to restrict democratic contestation and weaken checks and balances. Statistical evidence from a panel data set of the Argentine provinces strongly confirms this expectation, even after controlling for standard alternative explanations such as level of development. Sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is extremely robust to alternative panel estimators. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that the effect of heavy public spending on the economic autonomy of political actors is the main causal mechanism at work.
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Farukshin, M. "Ethno-Federalism: Russian and Foreign Discourse." World Economy and International Relations, no. 10 (2012): 40–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2012-10-40-51.
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The article considers different aspects of theory and practice of ethno-federalism disputed in the Russian and international political science. Special attention is given to such problems as advantages of ethnic federations and risks they create; ethno-federalism and realization of the right to self-determination, prevention and overcoming of ethnic conflicts and separatism.
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GARZARELLI, GIAMPAOLO, and LYNDAL KEETON. "Laboratory federalism and intergovernmental grants." Journal of Institutional Economics 14, no. 5 (December 28, 2017): 949–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000595.
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AbstractThis article contributes to an institutional economics analysis of the public economy by answering the following question: what is the role of intergovernmental grants in laboratory federalism? In line with factual evidence, the fiscal federalism literature on policy experimentation hints that grants can be employed to stimulate policy innovation through trial and error learning. Yet it lacks a theory of policy experimentation through grants, meaning that, in effect, we lack a fiscal theory of laboratory federalism. In the proposed approach, an intergovernmental grant is likened to a fiscal institution for political compromise between levels of government that frames policy experimentation options and constraints. At the same time, since policy solutions are not always easy to find or to implement, policy experimentation requires some degree of flexibility. Thus, the article shows that the extent of experimentation induced by a grant is influenced (or, more fashionably, nudged) by the conditionality attached to the grant. It argues, moreover, that if a grantor would like to induce more (less) experimentation, then, all other things equal, a grant with fewer (more) conditions attached should fare better than a grant with more (fewer) conditions attached.
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Bennett, R. J. "Tax Assignment in Multilevel Systems of Government: A Political-Economic Approach and the Case of Spain." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 5, no. 3 (September 1987): 267–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c050267.
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In this paper the question of tax assignment in multiple-level systems of government is addressed. Existing economic theory of fiscal federalism, which is the main source of information on tax assignment, is reviewed and various criticisms of this theory, as a normative theory, are outlined which indicate major difficulties in application to practice. Where a strong desire for decentralisation exists, such as in Spain, an alternative political-economic approach is suggested. This is then used to comment on developments in Spain where, it is concluded, the present assignment of taxing powers is insufficient to guarantee the autonomy of the regional governments. For Spain, regional access to a share of the VAT or personal income tax is suggested as the best option for tax reform in order to offer sufficient regional tax autonomy.
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Oates, Wallace E. "On The Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions." National Tax Journal 61, no. 2 (June 2008): 313–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2008.2.08.
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Joanis, Marcelin. "The Politics of Checkbook Federalism." Public Finance Review 46, no. 4 (December 14, 2016): 665–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142116679728.
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This article adopts the perspective of second-generation fiscal-federalism theory to provide an empirical assessment of Canada’s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In the context of the literature on the political economy of intergovernmental grant programs, it examines the influence of political considerations on the evolution of the Canadian fiscal arrangements under the Constitution Act of 1982. Fixed-effect regression results exploiting data from the 1982 to 2012 period show a statistically significant relationship between changes in both federal and provincial electoral variables and changes in a province’s total federal transfer revenues. Changes to social transfers appear to be more reactive to changes in the political environment than do changes in equalization transfers.
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Garman, Christopher, Stephan Haggard, and Eliza Willis. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with Latin American Cases." World Politics 53, no. 2 (January 2001): 205–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0002.
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Theories of fiscal federalism explain the efficiency and other economic gains from decentralization but do not explain its extent and nature in practice. The authors develop a political theory of decentralization that focuses on the lines of political accountability between politicians at different levels of government. The more accountable central-level politicians—presidents and legislators—are to subnational politicians, the greater the extent of decentralization and the more it will conform to the preferences of subnational politicians, for example, with respect to the degree of the center's discretion. The model is tested on five Latin American countries that, although formally decentralized, in fact exhibit wide differences in the distribution of spending and revenue responsibilities. The theory also helps explain a number of problems governments have encountered in decentralizing, including subnational debt crises and a mismatch between responsibilities and resources.
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Dafflon, B. "The Assignment of Functions to Decentralized Government: From Theory to Practice." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 10, no. 3 (September 1992): 283–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c100283.
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The question of why key academic economic arguments for the assignment of functions to decentralized government have not informed the political debate in Switzerland is examined in this paper. In the first section the most relevant theoretical factors of optimal government organization for service delivery are reviewed. A catalogue of criteria that have been debated in the Swiss context at both federal–cantonal and cantonal–local levels are covered in the second section. The main point is that the discussion is focused on rather different criteria from those noted in orthodox economic theory. The analysis of the causes and discrepancies between theory and practice permits a more general conclusion, addressed to fiscal federalism. The conclusion is that there is no general answer to how functions should be assigned to a particular level of government, as the solution depends upon the relevant value-judgments of the polity as well as the resources-use required to provide given services. The outcome is a set of proposals on how better procedures for the assignment of functions might be developed.
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Abbas, Kalbe. "Craig Burnside (ed.). Fiscal Sustainability in Theory and Practice: A Handbook. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. 2005. pp.xx+285. Price not given." Pakistan Development Review 43, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 295–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v43i3pp.295-297.
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Fiscal sustainability is essential for economic growth and comprises a set of fiscal policies that result in financial solvency over the long run. As such, fiscal sustainability is the prime objective of the World Bank’s Quality of Fiscal Adjustment Thematic Group (QFATG). It is a main issue in developing countries. The articles compiled from many journals here address fiscal sustainability analysis and the practical work undertaken by the Bank’s Development Economic Research Group (DECRG) or Poverty Reduction Economic Management undertaken by the Economic Policy Group (PRMEG) and others. This book, basically a combination of economic theory and practical methods of analysis, provides a simple set of tools to assess a government’s budget and debt position and is a comprehensive source of information on fiscal sustainability. It describes the effects of business cycles on public finance and examines the role of fiscal rule and currency crises and their impact on fiscal sustainability. Some basic concepts are explained, with solutions of complicated practical problems such as contingent liabilities, external debt position, and fiscal federalism.
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Yengibaryan, R. V. "Is There a Need for the Modernization of Russian Federalism and To What Extent?" Journal of Law and Administration, no. 3 (January 23, 2019): 3–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2073-8420-2018-3-48-3-10.
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Introduction. The issues of federalism theory, history, policy and practices have been the focus both in Russia and abroad over decades. Hundreds of books, thousands of research papers, lots of scientific conferences and seminars seem to have been dedicated to this problem. Yet we are still watching a burgeoning interest in this issue due to the increasing role of federalism in the reality of the modern world.Methods and Materials. The research involves such methods as logical analysis, systematic and comparative legal methods, etc.Research Outcomes. 1. The federal system of Russia, its political stability, sustainable nature of interfederal relations are the true facts, giving rise to necessity for the transition to a new model of federalism, which can prove to be more appropriate in terms of current economic and political environments prevailing in Russia.2. There is no doubt that the federal system of polity of the Russian Federation is justifed by legal, judicial, political and economic aspects, with no reasonable alternatives. The question is whether the existing principle of national and territorial structural organization of the Russian Federation is appropriate by now. There are persuasive arguments for the priority of the geographical and economic principle over the national and territorial division.3. The geographical and economic principle priority in the organization of modern Russia does not mean that specifc national and ethnic features of certain regions will be neglected.4. The geographical and economic principle priority in the organization of the Russian Federation will result in the consolidation of Russian entities and provide them with more extent of economic independence.Discussion and conclusion. It is obvious that from perspective of long-term development of Russia, the development of all Russian entities should be going at the same pace, which is not an easy task in the existing social, political and economic environments. The pace of development demonstrated by Moscow or Saint Petersburg Regions, or Tatarstan cannot be justly compared with those of Ingushetia or Dagestan. Indeed, the developed entities of the Russian Federation cannot endlessly donate to those lacking dynamics in their development. It is crystal clear that the modern day organization of the Russian Federation based on mere national and territorial grounds can hardly promote the equal development and integration of all Russian regions. Cultural and civilizational distinctions of certain entities should not lead to their isolation within one country and lagging behind national development.
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Kochetkov, V. V. "Constitutional issues of russian federalism." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 2 (June 15, 2016): 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls18154.
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This article addresses a problem of the form of government of Russia as a constitutional state. Even in the Russian political and legal thought in the second half of XIX - early XX century, the main debate was between supporters of federalization and the so-called autonomy of certain territories of Russia. The first thought that the Federation allows us to give a legal response to the challenges of nationalism and proletarian internationalism in the Bolshevik version. The latter believed that in the Russian Empire at that time there were no territory of equal size that could exist independently, and therefore to act as full-fledged subjects of the federation. Modern Russia, according to the 1993 Constitution, is a federal state. The concretization of the principles of Russian federalism performed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution in Art. 71, which sets out the objects of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian Federation; Art. 72, which lists the subjects of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Russian Federation, as well as in art. 73, which establishes that outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the RF power to the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the RF subjects of the Russian Federation shall possess full state power. However, the economic, social and political differentiation of regions that differ significantly from each other on the living conditions of citizens and labor rise to doubts aboutthe fairness of the existing system. Endowment of most subjects of the federation, and, consequently, their dependence on subsidies of the federal government, leaving no place for the realization of the interests of territorial public collectives living in the Federation. The current system of federal relations in modern Russia is more consistent with the concept of Russian jurists of the early twentieth century of autonomy than with federalism. And accordingly, it generates the same antinomy in the theory and the negative effects in practice. To overcome them must apply to the basic principles of constitutionalism as a form of legal: freedom and justice based on the recognition of equal human dignity. Federalism in a constitutional state is based on the totality of territorial public collectives having legal capacity. Therefore, no joint terms of jurisdiction of the center and subjects of federation in the federal constitutional state under Art. 72 of our Constitution cannot exist, since thereby seriously limit legal capacity of members of the federation.
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Dabrowski, Marek. "The future of the European Union: Towards a functional federalism." Acta Oeconomica 66, s1 (December 2016): 21–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.2016.66.s1.2.
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The series of adverse shocks of both economic and political character that Europe has suffered since 2008, the last of them coming from the Brexit referendum, revealed numerous institutional gaps and asymmetries in the EU integration architecture. They originate from the voluntary nature of the EU project and the necessity to obtain unanimous approval of all member states to take new integration steps. To increase the resilience of the EU project against current and future shocks, its major institutional gaps and asymmetries should be addressed as quickly as possible. In this paper, we use the theory of fiscal federalism and subsidiarity principle to set the agenda of the EU reform. This includes the identification of areas such as completing the EMU and Schengen projects, foreign, security, and defence policies, environmental and climate change policies where further integration can offer substantial returns to scale and better provisions of global and pan-European public goods. On the other hand, there are also areas such as agriculture policy, products, services and labour standards, and fiscal surveillance rules, where deregulation in favour of market forces could ease business environment and make EU regulations less bureaucratic. Developing integration beyond the traditional economic sphere will also have an impact on the size of the EU budget, balance of power between the EU governing bodies (a bigger role of the European Parliament) and the democratic legitimacy of the EU project.
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Shin, Geiguen, and Jeremy L. Hall. "Exploring the Influence of Federal Welfare Expenditures on State-Level New Economy Development Performance: Drawing From the Diffusion of Innovation Theory." Economic Development Quarterly 32, no. 3 (June 6, 2018): 242–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0891242418778115.
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Functional theory suggests that each level of government expands in the arena in which it can best perform, reducing the price of federalism. Focusing on the functional pattern of American federalism, we suggest that increased federal welfare spending increases state government performance in the “new economy” development policy areas by helping states minimize welfare costs and divert more own-source resources into economic development. The central focus is on the direct and indirect empirical relationships between federal welfare spending and state new economy performance. The authors use an index of innovation capacity that reflects the cumulative performance of a myriad of overlapping and mutually dependent state policies intended to bring about new economy development; this index measures state new economy development performance by focusing on the observable outputs of such polices rather than the adoption, implementation, or substance of individual policy choices. Mediating variables, such as state fiscal comfort and administrative capacity, measure the indirect impact of federal welfare spending on state new economy performance. The authors find that federal welfare spending stimulates state new economy development directly, but also indirectly through its positive impact on both state fiscal comfort and administrative capacity. The findings suggest that federal intergovernmental transfers continue to be an important policy mechanism with spillover effects for state economies.
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Biehl, D. "Optimal Decentralization—A Conceptual Approach to the Reform of German Federalism." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 7, no. 4 (December 1989): 375–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c070375.
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In the Federal Republic of Germany a tendency towards centralization can be identified. As it is difficult to decide whether this tendency increases or decreases welfare, a conceptual framework is developed that is based on an extended notion of costs in that it also allows a comparison of political with economic costs in the traditional sense. This approach allows the conceptual determination of an optimal degree of centralization/decentralization that depends on preference costs of citizens on the one hand [for instance, the costs of violated (‘frustrated’) values by a more centralized system] and resource costs (which increase with decentralization) on the other. This analysis also comprises as intermediate steps the derivation of certain principles that are elements of the theory of fiscal federalism.
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Youn, Ik Joong, and Bernhard Seliger. "A Critical Review of Existing Approaches to Siberia: Relevance to Siberian Economic Development." International Studies Review 6, no. 2 (September 28, 2005): 101–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-00602006.
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Russia went through major political and economic changes in the 1990s. Siberia, historically a resource-colony, also began autonomous economic development. However, economic development did not succeed as planned and resulted in total failure. Siberia still holds the same meaning to Russia, as a colony that provides natural resources. But the exploitation of Siberia's rich resources is not enough to entice policymakers and scientists to develop Siberia until it reaches its full economic potential. This leads to a concentration of research in the economic analysis of resources, energy, transport, environment, agriculture, and forestry. The focus on institutional transformation is very typical in the discussion about Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia's transformation, while micro-institutional analyses remain silent about Siberia. Emerging research on fiscal federalism and regionalization in Russia can provide basic elements of a micro-institutional theory, but elements such as a framework for education, local administration, and infrastructure are still wanting.
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Macey, Jonathan R. "Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism." Virginia Law Review 76, no. 2 (March 1990): 265. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1073203.
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Longaker, Mark Garrett. "Timothy Dwight's Rhetorical Ideology of Taste in Federalist Connecticut." Rhetorica 19, no. 1 (2001): 93–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.2001.19.1.93.
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Recent histories of early American rhetoric have not contextualized the rhetorics studied sufficiently, resulting particularly in an ahistorical portrait of Timothy Dwight as a “civic rhetor”. This essay situates Dwight's rhetorical theory in the political, social, and economic environment of early America. Particularly, it argues that Dwight's ideas about rhetoric, morality, politics, and theology were all tied together by his conception of “taste”, and in his career as a public minister, as a teacher at Yale, and as an active political figure in eighteenth-century Connecticut, Dwight pushed an ideology of taste that supported early American Federalism.
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Stark, Oded. "A Theory of Migration as a Response to Relative Deprivation." German Economic Review 1, no. 2 (May 1, 2000): 131–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00008.
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Abstract We model migration as a response to relative deprivation. We present a specific configuration of incomes in which the process of migration in response to relative deprivation reaches a steady state. However, for the general configuration of incomes we show that it is impossible to prove the existence of a steady state. We study the social welfare implications of the two cases and show that if individuals are left to pursue their betterment, the resulting state falls short of the best social outcome. We present several implications of the model including federalism and the demand for secession.
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Boadway, Robin, and Katherine Cuff. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 50, no. 5 (December 2017): 1348–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/caje.12301.
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Marciano, Alain. "The origins of Buchanan's views on federalism, Chicago 1946–1947." Journal of Institutional Economics 16, no. 3 (December 26, 2019): 319–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137419000742.
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AbstractBuchanan's first writings about federalism and fiscal justice were “'Federalism’: One Barrier to Labor Mobility” and “A Theory of Financial Balance in a Federal State,” two term papers that he wrote before his dissertation and that have never been discussed before. Studying them allows us to complete the recent literature on the origins of Buchanan's fiscal federalism. We show that most of Buchanan's ideas about fiscal equity were already in these works, and also that Buchanan made other claims and used other arguments – about mobility, for instance – that were absent from the dissertation but remained important to him for a long time. We also analyze these essays in the context in which Buchanan was at that time, namely the economics department of the University of Chicago. We show how Buchanan fed on, not to say was influenced by, the courses for which he wrote these essays. This allows us to shed new light on the role Theodore Schultz, D. Gale Johnson, Henry Simons, and Roy Blough, played at the beginning of Buchanan's career.
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Sikora, Justyna. "How to solve the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?" Przegląd Europejski, no. 4-2017 (March 25, 2018): 58–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/1641-2478pe.4.17.3.
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The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area (EA) highlighted shortcomings of its institutional framework – establishment of a monetary union without a central fiscal policy. Although the economic governance in the EA was substantially reformed in the aftermath of the crisis to address its weaknesses, further reforms including some elements of fiscal union are needed to increase resilience of the Economic and Monetary Union to shocks and prevent emergence of economic and financial distress in the future. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, the article analyses potential institutional reforms aimed at solving the sovereign debt crisis in the EA and indicates which proposals are desired and possible to implement. The research method used is a descriptive analysis of reforms proposed in the literature. In the article, the following reform proposals were assessed: the Debt Redemption Fund, European bonds, assigning the European Central Bank the role of the lender of last resort and a fiscal union with an EA fiscal capacity.
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Schwager, Robert. "The Theory of Administrative Federalism: An Alternative to Fiscal Centralization and Decentralization." Public Finance Review 27, no. 3 (May 1999): 282–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/109114219902700303.
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Zhao, Huiyu, and Robert Percival. "Comparative Environmental Federalism: Subsidiarity and Central Regulation in the United States and China." Transnational Environmental Law 6, no. 3 (August 2, 2017): 531–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2047102517000206.
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AbstractThe proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.
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Vigvári, A. "Is the conflict container full? Problems of fiscal sustainability at the local government level in Hungary." Acta Oeconomica 60, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 49–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/aoecon.60.2010.1.4.
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The paper discusses the reasons and possible resolutions of the contradictions in the Hungarian local government system, and proposes methods to resolve them. The nature of the Hungarian system cannot be described by classical normative theories of fiscal federalism. The operation of Hungarian local governments is determined rather by the decentralisation of conflicts stemming from the reduction of state responsibilities, and the resulting municipal behaviour. The second generation theory of fiscal federalism pays particular attention to the institutional guarantees of fiscal discipline shown by the lower levels of government sector. Actors in the Hungarian system, a system that functions as a ‘conflict container’, try to offset the financial pressures, weighing heavily on them by borrowing and by contingent liabilities. While central government has transferred new duties to local governments from year to year, it has reduced the amount of fiscal subsidies. Until a long-term comprehensive reform is implemented, consequent risks must be treated in the short run, as well.
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Danilovich, Alex, and Huda S. Abdulrahman. "Aiming at Secession." UKH Journal of Social Sciences 1, no. 1 (December 29, 2017): 48–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.25079/ukhjss.v1n1y2017.pp48-59.
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This study addresses the issue of sub-national units’ activism in the international arena, using the case of the Iraqi Kurdistan federal region. The prevailing view in the literature is that the increasing involvement of sub-state entities in international relations is caused by globalization and growing economic interdependence. We argue that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been extremely active in the international arena, primarily, to secure a favorable international image and gain support for recognition in pursuit of a secessionist agenda. To prove our argument, we generated data through interviews with KRG officials, politicians and Kurdish intellectuals and used secondary data, such as official documents, newspaper reports, statistics and public speeches. Our findings suggest that the KRG has methodically acted to garner international support for its secessionist plans. This conclusion may add to the theory of federalism and paradiplomacy by suggesting that strong political motives may be also the underlying causes of sub-state units’ engagement in international relations, not only globalization and economic interdependence.
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Dave, Forum. "Municipal finance analysis: The case study of Gujarat (India)." Public and Municipal Finance 9, no. 1 (January 4, 2021): 70–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/pmf.09(1).2020.07.
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This paper theoretically underpins the idea of greater involvement of local governments in the overall development of India explained through the theory of Fiscal Federalism. The theory outlines the dynamics of decentralization of power and functions through a multi-layered governance system leading to a new structure and added functions, finance, and accountability to local government. The paper also provides an overview of the increasing role of urban local governments in India and investigates whether the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) of Gujarat – a state in India, are efficient to perform the functions and responsibilities assigned to them by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA). It scrutinizes the financial health of local governments in the urban regions of India. The results based on the application of MANOVA indicate that the 74th CAA empowered ULBs with a strong economic base that these ULBs are capable of mobilizing their own resources. This means that smaller municipalities must develop and convergence must be supported by a proportionate level of grants. This will ensure that with the development of social infrastructure, economic activities will increase, and, as a result, the conversion will occur.
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Gimpelson, Vladimir, and Daniel Treisman. "Fiscal Games and Public Employment: A Theory with Evidence from Russia." World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 145–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0003.
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Why do some governments—both in different countries and in regions within those countries—employ more workers than others? Existing theories focus on the level of economic development, political redistribution, and social insurance. But they raise additional puzzles and do not account for all evidence or for a global trend toward decentralization of public employment. The authors propose a new theory, inspired by Russia's recent experience, that locates one motive for subnational public employment growth in a political and fiscal game between central and subnational governments. In countries with weak legal systems, local and regional officials may deliberately set their employment levels beyond their fiscal capacity, prompting bailouts from the central government, which fears the political cost to it if wage arrears accumulate and provoke strikes. The authors model the logic of such brinkmanship, derive several propositions, and show that they—and the model's assumptions—fit empirical evidence from Russia in the 1990s. Deficiencies of that country's overstaffed, underequipped, irregularly paid, ineffective, and strikeprone public sector appear to result in part from a system of dysfunctional incentives created by the interaction of electoral pressures with the system of fiscal federalism. The authors suggest parallels with Latin American countries such as Argentina and Brazil.
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Belousova, Svetlana. "Issues of building a model of a single executive vertical based on cooperative federalism in the aspect of municipal administration." SHS Web of Conferences 110 (2021): 01036. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111001036.
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Despite the fact that the theory of endogenous growth states that economic growth is mainly the result of endogenous rather than external forces, however, the theory assigns the greatest role in this growth to investment in human capital, innovation, knowledge, etc. Because of this, the greatest attention in the aspect of economic development of territories is given to the nature of the implementation of national projects as locomotives of growth. However, their implementation at the regional and local level is hindered by the extreme lack of preparation of local and regional management in the field of their own project and organizational activities, as well as clear interaction among themselves. The solution to this problem is associated with a new stage of local self-government reform aimed at building a model of a single executive vertical based on cooperative federalism. In the article, the author analyses two main trends in the development of this model: management centralization and cooperation. It is established that centralization has affected all aspects and directions of the implementation of power, while the problem of cooperation and coordination of actions of individual branches, spheres and levels of government remains. The task is set, and certain steps are identified to implement a complementary combination of centralization and cooperation or coordination of actions at different levels of management.
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Uhoda, Maxime. "Which competences for sub-national jurisdictions and how to finance them? The economic theory of fiscal federalism from the foundations to nowadays." Journal of Social and Economic Development 22, no. 1 (May 5, 2020): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40847-020-00099-w.
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