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Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic closure principle'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 24 April 2022

Last updated: 30 July 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Epistemic closure principle"

Greene, Richard. "A REJECTION OF THE EPISTEMIC CLOSURE PRINCIPLE." Southwest Philosophy Review 17, no. 2 (2001): 59–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20011725.

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Goldstein, Simon, and John Hawthorne. "Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods." Journal of Philosophy 121, no. 1 (2024): 26–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil202412112.

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Recent research has identified a tension between the Safety principle that knowledge is belief without risk of error, and the Closure principle that knowledge is preserved by competent deduction. Timothy Williamson reconciles Safety and Closure by proposing that when an agent deduces a conclusion from some premises, the agent’s method for believing the conclusion includes their method for believing each premise. We argue that this theory is untenable because it implies problematically easy epistemic access to one’s methods. Several possible solutions are explored and rejected.

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Montminy, Martin, and Wes Skolits. "DEFENDING THE COHERENCE OF CONTEXTUALISM." Episteme 11, no. 3 (2014): 319–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.13.

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AbstractAccording to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in

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Coliva, Annalisa. "Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7, no. 4 (2017): 217–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-00704001.

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The paper presents the key themes of my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws of inference.

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Lai, Changsheng. "The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox." Erkenntnis 85, no. 5 (2018): 1269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0076-7.

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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conc

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Szwed, Paulina, Małgorzata Kossowska, and Marcin Bukowski. "Effort investment in uncontrollable situations: The moderating role of motivation toward closure." Motivation and Emotion 45, no. 2 (2021): 186–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11031-021-09868-4.

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AbstractAccording to the principle of energy-conservation principle, effort investment is usually reduced in situations that are perceived as uncontrollable. This is because when success is recognized as impossible, any effortful actions are no longer justified. However, we predicted that individual differences in uncertainty tolerance, i.e., the need for closure (NFC), may moderate effort investment in uncontrollable situations. We tested this prediction in two experimental studies in which we exposed participants with differing levels of NFC to uncontrollable events, and indexed effort throu

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Mijic, Jelena. "The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy." Filozofija i drustvo 31, no. 4 (2020): 615–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid2004615m.

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This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s epistemic conte

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Luzzi, Federico. "WHAT DOES KNOWLEDGE-YIELDING DEDUCTION REQUIRE OF ITS PREMISES?" Episteme 11, no. 3 (2014): 261–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.3.

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AbstractAccording to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure (KCC), knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false (Warfield 2005; Fitelson 2010) or p is true but not known (Coffman 2008; Luzzi 2010). I explore a view that resolves this tension by abandoning

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Jackson, Alexander. "HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM." American Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 4 (2018): 341–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/45128629.

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Abstract Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) i

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Murphy, Peter. "The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 4 (2013): 271–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03011096.

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What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted belief must be false in the skeptical scenario. According to the competing ignorance account, the targeted belief must fall short of being knowledge in the skeptical scenario. This paper argues for two claims. The first is that, contrary to what is often assumed, the ignorance account is superior to the false belief account. The second is that the ignorance account ultimately hobbles the skeptic. It does so for two reasons. First, when t

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistemic closure principle"

Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini. "CETICISMO E ANTICETICISMO: UM ESTUDO A PARTIR DO PRINCÍPIO DE FECHAMENTO EPISTÊMICO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2012. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9115.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like here is a hand , and h for a skeptical scenario such p is not true, but just a illusion projected in my mind , the skeptical argument can be formalized as follows: (1) If S knows that p, then S knows that ~h; (2) S doesn t know that ~h, the

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Spectre, Levi. "Knowledge closure and knowledge openness : a study of epistemic closure principles /." Stockholm : Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-31219.

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SHIU, GUO-YI, and 徐國益. "Epistemic Closure Principle." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76778350172887005809.

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碩士 東吳大學 哲學系 104 The epistemic closure principle plays an important role in the skeptical argument. Some philosophers, in order to defend their own position against skepticism, try to argue that this principle can be rejected even if it seems to be so intuitive. In this thesis, I want to explain the idea of the epistemic closure principle based on the debate of internalism and externalism. In traditional epistemology, the concept of knowledge is understood mainly from the internalist standpoint, many different forms of skeptical argument are actually directed to this internalist tra

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Books on the topic "Epistemic closure principle"

Beebe, James R., and Jake Monaghan. Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0003.

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This chapter reports the results of four empirical studies that investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested our shared epistemic practices may only include a closure principle that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. The chapter argues that the results of these studies provide reason for thinking individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the closure principle. When the chapter authors used research ma

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Kraft, Tim, and Alex Wiegmann. Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Closure. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0004.

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According to epistemic closure, if someone knows some proposition P and also knows that P entails Q, she knows Q as well. This is often defended by appealing to its intuitiveness. Only recently, however, was epistemic closure put to the empirical test: Turri ran experiments in which closure is violated in folk knowledge ascriptions surprisingly often. The chapter authors disagree with this diagnosis. It is by no means obvious which experimentally testable hypothesis proponents of epistemic closure should accept. The chapter formulates a different hypothesis and argues that it is more apt for e

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Beebe, James R. Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746904.003.0011.

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Explanationist (or abductivist) responses to skepticism maintain that our commonsense beliefs about the external world can be rationally preferred to skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that the former provide better explanations of our sensory experiences than the latter. This kind of response to radical skepticism has never enjoyed widespread acceptance in the epistemological community due to concerns about the epistemic merits of inference to the best explanation and appeals to the explanatory virtues. Against this tide of skepticism about explanationism, the chapter argues that traditional

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Book chapters on the topic "Epistemic closure principle"

Yamada, Tomoyuki. "The Epistemic Closure Principle and the Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions." In Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning. Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03044-9_8.

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Avnur, Yuval. "The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and Other Principles)." In New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003104766-6.

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Borrelli, Arianna. "The Great Yogurt Project: Models and Symmetry Principles in Early Particle Physics." In Model and Mathematics: From the 19th to the 21st Century. Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97833-4_6.

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AbstractAccording to the received view of the development of particle physics, mathematics, and more specifically group theory, provided the key which, between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, allowed scientists to achieve both a deeper physical understanding and an empirically successful modeling of particle phenomena. Indeed, a posteriori it has even been suggested that just by looking at diagrams of observed particle properties (see Fig. 1) one could have recognized in them the structures of specific groups (see Fig. 2). However, a closer look at theoretical practices of the 1950s and ea

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Radical Skepticism and Closure." In Epistemic Angst. Princeton University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.003.0002.

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This chapter articulates a version of radical skepticism which essentially trades on a closure-style principle for knowledge. It argues that, properly construed, this type of radical skepticism presents us with a putative paradox. That means that prospective anti-skeptical strategies will fall into one of two camps—either they will be undercutting anti-skeptical strategies that demonstrate that this putative paradox is not in fact bona fide, or else they will be overriding anti-skeptical strategies that grant that the paradox is genuine but nonetheless offer independent grounds for rejecting a

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination." In Epistemic Angst. Princeton University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691167237.003.0003.

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This chapter reveals a more nuanced way to conceive of the radical skeptical paradox—one that makes no essential appeal to a closure-style principle for knowledge. It discusses the skeptical challenge presented by, on the one hand, underdeterminationRK/rational ground-based radical skepticism and, on the other hand, closureRK-based radical skepticism. Then, in light of these general reflections about these two forms of radical skeptical challenge, the chapter sets out what, both minimally and ideally, we would want from an intellectually satisfying response to the problem

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Berto, Francesco, and Mark Jago. "Epistemic and Doxastic Contents." In Impossible Worlds. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812791.003.0010.

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The case for making belief states the primary focus of our analysis and for including impossible worlds in that analysis is outlined in this chapter. This allows the reader to deny various closure principles, although this won’t help defeat worries about external-world scepticism. The issue that concerns the authors most is the problem of bounded rationality: belief states seem to be closed under ‘easy’ trivial consequence, but not under full logical consequence, and yet the former implies the latter. The solution presented here is that some trivial closure principle must fail on a given belie

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Floridi, Luciano. "A Defence of Information Closure." In The Logic of Information. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833635.003.0007.

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In this chapter, the principle of information closure (PIC) is defined and defended against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If successful, given that PIC is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of ‘S is informed that p’ among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of ‘S is

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Duží Marie and Menšík Marek. "Logic of Inferable Knowledge." In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-720-7-405.

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Intensional epistemic logics are not apt for handling properly the specification of communication and reasoning of resource-bounded agents in a multi-agent system. They oscillate between two unrealistic extremes: either the explicit knowledge of an &lsquo;idiot&rsquo; agent, deprived of any inferential capabilities, or the implicit knowledge of an agent who is a logical/mathematical genius. The goal of this paper is to introduce the notion of inferable knowledge of a rational yet resource-bounded agent. The stock of inferable knowledge of such an agent a is the closure of a chain-of-kn

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Pritchard, Duncan. "2. Is knowledge impossible?" In Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198829164.003.0002.

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‘Is knowledge impossible?’ considers an influential argument that purports to show that we do not know much of what we take ourselves to know. If this argument works, then it licenses a radical sceptical doubt. It first looks at Descartes’s formulation of radical scepticism—Cartesian scepticism—which employs an important theoretical innovation known as a radical sceptical hypothesis. The closure principle is also discussed along with the radical sceptical paradox. If this radical sceptical argument works, then we not only lack knowledge of much of what we believe, but we do not even have any g

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Rosenkranz, Sven. "Competing views." In Justification as Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0008.

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The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible

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Conference papers on the topic "Epistemic closure principle"

Heyninck, Jesse, Giovanni Casini, Thomas Meyer, and Umberto Straccia. "Revising Typical Beliefs: One Revision to Rule Them All." In 20th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2023}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2023/35.

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Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) extends propositional logic with a connective • expressing the most typical (alias normal or conventional) situations in which a given sentence holds. As such, it generalises e.g.~preferential logics that formalise reasoning with conditionals such as ``birds typically fly''. In this paper, we study revision of sets of PTL-sentences. We first show why it is necessary to extend the PTL-language with a possibility operator, and then define the revision of PTL-sentences syntactically and characterise it semantically. We show that this allows us to represent a w

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Ågotnes, Thomas, and Yì N. Wáng. "Somebody Knows." In 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2021}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2021/1.

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Several different notions of group knowledge have been extensively studied in the epistemic and doxastic logic literature, including common knowledge, general knowledge (everybody-knows) and distributed knowledge. In this paper we study a natural notion of group knowledge between general and distributed knowledge: somebody-knows. While something is general knowledge if and only if it is known by everyone, this notion holds if and only if it is known by someone. This is stronger than distributed knowledge, which is the knowledge that follows from the total knowledge in the group. We introduce a

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