Journal articles: 'Electricity market design'

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Cramton, Peter. "Electricity market design." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (2017): 589–612. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx041.

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Woo, C. K., and J. Zarnikau. "A nice electricity market design." Electricity Journal 32, no. 9 (November 2019): 106638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.106638.

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Ausubel, Lawrence M., and Peter Cramton. "Using forward markets to improve electricity market design." Utilities Policy 18, no. 4 (December 2010): 195–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2010.05.004.

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Piao, Longjian, Laurens de Vries, Mathijs de Weerdt, and Neil Yorke-Smith. "Electricity Markets for DC Distribution Systems: Design Options." Energies 12, no. 14 (July 10, 2019): 2640. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12142640.

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DC distribution systems (DCDSs) are a promising alternative to AC systems because they remove AC-DC conversions between renewable sources and loads. Their unique features compared to AC include low system inertia, strict power limits and power–voltage coupling. In a liberalised electricity market, merely applying an AC market design to a DCDS cannot guarantee the latter’s supply security and voltage stability; new markets must be designed to meet DC challenges. This article identifies the key design options of DCDS electricity markets. To identify these options, we develop a comprehensive design framework for local electricity markets; to our knowledge, we provide the first such analysis. Whereas previous studies focus on separate aspects of DCDS markets, we widen the scope to include the role of market architecture and investigate the arrangements of sub-markets. As an illustration, we demonstrate three promising DCDS market designs that can be defined in our framework, and provide a first assessment of their performance.

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Pownall, Thomas, Iain Soutar, and Catherine Mitchell. "Re-Designing GB’s Electricity Market Design: A Conceptual Framework Which Recognises the Value of Distributed Energy Resources." Energies 14, no. 4 (February 20, 2021): 1124. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14041124.

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The design of electricity markets determines the technologies, services and modes of operation that can access value, consequently shaping current and future electricity landscapes. This paper highlights that the efficacy of Great Britain’s electricity market design in facilitating net zero is inadequate and must be reconfigured. The rules of the current electricity market design are remnants of an electricity sector dominated by large-scale, centralised, fossil fuel technologies. Therefore, routes to market for the provision of necessary services to support net zero, not least flexibility, are largely inaccessible for distributed energy resources and, despite their benefits to the system, are thus undervalued. Based upon a review and consolidation of 30 proposed electricity market designs from liberalised electricity sectors, this paper proposes a new electricity market design for Great Britain. This design is presented alongside a new institutional framework to aid in the efficient operation of the market. Specifically, this paper proposes a new local balancing and coordinating market located at each grid supply point (the transmission and distribution interface). This is realised through the implementation of a distributed locational marginal pricing structure which is governed by the evolution of the current distributed network operator, known as the distributed service provider (DSP). The DSP also operates a local balancing and ancillary market for their geographical area. The wholesale market is reconfigured to coordinate with these new local markets and to harmonise the actors across the distribution and transmission network.

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Panfil, Michael, and Rama Zakaria. "Uncovering Wholesale Electricity Market Principles." Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law, no. 9.1 (2020): 145. http://dx.doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.9.1.uncovering.

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This paper examines, enunciates, and makes explicit a set of market principles historically relied upon by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate wholesale electricity markets as required under the Federal Power Act (FPA). These identified competitive market principles are supported by policy and legal foundations that run through a myriad of FERC orders and court decisions. This paper seeks to make that history and those implicit market principles explicit by distilling and organizing Commission Orders and court decisions. It concludes that five market principles, each with multiple subprinciples, can be identified as elemental to how FERC understands and implements its statutory authority. Clear articulation of these foundational principles should help guide engaged entities as wholesale power markets continue to evolve. Market Principle 1 states that wholesale market revenues should predominantly flow from well-designed energy and ancillary services markets. Market structures generally are found to be preferable to non-market structures. Moreover, energy and ancillary services markets, in relationship to wholesale capacity markets, are better able to efficiently promote a least-cost resource. Market Principle 2 states that when altering market design, FERC and Independent System Operators (ISOs) should focus on only those services that are clearly needed, and ensure that any market design change does not unduly discriminate between resources. Market design changes focused on technology-neutral and well-defined granular services will help ensure that the design change does not lead to undue discrimination or preference that effectively favors certain resources. When such an impact still occurs, strong evidence showing that the rules are not unreasonable and arbitrary and that no non-unduly discriminatory and preferential alternative exists must support the change. Market Principle 3 states that interventions that distort transparent and accurate pricing should be minimized. Out-of-market interventions, in particular, have the potential to distort price signals and undermine competition. Market Principle 4 states that FERC’s just and reasonable standard strongly favors rate decreasing outcomes. Markets are premised on the economic presumption that competition reduces prices, in furtherance of the just and reasonable standard. Market Principle 5 states that FERC and ISOs should facilitate and not undermine state public policy preferences. FERC and ISOs are not well-situated to serve as decision-makers in determining which state public policy preferences should be given effect. State public policy preferences that do not run afoul of FERC’s authority under the FPA should thus be given full effect.

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Olson, Mark, Stephen Rassenti, Mary Rigdon, and Vernon Smith. "Market Design and Human Trading Behavior in Electricity Markets." IIE Transactions 35, no. 9 (September 2003): 833–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07408170304406.

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Hogan, William W. "Virtual bidding and electricity market design." Electricity Journal 29, no. 5 (June 2016): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.05.009.

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Nelson, Tim, Fiona Orton, and Tony Chappel. "Decarbonisation and wholesale electricity market design." Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 62, no. 4 (July 31, 2018): 654–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8489.12275.

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Pereira, Guillermo Ivan, Patrícia Pereira da Silva, and Deborah Soule. "Assessment of electricity distribution business model and market design alternatives: Evidence for policy design." Energy & Environment 31, no. 1 (February 12, 2018): 40–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958305x18758248.

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The transition toward smart electricity distribution grids is transforming the European electricity sector. This has contributed to increased attention by policy makers regarding the future role of electricity distribution system operators in a more flexible, digital, and renewables-based electricity system. A better understanding on how to support the adaptation of the electricity distribution industry can contribute to the introduction of an effective policy framework. Our research provides evidence for policy design by presenting the results of a Policy Delphi study focused on business model and market design adaptation alternatives. We highlight the importance of supporting innovation and a more proactive approach to adaptation from both distribution system operators and regulators. Our findings support the importance of electricity distribution for neutral market facilitation, contributing to market development and enabling new market players. The results obtained support policy makers working on electricity sector adaptation and can contribute to the ongoing market redesign efforts under the Energy Union.

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MacGill, Iain, and Ryan Esplin. "End-to-end electricity market design - some lessons from the Australian National Electricity Market." Electricity Journal 33, no. 9 (November 2020): 106831. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2020.106831.

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Beus, Mateo, Ivan Pavić, Ivona Štritof, Tomislav Capuder, and Hrvoje Pandžić. "Electricity Market Design in Croatia within the European Electricity Market—Recommendations for Further Development." Energies 11, no. 2 (February 2, 2018): 346. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11020346.

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Vasin, Alexander, Polina Kartunova, and Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber. "Models for capacity and electricity market design." Central European Journal of Operations Research 21, no. 3 (August 19, 2012): 651–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10100-012-0259-2.

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Hogan, William W. "Multiple Market-Clearing Prices, Electricity Market Design and Price Manipulation." Electricity Journal 25, no. 4 (May 2012): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2012.04.014.

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Milgrom, Paul. "Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations." Annual Review of Economics 11, no. 1 (August 2, 2019): 383–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025818.

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Market design applies economic principles to the often messy problems of real-world exchange in which goods may not be homogeneous, the identities of trading partners may matter, contracts may not be executed, and even the formulation of trade as balancing supply and demand may be unhelpful. This article recounts the mostly academic research advancing the analysis and design of such markets. Among the highlighted applications are ones involving financial markets, Internet advertising, electricity auctions, spectrum auctions, cryptocurrencies, and combinatorial procurements.

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Wu, S. Q., Y. Z. Jiang, Z. X. Jing, and Z. Y. Chen. "Design of users’ electricity purchase packages for electricity sales companies in the electricity market." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 354 (October 25, 2019): 012087. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/354/1/012087.

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Ruiz, Pablo A., and George Gross. "Short-Term Resource Adequacy in Electricity Market Design." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 23, no. 3 (August 2008): 916–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2008.926094.

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van der Veen, Reinier A. C., and Rudi A. Hakvoort. "The electricity balancing market: Exploring the design challenge." Utilities Policy 43 (December 2016): 186–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.008.

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Hur, Jin, Dong-Joo Kang, Kyung-Soo Kook, Tai-Hyun Kim, Jeong-Ho Lee, and Young-Hwan Moon. "The Framework Design of an Electricity Market Simulator." IFAC Proceedings Volumes 36, no. 20 (September 2003): 653–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1474-6670(17)34544-5.

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Kaleta, Mariusz. "Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters." Central European Journal of Operations Research 28, no. 4 (August 19, 2019): 1291–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10100-019-00640-1.

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Abstract There are two pillars of sustainable development in the electricity sector: renewable energy and energy efficiency. Both can be addressed by a concept of electrical energy cluster, which is a local area power system that works towards self-balancing. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing the market mechanism for an electrical energy cluster. This task is complex and extensive with ill-defined constraints and criteria. Therefore, we propose the ARchitecture for Market Systems, a well-defined reference architecture that captures the entire design process and helps the designer to navigate through it. The contribution of the paper lies in structuring the cluster mechanism design problem through problem decomposition into several areas called views. Within this architecture, a mechanism is being designed by choosing parameters from the space of solutions, visualising the concept on different schemas, and applying simulation models for evaluation purposes. Based on our reference architecture, we also propose a decision support system (DSS) for the market designer. We prove the usefulness of the approach by implementing a part of the DSS concept and by presenting its application for exemplary cluster design processes.

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Bjørndal, Endre, Mette Bjørndal, Kjetil Midthun, and Asgeir Tomasgard. "Stochastic electricity dispatch: A challenge for market design." Energy 150 (May 2018): 992–1005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.02.055.

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O’Neill, Richard P., Emily Bartholomew Fisher, Benjamin F. Hobbs, and Ross Baldick. "Towards a complete real-time electricity market design." Journal of Regulatory Economics 34, no. 3 (May 13, 2008): 220–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-008-9062-3.

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23

Reinisch, W., and T. Tezuka. "Market Power and Trading Strategies on the Electricity Market: A Market Design View." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 21, no. 3 (August 2006): 1180–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2006.876675.

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Long, Li, Tianhai Yang, Qifen Li, Yongwen Yang, Lifei Song, and Tianjiao Wu. "Design of Distributed Electricity Trading Mechanism Based on Contract for Difference." E3S Web of Conferences 256 (2021): 01030. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125601030.

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A contract for difference is a medium and long-term financial contract, which can be used in the electricity market to lock the electricity price in advance and avoid the risk of electricity price fluctuations in the spot market. The construction of the domestic power spot market has just started. With the release of relevant policies and the gradual improvement of the market structure, it is urgent to design a corresponding trading mechanism to ensure the smooth transition of the market. The current day-ahead transactions, real-time transactions and other short-term transactions for distributed power generation, on the one hand power load forecasting, electricity price demand response and other related technologies need to be further improved, on the other hand due to the randomness and uncertainty of distributed energy, participating in the short-term spot market has large price fluctuations, which is not conducive to the stability of the electricity market, and it is also not conducive to the consumption of distributed energy. Aiming at the above problems, this paper uses the characteristics of CFDs to restrain market power to design a distributed energy trading mechanism to achieve the purpose of energy saving and emission reduction.

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de Souza, Waldemar, Carlos Heitor Campani, Martin Bohl, Rafael Palazzi, and Felipe de Oliveira. "Framework to structure the Brazilian electricity futures market." International Journal of Energy Sector Management 15, no. 5 (June 14, 2021): 914–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-04-2019-0011.

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Purpose This study aims to formulate a mechanism design in the derivatives market, summarizing a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market. Design/methodology/approach This exploratory study formulates a mechanism design in the derivatives market, summarizing a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market. Findings The results show a positive economic outcome for the creation of the Brazilian futures electricity market. Originality/value The main feature in this work is to summarize a framework to set up the Brazilian electricity futures market applying mechanism design, applicable in other countries. The features of the mechanism are the space of expected results (Z), the strategies to survey the environmental space (θ) and the mechanism design – messages space (M).

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Franco Cardona, Carlos Jaime, Mónica Castañeda Riascos, Alejandro Valencia Arias, and Jonathan Bermúdez Hernández. "The energy trilemma in the policy design of the electricity market." DYNA 82, no. 194 (December 21, 2015): 160–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/dyna.v82n194.48595.

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The energy "Trilemma" seeks to develop an electricity market which simultaneously ensures environmental quality, security of supply, and economic sustainability. The objective of this paper is to present the "Trilemma" energy as the latest trend in the design of energy policy. For this, a theoretical framework is presented in sections 2 and 3, in section 4 and 5 the importance of security of supply and economic sustainability are discussed, respectively. In section 6 the energy "trilemma" is presented, in section 7 a brief state of the art is showed. Finally in section 8, it is approached three different electricity markets. It is concluded that the regulator has passed in recent years from encouraging a liberalized market scheme, to promote a scheme based on intervention through policies that affect the market competitiveness but allow achieving its environmental goals.

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Kim, Seon-Gu, Seong-Il Hur, and Yeoung-Jin Chae. "Smart Grid and Its Implications for Electricity Market Design." Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.5370/jeet.2010.5.1.001.

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Newbery, David, Michael G. Pollitt, Robert A. Ritz, and Wadim Strielkowski. "Market design for a high-renewables European electricity system." Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 91 (August 2018): 695–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.04.025.

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Strbac, Goran, Dimitrios Papadaskalopoulos, Nikolaos Chrysanthopoulos, Ana Estanqueiro, Hugo Algarvio, Fernando Lopes, Laurens de Vries, et al. "Decarbonization of Electricity Systems in Europe: Market Design Challenges." IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 19, no. 1 (January 2021): 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mpe.2020.3033397.

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Chow, J. H., W. De Mello, and K. W. Cheung. "Electricity Market Design: An Integrated Approach to Reliability Assurance." Proceedings of the IEEE 93, no. 11 (November 2005): 1956–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2005.857493.

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Strbac, Goran, Dimitrios Papadaskalopoulos, Nikolaos Chrysanthopoulos, Ana Estanqueiro, Hugo Algarvio, Fernando Lopes, Laurens de Vries, et al. "Decarbonization of Electricity Systems in Europe: Market Design Challenges." IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 19, no. 1 (January 2021): 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mpe.2020.3033397.

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Dagoumas, Athanasios. "Impact of Bilateral Contracts on Wholesale Electricity Markets: In a Case Where a Market Participant Has Dominant Position." Applied Sciences 9, no. 3 (January 22, 2019): 382. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app9030382.

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This paper aims at tackling how the bilateral contracts affect wholesale electricity markets. It examines different levels of bilateral contracts among producers and demand aggregators, aiming to quantify their effect. In addition, it focuses on markets where bilateral contracts could be used as a tool by market participants with a dominant position. Further, the paper examined a case with asymmetrical portfolios, namely where a market participant has a dominant position as in case of Greece, aiming to investigate if bilateral contracts can be used as a tool to manipulate the market. The simulations have been done by an optimization model that provides the economic dispatch and clearing of the day-ahead electricity market. The model incorporated bilateral contracts with committed generating capacity from producers, as well as dynamic bidding strategy per market participant. Results provide useful insights on the design of electricity markets, especially in case of designing voluntary energy exchanges where a market participant has a dominant position.

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Grimm, Veronika, Bastian Rückel, Christian Sölch, and Gregor Zöttl. "The impact of market design on transmission and generation investment in electricity markets." Energy Economics 93 (January 2021): 104934. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104934.

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Rasouli, Mohammad, and Demosthenis Teneketzis. "Economizing the Uneconomic: Markets for Reliable, Sustainable, and Price Efficient Electricity." Sustainability 13, no. 8 (April 9, 2021): 4197. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13084197.

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Current electricity markets do not efficiently achieve policy targets i.e., sustainability, reliability, and price efficiency. Thus, there are debates on how to achieve these targets by using either market mechanisms e.g., carbon and capacity markets, or non-market mechanisms such as offer-caps, price-caps, and market-monitoring. At the same time, major industry changes including demand response management technologies and large scale batteries bring more elasticity to demand; such changes will impact the methodology needed to achieve the above mentioned targets. This work provides market solutions that capture all three policy targets simultaneously and take into account the above-mentioned industry changes. The proposed solutions are based on: (i) a model of electricity markets that captures all the above mentioned electricity policy targets; (ii) mechanism design and the development of a framework for design of efficient auctions with constraints (individual, joint homogeneous, and joint non-homogeneous). The results show that, within the context of the proposed model, all policy targets can be achieved efficiently by separate capacity and carbon markets in addition to efficient spot markets. The results also highlight that all three policy targets can be achieved without any offer-cap, price-cap, or market monitoring. Thus, within the context of the proposed model, they provide clear answers to the above-mentioned policy debates.

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Lüth, Alexandra, Jens Weibezahn, and Jan Martin Zepter. "On Distributional Effects in Local Electricity Market Designs—Evidence from a German Case Study." Energies 13, no. 8 (April 17, 2020): 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13081993.

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The European Commission’s call for energy communities has motivated academia to focus research on design and trading concepts of local electricity markets. The literature provides a wide range of conceptual ideas and analyses on the technical and economic framework of single market features such as peer-to-peer trading. The feasible, system-wide integration of energy communities into existing market structures requires, however, a set of legal adjustments to national regulation. In this paper, we test the implications of recently proposed market designs under the current rules in the context of the German market. The analysis is facilitated by a simplistic equilibrium model representing heterogeneous market participants in an energy community with their respective objectives. We find that, on the one hand, these proposed designs are financially unattractive to prosumers and consumers under the current regulatory framework. On the other hand, they even cause distributional effects within the community when local trade and self-consumption are exempt from taxes. To this end, we introduce a novel market design—Tech4all—that counterbalances these effects. With only few legal amendments, it allows for ownership and participation of renewable technologies for all community members independent of their property structure and affluence. Our presented analysis shows that this design has the potential to mitigate both distributional effects and the avoidance of system service charges, while simultaneously increasing end-user participation.

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Zhang, Chen, and Wei Yan. "Spot Market Mechanism Design for the Electricity Market in China Considering the Impact of a Contract Market." Energies 12, no. 6 (March 19, 2019): 1064. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12061064.

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To promote the reformation of the electricity market in China, a market mechanism that can support collaboration between the contract market and the upcoming spot market was designed in this paper. The focus of this paper was to develop a mechanism to institutionally stabilize the market by way of disciplining market power abuse through limiting arbitrage opportunities generated from multi-markets. To quantitatively describe the arbitrage opportunity, the arbitrage opportunity function (AOF) was defined. Based on inferences of the no-arbitrage principle and the AOF, a cost-based decomposition algorithm for contracts that could improve contract coverage was proposed. The incentive compatible settlement rule for the uncovered generation on the spot market was designed to properly manipulate the arbitrage opportunity. The decomposition algorithm and the settlement rule constituted the designed market mechanism. To verify the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism, the principles of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and payment cost minimization were employed to test the designed market mechanism based on the concept of dominant policy equilibrium. This test was conducted on a fictitious case based on the IEEE-14 system. The analysis and results may provide valuable insights on market design in China based on the functional correlation between the contract market and the spot market.

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Riesz, Jenny, Joel Gilmore, and Iain MacGill. "Frequency Control Ancillary Service Market Design: Insights from the Australian National Electricity Market." Electricity Journal 28, no. 3 (April 2015): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2015.03.006.

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Xin, Li, Zhaoqing Fu, Kangping Liu, Jiang Xu, and Baoming Ma. "Design of Evaluation Index System of Electric Power Multilateral Trading Market Operation." E3S Web of Conferences 252 (2021): 01029. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125201029.

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With the deepening of the reform of the electric power system and the continuous improvement of the demand level of electric power users, the psychological expectations of the market subjects have also undergone profound changes, and it is necessary to gradually strengthen and expand the key indicators and analysis dimensions that can reflect the operation situation of the electric power market, so as to adapt to the existing statistical analysis business needs. According to the current business content and demand of electricity market, this paper establishes a scientific and comprehensive evaluation index system of electricity market from the perspectives of market supply and demand, market structure, market behavior and market discipline. The system can reflect the development of power market comprehensively and objectively.

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Zhou, Zhi, Wai Kin Victor Chan, and Joe H. Chow. "Bidding behaviors in duopoly electricity markets with aspirant market share goals." SIMULATION 89, no. 11 (September 10, 2013): 1369–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037549713499248.

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MacGill, Iain. "Electricity market design for facilitating the integration of wind energy: Experience and prospects with the Australian National Electricity Market." Energy Policy 38, no. 7 (July 2010): 3180–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.047.

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Chen, Baike, Yuxia Rong, and Zhaoxia Jing. "Generation Revenue Regulation and Incentive Contract Design in Electricity Market." E3S Web of Conferences 252 (2021): 01009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202125201009.

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In order to curb market power, encourage investment and redistribute welfare, revenue regulation should be carried out in electricity market. The incentive contract represented by the Contract for Difference is a kind of regulation. This paper proposes a Government Authorized Contract based on Revenue Estimation Method (REM) from the perspective of regulating generation revenue. First, the principle and design of the Vesting Contract in Singapore electricity market is employed, analyzing its limitations in regulation. Then, the incentive contract based on REM is presented in four steps. Finally, the IEEE30 node classic system is adopted to demonstrate the proposed model, showing that it can promote generators to bid rationally.

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Kusumaningdyah, Widha, Tetsuo Tezuka, and Benjamin C. McLellan. "Investigating Preconditions for Sustainable Renewable Energy Product–Service Systems in Retail Electricity Markets." Energies 14, no. 7 (March 29, 2021): 1877. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14071877.

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Energy transitions are complex and involve interrelated changes in the socio-technical dimensions of society. One major barrier to renewable energy transitions is lock-in from the incumbent socio-technical regime. This study evaluates Energy Product–Service Systems (EPSS) as a renewable energy market mechanism. EPSS offer electricity service performance instead of energy products and appliances for household consumers. Through consumers buying the service, the provider company is enabled to choose, manage and control electrical appliances for best-matched service delivery. Given the heterogenous market players and future uncertainties, this study aims to identify the necessary conditions to achieve a sustainable renewable energy market. Simulation-Based Design for EPSS framework is implemented to assess various hypothetical market conditions’ impact on market efficiency in the short term and long term. The results reveal the specific market characteristics that have a higher chance of causing unexpected results. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates the advantage of implementing Simulation-Based Design for EPSS to design retail electricity markets for renewable energy under competing market mechanisms with heterogenous economic agents.

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Conejo, Antonio J., and Ramteen Sioshansi. "Rethinking restructured electricity market design: Lessons learned and future needs." International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 98 (June 2018): 520–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2017.12.014.

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Ringler, Philipp, Dogan Keles, and Wolf Fichtner. "How to benefit from a common European electricity market design." Energy Policy 101 (February 2017): 629–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.011.

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Bigerna, Simona, and Carlo Andrea Bollino. "Optimal Design for Hourly Electricity Price in the Italian Market." Atlantic Economic Journal 42, no. 1 (January 21, 2014): 111–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11293-013-9398-7.

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Brown, David P., and Derek E. H. Olmstead. "Measuring market power and the efficiency of Alberta's restructured electricity market: An energy‐only market design." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 50, no. 3 (July 8, 2017): 838–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/caje.12280.

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Wolff, Georg, and Stefan Feuerriegel. "Short-term dynamics of day-ahead and intraday electricity prices." International Journal of Energy Sector Management 11, no. 4 (November 6, 2017): 557–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijesm-05-2016-0009.

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Purpose Since the liberalization of electricity markets in the European Union, prices are subject to market dynamics. Hence, understanding the short-term drivers of electricity prices is of major interest to electricity companies and policymakers. Accordingly, this paper aims to study movements of prices in the combined German and Austrian electricity market. Design/methodology/approach This paper estimates an autoregressive model with exogenous variables (ARX) in a two-step procedure. In the first step, both time series, which inherently feature seasonality, are de-seasonalized, and in the second step, the influence of all model variables on the two dependent variables, i.e. the day-ahead and intraday European Power Energy Exchange prices, is measured. Findings The results reveal that the short-term market is largely driven by seasonality, consumer demand and short-term feed-ins from renewable energy sources. As a contribution to the existing body of literature, this paper specifically compares the price movements in day-ahead and intraday markets. In intraday markets, the influences of renewable energies are much stronger than in day-ahead markets, i.e. by 24.12 per cent for wind and 116.82 per cent for solar infeeds. Originality/value Knowledge on the price setting mechanism in the intraday market is particularly scarce. This paper contributes to existing research on this topic by deriving drivers in the intraday market and then contrasting them to the day-ahead market. A more thorough understanding is especially crucial for all stakeholders, who can use this knowledge to optimize their bidding strategies. Furthermore, the findings suggest policy implications for a more stable and efficient electricity market.

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Herrero, Ignacio, Pablo Rodilla, and Carlos Batlle. "Evolving Bidding Formats and Pricing Schemes in USA and Europe Day-Ahead Electricity Markets." Energies 13, no. 19 (September 24, 2020): 5020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13195020.

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This paper compares the evolution of USA and European power markets and evaluates the suitability and future challenges of their designs in the context of the transition to a low-carbon power system. The analysis focuses on bidding formats (the way in which organized electricity markets allow participants to express their operational constraints) and pricing schemes (how agents recover their short-term costs from market prices). The radical evolution of the power mixes worldwide already experienced in the last decade and the larger one to come, with even greater shares of renewable energy and a more prominent role for storage resources, exposes limitations in current market designs. We develop an in-depth and comprehensive review of best practices from both sides of the Atlantic, and learning from them, we draw recommendations to evolve these market design elements.

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Qamber, Isa Salman, and Mohamed Y. Al-Hamad. "Power System Market Planning." European Journal of Engineering Research and Science 4, no. 11 (November 6, 2019): 17–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejers.2019.4.11.1602.

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The loss of load expectation (LOLE) considered an acceptable security standard across most of the national electricity systems. In the present study, the LOLE is calculated. This means that the LOLE needs developing a model. The developed model serving to assesses the security of supply risks associated with the different electricity capacity margin levels, where the capacity margin is the level by which available electricity generation capacity exceeds the maximum expected level of demand. Then, the developed model updated on an annual basis. The annual update is helping to fulfill the Electricity Authority for planning, operation and control. The developed model will assess the system by calculating the capacity margin probability by combining both the generation and load models. The calculation of LOLE is an internationally accepted criterion in capacity adequacy. The results for the model of each region vary due to several factors, such as generation resource, load forecast, and forced outage rates (FOR). The estimation of the risk is economically optimal reserve margin to a number of case studies assumptions considered in the present study. The results help in future planning for the electric system operation and control. Furthermore, the study is helping to evaluate the implications of the obtained results for the electricity policy market to determine the best model for market design in the future.

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Phang, Sock-Yong. "The convergence of water, electricity and gas industries: Implications for PPP design and regulation." Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 21, no. 4 (November 6, 2020): 380–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1783591720970340.

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In several countries that have privatised their utilities, power and water are separate industries regulated by sector-specific regulators. In a parallel development, desalination has become an important source of water supply in countries where there is a shortage of cheap and clean freshwater. Where the energy source is gas, the use of gas-fired power plants to supply electricity for desalination links the water, electricity and gas industries. We use the case of the financial collapse of an integrated water and power project to illustrate the problems that can arise from such convergence, and to draw lessons for firms, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and regulators. A water company had successfully tendered to build a desalination plant for a water agency that would deliver an agreed volume of water per day for a 25-year period. The technology proposed was an integrated on-site power plant to supply electricity to the desalination plant as well as to the electricity grid. The business model was for profits from electricity sales to cross-subsidise water desalination costs. However, a combination of take-or-pay LNG contracts and low spot prices in a competitive electricity market led to deep operating losses. The reasons for the collapse of the business were neither technological nor operational but arose from failure to adequately manage the market risks arising from infrastructure convergence, competition, long-term rigid contractual arrangements and missing markets. The case highlights the importance of risk assessment at bidding stage and, in particular, the risks that a cross-subsidy can create. Viewed in this context, our recommendations are for regulatory convergence for converging infrastructure sectors, multi-sector risk assessments for PPP contracts, crafting flexible PPP contracts in anticipation of future adjustments, development of more liquid hedging markets and promoting competition where feasible in infrastructure sectors.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Electricity market design'

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