Relevant bibliographies by topics / Enkrasia

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Enkrasia'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Enkrasia"

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Toppinen, Teemu. "Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20, no. 5 (2017): 943–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9819-9.

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Skipper, Mattias. "Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat." Erkenntnis 84, no. 6 (2018): 1369–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0012-x.

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Rudy‐Hiller, Fernando. "Inverse enkrasia and the real self." Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2020): 228–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.465.

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Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. "Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 3 (2018): 597–632. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1196-2.

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Klein, Dominik, and Alessandra Marra. "From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia." Studia Logica 108, no. 1 (2019): 85–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09854-5.

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Horst, David. "Enkratic Agency." European Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2016): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12172.

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Coates, Allen. "The Enkratic Requirement." European Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2011): 320–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00449.x.

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Dorion, Louis-André. "Akrasia et enkrateia dans les Mémorables de Xénophon." Dialogue 42, no. 4 (2003): 645–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300005692.

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AbstractThis article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in the Memorabilia. As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains that akrasia is impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting to enkrateia, instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for countering akrasia falls to enkrateia.
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Machek, David. "Aristotle on Enkratic Ignorance." Journal of the History of Philosophy 58, no. 4 (2020): 655–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2020.0071.

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Lee, Wooram. "Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality *." Philosophical Perspectives 34, no. 1 (2020): 164–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12136.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Enkrasia"

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Johansson, Einar. "Frivilliga fel : den sokratiska paradoxen och Platons Staten." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-419137.

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I denna uppsats undersöker jag hur två olika tolkningar av den sokratiska frivillighetsparadoxen ingen gör fel frivilligt påverkar möjligheten att förstå Platons dialog Staten. Min hypotes är att de två tolkningarna av frivillighetsparadoxen kastar ljus över diskussionen i Staten, och att det är nödvändigt att förstå frivillighetsparadoxens roll för att förstå vad som står på spel i Staten. I uppsatsen ämnar jag visa att ett möjligt sätt att läsa Staten är att tolka Sokrates och de övriga samtalsdeltagarnas uttalanden baserat på kontexten, eftersom vissa uttalanden är polemiska i sin karaktär, medan andra är traditionella. Jag argumenterar för att såväl den traditionella synen på Sokrates som den polemiska dito är korrekta analyser av Sokrates filosofiska gärning, men inte heltäckande sådana, eftersom Sokrates ibland är polemisk – mot de som kvickt måste nedkämpas – och ibland är instruerande på traditionellt manér, mot de som kan förbättras genom det filosofiska samtalet. Detta sätt att läsa Staten skiljer sig från andra genom att läsaren bör avstå a priori-uppfattningar om Sokrates, Thrasymakos eller Glaukons och Adeimantos ståndpunkter till förmån för att tolka beteenden hos samtalsdeltagarna samt deras uppfattningar, vilka förmedlas av texten.
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Bredenkamp, David Samuel Milne. "Enkrateia in die Pauliniese hoofbriewe." 2001. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-09302003-101905.

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(9138071), Samuel C. Bennett. "With and Without Self-Control: The Aristotelian Character Types of Akrasia and Enkrateia." Thesis, 2020.

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<p>My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of <i>akrasia </i>(un-self-control) and <i>enkrateia </i>(self-control) in Aristotle’s ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue for the thesis that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue for the thesis that agents do not express these character types only in temperance’s practical domain; rather, agents can express <i>akrasia</i> and <i>enkrateia</i> in any practical domain where one’s reason can conflict with one’s desire, so the character types have wide ranges of expression. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between strict forms of the character types, which agents express in temperance’s practical domain, and loose forms of the character types, which agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage’s practical domain). I also argue that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are united according to the ontological and terminological relation of metaphor, or inclusive resemblance. In Chapter 3, I draw two lines of psychological justification for the view that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are wide-ranging character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not only through the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism, but also through the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types with wide ranges of expression.<b></b></p>
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Books on the topic "Enkrasia"

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Me glōssikē enkrateia stōn gegonotōn tēn akrateia. [s.n.], 2003.

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Askell, Amanda. Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0013.

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Askell investigates what the epistemic consequentialist will say about epistemic enkrasia principles, principles that instruct one not to adopt a belief state that one takes to be irrational. She argues that a certain epistemic enkrasia principle for degrees of belief can be shown to maximize expected accuracy, and thus that a certain kind of epistemic consequentialist is committed to such a principle. But this is bad news for such an epistemic consequentialist, according to Askell, because epistemic enkrasia principles are problematic.
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Book chapters on the topic "Enkrasia"

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"Enkrateia." In Figuren der Souveränität. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783846744499_006.

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"Enkratic Reasoning." In Rationality Through Reasoning. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088.ch16.

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"Plato And Enkrateia." In Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. BRILL, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004156708.i-308.35.

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Skipper, Mattias. "Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence." In Higher-Order Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0009.

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Two attractive theses about epistemic rationality—evidentialism and the enkratic principle—jointly imply that a certain sort of self-misleading evidence is impossible. That is to say, if evidentialism and the enkratic principle are both true, one’s evidence cannot support certain false beliefs about what one’s evidence supports. Recently, some epistemologists have argued that self-misleading evidence is possible, since misleading higher-order evidence doesn’t have the strong defeating force needed to rule out this possibility. The goal of this chapter is to offer an account of higher-order defeat that does indeed render self-misleading evidence impossible. Central to the account is the idea that higher-order evidence acquires its normative significance by influencing which conditional beliefs it’s rational to have. What emerges is an independently plausible view of higher-order evidence that allows us to reconcile evidentialism and the enkratic principle.
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"Akrasia And Enkrateia In Ancient Stoicism: Minor Vice And Minor Virtue?" In Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. BRILL, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004156708.i-308.55.

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"Chapter 9. Akrasia and Enkrateia in Simplicius’s Commentary on Epictetus’s Encheiridion." In The Neoplatonic Socrates. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.9783/9780812210002.127.

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Dorst, Kevin. "Higher-Order Uncertainty." In Higher-Order Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0002.

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You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition—that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it.
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"Von der selbstbestimmten Enthaltsamkeit (Enkrateia) zum Mythos in den ältesten apokryphen Apostelakten." In Mythos und Neomythos. Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783657782529_005.

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Johnson, David M. "Self-Mastery, Piety, and Reciprocity in Xenophon’s Ethics." In Early Greek Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758679.003.0019.

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“Self-Mastery, Piety, and Reciprocity in Xenophon’s Ethics” focuses on the following aspects of Xenophon’s ethics. Xenophon’s interest in leadership makes ethics a central concern across his wide-ranging body of work. The foundation of virtue, for Xenophon, is enkrateia (self-mastery), which he believed could be squared with Socratic intellectualism as it was required both for the acquisition of knowledge and for the successful application of knowledge in the face of non-intellectual drives. Xenophon’s famous piety is also of ethical import, as he argues that the gods designed the world to our benefit, benefit the pious through divination, and established unwritten laws which should regulate our conduct. Among those laws is one rewarding reciprocity, which is the central factor in successful interpersonal relationships and friendship. Xenophon, despite his emphasis on self-mastery, believed that the best life was also the most pleasant life, though he also distinguished between pleasures.
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Lombardini, John. "Xenophon, Socratic Mockery, and Socratic Irony." In Politics of Socratic Humor. University of California Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520291034.003.0004.

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This chapter focuses on the irony of Xenophon’s Socrates and argues that it is a more direct form of mockery than that found in Plato and that it is one that fits with Xenophon’s overall portrait of Socrates as more willing to engage in mockery and abusive forms of humor than his Platonic counterpart. It argues that this distinctive type of irony is connected with the crucial role that enkrateia (mastery of oneself) plays in the pedagogical approach deployed by Xenophon’s Socrates. It also tracks the different kinds of Socratic conversations emphasized respectively by Plato and Xenophon; while the irony of the Platonic Socrates is linked to his practice of the elenchus, that of the Xenophontic Socrates is connected with those conversations in which Socrates attempts to lead his interlocutors toward virtue. Thus, while the Platonic Socrates deploys irony specifically to draw his interlocutors into conversation, Xenophon’s Socrates does so in order to reveal the gap between the noble goals for which his interlocutors aspire and their abilities to achieve those goals. This interpretation is developed through close attention to Socrates’s conversations with his fellow citizens at Memorabilia 3.1–7.
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