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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Economics ; Law

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Academic literature on the topic 'Economics ; Law'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 7 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Hylton, Keith N. "Law and economics versus economic analysis of law." European Journal of Law and Economics 48, no. 1 (2018): 77–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-018-9580-0.

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HARNAY, SOPHIE, and ALAIN MARCIANO. "POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM “LAW AND ECONOMICS” TO AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 31, no. 2 (2009): 215–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837209090208.

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Jackson, J. "Global economics and international economic law." Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 1 (1998): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/1.1.1.

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Mercuro, Nicholas. "Research in Law and Economics: Normative Law and Economics." Journal of Economic Issues 20, no. 4 (1986): 1146–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.1986.11504584.

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Bodkhe, Naresh. "Law and Economics." Artha Vijnana: Journal of The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics 53, no. 4 (2011): 439. http://dx.doi.org/10.21648/arthavij/2011/v53/i4/117551.

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Ostas, Daniel T. "LAW & ECONOMICS." Journal of Legal Studies Education 15, no. 1 (1997): 14–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1722.1997.tb00058.x.

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Cross, Frank B. "Law versus Economics?" Law & Social Inquiry 17, no. 04 (1992): 653–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1992.tb00633.x.

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Stigler, George J. "Law or Economics?" Journal of Law and Economics 35, no. 2 (1992): 455–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467262.

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Schäfer, Hans-Bernd. "Law and economics." European Journal of Political Economy 7, no. 3 (1991): 419–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(91)90025-x.

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McGuire, A. "Law and economics." International Review of Law and Economics 10, no. 2 (1990): 211–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(90)90025-o.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Russell, Phillip Byron. "Law and economics : an economic and legal analysis of US antitrust." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/29530.

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Okulicz, Danisz. "Essays in law and economics." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/667985.

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En esta tesis se investigará el rol de la información asimétrica en el mercado de los servicios legales. En particular, se estudiará cómo los agentes individuales desinformados interactúan con abogados y agentes corporativos en el sistema de justicia civil. En el capítulo 1, se estudiará el problema clásico de negociaciones previas al juicio entre el demandante, quien está desinformado sobre el resultado del potencial juicio, y el demandado, que es capaz de predecirlo. Contribuyo a las fuentes ya existentes, proponiendo que el demandante contrate un abogado para recibir consejos no vinculantes, no verificables durante la negociación. Me parece que el resultado de la negociación depende en gran medida de si el abogado o el demandante están más dispuestos a resolver el caso mediante un juicio. Además, muestro que, aunque un contrato que alinea perfectamente los incentivos del demandante y el abogado es siempre factible, nunca es óptimo. Si el valor esperado de la compensación es alto, entonces el contrato óptimo es un salario por hora. En caso contrario, un contrato de tarifa contingente sería el indicado. En el capítulo 2, analizo cómo influyen las inquietudes profesionales en la elección de los agentes económicos sobre los casos realizados. Por ejemplo, cómo influyen estas en la decisión de un abogado sobre escoger o no un caso. Propongo un modelo en el que un agente caracterizado por su nivel de habilidad decide si realizar una tarea de dificultad aleatoria. Comparo el funcionamiento de un agente superior y el de uno menor. El agente superior está principalmente interesado en el pago monetario, pero el agente menor, le preocupa también la opinión del mercado sobre su nivel de habilidad. El mercado observa el resultado del caso, pero no su dificultad. Demuestro que el agente menor se enfrenta a un compromiso entre aparentar éxito mediante la elección de casos fáciles y aparentar experiencia completando todos los casos que recibe. Típicamente, la segunda impresión persiste, y el agente menor realiza más tareas que un agente superior. Propongo que el pago monetario del agente se determine de forma endógena mediante contratación con un principal. Demuestro que el principal está en mejores condiciones cuando se enfrenta con un agente menor, ya que es capaz de explotar sus inquietudes profesionales y reducir el precio ofrecido. En el capítulo 3, estudio cómo se forman las demandas por litigios colectivos, y cómo el demandado puede intervenir en el proceso. En los litigios colectivos, el resultado del juicio depende del número de litigantes. Propongo un modelo dinámico de litigio, en el que el demandado se enfrenta a la llegada de los demandantes con el tiempo. Demuestro que cuando todos demandantes deciden estratégicamente sobre la presentación de la demanda y la resolución del caso, el demandado puede evitar completamente la formación de un colectivo. Sin embargo, si algunos demandantes se unen exógenamente al colectivo y el demandado mantiene información privada sobre el alcance del daño, entonces las negociaciones previas al juicio con los demandantes estratégicos pueden fallar, y el litigio colectivo puede tener éxito. Analizo el papel de acuerdos secretos en este contexto. Demuestro que la disponibilidad de acuerdos secretos perjudica el proceso de aprendizaje de algunos demandantes y disminuye sus pagos. Además, el demandado, puede también perder en la disponibilidad de acuerdos privados.<br>In this thesis, I investigate the role of information asymmetries on the market for legal services. In particular, I study how uninformed individual agents interact with lawyers and corporate agents in the civil justice system. In Chapter 1 I study a classical problem of pretrial negotiations between a plaintiff who is uninformed about the outcome of a potential trial and a defendant who is able to predict it. I contribute to the existing body of the literature by allowing the plaintiff to contract an attorney and receive unbinding, unverifiable advice during the negotiation. I find that the outcome of the negotiation strongly depends on whether the attorney or the plaintiff are more willing to resolve the case by a trial. Moreover, I show that even though a contract that perfectly aligns the incentives of the plaintiff and the attorney is always feasible, it is never optimal. If the expected value of the compensation is high then the optimal contract is an hourly wage. In the opposite scenario, a contingent fee contract is optimal. In Chapter 2 I analyze how career concerns influence the economic agents' choice of performed tasks. For example, how they influence a lawyer's decision on whether to take a case. I propose a model in which an agent characterized by a skill level decides whether to perform a task of random difficulty. I compare the behavior of a senior and a junior agent. A senior agent is primary interested in the monetary pay-off, but the junior agent is also concerned with the market's belief about his skill level. The market observes the outcome of the task, but not its difficulty. I show that a junior agent faces a trade-off between appearing successful by cherry-picking only the simplest tasks and appearing experienced by performing any task received. Typically the second effect prevails and a junior agent performs more tasks than a senior agent. I allow for the monetary payoff of the agent to be endogenously determined by contracting with a principal. I show that the principal is better-off when dealing with a junior agent, since she is able to exploit his career-concerns and cut the offered price. In Chapter 3 I study how the collective litigation suits are formed, and how the defendants can interfere in this process. In collective litigations the outcome of the trial depends on the number of litigants. I propose a dynamic model of litigation in which a defendant faces the arrival of plaintiffs over time. I show that when all plaintiffs strategically decide on filing the suit and settling the case, the defendant can completely avoid the formation of a collective. However, if some plaintiffs exogenously join the collective and the defendant holds private information about the scope of the harm then pretrial negotiations with strategic plaintiffs may fail, and the collective litigation may succeed. I analyze the role of secret settlements in this context. I show that availability of private settlements harms the learning process of some plaintiffs and diminishes their payoffs. Moreover, the defendant may also lose on the availability of private settlements.

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Givati, Yehonatan. "Essays in Law and Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10782.

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Part I examines the consequences of an organizational reform in Israel that transferred the responsibility for housing arrestees from the police to the prison authority. Using the staggered introduction of the reform in different regions of the country, we show that the reform led to an increase in the number of arrests and to a decrease in the number of reported crimes, with effects concentrated in more minor crimes. The reform also led to a decrease in the quality of arrests, measured by the likelihood of indictment following an arrest. These findings are consistent with the idea that the reform externalized the cost of housing arrestees from the Police's perspective, and therefore led to an increase in police activity. Part II examines why some countries mandate a long maternity leave, while others mandate only a short one. We incorporate into a standard mandated-benefit model social tolerance of gender-based discrimination, showing that the less tolerant a society is of gender-based discrimination, the longer the maternity leave it will mandate. Relying on recent research in psychology and linguistics we collected new data on the number of gender-differentiated personal pronouns across languages to capture societies' attitudes toward gender-based discrimination. We first confirm, using within-country language variation, that our linguistic measure is correlated with attitudes toward gender-based discrimination. Then, using cross-country data on length of maternity leave we find a strong correlation between our language-based measure of attitudes and the length of maternity leave. Part III examines why plea bargaining is commonly employed in some countries, while its use is heavily restricted in others. I develop a model in which a social planner, who minimizes the social harms from punishing the innocent and not punishing the guilty, decides on the optimal scope of plea bargaining. The model shows that a lower social emphasis on ensuring that innocent individuals are not punished leads to a greater use of plea bargaining. Using new cross-country data on social preferences for punishing the innocent versus not punishing the guilty and a new coding of plea bargaining regimes, I find results that are consistent with the model's prediction.<br>Economics

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Yang, Crystal Siming. "Essays in Law and Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10834.

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This dissertation consists of three papers relating to the field of Law and Economics. The first two papers examine the impact of increased judicial discretion on both racial disparities and inter-judge disparities in the federal criminal justice system. The third paper analyzes the effects of OSHA programs on workplace safety, wages, and employment. The common thread throughout this work is a focus on how legal actors and institutions affect substantive outcomes of individuals.<br>Economics

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Graham, Bradley J. "Essays in law and economics." Connect to online resource, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3303824.

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Miller, Alan Daniel McAfee R. Preston McAfee R. Preston. "Essays on law and economics /." Diss., Pasadena, Calif. : California Institute of Technology, 2009. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292009-171353.

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Zimmermann, Claus D. "Essays on the law and economics of international economic dispute settlement." Paris 1, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA010047.

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Faisant appel à des cadres méthodologiques d'économie du droit et d'économie politique, cette thèse en quatre articles entreprend une analyse de différents aspects clés du règlement des différends économiques internationaux, tout particulièrement du règlement des différends tel qu'entrepris sous les auspices de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC). Les aspects clés ainsi analysés concernent la décision des parties signataires d'un traité international d'accorder ou de refuser le droit de porter plainte à des personnes privées, leur choix de l'arsenal de contre-mesures ainsi que des détails relatifs aux mécanismes de mise en œuvre. L'article 1 analyse les fondements économiques du pouvoir que possèdent les gouvernements des pays membres de l'OMC de s'interposer en tant que filtres politiques ex ante de potentiels litiges, tout en contrastant cette analyse avec ce que l'on peut observer dans le domaine des investissements étrangers. L'article 2 se penche sur un thème d'économie du droit plus« classique» en démontrant que, même s'il n'a pas été conçu expressément pour encourager la rupture efficiente des obligations contenues dans les accords de l'OMC, le mécanisme actuel de règlement des différends à l'OMC facilite, de facto, le non-respect temporaire du droit de l'OMC. L'article 3 examine les principales alternatives à des mesures de rétorsion en tant que mesures de dernier recours. L'article 4 identifie les déficits de l'analyse conventionnel de pourquoi le système de règlement des différends à l'OMC n'a pas été équipé de mesures correctives rétrospectives mais seulement prospectives.

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Chang, Philip Se-Hun. "Sociological economic analysis of law : a theoretical framework for understanding the correlative aspects of law and economics." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.429552.

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Wohlschlegel, Ansgar. "The economics of corporate bankruptcy law." [S.l. : s.n.], 2002. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=96600664X.

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Lem, Jacklin Chou. "Essays in empirical law and economics/." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62398.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2010.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>This dissertation, which is a collection of three essays, uses empirical methods to study questions at the intersection of law and economics. The first chapter, co-authored with Joshua Fischman, explores how supervision by an administrative appeals court, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), influences the exercise of discretion of lower court immigration judges in asylum cases. The second chapter studies whether career concerns influence judicial decision-making within the context of asylum adjudication in immigration courts. The final chapter investigates how expansions in the right to counsel impacted criminal defendants, with particular focus on the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Gideon vs. Wainwright.<br>by Jacklin Chou Lem.<br>Ph.D.

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Books on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Thomas, Ulen, ed. Law & economics. 5th ed. Pearson Education, Inc., 2008.

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Thomas, Ulen, ed. Law & economics. 6th ed. Prentice Hall, 2012.

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Harrison, Jeffrey L. Law and economics. W.W. Norton & Co., 2008.

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Cooter, Robert. Law and economics. HarperCollins publ, 1988.

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Law and economics. Oxford University Press, 2010.

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Cooter, Robert. Law and economics. HarperCollins, 1988.

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Thomas, Ulen, ed. Law and economics. 4th ed. Pearson Addison Wesley, 2004.

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Cooter, Robert. Law and economics. Scott, Foresman, 1988.

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Bradley, Ian. Economics of law. Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Kershaw, Rowley Charles, Tullock Gordon, and Tullock Gordon, eds. Law and economics. Liberty Fund, 2005.

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Book chapters on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Friedman, David. "Law and Economics." In The World of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_47.

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Friedman, David. "Law and Economics." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_693.

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Friedman, David. "Law and Economics." In The Invisible Hand. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20313-0_21.

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Friedman, David. "Law and Economics." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_693-1.

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Hanson, Jon, Kathleen Hanson, and Melissa Hart. "Law and Economics." In A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444320114.ch19.

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Salvador Coderch, Pablo, and Antoni Terra Ibáñez. "Law and Economics." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer New York, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_284-1.

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Salvador Coderch, Pablo, and Antoni Terra Ibáñez. "Law and Economics." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_284.

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Rao, P. K. "Law and Economics." In The Economics of Transaction Costs. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230597686_6.

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Salvador Coderch, Pablo, and Antoni Terra Ibáñez. "Law and Economics." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer New York, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_284-2.

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Garoupa, Nuno. "Law and Economics and Economic Design." In The Future of Economic Design. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_56.

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Conference papers on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Sugianto, Fajar, Stevinell Mildova, and Felicia Christina Simeon. "Increasing Economic Performance Through the Rule of Law in Indonesia: Law and Economics Perspective." In International Conference on Law, Economics and Health (ICLEH 2020). Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200513.019.

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Zirnstein, Elizabeta. "Legal Aspects of Employees Copyright at University." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.1.

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Repas, Martina. "Reproduction of Copyrighted Works at Universities, Compensation and Collective Management." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.2.

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Krajnc, Saša. "Copyright Exceptions for Education." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.3.

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Bogataj Jančič, Maja. "Great Expectations and Even Greater Dissapointmets: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.4.

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Krapež, Katarina. "Contemporary Market of Scientific Journals: In the Grip of Non-transparent Business Models and Compromises in Quality." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.5.

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Primec, Andreja, and Igor Perko. "Predicting the Successfulness of Students at the University of Maribor – Myth or Reality?" In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.6.

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Keresteš, Tomaž. "Academic Plagiarism." In IXth Conference Law and Economics. University of Maribor Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/978-961-286-115-5.7.

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Bortnikov, S. P. "Law Of The Digital Economy: Law Corpus Vs Economics Animus." In Global Challenges and Prospects of The Modern Economic Development. European Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.04.02.201.

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Suryoutomo, Markus, and Sri Purwaningsih. "Immaterial Compensation in Tort Law Acts Judge Made Law Through Rechsvinding." In International Conference on Law, Economics and Health (ICLEH 2020). Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200513.095.

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Reports on the topic "Economics ; Law"

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Jolls, Christine. Behavioral Law and Economics. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12879.

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Donohue, John. The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11631.

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Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Welfare Economics, Morality and the Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9700.

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Djankov, Simeon, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11883.

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Phung, D. L. Theory and evidence for using the economy-of-scale law in power plant economics. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/6304295.

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Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. Economic Analysis of Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6960.

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Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9483.

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Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9694.

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Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Property Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9695.

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Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Contract Law. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9696.

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