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Journal articles on the topic 'English auctions'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Lucking-Reiley, David. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet." American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (1999): 1063–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1063.

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William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44)

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2

Azevedo, Eduardo M., David M. Pennock, Bo Waggoner, and E. Glen Weyl. "Channel Auctions." Management Science 66, no. 5 (2020): 2075–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3487.

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Standard auction formats feature either an upper bound on the equilibrium price that descends over time (as in the Dutch auction) or a lower bound on the equilibrium price that ascends over time (as in the English auction). We show that in some settings with costly information acquisition, auctions featuring both (viz., a narrowing channel of prices) outperform the standard formats. This Channel auction preserves some of benefits of both the English (truthful revelation) and Dutch (security for necessary information acquisition) auctions. Natural applications include housing, online auction si

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3

Miller, Joshua J. "From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders." Review of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 2 (2014): 105–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006.

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Abstract This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-

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4

Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence." American Economic Review 109, no. 5 (2019): 1911–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180773.

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We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to t

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5

Heck, Eric van. "Innovative electronic auctions in supply and demand chains: Empirical research in the flower industry." Journal on Chain and Network Science 1, no. 1 (2001): 65–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2001.x006.

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Exploiting the Internet for commercial ends has become a key theme for most organizations. There are significant advantages for both buyers and sellers in using this medium. Savings are made as a result of reducing transaction costs, increasing the circle of potential customers, and improving the search-and-find capabilities for all parties concerned. At the moment there are several hundred Web-based auctions. And yet the place to see state-of-the-art auctions is not on the Web but rather in one of the dozen or so auction halls in Holland. This article analyses different electronic auction ini

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6

Orr, Leah. "Prices of English Books at Auction c. 1680." Library 20, no. 4 (2019): 501–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/library/20.4.501.

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Abstract Scholars have noted the significance and spread of the second-hand book trade in seventeenth-century England, but so far little information about the books and their prices has been available. This essay examines the evidence from annotations to an early book auction catalogue relating to ten auctions that took place in London between 1676 and 1682, providing the prices for thousands of books. A comparison between the prices for which books sold at auction, and the prices of the same books new in the Term Catalogues in the decade prior to these auctions reveals that most of the relati

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7

Krishna, Vijay. "Asymmetric English auctions." Journal of Economic Theory 112, no. 2 (2003): 261–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00074-7.

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8

Piotrowski, Edward W., and Jan Sładkowski. "Quantum English auctions." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 318, no. 3-4 (2003): 505–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(02)01533-9.

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9

Trifunovic, Dejan. "Optimal auction mechanisms with private values." Ekonomski anali 55, no. 184 (2010): 71–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1084071t.

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This paper reviews equilibrium behavior in different auction mechanisms. We will deal with two types of open auctions, English and Dutch, and two types of sealed-bid auctions, first-price and second-price, when there is a single object for sale and bidders have private values. We show that under certain conditions all four auctions yield the same expected revenue to the seller, but once these assumptions are relaxed revenue equivalence does not hold. We will also study auctions by using standard tools from demand theory. Finally, we will analyze collusive behavior of bidders. The two goals tha

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10

Yang, Zan, Rongrong Ren, Hongyu Liu, and Huan Zhang. "Land leasing and local government behaviour in China: Evidence from Beijing." Urban Studies 52, no. 5 (2014): 841–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098014529342.

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Since 2004, two auction mechanisms – listing auctions and tender auctions – have played a dominant role in land lease arrangements for real estate development in Beijing. Listing auctions in land markets are similar to general English auctions, where bidders offer the highest price to win. However, in tender auctions, winners are determined by the bidding price and the bidder’s financial capability and reputation. Based on granted land parcels from 2006 to 2012 in Beijing, this paper attempts to examine the price differences between the two auctions and the role of land auction in urban develo

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11

Trifunovic, Dejan. "Single object auctions with interdependent values." Ekonomski anali 56, no. 188 (2011): 125–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1188125t.

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This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders? values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object.

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12

Manakov, A. "Timber Auctions in the Context of the Modern Auction Theory." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 3 (March 20, 2007): 86–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-3-86-94.

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The article provides theoretical analysis and evaluation of the timber auctions reforms in Russia. The author shows that the mechanism of the "combined auctions", which functioned until recently, is more appropriate from the theoretical point of view (and from the point of view of the Russian practice) as compared to the officially approved format of the English auction.

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13

Chung, Yu-Fang, Tzer-Long Chen, Tzer-Shyong Chen, Dai-Lun Chiang, and Yu-Ting Chen. "An Agent-Based Auction Protocol on Mobile Devices." Journal of Applied Mathematics 2014 (2014): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/314180.

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This paper proposes an English auction protocol to preserve a secure, fair, and effective online auction environment, where the operations are integrated with mobile agent technology for bidders participating in online auctions. The protocol consists of four participants, namely, registration manager, agent house, auction house, and bidder.

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14

A. Majid, Kashef, Andrew Bryant, and Pradeep A. Rau. "“Name your price” – online auctions and reference prices." Journal of Product & Brand Management 23, no. 6 (2014): 420–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpbm-06-2014-0626.

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Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the presence of varying price points on the impact of product valuations in both English and reverse auctions on potential bidders, that is, those not yet engaged in the auction. Internet auctions, both English style and reverse, constitute one of the success stories of digital commerce. Design/methodology/approach – As its method of research, this paper uses an experimental approach to explore the effects of multiple reference prices. Findings – While previous research has done well to show that a lower initial price decreases barriers to entry and can

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15

Lopomo, Giuseppe. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions." Journal of Economic Theory 82, no. 1 (1998): 144–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2425.

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16

Lacetera, Nicola, Bradley J. Larsen, Devin G. Pope, and Justin R. Sydnor. "Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8, no. 4 (2016): 195–229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150020.

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Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the auction house. We discuss the mechanisms driving differential performance and find evidence suggesting

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17

Menezes, Flavio M. "Multiple-unit English auctions." European Journal of Political Economy 12, no. 4 (1996): 671–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00022-5.

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18

Gonçalves, Ricardo. "Irrationality in English auctions." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67, no. 1 (2008): 180–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.002.

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19

BHARGAVA, BHARAT, MAMATA JENAMANI, and YUHUI ZHONG. "COUNTERACTING SHILL BIDDING IN ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTION." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 14, no. 02n03 (2005): 245–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843005001158.

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The popularity of online auctions and the associated frauds have led to many auction sites preferring English auction over other auction mechanisms. The ease of adopting multiple fake identities over the Internet nourishes shill bidding by fraudulent sellers in English auction. In this paper, we derive an equilibrium bidding strategy to counteract shill bidding in an online English auction. An algorithm based on this strategy is developed. We conduct experiments to evaluate the strategy in a simulated eBay like auction environment. Five popular bidding strategies are compared with the proposed

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20

Ying Tang, Huang, Chen Jong Rong, and Chen Ying Hui. "Do auction formats matter in eBay auctions?" African Journal of Business Management 6, no. 45 (2012): 11312–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5897/ajbm12.761.

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21

Anthony, Patricia, and Edwin Law. "Autonomous Seller Agent for Multiple Simultaneous English Auctions." International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems 4, no. 2 (2012): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jats.2012040101.

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The growth of online auction is due to the flexibility and convenience that it offers to consumers. In the context of online auction, deriving the best reserve price can be associated to the seller’s optimization problem. Determining this reserve price is not straightforward due to the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the auction environment. Setting the price too high will lead to the possibility of no sale outcome. Putting the price too low may produce a sale with less profit due to its lower selling price. The authors propose a strategy to derive the best reserve price based on several s

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22

Malenko, Andrey, and Anton Tsoy. "Selling to Advised Buyers." American Economic Review 109, no. 4 (2019): 1323–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170334.

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In many cases, buyers are not informed about their valuations and rely on experts, who are informed but biased for overbidding. We study auction design when selling to such “advised buyers.” We show that a canonical dynamic auction, the English auction, has a natural equilibrium that outperforms standard static auctions in expected revenues and allocative efficiency. The ability to communicate as the auction proceeds allows for more informative communication and gives advisors the ability to persuade buyers into overbidding. The same outcome is the unique equilibrium of the English auction whe

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23

Asli, Larbi, Méziane Aïder, and El-Ghazali Talbi. "Solving a dynamic combinatorial auctions problem by a hybrid metaheuristic based on a fuzzy dominance relation." RAIRO - Operations Research 53, no. 1 (2019): 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2018051.

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This paper introduces a bi-objective winner determination problem which is based on English auctions. Most models of combinatorial auctions (winner determination problem) do not allow the bidder to update his offer, due to the fact that these mechanisms are static. However in reality bidders are in rough competition while there is time for auction. In this work we give a mathematical formulation of the dynamic model of the bi-objective winner determination problem, where the objectives are: (i) maximization of the total income, (ii) maximization of the number of items sold. This problem is bas

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24

Deck, Cary, Maroš Servátka, and Steven Tucker. "Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?" American Economic Review: Insights 2, no. 2 (2020): 225–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190244.

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The bubble-and-burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized by two alternative sets of clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction yields prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders

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25

Kamecke, Ulrich. "Dominance solvable English matching auctions." Mathematical Social Sciences 42, no. 3 (2001): 253–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00072-5.

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26

Neeman, Zvika. "The effectiveness of English auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 43, no. 2 (2003): 214–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00005-8.

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27

Bellosta, Marie-Jo, Sylvie Kornman, and Daniel Vanderpooten. "Preference-based English reverse auctions." Artificial Intelligence 175, no. 7-8 (2011): 1449–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.015.

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28

Mabu, Shingo, Donggeng Yu, Chuan Yue, and Kotaro Hirasawa. "No Time Limit and Time Limit Model of Multiple Round Dutch Auction Based on Genetic Network Programming." Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 15, no. 1 (2011): 3–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2011.p0003.

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Nowadays, Dutch auction is used widely at online auction sites. To make online Dutch auction more efficient and more intelligent, it is useful to develop an agent using evolutionary computation which will be adaptive to different auction environments. In this paper, a Genetic Network Programming (GNP) based strategy for auction agents has been proposed to do auctions in multiple round Dutch Auction environments under two types of auction models, no time limit model and time limit model. GNP is a graph-based evolutionary method extended from Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Genetic Programming (GP),

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29

Andersson, Tommy, and Albin Erlanson. "Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 81 (September 2013): 116–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.001.

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30

Bikhchandani, Sushil, Philip A. Haile, and John G. Riley. "Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 38, no. 1 (2002): 19–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0879.

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31

Avery, Christopher. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions." Review of Economic Studies 65, no. 2 (1998): 185–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00041.

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32

Menezes, Flávio M., and Matthew J. Ryan. "Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions." International Journal of Game Theory 38, no. 3 (2009): 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0164-7.

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33

Albano, Gian Luigi, and Frédéric Jouneau-Sion. "Bayesian inference in repeated English auctions." Test 13, no. 1 (2004): 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02603006.

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34

Sønstebø, Ole Jakob, Jon Olaf Olaussen, and Are Oust. "Opening Bid Strategies in English Auctions." Journal of Real Estate Research 43, no. 1 (2021): 123–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08965803.2021.1886540.

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35

Malekovic, Ninoslav, Lazaros Goutas, Juliana Sutanto, and Dennis Galletta. "Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions." Electronic Markets 30, no. 1 (2019): 151–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12525-019-00355-w.

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36

MA, JUN, SHOUYANG WANG, and K. K. LAI. "SHILL BIDDING IN ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTIONS WITH A RANDOM NUMBER OF BIDDERS." International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making 03, no. 04 (2004): 539–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219622004001239.

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Shill bidding has increased substantially with the explosion in the number of online auctions. For English auctions with conventional intermediation fee schedules and a continuous increment of the bid, sellers may profit from shill bidding, which is illegal. To deter shill bidding, Wang et al.31 designed a mechanism — the shill-deterrent fee schedule (SDFS) which makes shill bidding unprofitable. This paper analyzes the feasibility of applying SDFS rules to both single round and multi-round English auctions in a framework of independent private value (IPV) with a random number of bidders. It i

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37

Chow, Yuen Leng, and Joseph T. L. Ooi. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions." Real Estate Economics 42, no. 2 (2013): 253–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12035.

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38

Georganas, Sotiris. "English auctions with resale: An experimental study." Games and Economic Behavior 73, no. 1 (2011): 147–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.005.

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39

Hernández, Cristián, Daniel Quint, and Christopher Turansick. "Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity." RAND Journal of Economics 51, no. 3 (2020): 868–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12343.

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40

Biais, Bruno, and Anne Marie Faugeron-Crouzet. "IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, … French, and Internet." Journal of Financial Intermediation 11, no. 1 (2002): 9–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jfin.2001.0319.

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41

Harstad, Ronald M., and Michael H. Rothkopf. "An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions." Management Science 46, no. 1 (2000): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.1.15128.

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42

Dubra, Juan, Federico Echenique, and Alejandro M. Manelli. "English auctions and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem." Journal of Economic Theory 144, no. 2 (2009): 825–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.001.

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43

Brendstrup, Bjarne. "Non-parametric estimation of sequential english auctions." Journal of Econometrics 141, no. 2 (2007): 460–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2006.10.004.

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44

Trifunovic, Dejan. "Sequential auctions and price anomalies." Ekonomski anali 59, no. 200 (2014): 7–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1400007t.

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In sequential auctions objects are sold one by one in separate auctions. These sequential auctions might be organized as sequential first-price, second-price, or English auctions. We will derive equilibrium bidding strategies for these auctions. Theoretical models suggest that prices in sequential auctions with private values or with randomly assigned heterogeneous objects should have no trend. However, empirical research contradicts this result and prices exhibit a declining or increasing trend, which is called declining and increasing price anomaly. We will present a review of these empirica

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45

Baisa, Brian, and Justin Burkett. "Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences." Journal of Mathematical Economics 82 (May 2019): 227–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.001.

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46

Menkhaus, Dale J., Owen R. Phillips, and Kalyn T. Coatney. "Shared Agents and Competition in Laboratory English Auctions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85, no. 4 (2003): 829–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8276.00491.

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47

Haile, Philip A., and Elie Tamer. "Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 1 (2003): 1–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/344801.

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48

Greenleaf, Eric A. "Reserves, Regret, and Rejoicing in Open English Auctions." Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 2 (2004): 264–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/422106.

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49

Hu, Audrey, Steven A. Matthews, and Liang Zou. "English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders." Journal of Mathematical Economics 76 (May 2018): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.02.002.

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50

Brendstrup, Bjarne, and Harry J. Paarsch. "Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions." Journal of Econometrics 134, no. 1 (2006): 69–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2005.06.017.

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