Academic literature on the topic 'Elections Elections Approximation theory'

Submitted by João Vitor Granja de Almeida (joaov.granja@gmail.com) on 2015-06-26T14:17:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoGranja_DissertacaoEPGE.pdf: 491088 bytes, checksum: 6b308d5edc8ccc344f8fbbfb2b5ced15 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-06-30T14:06:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoGranja_DissertacaoEPGE.pdf: 491088 bytes, checksum: 6b308d5edc8ccc344f8fbbfb2b5ced15 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-07-03T17:33:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoGranja_DissertacaoEPGE.pdf: 491088 bytes, checksum: 6b308d5edc8ccc344f8fbbfb2b5ced15 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-03T17:33:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoGranja_DissertacaoEPGE.pdf: 491088 bytes, checksum: 6b308d5edc8ccc344f8fbbfb2b5ced15 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-30<br>Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.<br>In this paper, I develop and analyze a two-period model where two politicians compete for the preference of a representative voter, who knows how benevolent one of the politicians is but is imperfectly informed about the benevolence of the second politician. The known politician is interpreted to be a long time incumbent, whilst the unknown politician is taken to represent a lesser known challenger. I show how the incentive provision mechanism inherent in elections - which arises through the possibility of voting an incumbent out of offi ce - and information acquisition considerations by the voter combine to determine that in any equilibrium of the game the voter chooses the unknown politician in the initial period of the model - an action referred to as experimentation -, thus providing a rationale for voting long time incumbents out of offi ce. Speci cally, I show that the voter's decision over whom to elect in the initial period boils down to a comparison of the informational benefi ts of choosing the unknown politician and the economic losses of doing so. The former, which captures information acquisition concerns, is shown to be positive, whereas the latter, which captures incentive provision, is shown to be non-positive, implying that it is always optimal for the voter to choose the unknown politician.

Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few. —George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman (1903) This thesis consists of three essays in the field of empirical political economy. The topics addressed in these essays are very diverse, as are the historico-institutional settings. What they share is the quantitative analysis of election results and – at least in the author’s opinion – the inquiry of relevant research questions about political attitudes and institutions. This gives the dissertation its title “No Ordinary Elections”. Chapter one looks at the effect of war service on political attitudes. I analyse the impact of WWI veterans on changes in electoral support for Germany’s antidemocratic right after 1918. In order to quantify the effect, I construct the first disaggregate estimates of German WWI veterans since official army records were destroyed. I combine this data with a new panel of voting results from 1881 to 1933. Differences-in-Differences estimates show that war participation had a strong positive effect on support for the right-wing at the expense of socialist parties. A one standard deviation increase in veteran inflow shifted voting patterns to the right by more than 2%. My findings are robust to a number of checks including an IV identification strategy based on draft exemption rules. The effect of veterans on voting is highly persistent and strongest in working class areas. Gains for the right-wing, however, are only observed after a time period of communist insurgencies. I argue that veterans’ impact is consistent with the spread of a popular anti-communist conspiracy theory, the stab-in-the-back myth. I provide suggestive evidence that veterans must have picked this idea up during wartime, injected it into the working class and facilitated the rise of right-wing parties. The second chapter documents evidence on how election fraud in authoritarian regimes can be used by lower-tier officials to cast signals about their loyalty or competence to the central government. I exploit a radical policy change in Russia in 2004 which allowed the president to replace governors of the country’s 89 regions at his own will. As a result, federal elections after 2004 were organised by two types of governors: one was handpicked by the president, the other one elected before the law change and re-appointed. Even though both types faced removal in case of bad results, the need to signal loyalty was much lower for the first type. In order to estimate the effect of handpicked governors on electoral fraud, I use a diff-in-diff framework over 7 federal elections between 2000 and 2012. For this time period, I construct a new indicator of suspicious votes for each region which correlates strongly with incidents of reported fraud. My baseline estimates show that in territories with a handpicked governor the share of suspicious votes decreased by more than 10% on average and dropped even further if the region’s economy had done well over the past legislature. These findings suggest that officials have less need to use rigging as a signal once loyalty is assured unless faced circumstances raising doubts about their competence. Finally, chapter three studies the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986 and voters’ response in West Germany. The analysis uses a diff-in-diff estimation which exploits variation in proximity to the nearest nuclear power plant (NPP) across 301 counties. Proximity is used as proxy for the shock from perceived risk of a nuclear accident. Using data over a time period of almost 40 years and 11 elections, my results indicate that living closer to an NPP increased polarisation and benefited anti- but even more pro-nuclear parties. While gains of Greens are shown to be similar across social groups and therefore in line with home-voter effects, the increase of conservatives runs counter to most expectations. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect on conservatives is far stronger in areas with an above-median share of adolescents in their impressionable years and of higher average education. I argue that this can be explained by differences in assessing the economic losses from exiting nuclear power over the risk of a nuclear accident after the disaster. Using variation in the scheduling of state elections, I can also show that the pro-nuclear response was stronger in counties which did not vote in the immediate aftermath of Chernobyl leaving more time for a rational electoral choice.

More research is needed to be able to fully understand the role that social media plays in elections, specifically in local elections. Candidates need to understand how it works and how they can effectively use this new communication medium. By exploring Diffusion of Innovation Theory, Social Information Processing Theory, and the Two-Way Symmetrical Model of communications this study sought to answer one overarching question: how should a candidate employ social media in a local election? This qualitative, single case study explores the 2014 recall and general election in Yorba Linda, California. Councilman Tom Lindsey and candidate Matt Palmer are the primary subjects of study. Observations were made through analysis of documentation, interviews, and participant and direct observation. The researcher was employed as the campaign manager for both Lindsey's and Palmer's campaigns. The findings support the use of social media in local campaigns on a case by case basis. Determining use depends on the demographics of the voters and the abilities of the candidate. The data suggests that social media needs to be part of comprehensive strategy that includes traditional communication tools. Observations from the case study illustrate the need for candidates to engage in two-way communication that is monitored and regulated. This study begins to establish social media as a tool that candidates can use to inexpensively reach voters in a way that showcases the candidate's personality and allows them to connect on a personal level with constituents. Social media will play a role in politics at all levels.

This thesis examines the unique set of circumstances which led to the rapid rise of a supposed right-wing populist party in Sweden. The Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) are not the first nationalist party to enter the Swedish parliament, but are the first to survive multiple parliamentary elections and are currently the third largest party in parliament. This thesis argues the Sverigedemokraterna do not constitute a political party, but remain a populist movement within Swedish politics, are not right-wing but rather a lagom-inspired hybrid, and the stabilizing effects of the culture of lagom prevents the permanence of extremism in Swedish politics. The increase in immigrants from predominantly Muslim states due to the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war stoke the anti-Islamic rhetoric of this nationalist group, but did not cause their rapid ascent and neither did the entry of Sweden into the European Economic Community. The Sverigedemokraterna are a single-point culmination of a century of nationalist and fascist groups splitting and merging within Sweden, but as other groups continue to appear the SD cannot be the only culmination.<br>Master of Arts