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Journal articles on the topic 'Electoral Systems'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 10 March 2023

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1

Birch, Sarah. "Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct." Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 12 (September 17, 2007): 1533–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006292886.

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This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.

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Pappalardo, Adriano. "Electoral Systems, Party Systems." Party Politics 13, no. 6 (November 2007): 721–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068807080084.

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3

Frosini, Tommaso Edoardo. "Una ley electoral que protege la bipolaridad y favorece la gobernabilidad = An electoral law that protects and promotes bipolarity governance." Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, no. 34 (July 1, 2014): 425. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/trc.34.2014.14092.

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Hay muchos sistemas electorales en el mundo; en realidad, cada país tiene el suyo. Sin duda, Italia tiene también derecho a tener su propio sistema electoral, y no han faltado soluciones, comenzando con la restauración del sistema mayoritario, por ejemplo. Lo importante es que sea un sistema electoral destinado a favorecer la formación de mayorías y un Gobierno elegido y legitimado mediante el voto de los electores. Representación y gobernabilidad: estos son los objetivosThere are many electoral systems around the world; actually, each country has its own. Without a doubt, Italy also is entitled to have its own electoral system, and it doesn’t lack solutions, starting with the restoration of the majoritarian system, for example. The important thing is that there should be an electoral system destined to promote the formation of a majority and government chosen and legitimated by voter. Representation and governability, these are the goals

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Garrote de Marcos, María. "Circunscripciones de baja magnitud y proporcionalidad en Europa: una panorámica selectiva." Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, no. 45 (April 3, 2020): 451. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/trc.45.2020.27142.

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Este trabajo describe los sistemas electorales de Irlanda, Suiza y Portugal. Estos tres países, al igual que España, comparten la utilización de circunscripciones reducidas en el marco de un sistema electoral proporcional. Sin embargo, cada uno emplea una modalidad de voto diferente, circunstancia que ayuda a comprender la importancia de este elemento en el funcionamiento de los sistemas electorales. El análisis del marco legal, su evolución y los rendimientos políticos nos ofrece una valiosa información sobre modelos electorales distintos que pueden servir de referencia para valorar algunos aspectos problemáticos del sistema electoral español.This paper describes the electoral systems of Ireland, Switzerland and Portugal. These three countries, like Spain, share the use of low magnitude constituencies within the framework of a proportional electoral system. However, each uses a different ballot structure, a circumstance that helps to understand the relevance of this element in the functioning of electoral systems. The analysis of the legal framework, its evolution and political performance offers us valuable information on different electoral models which can serve as a reference to assess some problematic aspects of the Spanish electoral system.

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5

Teorell, Jan, and Catharina Lindstedt. "Measuring Electoral Systems." Political Research Quarterly 63, no. 2 (November 10, 2009): 434–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912909349630.

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6

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. "Designing electoral systems." Electoral Studies 8, no. 1 (April 1989): 49–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(89)90021-8.

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7

Watts, Duncan. "Comparing electoral systems." Representation 35, no. 2-3 (June 1998): 175–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344899808523035.

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8

Borooah, Vani K. "The Proportionality of Electoral Systems: Electoral Welfare and Electoral Inequality." Economics and Politics 14, no. 1 (January 2002): 83–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00101.

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9

Michalak, Bartłomiej. "Mixed Electoral Systems: A Hybrid or a New Family of Electoral Systems?" World Political Science 12, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wps-2015-0012.

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AbstractThe main research question posed in the article is whether the mixed electoral systems are separate third class of electoral systems? Although, they were primarily designed as a tool for implementing completely contradictory objectives of the majoritarian and proportional representation, as a consequence, they created fully new quality, which cannot be reduced to the sum of effects being produced by their components. Reasons for this include, among others, their genesis and political purpose (the desire to combine the best features and characteristics of the majoritarian and proportional systems into one system), mechanics (multi-formula and multiple-tiered seat allocation mechanism), multiplicity of variants and detailed technical solutions (presence or lack of mandate transfer and/or of vote transfer between majoritarian and proportional subsystems). The distinctiveness of mixed electoral systems is, however, determined primarily by self-relevant political consequences generated within strategies of nominating party candidates (the number of candidates listed within single-mandate constituencies of the majority part has a positive effect on the party’s results in proportional subsystem), electorate voting behaviors (the psychological effect is acting on voters toward honest and not strategic voting), the level of disproportionality of election results (the mixed system are in general less proportional than traditional systems of proportional representation, however, they are more proportional than the majoritarian voting systems) and the degree of party dispersion (the mixed systems are usually correlated with three-body format of the party system).

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10

Golosov, Grigorii V. "Party systems, electoral systems, and legislative fragmentation." Party Politics 23, no. 5 (September 22, 2015): 487–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815603624.

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Using electoral data from a nearly comprehensive set of the world’s electoral democracies (1992–2014), including 131 independent countries and one non-sovereign territory, this article develops an explanatory model of legislative fragmentation that incorporates electoral fragmentation, the territorial patterns of party support, district magnitude, specific electoral system effects, and the balance of personal and party vote components within the incentive structures generated by electoral rules. The analysis proves that there is a strong negative association between the territorial homogeneity of the vote and legislative fragmentation, and shows that those varieties of electoral rules that increase the salience of personal component in party-centred elections tend to enhance legislative fragmentation. Due to its statistical properties, the model allows for establishing the impact of each of the factors, as well as their relative weights, with a high degree of certainty.

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11

Siaroff, Alan. "Spurious majorities, electoral systems and electoral system change." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (July 2003): 143–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040412331310131.

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12

Schakel, Arjan H., and Régis Dandoy. "Electoral Cycles and Turnout in Multilevel Electoral Systems." West European Politics 37, no. 3 (April 28, 2014): 605–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.895526.

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13

Tremblay, Manon. "The Politics of Electoral Systems." Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 236–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423907070199.

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The Politics of Electoral Systems, Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. xxvi, 662.The Politics of Electoral Systems is the most recent and thorough work currently available on electoral systems. There is, of course, The Handbook of Electoral Choice (Josep M. Colomer, ed., London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) but this work focuses more specifically on the issue of electoral reform in relation to democratization. The Politics of Electoral Systems covers a wide variety of electoral systems from theoretical and empirical perspectives—and it does so excellently. This brand new work is destined to become no less than the bible of electoral systems.

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14

Hanish, Shak Bernard. "WESTERN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS APPLIED." International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research 5, no. 10 (October 30, 2020): 3094–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.46609/ijsser.2020.v05i10.019.

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15

Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems." American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 531–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963173.

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Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select “representative” legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the “representativeness” of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system—voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy—we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.

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Hanish, Shak Bernard. "WESTERN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS APPLIED ." International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 4 (April 30, 2021): 1376–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.46609/ijsser.2021.v06i04.018.

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17

Russo, Giuseppe, and Francesco Salsano. "Electoral systems and immigration." European Journal of Political Economy 60 (December 2019): 101807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.07.005.

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18

Blais, André, and Kees Aarts. "Electoral Systems and Turnout." Acta Politica 41, no. 2 (June 20, 2006): 180–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500148.

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19

Zimmerman, Joseph F. "Alternative local electoral systems." National Civic Review 79, no. 1 (January 1990): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4100790104.

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20

Umeda, Michio. "District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties." Japanese Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (May 18, 2021): 57–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109921000074.

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AbstractThis paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

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21

Usova, V. А. "MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM." Вестник Пермского университета. Политология 15, no. 1 (2021): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2021-1-19-34.

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Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism.

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22

Bochsler, Daniel. "BENDING THE RULES: ELECTORAL STRATEGIES UNDER MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Representation 51, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 261–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2015.1064223.

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23

Carey, John M., and Simon Hix. "The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems." American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (February 2011): 383–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00495.x.

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24

PEKKANEN, ROBERT, BENJAMIN NYBLADE, and ELLIS S. KRAUSS. "Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan." American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 183–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055406062095.

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How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

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25

Gallego, Maria, and Norman Schofield. "The Convergence Coefficient across Political Systems." Scientific World Journal 2013 (2013): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/653035.

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Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves atthe electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient,c. It has been shown that high values ofcimply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move.

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Khudoley, D. M., and K. M. Khudoley. "FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ELECTORAL LAW AS IMPLEMENTED IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Вестник Пермского университета. Юридические науки, no. 49 (2020): 442–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/1995-4190-2020-49-442-475.

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Introduction: the article analyzes the fundamental principles of electoral law and how they are implemented in various electoral systems. Purpose: to identify the objective criteria a democratic electoral system must meet. Methods: along with general scientific methods, there have been used specific scientific methods, including comparative legal and systemic ones. Results: there have been identified three principles of electoral law that can be recognized as fundamental: the principles of equal, free, and fair election. They mutually presuppose, guarantee, and supplement each other. Moreover, provisions of one principle can be corrected by provisions of the others. Thus, the principles of equal, free and fair election form an integral sustainable system whose elements are in a dialectical unity. These principles cover all the subjects of electoral law and electoral process and they must be followed at each stage of elections. Furthermore, they are complex and include provisions of a number of secondary principles (the principles of universal, equal, direct suffrage in a secret ballot, etc.). Conclusions: the above principles are implemented to the greatest extent in ranked voting. Some ranked voting systems ensure proportional representation of parties. Elections held based on such voting assure free and equal participation of both independent and party candidates. Many other majoritarian, proportional or mixed-member electoral systems do not meet the abovementioned criteria.

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27

Oktyabrskiy, R. D. "Risks of the Electoral Systems." Issues of Risk Analysis 18, no. 1 (February 25, 2021): 10–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.32686/1812-5220-2021-18-1-10-15.

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The article examines the existing electoral systems for the election of top officials of the state. Based on historical experience and analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the systems, an attempt is made to identify the most preferable election model for Russian conditions that meets modern democratic principles. The requirements for such a model are formulated for a possible competition over the best solution and one of the options is proposed in which the risks of conflict situations are minimized.

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Hikmet Sami, TÜRK. "ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND TURKISH EXPERIENCE." Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 43, no. 1 (1993): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1501/hukfak_0000000738.

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29

Reilly, Ben. "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies." Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 156–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0029.

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30

Rule, Wilma. "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems." PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 4 (December 1994): 689. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/420369.

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31

KAPUR, J. N., C. R. BECTOR, and UMA KUMAR. "Mathematical Modelling of Electoral Systems." Teaching Mathematics and its Applications 6, no. 4 (1987): 184–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/teamat/6.4.184.

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32

BRADY, DAVID, and JONGRYN MO. "Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice." Comparative Political Studies 24, no. 4 (January 1992): 405–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414092024004001.

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This article shows how the ruling party of Korea, the DJP, chose and implemented a strategy to win the 13th National Assembly election of 1988 and explains why that strategy failed. In addition, this election is analyzed in a more general context. The authors find, for example that the preference of a party over electoral systems is determined by the spatial distribution of its votes and that the choice of an electoral system is the outcome of a bargaining process among the parties. In the context of democratization, the Korean experience shows that the democratic reform policies of an authoritarian government are shaped by the interplay between the ruling party's desire to create a political system wherein they maintain power and the constraints to create a system that would channel the opposition's activities into electoral or institutional outlets.

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33

Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 2 (May 1, 2002): 609–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355302753650346.

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34

Gassner, Marjorie, Darwin Ugarte Ontiveros, and Vincenzo Verardi. "Human Development and Electoral Systems." Journal of Human Development 7, no. 1 (March 2006): 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649880500501161.

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35

Lago, Ignacio, Sandra Bermúdez, Marc Guinjoan, Kelly Rowe, and Pablo Simón. "Party Mobilization and Electoral Systems." Government and Opposition 54, no. 1 (January 23, 2017): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.46.

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How party strategies vary by electoral system remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies diverge between districted electoral systems and systems using a single national district. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts or the strength of parties’ local organizations. Our results show that only the frequency of visits to districts by large parties are clearly affected by electoral systems and, more specifically, by the number of districts and district population.

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36

Gallagher, Michael. "Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems." Electoral Studies 10, no. 1 (March 1991): 33–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(91)90004-c.

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37

Aboal, Diego. "Electoral systems and economic growth." Economia Politica 37, no. 3 (May 21, 2020): 781–805. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-020-00185-6.

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38

Verardi, Vincenzo. "Electoral systems and income inequality." Economics Letters 86, no. 1 (January 2005): 7–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.05.001.

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39

Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gerrit Voerman. "Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection." Acta Politica 41, no. 2 (June 20, 2006): 146–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500153.

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40

Harfst, Philipp. "The Politics of Electoral Systems." Acta Politica 42, no. 4 (November 21, 2007): 466–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500196.

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41

Myerson, Roger B. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems." European Economic Review 43, no. 4-6 (April 1999): 671–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00089-0.

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42

Hunter, Lance Y., and Joseph W. Robbins. "Military Spending and Electoral Systems." Armed Forces & Society 42, no. 1 (December 12, 2014): 51–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x14559976.

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43

Rule, Wilma. "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems." PS: Political Science & Politics 27, no. 04 (December 1994): 689–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096500041731.

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44

Buckley, Fiona. "Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction." Irish Political Studies 27, no. 1 (February 2012): 168–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2012.636199.

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45

Thames, Frank C., and Martin S. Edwards. "Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 7 (September 2006): 905–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414005282383.

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The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed-member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

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46

BLAIS, ANDRE. "The classification of electoral systems." European Journal of Political Research 16, no. 1 (January 1988): 99–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1988.tb00143.x.

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47

Blais, André. "The Debate over Electoral Systems." International Political Science Review 12, no. 3 (July 1991): 239–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019251219101200304.

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48

Wlezien, Christopher, and Stuart N. Soroka. "Electoral Systems and Opinion Representation." Representation 51, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 273–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2015.1111928.

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49

Golosov, Grigorii V. "Electoral Systems and Territorial Representation." Representation 52, no. 2-3 (July 2, 2016): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2017.1287771.

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50

Blais, André, and Louis Massicotte. "Mixed electoral systems: An overview." Representation 33, no. 4 (March 1996): 115–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344899608522970.

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