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1
diZerega, Gus. "Elites and Democratic Theory: Insights From the Self-Organizing Model." Review of Politics 53, no. 2 (1991): 340–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500014650.
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The role of elites within liberal democracy is a perennial issue. One reason why is an inappropriate theoretical conception of democracy. They are self-organizing systems rather than instrumental organizations. As such they have more in common systemically with science and the market than with democratic organizations or undemocratic states. Examining the role of elites within science and the market sheds light on how they work within democracies. Such an examination shows them to be both necessary and dangerous. Traditional “elitist” analyses of democracy suffer from confusions which the self-organizing model clears up. It also offers improvements on traditional “pluralist” conceptions.
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Tancher, Viktor V. "Neo-Elitist Theory in Light of Democratic Transformation and Ukrainian Realities." Sociological Research 39, no. 6 (November 2000): 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/sor1061-015439065.
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Garner, Robert. "Animal rights and the deliberative turn in democratic theory." European Journal of Political Theory 18, no. 3 (February 25, 2016): 309–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885116630937.
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Deliberative democracy has been castigated by those who regard it as exclusive and elitist because of its failure to take into account a range of structural inequalities existing within contemporary liberal democracies. As a result, it is suggested, deliberative arenas will merely reproduce these inequalities, advantaging the already powerful extolling mainstream worldviews excluding the interests of the less powerful and those expounding alternative worldviews. Moreover, the tactics employed by those excluded social movements seeking to right an injustice are typically those – involving various forms of protest and direct action – which are incompatible with the key characteristics of deliberatively democracy. This paper seeks to examine the case against deliberative democracy through the prism of animal rights. It will be argued that the critique of deliberative democracy, at least in the case of animal rights, is largely misplaced because it underestimates the rationalistic basis of animal rights philosophy, misunderstands the aspirational character of deliberative theory and mistakenly attributes problems that are not restricted to deliberation but result from interest group politics in general. It is further argued that this debate about the apparent incompatibility between the ideals of deliberative democracy and non-deliberative activism disguises the potential that deliberative democracy has for advocates of animal rights and, by extension, other social movements too.
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Shklar, Judith N. "Redeeming American Political Theory." American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962875.
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American political theory has been accused of being uniformly liberal; but its history is diverse and is worth studying to understand the development of political science and the institutions it reflects (representative government, federalism, judicial review, and slavery). While modern social science expresses a slow democratization of values, it has been compatible with many ideologies. This can be seen in Jefferson's anthropology, Madison's theory of collective rationality, and Hamilton's empirical political economy. Jacksonian democracy encouraged social history, while its opponents devised an elitist political sociology. Southern defenders of slavery were the earliest to develop a deterministic and authoritarian sociology, but after the Civil War Northern thinkers emulated them with Social Darwinism and quests for causal laws to grasp constant change in industrial society. Though social critics abounded, democratic empirical theory emerged in the universities only in the generation of Merriam and Dewey, who founded contemporary political science.
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Crane, Sam. "The Problem of Power in Confucian Political Thought." Comparative Political Theory 1, no. 1 (June 16, 2021): 117–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26669773-01010008.
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Abstract In this brief reflection on Shaun O’Dwyer’s book, Confucianism’s Prospects, I accept his central arguments regarding the implausibility of “Confucian democracy,” and I suggest a further reason for the inapplicability of Confucianism as a perfectionist doctrine for modern pluralistic East Asian societies. Beyond the elitist paternalism that is the focus of O’Dwyer’s analysis, I suggest that Confucianism’s theory of power, as illustrated by reference to the Mencius and the Analects, is insufficient to the task of constituting and reproducing modern democratic practice. Thus, for democracy to develop in East Asia, it must be grounded in liberalism.
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Richmond, Sheldon. "Knowing as a Subversive Activity: A Conversation with Steve Fuller’s Post-Truth: Knowledge as a Power Game." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 1 (December 17, 2018): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393118814763.
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Fuller carries social constructionism to its bitter end in his theory of the “post-truth condition”—endemic to current life and to the entirety of Western Philosophy. According to Fuller, the gates to the elitist power/knowledge-games have been crashed by the democratic mob. Fuller implicitly extends Popper’s radicalism in the philosophy of science to political and social philosophy. Rather than Popper’s piecemeal social engineering for the purpose of minimizing human suffering, Fuller promotes revolutionary social change in the face of catastrophes. Fuller pushes for a “proactionary” approach because the current vast social change refutes the fragility-assumption of Popper’s “risk-adverse” sociopolitical philosophy.
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Woessner, Martin. "New Detours in American Intellectual History." American Literary History 32, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/alh/ajz050.
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Abstract US intellectual history is at something of a crossroads. Situated between the longstanding methodological debates of its disciplinary past and current aspirations for a more diverse, democratic, and inclusive future, the recent works surveyed in this essay suggest a field in transition. Once dismissed as elitist—as being exclusively interested in the lives and writings of dead, white males, for example—intellectual history now encompasses an ever-widening range of topics and concerns. It is far more interdisciplinary, far more transnational, and far more interested in popular culture than it has ever been before, but whether the new pathways currently being charted by a new generation of scholars will allow intellectuals to continue to thrive in an increasingly restructured and underfunded academic setting remains to be seen.
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Cohen, Monica F. "IMITATION FICTION: PIRATE CITINGS IN ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON'S TREASURE ISLAND." Victorian Literature and Culture 41, no. 1 (March 2013): 153–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150312000289.
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When Charles Dickens tried to lobby for American support of an international copyright agreement during his wildly popular 1842 tour of the United States, the English author was famously shocked to find himself lambasted as an elitist who dared expect payment for what Americans believed they had the right to read for free (McGill 109–40; Claybaugh 71; Pettitt 152). Dickens encountered in the practice of literary piracy, or what was called in the United States, the culture of reprinting, a deep fissure in capitalist democratic culture between individual ownership and public access, an ideological divide that forms the backdrop for the creation and circulation of nineteenth-century print. If the legal privatization of intellectual property hovered in the imagination of so many Victorian writers, it formed the happy ending of a long nineteenth-century struggle over literary piracy, a contention of goods that shaped the Victorian stage as we well as the transatlantic literary marketplace.
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Rehmann, Jan. "Power ≠ Power: Against the Mix-Up of Nietzsche and Spinoza." Critical Sociology 45, no. 2 (December 21, 2016): 239–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0896920516683233.
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The reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy is still predominated by a widespread “hermeneutics of innocence” (Losurdo) that dissimulates Nietzsche’s elitist perspectives. This article challenges a core element of this hermeneutics, the conflation of Spinoza and Nietzsche. The assumption of a continuity of their power concepts overlooks that the late Nietzsche took a sharp anti-Spinozian turn and introduced his “will to power” against Spinoza’s “conatus.” Whereas Spinoza’s potentia agendi designates a collective and cooperative capacity to act, which can be reconceptualized with the help of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, Nietzsche’s “will to power” naturalizes the principle of domination. An ethics inspired by Nietzsche can never get rid of its inherent “pathos of distance,” which manifests itself even in its most “leftist” forms as a celebration of social distinctions against ordinary people. Recourse to Spinoza can help redefine life affirmation in a democratic-socialist way and thus provides an ethics for a hegemony from below.
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SOLOMON, RAKESH H. "From Orientalist to Postcolonial Representations: A Critique of Indian Theatre Historiography from 1827 to the Present." Theatre Research International 29, no. 2 (July 2004): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0307883304000276.
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This essay offers a comparative critique of all major Indian theatre histories written during the modern era. It reveals three distinct representations of Indian theatre and argues that each was a manifestation of a discrete historiographic approach, shaped by its particular historical and cultural moment. Theatre histories of the Orientalist period offer a narrow and elitist construction of Indian theatre as synonymous with a single defunct genre, the ancient Sanskrit theatre. Histories of the high nationalist phase make a token acknowledgement of the Sanskrit and traditional genres but define Indian theatre as comprising primarily of the modern genre. Postcolonial histories construct a democratic and comprehensive Indian theatre – embracing the Sanskrit, traditional, and modern genre – but with an unpersuasively high significance assigned to the modern genre's post-Independence phase. Such different representations of Indian theatre show how theatre historiography in the modern period, like theatre historiography in any era, regularly refashioned itself under the pressure of changing historical, political, and cultural conditions.
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Törnquist, Olle. "Power, Conflict and Democracy: The Analytical Framework." PCD Journal 1, no. 1-2 (June 6, 2017): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/pcd.25673.
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The point of departure for the Power, Conflict and Democracy Programme (PCD) is the critique of the two conventional explanations for the problems of democratisation in the global South for being empirically mistaken and based on narrow and static theory. We argue that the root causes for the crisis of democratisation are neither poor application of the mainstream model (emphasising elitist pacts and institution-building in return for more privatisation and self management), nor that democracy is premature due the lack of sufficient preconditions. Rather, the more fundamental dilemma is the depoliticisation of democracy and the fact that the paradigms are unable to conceptualise the problems and options involved. This inability is because the proponents of both the dominant arguments agree on a narrow definition of democracy in terms of freedoms and fair election - and then either neglect the basic conditions or say they have to be created beforehand by other means. The result is that both paradigms exlude by definition approaches that focus less on democratic rules of the game in themselves and more on how these institutions may be used and expanded in favour of improved social, economic, and other condition. Given that such social democratic oriented paths have been quite important, especially in the transition of the previously poor Scandinavian countries into welfare states and that adapted versions are now gaining ground in paradigmatic cases such as Brazil, there is an obvious need to widen the perspective.
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Balázs, Zsuzsanna. "Yeats's Queer Dramaturgies: Oscar Wilde, Narcissus, and Melancholy Masculinities in Calvary." International Yeats Studies 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 15–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.34068/iys.04.01.02.
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This article opens up Yeats’s Calvary (1920) for new contemporary queer theatrical interpretations by addressing the tension between dramaturgies of exclusion and inclusion as well as between the authority of masculinity and the transgressive counter-authority of effeminacy and melancholy masculinities. Due to Yeats’s anti-democratic and elitist remarks and his problematic responses to authoritarian political performance in Europe and Ireland, his theatre is often seen as a space which fosters exclusion, conventional notions of heroism, and sexual polarization. Even though the authoritarian and elitist aspects of Yeats’s life and work cannot be denied, his rich queer and feminist networks, and most importantly his sympathy for Oscar Wilde and Roger Casement changed and shaped the representations of gender in his plays in considerable ways. Thanks to these influences, Yeats’s drama took significant steps towards creating space for a queer dramaturgical epistemology which refuses totalizing and homogenizing (hetero)normative frames, mostly those of hyper-masculinity, Carlylian views of heroism and sexual/gender polarization. Through the lens of performance and queer theory, this article highlights the anti-normative and anti-authoritarian potential of Yeats’s theatre in the context of Wilde’s influence. Yeats does not mention Wilde in his notes to Calvary, but his essays about Wilde prove that he identified the hardships of Wilde’s life with those of Christ and also Lazarus even more than two decades after Wilde’s death. This study also illustrates how the use of the unhappy Lazarus motif and the implicit references to the myth of Narcissus in Calvary can serve to express sympathy for Wilde and precarious, stigmatized lives in general and can thus convey vital messages about queerness today.
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Körösényi, András. "Beyond the Happy Consensus about Democratic Elitism." Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 364–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913309x447576.
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AbstractA growing number of studies assign elites and leaders a larger role than democratic elitism assumes. Democratic elitism is not a coherent theory because it papers over three quite distinct models of political representation and democratic control: Robert Dahl's mandate model; the accountability model associated chiefly with John Plamenatz; and the authorization model set forth by Adam Przeworski and colleagues. This last model, wherein elites and leaders conceptualize and present voters' choices, best captures elite-voter relations in today's democracies. This authorization model is decidedly pessimistic about controlling elites and leaders in a democracy, but it is nonetheless compatible with a skeptical reading of Schumpeter.
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Borchert, Jens. ""They Ain't Making Elites Like They Used To": The Never Ending Trouble with Democratic Elitism." Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 345–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913309x447567.
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AbstractThis article identifies three central tenets of democratic elitism as developed by various authors. It then traces the fate of these ideas within democratic theory. Surprisingly, I find almost universal, if unacknowledged, acceptance of democratic elitism's principles in contemporary theories of democracy. In the public, however, there is still a strong yearning for a democracy that is closer to the ideal and more open to public participation. This is reflected in public criticisms of "detached" professional politicians. I argue that a conceptual solution to the tension between the state of democratic theory and the public's expectations may ironically be provided by one strand within the theory of democratic elitism, namely Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchy.
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Engelstad, Fredrik. "Democratic Elitism – Conflict and Consensus." Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 383–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913309x447585.
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AbstractClassical elite theory stressed tensions between elites and democracy, whereas modern studies of elites take democracy as a point of departure – to a large extent under the heading of democratic elitism. This article discusses two strands of elite studies in a democracy perspective, one stressing elite conflict, the other focusing on elite consensus. As points of departure for empirical analysis both strands are valuable, but when linked to democratic theory they are insufficient. It is necessary to view elites in light of constitutional features that regulate their relationship with the state. Moreover, the public sphere must be taken into account as a constitutive element of democracy and as an arena for communication between elite groups and between them and citizenries.
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Fios, Frederikus. "Menafsir Dekonstruksi Derida dalam Sosok Paus Fransiskus." Humaniora 5, no. 2 (October 30, 2014): 1246. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/humaniora.v5i2.3267.
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Jacques Derida is a phenomenal philosopher through his philosophy of deconstruction theory. Derida showed systematically the death of structuralism. His speech shocked the world of academics in France and almost all of America and Europe. Deconstruction is a new way of reading the text, by shifting the core of a text to the side, and put the idea on the edge (the unnoticed, hidden ideas) to the center or importance. Derida rejected dichotomous, binary opposition, bipolarity, thinking model or ways of thinking that one is privileging and marginalizing other ideas. Derida thought the model that would proclaim democratic, open, and dynamic diversity that would make room for multiple interpretations of meaning or open horizon that tolerate differences in interpretation of a text. What was conceptualized by Derida is found legitimacy in practical adequacy in the figure of Pope Francis, the Catholic Church's highest leader. Francis shows a deconstructive way to lead contemporary Catholic Church. Francis has opened a new, broader, and other meaning in looking the praxis of the Church. He does not prioritize elitist lifestyle, yet puts a simple and frugal lifestyle. He changes conservative theology into progressive-liberal theology. He realized Church needs not theology but a living testimony of a good, caring, generous, compassion life that does not use religion for immoral behavior, dehumanization, and corruption. Derida did philosophical deconstruction, Francis did spiritual-leadership deconstruction. What unites both of them is a word called "deconstruction".
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Amwaritama, Mimin. "The Distribution of Power in The Recruitment of Prospective Head Area by PDI-P in The Election Year 2015 Jember." Journal of Local Government Issues 1, no. 1 (April 19, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/logos.vol1.no1.1-14.
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The distribution of power is still a debate in the party's internal politics, especially in terms of recruitment of candidates for regional elections head. Yet the existence of a clear policy related settings portion of authority between the Centre Party and the party in an area is often the cause of difference of interests and the decision appeared, particularly the matter of flying a candidate head of the region. The implication is unavoidable political dynamics. This paper seeks to analyse thoroughly about the distribution of power in the political candidate recruitment head area in PDI-P Jember. The focus of the writing refers to the moment of the Election Year 2015 Jember. Analysis of peeled through the perspective of the theory of political recruitment and distribution of power. The results of the analysis gave an explanation that is not yet a clear subject control distribution of power in the sphere of internal party candidacy candidate in terms of the head area. This implies the existence of the political dynamics of differences at each level of the process candidacy. When the populist nature of the power distribution then the process candidacy running electorate with a more democratic, more inclusive, as well as the representation of social groups can be more assured. Meanwhile, when the distribution of power are elitist by rising degree of exclusivity of candidacy political interests, opportunities to appear much larger due to the interaction between the candidates with the electorate became more and more intensive
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Amwaritama, Mimin. "The Distribution of Power in The Recruitment of Prospective Head Area by PDI-P in The Election Year 2015 Jember." Journal of Local Government Issues 1, no. 1 (April 19, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/logos.vol1.no1.1-19.
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The distribution of power is still a debate in the party's internal politics, especially in terms of recruitment of candidates for regional elections head. Yet the existence of a clear policy related settings portion of authority between the Centre Party and the party in an area is often the cause of difference of interests and the decision appeared, particularly the matter of flying a candidate head of the region. The implication is unavoidable political dynamics. This paper seeks to analyse thoroughly about the distribution of power in the political candidate recruitment head area in PDI-P Jember. The focus of the writing refers to the moment of the Election Year 2015 Jember. Analysis of peeled through the perspective of the theory of political recruitment and distribution of power. The results of the analysis gave an explanation that is not yet a clear subject control distribution of power in the sphere of internal party candidacy candidate in terms of the head area. This implies the existence of the political dynamics of differences at each level of the process candidacy. When the populist nature of the power distribution then the process candidacy running electorate with a more democratic, more inclusive, as well as the representation of social groups can be more assured. Meanwhile, when the distribution of power are elitist by rising degree of exclusivity of candidacy political interests, opportunities to appear much larger due to the interaction between the candidates with the electorate became more and more intensive
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Vengroff, Richard, and F. L. Morton. "The Theory of Democratic Elitism Revisited Again." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (March 2001): 169–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423901777876.
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Best, Heinrich. "Associated Rivals: Antagonism and Cooperation in the German Political Elite." Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 419–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913309x447602.
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AbstractThis article explores the failures and achievements of democratic elitism in Germany. I first outline the conditions in which concepts of leader democracy and democratic elitism were set forth by Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter during the first half of the twentieth century. I then argue that democratic elitism can usefully be reformulated in terms of principal-agent theory and William Sumner's theory of antagonistic cooperation. I present empirical findings from a study of elite conflict and consensus in re-unified Germany that are consistent with these theories, and I suggest that democratic elitism should incorporate both.
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Halpin, Andrew. "The Province of Jurisprudence Contested." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 23, no. 2 (July 2010): 515–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900005026.
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Allan Hutchinson’s recent book, The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized, is regarded as presenting the opportunity for considering what is involved in seeking to establish the province of jurisprudence as a distinctive field of inquiry. The scale of Hutchinson’s ambition matches John Austin’s original efforts to determine the Province of Jurisprudence, but seeks to replace an analytical approach to jurisprudence he associates with Austin by a theoretical approach committed to advancing “strong” democracy. This provokes an initial reflection on the nature of theoretical disageement, and in particular disagreement which goes beyond trivial theoretical contestability so as to contest the nature of the subject matter that is being investigated by establishing an appropriate field of inquiry for it. Three different techniques are introduced which are capable of demarcating the subject matter of jurisprudence through establishing a field of inquiry favouring a particular theoretical viewpoint: axiomatic disengagement, ambitious insight, and a split field of inquiry.Hutchinson’s principal concern with the democratization of law, legal theory, and the province of jurisprudence is examined in detail. The process of democratization and its anti-elitist character is traced through Hutchinson’s opposition to the aloof philosophical analysis of the universal in favour of an engagement with local and particular issues. However, the weight Hutchinson places on his conception of strong democracy, so as to provide a different understanding of the the law-power nexus and of the relationship between law and morality operating in strong democracies, is shown to be misplaced. Two related failings are pointed out. First, there is a failure to recognize competing groupings within the people, which contradict the uniform collective body Hutchinson associates with those formerly governed by elites and then constituting those liberated to exercise self-governance. Secondly, this links into Hutchinson’s exclusive preoccupation with the participatory axis of democracy – which he regards as the core feature of strong democracy, and at the same time the basis for the law-power nexus and the law-morality relationship within a strong democracy. This is revealed as an inadequate and impoverished understanding of democracy once the presence of competing groupings within the people is acknowledged. Hutchinson’s one-dimensional representation of democracy along a participatory-representational continuum is rejected for failing to recognize a distinct fiduciary-beneficiary axis, which a richer understanding of “for the people” conveys. These corrections have important consequences for a role for law that cannot be reduced solely to politics, and for a broader sweep to analytical jurisprudence than Hutchinson allows.Hutchinson’s own efforts to capture the province of jurisprudence are then assessed. These are recharacterized as seeking to establish within a split field of inquiry a theory of strong democratic law, but, in the absence of a convincing account of the nature of democracy and its relationship with law, the project is judged to be unfulfilled.
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Sniderman, Paul M., Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russel, Philip E. Tetlock, and Markus Prior. "The Theory of Democratic Elitism Revisited: A Response to Vengroff and Morton." Canadian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (September 2000): 569–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900000202.
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Two questions have dominated the modern study of politics. How do political systems become democratic? And how, supposing they have managed to become democratic, do they manage to remain so? As yet, there is no agreement on the answer to the first question. For a generation, however, there has been consensus on a core part of the answer to the second. In democratic polities, political elites have come to consensus in support of democratic rights, and in times of political stress this elite consensus has served as a bulwark protecting citizens' liberties.
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Mansbridge, Jane, and Stephen Macedo. "Populism and Democratic Theory." Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15, no. 1 (October 13, 2019): 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042843.
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Commentators routinely describe “populism” as vague. Some argue that the early US populists, who coined the modern usage, were not populists. We disagree and identify this common conceptual core: the “people” in a moral battle against “elites.” The core definition fits all cases of populism: those on the left and right, those in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition to this minimal common core, we identify strongly suggested and frequently correlated non-core characteristics. These include the people's homogeneity and exclusivity, direct rule, and nationalism, as well as a single leader, vilification of vulnerable out-groups, and impatience with deliberation. The US Populist Party and Spain's Podemos Party fit the core definition but have few of the other characteristics. The core can be good for democracy, we argue, while the associated characteristics are often dangerous. Populism in opposition can be good for democracy, while populism in power carries great risks.
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Kim, Bun Woong, and David S. Bell. "The Theory and Applicability of Democratic Elitism to Korean Public Administration." Asian Journal of Public Administration 7, no. 1 (June 1985): 70–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02598272.1985.10800157.
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Maloy, J. S. "A Genealogy of Rational Choice: Rationalism, Elitism, and Democracy." Canadian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (September 2008): 749–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423908080815.
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Abstract. Unlike previous methodological debates in political science, the recent rational choice controversy has excluded consideration of normative questions altogether. These can be recovered, in part, through a genealogy of counter-utopian democratic theory which connects modern rational choice theory to the fin-de-siècle sociology of elites via the mediating figure of Schumpeter. The family resemblances include the aspiration toward a pure science of society, the search for a “realistic” theory of democratic politics, and the shading of an empirical proposition about elite domination into a normative celebration. Though democratic theorists have learned much from the counter-utopian tradition generally, both sides of the rational choice controversy have failed to take seriously the elitists' recognition of the ineluctable normative and ideological dimensions of social research.Résumé. Les débats récents sur le choix rationnel, à contre-pied d'autres disputes méthodologiques en science politique, ont exclu les questions normatives. Ces questions peuvent se rétablir, en partie, par l'intermédiaire d'une généalogie contre-utopiste de la théorie démocratique, qui lie la théorie moderne du choix rationnel au retour de la sociologie élitiste de fin de siècle, avec le personnage de Schumpeter comme médiateur. Les ressemblances familiales portent l'aspiration à une science pure de la société, la recherche d'une théorie «réaliste» de la démocratie et la transition d'une proposition empirique sur la domination des élites vers une célébration normative. Bien que les théoriciens démocratiques aient beaucoup appris de la tradition contre-utopiste, aucune des deux parties du débat sur le choix rationnel n'a pris en compte la reconnaissance élitiste des aspects idéologiques inévitables de la recherche sociale.
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McCormick, John P. "Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism." American Political Science Review 95, no. 2 (June 2001): 297–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401002027.
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This essay demonstrates that Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought addresses the deficiencies of two opposite poles of contemporary democratic theory: As do formal or minimalist approaches, he specifies electoral mechanisms for elite control; and similar to substantive or civic culture approaches, he encourages more direct and robust modes of popular participation. On these grounds, I cull from Machiavelli’s Discourses a theory of democracy in which the populace selects the elites who will hold office but also constantly patrols them through extraelectoral institutions and practices, such as the tribunes of the people, public accusations, and popular appeals. Machiavelli adds to these institutional features of popular government an important cultural dimension: The people should despise and mistrust elites, and they should actively confront the injustice that elite governing inevitably entails. Finally, I explore the ramifications of this theory for debates over elite accountability in contemporary democratic theory.
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Wedel, Janine R. "From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 21st Century." Theory, Culture & Society 34, no. 5-6 (July 10, 2017): 153–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276417715311.
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The dominant theory of elite power, grounded in Weberian bureaucracy, has analyzed elites in terms of stable positions at the top of enduring institutions. Today, many conditions that spawned these stable ‘command posts’ no longer prevail, and elite power thus warrants rethinking. This article advances an argument about contemporary ‘influence elites’. The way they are organized and the modus operandi they employ to wield influence enable them to evade public accountability, a hallmark of a democratic society. Three cases are presented, first to investigate changes in how elites operate and, second, to examine varying configurations in which the new elites are organized. The cases demonstrate that influence elites intermesh hierarchies and networks, serve as connectors, and coordinate influence from multiple, moving perches, inside and outside official structures. Their flexible and multi-positioned organizing modes call for reconsidering elite theory and grappling with the implications of these elites for democratic society.
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Allett, John. "Crowd Psychology and the Theory of Democratic Elitism: The Contribution of William McDougall." Political Psychology 17, no. 2 (June 1996): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3791808.
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Rohrschneider, Robert. "Report from the Laboratory: The Influence of Institutions on Political Elites' Democratic Values in Germany." American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (December 1994): 927–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082717.
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The unification of Germany revives several questions about the future of Germany's democracy. Given the socialist-authoritarian background, how supportive are East Germany's elites of liberal democratic rights? Has the socialist-democratic experience instilled into elites a social egalitarian conception of democracies? In what ways, if at all, do elites support direct democracy procedures? I examine political elites' conceptions of democracies in the united Germany in 1991, using a survey of 168 parliamentarians from the united parliament in Berlin. I find that the socialist and parliamentary institutions in the East and the West, respectively, have substantially influenced elites' conceptions of democracies in Germany, leading to a value divergence across the East-West boundary. Yet the findings also suggest that a partial value convergence in terms of liberal democratic rights among postwar elites has taken place. The results support an institutional learning theory, but they also suggest that support for liberal democratic values has been diffused into East Germany.
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Abdelkader, Deina. "Democratic Transitions: Are There Recipes for Success?" ICR Journal 9, no. 4 (October 16, 2018): 105–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v9i4.97.
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In transitioning to democracy, rationalists assume that either the masses or the elites bring about change. This paper hypothesises that there is a causal relationship between the actors involved in social change and the end product the progress of democratic transition and whether revolution from below or from above is more likely to bring about the transition. By examining Pacting Theory as a democratic transition theory, this paper will analyse the role of the military in Egypts democratisation process. The interplay of the military powers and relinquishing those powers to a civilian government will have implications for social movements theory and the approaches to democratic transition theory.
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He, Tian. "Towards a theory of the transformation of the developmental state: political elites, social actors and state policy constraints in South Korea and Taiwan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 (October 8, 2019): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109919000197.
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AbstractThe institutional changes to the developmental states in South Korea and Taiwan have been well-documented. This paper offers a theory to recount the states' actual transformation processes in these two cases. Advancing existing insight that the state's transformation process is shaped by the emergence of either concentrated or dispersed economic interests, I argue that a crucial process behind the transformation of the developmental state is a democratic transition of a country motivated by ruling elites' strategic choices. Specifically, a democratic transition in a developmental state is shaped by two consecutive elite decisions: (1) the decision to initiate democratic transition in response to the democratic mobilisation of the middle class; (2) the decision to introduce democratic elections in response to an electoral threat from opposition elites. This process of democratic transition facilitates the emergence of state policy constraints by transforming the political foundation of the state.
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Higley, John. "Elite Trust and the Populist Threat to Stable Democracy." American Behavioral Scientist 64, no. 9 (July 19, 2020): 1211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764220941215.
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One aspect of elite theory holds that democratic stability depends heavily on elites trusting each other to keep distributive issues from reaching acute degrees impelling power seizures. This presumes that agreement about the distribution of valued things is seldom deep or wide in large publics. When distributive issues rise to clear public consciousness, the tendency is toward civil strife. Populists assail and undermine elite trust and the management of politics by elites. They thereby weaken an important basis of democratic stability. I argue that the rise of populist leaders to power leads to an erosion of elite trust, which makes distributive issues more acute and threatens the stability of democratic institutions.
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WARREN, MARK E. "Voting with Your Feet: Exit-based Empowerment in Democratic Theory." American Political Science Review 105, no. 4 (October 18, 2011): 683–701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000323.
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Democracy is about including those who are potentially affected by collective decisions in making those decisions. For this reason, contemporary democratic theory primarily assumes membership combined with effective voice. An alternative to voice is exit: Dissatisfied members may choose to leave a group rather than voice their displeasure. Rights and capacities for exit can function as low-cost, effective empowerments, particularly for those without voice. But because contemporary democratic theory often dismisses exit as appropriate only for economic markets, the democratic potentials of exit have rarely been theorized. Exit-based empowerments should be as central to the design and integrity of democracy as distributions of votes and voice, long considered its key structural features. When they are integrated into other democratic devices, exit-based empowerments should generate and widely distribute usable powers for those who need them most, evoke responsiveness from elites, induce voice, discipline monopoly, and underwrite vibrant and pluralistic societies.
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Taylor, Betsy, and Herbert Reid. "Globalization, Democracy and the Aesthetic Ecology of Emergent Publics for a Sustainable World: Working from John Dewey." Asian Journal of Social Science 34, no. 1 (2006): 22–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853106776150135.
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AbstractThe global justice movement reveals a diverse array of emergent publics striving politically for a sustainable world. Working partly from John Dewey, we try to illuminate democratic grounds for knowledge and action in these endeavors. We begin by situating Dewey's ideas in the politics of American history, especially historian John Diggins' countervailing approach to issues of authority, knowledge and opinion. Diggins, against Robert Westbrook and others, contends that Dewey's philosophy of politics chased radical democratic illusions, whereas he might have learned from Charles S. Peirce to uphold the boundary between professional communities and other entities including democratic publics. Dewey saw no democratic alternative to harness the political energy of ordinary people. We argue that Dewey had come to understand that a corporate state system of political economy had come to engulf both the liberal democratic polity and the professions. Dewey's political challenge to the professions and his illumination of the aesthetic ecology of democratic publics prefigure a democratic republican alternative that opens up a new basis for participation in the global justice movement confronting, among other obstacles, a transnational corporate state based in the USA.A Marxist-progressivist notion of the ongoing socialization of markets by corporate capitalism too often reinforces an anti-Populist intellectual sensibility that is coupled with, whether wittingly or not, either a social-democratic elitism or a revolutionary vanguardism. Globalization struggles need, on the contrary, a pragmatic vision of democratic publics instituting a true diversity of policies assuring a world-in-common. The fight for public spaces in the treacherous politics of civil society and global consumerism is a struggle against subjectivization. The fact that corporate state elitism, in the U.S. context, feeds on a rightist version of nationalism does not mean we can junk the history of democratic struggle for a republican alternative to imperialism. By and large, neo-liberal policies "from above" have aggravated various types of inequality and the militaristic turn pursued by some elites compounds not only negative side effects but critical opportunities. Democratic action in and from the United States has to be clear about both place-based forms of life and expanding forms of solidarity in global struggles for democracy and the commons.Our reading of Dewey is strengthened by research that highlights his ecological ontology and its key role in his democratic theory. We argue that globalizing knowledge regimes and their products, such as deforestation, re-institute destructive dualisms that would be transformed by a Deweyan approach that energizes democratic forms of agency and policy. Dewey's essay on "Time and Individuality" is explicated to disclose the radical democratic implications of Deweyan science. We show further that this approach, as a field science and ecological stewardship, provides public alternatives to violence, whether primarily "social" or "environmental". A Deweyan logic of particularity casts in contrasting relief our historical epoch's dominant logic of fungibility, the fetishization of global economic space, and its looming costs. The reclamation and reconstruction of democratic publics are long overdue and requires new regimes of participatory and place-based knowledge opening on the global commons for sustainable life.
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Fujimoto, Yuka, and Charmine E.J. Härtel. "Organizational diversity learning framework: going beyond diversity training programs." Personnel Review 46, no. 6 (September 4, 2017): 1120–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/pr-09-2015-0254.
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Purpose To overcome the shortcomings of diversity training programs, the purpose of this paper is to conceptualize an organizational diversity-learning framework, which features an organizational intervention for employees’ joint decision-making process with other employees from different statuses, functions, and identities. Borrowing key principles from the diversity learning (Rainey and Kolb, 1995); integration and learning perspective (Ely and Thomas, 2001; Thomas and Ely, 1996), and the key practices informed by deliberative democratic theories (Thompson, 2008), the authors develop a new organizational diversity learning framework for behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive learning at workplaces. They conclude with directions for future research. Design/methodology/approach This paper first presents an overview of key shortcomings of diversity training programs in relation to their group composition, design, content and evaluation. Second, it borrows the key principles of diversity learning (Rainey and Kolb, 1995); integration and learning perspectives (Ely and Thomas, 2001; Thomas and Ely, 1996), and the key practices informed by deliberative democratic theories (Thompson, 2008) to delineate the organizational diversity learning framework. Third, it presents a table of the approach contrasted with the shortcomings of diversity training programs and discusses practical and theoretical contributions, along with directions for future research. Findings This paper conceptualizes an organizational diversity-learning framework, which features an organizational intervention for employees’ joint decision-making process with other employees from different statuses, functions, and identities. Research limitations/implications The organizational diversity learning framework developed in this paper provides an inclusive diversity learning paradigm in which diversity learning rests in the experience of the learner. As stated by experiential learning theory, this framework encourages workers to heuristically learn about diverse perspectives in a psychologically safe environment, to reflect on different perspectives, and to create a new awareness about learning from others. As the participants learn to apply new repertoires for interacting with others in their daily work interactions (e.g. listening to different perspectives shared by unfamiliar social group members), it proposes that their behaviors may create a ripple effect, changing other colleagues’ attitudes, behaviors, and thinking patterns on working with diverse coworkers. Practical implications This paper provides detailed instructions for practitioners to facilitate diversity learning. It highlights a few key practical implications. First, the framework provides a method of organization-wide diversity learning through intersecting networks within the workplace, which is designed to reduce the elitist organizational decision making that mainly occurs at the upper echelon. Second, unlike other stand-alone diversity initiatives, the framework is embedded in the organizational decision-making process, which makes employees’ learning applicable to core organizational activities, contributing to both employees’ diversity learning and organizational growth. Third, the framework provides a preliminary model for transferring employees’ diversity learning in daily work operations, nurturing their behavioral learning to interact with different social groups more frequently at work and inclusive of their colleagues’ perspectives, feelings, and attitudes. Social implications Workforces across nations are becoming increasingly diverse, and, simultaneously, the gap and tension between demographic representation in the upper and lower echelons is widening. By joining with other scholars who have advocated for the need to move beyond diversity training programs, the authors developed the organizational diversity learning framework for meaningful co-participation of employees with different statuses, functions, and identities. By inviting minority perspectives into the organizational decision-making process, top managers can explicitly send a message to minority groups that their perspectives matter and that their contributions are highly valued by the organization. Originality/value There has not been a conceptual paper that delineates the diversity inclusive decision-making process within a workplace. The authors established the organizational diversity learning framework based on the diversity learning, organizational diversity integration and learning perspectives, and deliberative democracy practices. The proposed framework guides organizations in structural interventions to educate employees on how to learn from multiple perspectives for better organizational decision making.
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Skultety, Steven C. "Aristotle’s Theory of Partisanship." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 25, no. 2 (2008): 208–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000132.
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This paper develops and defends a new interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of democratic and oligarchic identity. Rejecting interpretations that ground partisan identities in class, greed, or conceptions of justice, this interpretation posits that Aristotle thought of democrats and oligarchs as being defined by the confluence of four distinct traits: (1) having an incorrect conception of happiness, (2) having an incorrect conception of political desert, (3) suffering from an emotional defect, and (4) habitually inferring equality/inequality in all respects from one respect. The argument for this interpretation is that it best explains why Aristotle attributes a despotic attitude to partisans and it explains why democrats and oligarchs are depicted as being unstintingly hostile towards one another. The paper concludes by arguing that Aristotle chose these four traits in order to show that partisans are citizens who devote themselves to a life of discriminatory elitism.
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Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution." British Journal of Political Science 44, no. 3 (May 23, 2013): 575–603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000124.
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Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracyex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.
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Charchuła, Jarosław. "CIVIC EDUCATION AND SHAPING ELITES IN SOCIAL THEORY OF JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET." Osvitolohiya, no. 8 (2019): 65–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2226-3012.2019.8.6571.
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The social concept of José Ortega y Gasasse was developed at the beginning of the twentieth century but still remains valid. This article highlights in a special way the importance of civic education as a foundation for building a democratic society and shaping elites. In the light of Ortega y Gasset’s liberalism, important assumptions regarding freedom, civic education as well as the formation of elites are being analysed. These issues will be analysed in the context of assumptions regarding the principles of shaping the privacy of each citizen, which is the centre and source of all activities of the individual. Properly shaped privacy is the main goal of civic education and guarantees the formation of elites in society.
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Carvalho, Jean-Paul, and Christian Dippel. "Elite Identity and Political Accountability: A Tale of Ten Islands." Economic Journal 130, no. 631 (February 21, 2020): 1995–2029. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa018.
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Abstract Emancipation of slaves in the 1830s transformed the political elites of the British Caribbean plantation islands. New elites were more accountable to the citizenry. We develop a theory in which two factors limit and possibly reverse the effect of this on political outcomes, with legislators: (i) ‘stepping up’ to pass extractive policies; and/or (ii) weakening democratic institutions. The theory is supported by an historical analysis of ten Caribbean plantation islands, based on original archival data on legislator race, occupation and roll-call voting. Eventually, all assemblies that experienced a significant change in composition dissolved themselves and converted to British ‘Crown Rule’.
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Ruman, Yustinus Suhardi. "Praktik Demokrasi Pasca-Pemilu di Tingkat Lokal: Preferensi para Aktor Elite dalam Perspektif Teori Pilihan Rasional." Humaniora 6, no. 2 (April 30, 2015): 264. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/humaniora.v6i2.3340.
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Electoral democracy generates the political elites. Because these political elites are born through a democratic process, they are expected to practice their power in accordance to the basic principles of democracy. One of them is to open the opportunity and acces of people to participatie in decision making proceses. Nevertheless, the problem is that the political elites who were elected through electoral democracy tend to close the participation of citizen in policy making process. To analyze how the political elites formulated the policy and what the rationality of the policy was, this article used rational choice theory. Article used secondary data to analyze the problem. Results of the analysis showed that democracy in local level after elections was determined by rationality, preferences, and interests of the political elites. The practices of power of the elites in local level in the context of rational choice theory made opportunity and access for the people obstructed. It then affects the existing development policies reflect only rationality, preferences, and interests of some elites.
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Svanikier, Johanna Odonkor. "Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana." Comparative Sociology 6, no. 1-2 (2007): 114–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913307x187423.
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AbstractThis article proposes that elite theory is at the heart of understanding political conflict in Africa. A case study of Ghana analyses the historical origins of elite conflict in Ghana before and after independence. The article links high levels of political elite circulation resulting from the transformation of traditional social structures with high levels of political elite differentiation and instability in the post-colonial era. Since 1992 Ghana's new liberal democratic regime has flourished. There are indications that there is a gradual increase in unity amongst competing political elites. Diversity amongst political elites has resulted in greater representation at the leadership level. These factors may explain the sustained period of political stability and the gradual deepening of liberal democracy in Ghana.
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Levin, Daniel. "Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democratic Theory." Law & Social Inquiry 29, no. 01 (2004): 105–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2004.tb00331.x.
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Although the United States is often criticized for its lack of historical consciousness, historicity provides a compelling rhetorical trump in constitutional argument, particularly according to advocates of original understanding jurisprudence or “originalism.” Originalism has also proven to be quite popular as a constitutional position, especially in public discourse outside academe and the courts. I argue that originalism's appeal derives from Americans' interest in heritage. Using the literature on public history, memory, and cultural studies to distinguish the cultural phenomenon of heritage from history proper, I argue that originalism, like heritage, offers the possibility of an immediate and authentic encounter with the past tied to a critique of modernism as both antidemocratic and inauthentic. Originalism portrays the federal period as a special moment of civic unity, whose virtues have been preserved by the larger public, but have been eroded among elites by modernity.
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Bozóki, András. "Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central Europe." Comparative Sociology 2, no. 1 (2003): 215–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913303100418762.
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AbstractElite theory enjoyed a remarkable revival in Central and Eastern Europe, and also in international social science research, during the 1990s. Many researchers coming from different schools of thought turned to the analysis of rapid political and social changes and ended up doing centered research. Since democratic transition and elite transformation seemed to be parallel processes, it was understandable that sociologists and political scientists of the region started to use elite theory. The idea of "third wave" of democratization advanced a reduced, more synthetic, "exportable" understanding of democracy in the political science literature. The main focus of social sciences shifted from structures to actors, from path dependency to institutional choices. Transitions, roundtable negotiations, institution-building, constitution-making, compromise-seeking, pactmaking, pact-breaking, strategic choices — all of these underlined the importance of elites and research on them. Elite settlements were seen as alternatives of social revolution. According to a widely shared view democratic institutions came into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. The elite settlement approach was then followed by some important contributions in transitology which described the process of regime change largely as "elite games." By offering a systematic overview of the theoretical interpretations of elite change from New Class theory to recent theorizing of elite change (conversion of capital, reproduction, circulation, political capitalism, technocratic continuity, three elites and the like), the paper also gives an account of the state of the arts in elite studies in different new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
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Legiedz, Tomasz. "The transition from limited access orders to open access orders in the post-communist Europe." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 187–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.07.003.
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This paper attempts to explain the process of institutional transition of post-communist countries applying conceptual framework proposed by D.C. North, J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. The first part of the article is devoted to outline the theory of North, Weingast, and Wallis. The second part the theory is used to analyze transformation processes in post-communist countries. An important conclusion of this paper is that cultural, religious and historical factors have crucial impact on formation of new coalitions of elites in the transitions countries. In the countries where Western values were present the transfer of the market and democratic formal institutions was easier. Also, the process of transformation was strongly influenced by external factors, especially the prospect of integration with the European Union, which encouraged elites to take action that benefited the opening of both political and economic markets. These observations suggest that, in general, the success of transformation in transition countries did not depend on the intentional actions of ruling elites.
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Cassell, Kaitlen J., John A. Booth, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Support for Coups in the Americas: Mass Norms and Democratization." Latin American Politics and Society 60, no. 4 (September 4, 2018): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2018.39.
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AbstractCoups d’état, once a common end for democracies in the Americas, have declined sharply in recent years. This article investigates whether overall public support for coups is also in decline. Examining 21 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2004 to 2014 helps to evaluate two alternative theses on democratization: Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán’s 2013 normative regime preferences theory, which inquires (but does not test) whether public opinion can signal to elites a reluctance or willingness to support a coup; and classic modernization theory (Inglehart 1988; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). We find a substantively meaningful effect of democratic attitudes on coup support and a weak effect for national wealth, from which we infer that evolving elite values and preferences are paralleled at the mass level and that together, those two trends play a stronger role in the consolidation of democratic regimes than does modernization.
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Alexander, Jeffrey C. "The Societalization of Social Problems: Church Pedophilia, Phone Hacking, and the Financial Crisis." American Sociological Review 83, no. 6 (October 4, 2018): 1049–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003122418803376.
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This article develops a theory of “societalization,” demonstrating its plausibility through empirical analyses of church pedophilia, media phone-hacking, and the financial crisis. Although these strains were endemic for decades, they had failed to generate broad crises. Reactions were confined inside institutional boundaries and handled by intra-institutional elites according to the cultural logics of their particular spheres. The theory proposes that boundaries between spheres can be breached only if there is code switching. When strains become subject to the cultural logics of the civil sphere, widespread anguish emerges about social justice and concern for the future of democratic society. Once admired institutional elites come to be depicted as perpetrators, and the civil sphere becomes intrusive legally and organizationally, leading to repairs that aim for civil purification. Institutional elites soon engage in backlash efforts to resist reform, and a war of the spheres ensues. After developing this macro-institutional model, I conceptualize civil sphere agents, the journalists and legal investigators upon whose successful performances the actual unfolding of societalization depends. I also explore “limit conditions,” the structures that block societalization. I conclude by examining societalization, not in society but in social theory, contrasting the model with social constructionism, on the one hand, and broad traditions of macro-sociological theory, on the other.
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Woods, Dwayne. "Elites, ethnicity, and ‘home town’ associations in the Côte d'Ivoire: an historical analysis of state–society links." Africa 64, no. 4 (October 1994): 465–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1161369.
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The democratisation process which began in the early 1990s in many sub-Saharan African countries has led to renewed interest in the role of voluntary associations in the shaping of the political and social realms. This article maintains that the most effective way to understand the role of associational politics and developments in Africa is not by postulating what they should do according to Western democratic theory, but through an historical analysis of how associations functioned before the introduction of multi-party competitive elections and putative democratic rules in recent years. In this way it will be possible to attain a richer and more complex under-standing of state–society relations under one-party and military regimes, and thus of how these links are likely to change in a more pluralistic environment. This article explores these issues in the Côte d'Ivoire.
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Kim, Hun Joon. "Structural determinants of human rights prosecutions after democratic transition." Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 2 (March 2012): 305–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431600.
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Over the last three decades, a growing number of countries have experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and the new governments have been increasingly expected to address past human rights violations. While the academic literature on the impact of human rights prosecution is relatively well developed, the literature on the causes of such prosecution is still sparse. Why do states pursue criminal prosecutions against former state officials on the charge of human rights violations? This article answers this question by testing three key theories: the balance of power between old and new elites, transnational advocacy networks, and the diffusion theory. I conduct a cross-national study of 71 countries that were in a state of democratic transitions between 1980 and 2006, using a new dataset on domestic human rights prosecutions. I find strong evidence to support the transnational advocacy networks and diffusion explanations. First, active domestic and international human rights advocacy for individual criminal accountability is a key factor guaranteeing persistent and frequent human rights prosecutions. My study further shows that domestic advocacy plays a crucial role in criminal prosecutions of high-profile state officials while international pressure is more effective in promoting prosecutions of low-profile officials. Second, the diffusion theory is also supported since the occurrence of human rights prosecution in neighboring countries is a relevant factor. Interestingly, transitional countries are most sensitive to trials occurring in culturally or linguistically similar countries and this supports the constructivist norm diffusion theory, which focuses on the role of identity and communication in the diffusion process. However, I find that the power balance explanation, which has been the prevailing explanation, is valid only for the immediate use of human rights prosecutions.
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Au, Anson. "Abandon canon in American sociology." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 39, no. 5/6 (June 10, 2019): 494–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijssp-02-2019-0049.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to challenge the practice of having, using and constructing any canon in sociological theory. This paper argues that the elitism of American sociology and the forms of inequality it engenders are sustained by the construction of a canon itself. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a conceptual approach to examine the problems of research practice, academic writing, inequality and empirical translation that canonical thinking engenders within the academy and beyond. Findings Reflecting on the problems outlined, this paper articulates a more democratic agenda for treating canon in research and education by drawing upon standards of practice in ethnography, participatory action research and Southern Theory. Originality/value This paper interrogates the relations of domination that remain at work in the discipline and that which concern the elite position of American sociology itself.
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Ang, Milena, and Monika Nalepa. "Can Transitional Justice Improve the Quality of Representation in New Democracies?" World Politics 71, no. 04 (August 28, 2019): 631–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887119000066.
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AbstractCan transitional justice enhance democratic representation in countries recovering from authoritarian rule? The authors argue that lustration, a policy that reveals secret collaboration with the authoritarian regime, can prevent former authoritarian elites from extorting policy concessions from past collaborators who have been elected as politicians in the new regime. Absent lustration, former elites can threaten to reveal information about past collaboration unless the politicians implement policies these elites desire. In this way, lustration policies enable politicians to avoid blackmail and to be responsive to their constituents, improving the quality of representation. The authors show that whether lustration enhances representation depends on its severity and the extent to which dissidents-turned-politicians would suffer if the skeletons in their closets were revealed. The authors also find that the potential to blackmail politicians increases as the ideological distance between authoritarian elites and politicians decreases. They test this theory with original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset, which spans eighty-four countries that transitioned to democracy since 1946.