Relevant bibliographies by topics / Epistemic humility

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
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  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic humility'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Epistemic humility"

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Wu, Kevin Chien-Chang. "Deliberative democracy and epistemic humility." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, no. 2 (March 29, 2011): 93–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10002888.

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AbstractDeliberative democracy is one of the best designs that could facilitate good public policy decision making and bring about epistemic good based on Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) theory of reasoning. However, three conditions are necessary: (1) an ethic of individual epistemic humility, (2) a pragmatic deflationist definition of truth, and (3) a microscopic framing power analysis during group reasoning.
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Kidd, Ian James. "Inevitability, contingency, and epistemic humility." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55 (February 2016): 12–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.08.006.

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Teti, Stowe Locke. "Epistemic humility and empathic imagination." Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 8, no. 3 (2018): 213–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nib.2018.0067.

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Dormandy, Katherine. "Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?" Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (November 15, 2018): 292–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807186.

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In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them.
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Dougherty, Trent, and Brandon Rickabaugh. "Natural Theology, Evidence, and Epistemic Humility." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 2 (June 19, 2017): 19–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i2.1924.

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One not infrequently hears rumors that the robust practice of natural theology reeks of epistemic pride. Paul Moser’s is a paradigm of such contempt. In this paper we defend the robust practice of natural theology from the charge of epistemic pride. In taking an essentially Thomistic approach, we argue that the evidence of natural theology should be understood as a species of God’s general self-revelation. Thus, an honest assessment of that evidence need not be prideful, but can be an act of epistemic humility, receiving what God has offered, answering God’s call. Lastly, we provide criticisms of Moser’s alternative approach, advancing a variety of philosophical and theological problems against his conception of personifying evidence.
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Dunnington, Kent. "Intellectual Humility and Incentivized Belief." Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (October 28, 2018): 268–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807173.

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Despite disagreement about what is fundamental or necessary to intellectual humility, there is broad agreement that intellectual humility will bear on the higher-order epistemic attitudes one takes towards one’s beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes). Intellectually humble people tend not to under- or overstate the epistemic strength of their doxastic attitudes. This article shows how incentivized beliefs—beliefs that are held partly for pragmatic reasons—present a test case for intellectual humility. Intellectually humble persons will adopt ambivalent higher-order epistemic attitudes towards their incentivized beliefs. This is important for institutions that incentivize belief with material or social rewards, such as religious institutions that require orthodoxy for membership. The article argues that such institutions cannot simultaneously incentivize orthodox belief and enjoin conviction about such beliefs, unless they are willing to reject intellectual humility as a virtue.
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Hazlett, Allan. "HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY." Episteme 9, no. 3 (September 2012): 205–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11.

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AbstractThis paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.
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Poama, Andrei. "Waiving Jury Deliberation." Social Theory and Practice 46, no. 1 (2020): 181–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202022083.

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This article argues that, given the current pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of jury deliberation, we ought to treat it with epistemic humility. I further argue that epistemic humility should be expressed and enforced by turning jury deliberation from a mandatory rule of the jury trial to a waivable right of the defendant. I consider two main objections to my argument: the first one concerns the putative self-defeatingness of humility attitudes; the second objection points to the burdensomeness of granting an unconditional jury deliberation waiver to the defendant.
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Schwab, A. "Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice: Translating Epistemic Categories into Ethical Obligations." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37, no. 1 (January 11, 2012): 28–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr054.

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Ho, Anita. "Trusting experts and epistemic humility in disability." IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4, no. 2 (September 2011): 102–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.4.2.102.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistemic humility"

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Vavova, Ekaterina Dimitrova. "Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62421.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-84).
I consider three ways in which our epistemic situation might be more impoverished than we ordinarily take it to be. I argue that we can save our robust epistemic lives from the skeptic. But only if we accept that they aren't quite as robust as we thought. In Chapter One, I ask whether the discovery that your belief has been influenced by your background should worry you. I provide a principled way of distinguishing between the kind of influence that is evidence of our own error, and the kind that is not. I argue, contra the dogmatist, that appropriate humility requires us to reduce confidence in response to the former. I conclude by explaining the nature and import of such humility: what it is, what accommodating it rationally amounts to, and why it need not entail skepticism. In Chapter Two, I ask whether awareness of disagreement calls for a similar sort of humility. Many of those who think it does make a plausible exception for propositions in which we are rationally highly confident. I show that, on the contrary, rational high confidence can make disagreement especially significant. This is because the significance of disagreement is largely shaped by our antecedent expectations, and we should not expect disagreement about propositions in which high confidence is appropriate. In Chapter Three, I consider whether a deflated theory of knowledge can help negotiate the path between skepticism and dogmatism more generally. I argue that knowing some proposition does not automatically entitle you to reason with it. The good news is that, on this view, we know a lot. The bad news is that most of what we know is junk: we cannot reason with it to gain more knowledge. It thus cannot play many of the roles that we typically want knowledge to play.
by Ekaterina Dimitrova Vavova.
Ph.D.
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Wirén, Sacharias. "En mångfalds påverkan : En religionsfilosofisk studie i trosvisshet relaterat till religiös pluralism." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-201454.

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The premise for this study is the question how we should relate to people with different religious beliefs. The aim is to examine if an existence characterized by a religious diversity should affect the certainty and confidence in our faith. To answer my question I have turned to the philosophers David Basinger, Mikael Stenmark, William Lane Craig and Robert McKims different views on this issue. Using an approach based on a comparative method and argument analysis I have then assessed their different opinions in the matter. Based on my own discussion of these arguments I conclude that a religious diversity should imply a reduction in our own religious confidence and that it should be reduced in relation to the amount of disagreement that exist between conflicting religious perspectives in an specific case and matter. This may also foster a reduction of religious intolerance through a nuanced of our own belief while highlighting the conceptions and values in our own religion that stresses tolerance.
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Brandt, Phillip Luther. "Negotiating authority and epistemic humility : Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae I, 65-74 as a propaedeutic training in the reverential reading of patristic texts." Thesis, University of Kent, 2014. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/42924/.

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Aquinas’ treatment of the Creation narrative (Genesis 1:1-2:4) within QQ 65-74 of the prima pars of his Summa Theologiae (ST) has long been and remains neglected, virtually unread, within the community of the readers of Aquinas. This neglect is born of a mistaken expectation of this section of the ST as a quest for theological or philosophical truth. Those reading his parallel treatments of the same material have deemed ST I, 65-74 insufficiently robust, shallow, even embarrassing for those who see him as a theological touchstone. But the readers of Aquinas in general and of the ST in particular have not asked why Aquinas elected to engage in this apparently simplistic treatment of a Scriptural passage which addressed issues that were foundational to his philosophical and theological project. Drawing upon Aquinas’ historical context and through comparison with his other treatments of the same biblical material this thesis argues that within these QQ Aquinas deliberately shaped his use of patristic sources to create both a primer on the use of these patristic sources for his students and, in so doing, also made a necessary appeal to all his readers that they embrace Augustine’s epistemic humility. Read through this lens, ST I, 65-74 provides important insights into Aquinas’ use of ideas and authoritative texts and once more gives voice to his still relevant call for epistemic humility.
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Books on the topic "Epistemic humility"

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Embracing epistemic humility: Confronting triumphalism in three Abrahamic religions. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013.

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Wright, Jennifer Cole, ed. Humility. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190864873.001.0001.

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This volume will explore humility as a virtue from a multidisciplinary perspective. Specifically, we will explore humility within different religious/spiritual traditions, arguing that it involves an appropriate alignment with God and/or a higher spiritual power, one in which we occupy rightful space, have proper self-regard, and receptive intelligence to the living world around us. We will also explore humility more secularly, examining its epistemic value in the development of knowledge, as well as the important role it has to play in politics, competitive activities, and business management, helping us keep our accomplishments in proper perspective, be less self-occupied, and display a willingness to help (and forgive) others. Finally, we will consider whether humility is the most important virtue—foundational to the mature development and expression of all other virtues and to moral exemplarity more generally.
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Macaskill, Grant. Intellectual Humility and the Practices of Faith. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198799856.003.0007.

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This chapter examines the practices with which intellectual humility is enmeshed in the Christian life: patience and gratitude, which are both manifested in prayer. The discussion recognizes that intellectual humility does not function in isolation, as a virtue in its own right, but is expressed through, and fed by, other practices within the life of faith, as the minds of believers are rightly ordered with respect to God. Patience and gratitude are not represented within the New Testament simply as dispositions, but as deliberate volitional activities, by which the lordship and the goodness of God are acknowledged and behaviours modified accordingly. The chapter traces the key ways in which faithful servants are represented as ‘waiting upon God’ and giving thanks to him, and considers the ways that that these practices are represented as bearing on the epistemic and volitional characteristics of those servants.
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Baehr, Jason. Virtue. Edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.32.

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Intellectual virtues are character traits that facilitate the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods. This chapter takes up the question of which traits are intellectual virtues in relation to a particular variety of knowledge; namely, knowledge of God. It is argued that moral humility (as distinct from intellectual humility) is an intellectual virtue in this context. This account of moral humility and its epistemically salutary effects is sketched against the backdrop of an account of human pride and the obstacles such pride poses to the acquisition of theistic knowledge. Finally, an objection is considered according to which, owing to other features of human psychology, moral humility may in fact be an intellectual vice in this context.
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Macaskill, Grant. Sketching the Christian Self in the New Testament Writings. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198799856.003.0004.

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This chapter considers the representation of personhood and agency in the New Testament, as matters that frame Christian conceptions of personal virtue, in general, and intellectual humility, specifically. It is particularly attentive to the ways in which the New Testament represents the Christian self as constituted by another, by the determinative personhood of Jesus Christ, operating through the Holy Spirit. The account is necessarily Trinitarian and necessarily communal: the personhood of Jesus is determinative for the identity of all Christians, who are thereby represented as a unity, as his body, sharing in ‘the mind of Christ’ through the work of the Spirit, and thereby relating properly to God. Crucially, too, this chapter highlights that Christocentric identity is essentially ‘disrupted’ and, as such, opened to new ways of considering reality and acting within it. Properly understood, this generates both epistemic and volitional humility.
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Kawall, Jason. Environmental Virtue Ethics. Edited by Nancy E. Snow. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199385195.013.24.

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Environmental virtue ethics is among the most fruitful and influential applications of virtue ethics. This chapter considers the attractions of a virtue-based approach to environmental ethics in particular, before examining how we come to identify environmental virtues and vices. Following consideration of representative environmental virtues (humility and courage), and vices (arrogance and inattention), the chapter turns to a consideration of objections to environmental virtue ethics. While many of these objections are readily answerable, they suggest that greater attention must be paid to political virtues, and to the role of institutions and social structures in shaping possibilities for acquiring and acting upon environmental virtues. There are also significant epistemic worries concerning the ability to identify environmental virtues and exemplars. The chapter closes with a consideration of ways in which appeals to psychology and the social sciences might enrich and enhance environmental virtue ethics, and help to overcome its remaining epistemic problems.
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Tanesini, Alessandra. The Mismeasure of the Self. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198858836.001.0001.

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The aim of this book is to offer detailed characterizations of some intellectual virtues and vices of self-evaluation, to highlight the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from them, to explain their psychological bases and to suggest that some interventions that inhibit vicious behaviour and promote intellectual virtue. The first chapter introduces the virtues and vices of intellectual self-evaluation that are the main topic of the book. The second chapter offers a detailed account of three kinds of intellectual vices: character traits, thinking styles, and sensibilities. The chapter includes a defence of the view that motivations play a crucial role in the development and preservation of these psychological features. The third chapter introduces attitude psychology which supplies the framework for detailed accounts of virtue and vices. These accounts are provided in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 discusses humility, pride, and concern for one’s intellectual reputation. Chapter 5 details superbia, arrogance, servility, and self-abasement. Chapter 6 is dedicated to vanity, narcissism, timidity, and fatalism. Chapter 7 analyses the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from these intellectual vices. Chapter 8 argues individuals are morally and epistemically responsible for their epistemic vices and the bad believing that flows from them, but raises questions about the wisdom and morality of blaming people for these psychological features. Finally, Chapter 9 evaluates some interventions designed to promote virtue and reduce vice.
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Anjum, Rani Lill, and Stephen Mumford. What Probabilistic Causation Should Be. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198733669.003.0020.

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Irrespective of degrees of belief, there are cases where the world itself seems to work in a probabilistic way. But there are different accounts of what this means. One view is that the facts of probability are fixed ultimately by the relative frequency of an occurrence. A propensity theory, however, says that real-world probabilistic facts are what generate any such frequencies. The latter is associated with epistemic humility: because there is no guarantee that the generated frequencies match the real facts of probability, we cannot know for sure what those probabilities are even if we know all the facts of frequency. Furthermore, the strength of a propensity cannot be probabilistically defined since the former might be doubled indefinitely while probabilities are measured on a bounded scale.
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Schmidt, Peter R., and Alice B. Kehoe, eds. Archaeologies of Listening. University Press of Florida, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5744/florida/9780813056241.001.0001.

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Archaeologies of Listening provides a fresh and bold look at how archaeologists and heritage managers may enhance their capacity to interpret and understand material culture and heritage values. By listening closely to indigenous voices and to those who have long-term relationships with the landscape, deeper empirical understandings are brought to interpretations. Drawing on the founding principles of anthropology, Archaeologies of Listening demonstrates the value of cultural apprenticeship, an almost forgotten part of archaeological practice. The authors argue that epistemic humility is central to creating relationships of equality and mutuality, critical components in an anthropological archaeology that overcomes a narrowly scientific approach. By embracing a humanistic perspective with people-centric practice and ethics, this volume points the way to reawakening the core principles of anthropology in community archaeology and heritage studies.
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Wilson, Catherine. Essential Religiosity in Descartes and Locke. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815037.003.0010.

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This chapter offers an overview and comparison of Descartes’s and Locke’s stances toward religious and moral issues (their ‘essential religiosity’), such as their views on divine agency in the creation of the world and direction of human affairs; the relevance of divine retribution and reward to morality; their sense of supernatural power and artistry as revealed in things of the world. It contrasts the different kinds of epistemic and moral humility that these engender in each author. Descartes’s attitude of acceptance towards all that befalls us followed from his conception of the universe as a law-governed realm, manifesting God’s impersonal wisdom and power. Locke’s belief that God is merciful with respect to human weakness and our tendency to stumble and blunder follows from his sense of the complexity of nature and human affairs and the mediocrity of human reason.
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Book chapters on the topic "Epistemic humility"

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Matthews, D. "Epistemic Humility." In Wisdom, Knowledge, and Management, 105–37. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36506-0_7.

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González de Prado, Javier. "Gaslighting, Humility, and the Manipulation of Rational Autonomy." In Epistemic Autonomy, 250–68. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003003465-17.

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Nadelhoffer, Thomas, Rose Graves, Gus Skorburg, Mark Leary, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. "Partisanship, humility, and epistemic polarisation." In Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism, 175–92. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429291395-15.

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Adsit, Janelle. "Pluriversality and Multiepistemic Humility." In Epistemic Justice, Mindfulness, and the Environmental Humanities, 26–55. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003037439-2.

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Kato, Julius-Kei. "Epistemic Confidence, Humility, and Kenosis in Interfaith Dialogue." In Interfaith Dialogue, 265–76. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59698-7_20.

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Ryan, Sharon. "Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism." In Themes from Klein, 129–43. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_9.

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Burton, Simon, and Emily Brady. "What Is It Like to Be a Bird? Epistemic Humility and Human-Animal Relations." In The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics, 89–101. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44206-8_6.

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Kim, Han-Kyul. "Epistemic Humility." In Locke’s Ideas of Mind and Body, 57–79. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315279770-4.

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Nguyen, C. Thi. "Self-Trust and Epistemic Humility." In Humility, 325–53. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190864873.003.0014.

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Some cognitive domains, like the moral, aesthetic, and religious, seem to demand a special kind of intellectual autonomy. We should, it is thought, think for ourselves and not trust others. This call for autonomy seems to support a radical intellectual self-sufficiency. In particular, the fact that our peers disagree with us can be disregarded by the fully intellectually self-sufficient person. I argue against radical intellectual self-sufficiency. I argue, instead, that our basis for self-trust in these domains should also extend to trusting others. So long as we do not have a good account of our own reliability in these domains, our general cognitive similarity to others ought to lead us to weight their testimony, and so weight their disagreement. We should be epistemically humble in the face of disagreement. Furthermore, epistemic humility here is a form of intellectual autonomy, for we discover the evidence of disagreement and think through its consequences for ourselves.
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Roberts, Robert C., and W. Jay Wood. "Humility and Epistemic Goods." In Intellectual Virtue, 257–80. Oxford University Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0012.

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