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Journal articles on the topic 'Epistemic humility'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Wu, Kevin Chien-Chang. "Deliberative democracy and epistemic humility." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, no. 2 (March 29, 2011): 93–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10002888.

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AbstractDeliberative democracy is one of the best designs that could facilitate good public policy decision making and bring about epistemic good based on Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) theory of reasoning. However, three conditions are necessary: (1) an ethic of individual epistemic humility, (2) a pragmatic deflationist definition of truth, and (3) a microscopic framing power analysis during group reasoning.

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2

Kidd, Ian James. "Inevitability, contingency, and epistemic humility." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 55 (February 2016): 12–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.08.006.

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3

Teti, Stowe Locke. "Epistemic humility and empathic imagination." Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 8, no. 3 (2018): 213–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nib.2018.0067.

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4

Dormandy, Katherine. "Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?" Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (November 15, 2018): 292–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807186.

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In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them.

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Dougherty, Trent, and Brandon Rickabaugh. "Natural Theology, Evidence, and Epistemic Humility." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 2 (June 19, 2017): 19–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i2.1924.

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One not infrequently hears rumors that the robust practice of natural theology reeks of epistemic pride. Paul Moser’s is a paradigm of such contempt. In this paper we defend the robust practice of natural theology from the charge of epistemic pride. In taking an essentially Thomistic approach, we argue that the evidence of natural theology should be understood as a species of God’s general self-revelation. Thus, an honest assessment of that evidence need not be prideful, but can be an act of epistemic humility, receiving what God has offered, answering God’s call. Lastly, we provide criticisms of Moser’s alternative approach, advancing a variety of philosophical and theological problems against his conception of personifying evidence.

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Dunnington, Kent. "Intellectual Humility and Incentivized Belief." Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (October 28, 2018): 268–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807173.

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Despite disagreement about what is fundamental or necessary to intellectual humility, there is broad agreement that intellectual humility will bear on the higher-order epistemic attitudes one takes towards one’s beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes). Intellectually humble people tend not to under- or overstate the epistemic strength of their doxastic attitudes. This article shows how incentivized beliefs—beliefs that are held partly for pragmatic reasons—present a test case for intellectual humility. Intellectually humble persons will adopt ambivalent higher-order epistemic attitudes towards their incentivized beliefs. This is important for institutions that incentivize belief with material or social rewards, such as religious institutions that require orthodoxy for membership. The article argues that such institutions cannot simultaneously incentivize orthodox belief and enjoin conviction about such beliefs, unless they are willing to reject intellectual humility as a virtue.

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7

Hazlett, Allan. "HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY." Episteme 9, no. 3 (September 2012): 205–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11.

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AbstractThis paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.

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8

Poama, Andrei. "Waiving Jury Deliberation." Social Theory and Practice 46, no. 1 (2020): 181–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202022083.

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This article argues that, given the current pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of jury deliberation, we ought to treat it with epistemic humility. I further argue that epistemic humility should be expressed and enforced by turning jury deliberation from a mandatory rule of the jury trial to a waivable right of the defendant. I consider two main objections to my argument: the first one concerns the putative self-defeatingness of humility attitudes; the second objection points to the burdensomeness of granting an unconditional jury deliberation waiver to the defendant.

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9

Schwab, A. "Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice: Translating Epistemic Categories into Ethical Obligations." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37, no. 1 (January 11, 2012): 28–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhr054.

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10

Ho, Anita. "Trusting experts and epistemic humility in disability." IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4, no. 2 (September 2011): 102–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.4.2.102.

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11

Kallestrup, Jesper, and Duncan Pritchard. "From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility." Res Philosophica 93, no. 3 (2016): 533–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2016.93.3.2.

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12

Schwab, Abraham P. "Abstract of "Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice"." Journal of Long-Term Effects of Medical Implants 18, no. 1 (2008): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1615/jlongtermeffmedimplants.v18.i1.180.

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13

Mellers, Barbara, Philip Tetlock, and Hal R. Arkes. "Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization." Cognition 188 (July 2019): 19–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.10.021.

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14

Babbitt, S. E. "Secularism, Ethics, Philosophy: A Case for Epistemic Humility." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 4–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2010-046.

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15

Kraft, James. "Religious tolerance through religious diversity and epistemic humility." Sophia 45, no. 2 (October 2006): 101–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02782484.

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16

Forsthoefel, Thomas A. "Loving the Ineffable: Epistemic Humility and Interfaith Solidarity." Journal of Dharma Studies 1, no. 2 (February 4, 2019): 259–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42240-019-00024-3.

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17

Cobb, Aaron D. "HOPE FOR INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY." Episteme 16, no. 1 (June 28, 2017): 56–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.18.

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ABSTRACTRobert Roberts and W. Jay Wood (2007) define intellectual humility as a dispositional absence of concern for self-importance. And they contrast this virtue with distinct species of vicious pride. The aim of this project is to extend their regulative epistemology by considering how epistemic agents can cultivate a dispositional detachment from the concerns characteristic of the prideful vices of hyper-autonomy and presumption. I contend that virtuous communities help to foster intellectual humility through their role in cultivating the virtue of hope. Thus, regulative epistemology ought to focus greater attention on the role of communities in the development of intellectual virtue.

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18

Worthington, Everett L. "Fine-tuning the Relationship between Religion and Intellectual Humility." Journal of Psychology and Theology 46, no. 4 (November 2, 2018): 305–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647118807793.

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I examine religious humility, which is one content area of intellectual humility. Intellectual humility is the subtype of humility that involves taking a humble stance in sharing ideas, especially when one is challenged or when an idea is threatening. I position religious humility within the context of general humility, spiritual humility, and relational humility, and thus arrive at several propositions. People who are intensely spiritually humble can hold dogmatic beliefs and believe themselves to be religiously humble, yet be perceived by others of different persuasions as religiously dogmatic and even arrogant. For such people to be truly religiously humble, they must feel that the religious belief is core to their meaning system. This requires discernment of which of the person’s beliefs are truly at the core. But also the religiously humble person must fulfill the definition of general humility, accurately perceiving the strengths and limitations of the self, being teachable to correct weaknesses, presenting oneself modestly, and being positively other-oriented. Humility thus involves (1) beliefs, values, and attitudes and (2) an interpersonal presentational style. Therefore, intellectually humble people must track the positive epistemic status of their beliefs and also must present with convicted civility.

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Dammann, Olaf. "Toward Epistemic, Intersectoral, and Disciplinary Humility for Population Health Science." American Journal of Public Health 110, no. 4 (April 2020): 425–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2019.305548.

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20

Fisch, Menachem. "A modest proposal: Towards a religious politics of epistemic humility." Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 1 (March 2003): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1475483032000055229.

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21

Gueguen, Marie, and Stathis Psillos. "Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Humility in Pierre Duhem’s Philosophy of Science." Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science, no. 2 (June 28, 2017): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i2.06.

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Duhem’s philosophy of science is difficult to classify according to more contemporary categories like instrumentalism and realism. On the one hand, he presents an account of scientific methodology which renders theories as mere instruments. On the other hand, he acknowledges that theories with particular theoretical virtues (e.g., unity, simplicity, novel predictions) offer a classification of experimental laws that “corresponds to real affinities among the things themselves.” In this paper, we argue that Duhem’s philosophy of science was motivated by an anti-sceptical tendency, according to which we can confidently assert that our theories reveal truths about nature while, at the same time, admitting that anti-scepticism should be moderated by epistemic humility. Understanding Duhem’s epistemological position, which was unique amongst French philosophers of science in the beginning of the 20th century, requires a careful examination of his accounts of representation, explanation, and of their interrelation.

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22

BAEHR, JASON. "Flannery O'Connor and religious epistemology." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (September 25, 2018): 349–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000562.

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AbstractWhat are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extrapolate an alternative model of religious inquiry from three stories by the Southern Gothic writer Flannery O'Connor (1925–1964). According to the model, a person's fitness for religious inquiry also depends on whether she possesses a certain moral posture. In particular, I argue that something like moral humility functions as an epistemic virtue in the theistic domain.

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23

Kierstead, James. "Democracy’s Humility: A Reading of Sophocles’ Antigone." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 34, no. 2 (November 11, 2017): 288–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340128.

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Abstract Hegelian readings of Antigone would have us believe that Creon and Antigone are both heroes and villains at once. In this essay, I argue that Creon is in fact the villain of the piece, and a paradigmatic tyrant. Far from representing democratic rationalism, Creon is in fact the antitype of the epistemic humility that was one of the foundational ideals of Athenian democracy. As the Ode to Man and Protagoras’ Great Speech in Plato’s dialogue both suggest, human expertise ultimately reaches its limits in the sphere of ethics, an area overseen by the gods. For both Protagoras and Sophocles, in my reconstruction, democratic and religious practices are not an arrogant attempt to deny this fact, but a way of humbly accepting it. Through the humbling of Creon and the piety and reasonableness of Teiresias, Haimon, and even the Guard, Antigone illustrates an essential characteristic of democracy: its humility.

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24

Langton, Rae. "Reply to Lorne Falkenstein." Kantian Review 5 (March 2001): 64–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000649.

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In Kantian Humility I argue that, for Kant, ignorance of things in themselves is ignorance of the intrinsic properties of substances, and that this is epistemic humility, rather than idealism: some aspects of reality, the intrinsic aspects, are beyond our epistemic grasp.The interpretation draws upon what Falkenstein takes to be ‘a novel and not implausible understanding of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances’ which views it as a distinction between the intrinsic and the relational. He concedes that Kant frequently puts his distinction in just these terms, that I make ‘a strong textual case for it’, that it is ‘plausible and intriguing’ and that it may even be ‘correct, at least for a certain strand of Kant's thought’. He presumably also allows that this distinction between ‘things as they are in relation to other things and things as they are on their own’ is at base a metaphysical distinction, which makes no mention of how things look to us, appear to us or depend on our minds. I am pleased to find sympathy for this understanding of Kant's distinction in a review whose overall tenor is so critical.

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Tsekeris, Charalambos, and Konstantinos Koskinas. "A “Weak” Reflection on Unpredictability and Social Theory." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 36–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v8i1.183.

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This concise reflection seeks to comprehensively interconnect the well-established theoretical and methodological logic of self-organization with a new reflexive ethos and aesthetic of epistemic modesty and humility. A brief elaboration on the issue of unpredictability further encourages a suitable and sustainable analytic framework for generating, developing and cultivating a radical ethics/aesthetics of epistemological weakness, as well as a sense of less strong and more reflexive sociological/philosophical worldview.

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Tsekeris, Charalambos, and Konstantinos Koskinas. "A “Weak” Reflection on Unpredictability and Social Theory." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 36–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/vol8iss1pp36-42.

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This concise reflection seeks to comprehensively interconnect the well-established theoretical and methodological logic of self-organization with a new reflexive ethos and aesthetic of epistemic modesty and humility. A brief elaboration on the issue of unpredictability further encourages a suitable and sustainable analytic framework for generating, developing and cultivating a radical ethics/aesthetics of epistemological weakness, as well as a sense of less strong and more reflexive sociological/philosophical worldview.

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27

D’Oro, Giuseppina. "Between ontological hubris and epistemic humility: Collingwood, Kant and the role of transcendental arguments." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (June 21, 2018): 336–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1471660.

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28

Kidd, Ian James. "Pierre Duhem’s epistemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a reply to Ivanova." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42, no. 1 (March 2011): 185–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.11.007.

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Mosley, Albert G. "Book Review: Donald M. Borchert, Embracing Epistemic Humility: Confronting Triumphalism in Three Abrahamic Religions." Review & Expositor 112, no. 2 (May 2015): 336–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0034637315582479j.

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30

Rizzieri, Aaron. "The Practice of Assertion under Conditions of Religious Ignorance." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 1 (May 3, 2017): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1863.

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The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections generalize.

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31

Shaheen, Jonathan L. "Hegel, Humility, and the Possibility of Intrinsic Properties." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 100–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000185.

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Rae Langton (1998) offers a non-idealist interpretation of Kantian things in themselves according to which we have no knowledge of things in themselves – the intrinsic nature of things – just because our epistemic access to things is via their relational, non-intrinsic properties. Whatever the merits of her account as an interpretation of Kant's metaphysics, its plausibility presupposes the coherence of her notion of intrinsic properties. According to the account of intrinsic properties Langton uses, as we will see, there are only intrinsic properties if certain worlds are possible. Allais (2006) attacks one half of the modal intuitions on which Langton relies, but is adequately rebutted by Langton (2006). This paper discusses another, far more radical critique of the other half of the modal intuitions underlying Langton's account of intrinsic properties, intuitions which are also the basis of Langton and Lewis' (1998) account of the same. The account of intrinsicness under fire here depends on the possibility of objects existing alone in worlds in which no other objects (not counting their parts) exist. But according to Hegel's Logik, such worlds are simply not possible. To develop this critique, we cast a broad net by linking Langton (1998) with Lewis (2009) and Langton and Lewis (1998), and then consider (in a necessarily limited fashion) claims from the 1832, Lehre vom Sein in Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, which we consult in the edition of Hegel (2008). The primary aim of this paper is to offer a clear model of the modal error which Hegel purports to identify, and to show its application to Langton's work.

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Xhignesse, Michel-Antoine. "Social Kinds, Reference, and Meta-Ontological Revisionism." Journal of Social Ontology 4, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 137–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0013.

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AbstractJulian Dodd has characterized the default position in metaphysics as meta-ontologically realist: the answers to first-order ontological questions are thought to be entirely independent of the things we say and think about the entities at issue. Consequently, folk ontologies are liable to substantial error. But while this epistemic humility is commendable where the ontology of natural kinds is concerned, it seems misplaced with respect to social kinds since their ontology is dependent upon the human social world. Using art and art-kinds as paradigmatic examples of social kinds, I argue that meta-ontological realism sets conditions that are too strict to apply to social kinds. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be too quick to embrace the conclusion that our folk theories of social kinds cannot err substantially. By modelling the reference of social kind-terms on that of natural kind-terms, it becomes clear that in both cases, our sole epistemic privilege lies in our ability to pinpoint the subject of our inquiries.

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York, Kyle. "The Philosopher as Moral Activist." Essays in Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2020): 46–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip2020211/24.

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It is normal to think that philosophers’ first dedication is to the truth. Publishers and writers consider ideas and papers according to criteria such as originality, eloquence, interestingness, soundness, and plausibility. I suggest that moral consequence should play a greater role in our choices to publish when serious harm is at stake. One’s credence in a particular idea should be weighed against the potential consequences of the publication of one’s ideas both if one turns out to be right and if one turns out to be wrong. This activist approach to philosophical writing combines moral concern with epistemic humility.

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Lin, Bonnie Elizabeth. "Encountering the Other: Postmodern and Barthian Pastoral Theologies in Dialogue." International Journal of Practical Theology 24, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 212–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ijpt-2020-0055.

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AbstractThe proliferation of contextual theologies points to the perspectival character of all theological systems, underscoring the need for epistemic humility, self-reflexivity, and openness to alterity. Yet, constructive dialogue often proves difficult due to divergent sources of authority and conflicting normative values. I consider proposals by Elaine Graham and Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, pointing out not only how their postmodern and Barthian pastoral theological models differ, but also where they may be congruent and mutually edifying. Karl Barth attracts skepticism from both “conservatives” and “liberals,” yet each may find in him an ally, resource, and bridge for engaging the other.

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Trenca, Mihaela. "Tracing the becoming of reflective practitioner through the enactment of epistemic practices." Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management 13, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 350–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/qram-09-2015-0089.

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Purpose This paper aims to develop a conceptual framework for tracing the cognitive and affective micro-processes management accountants can draw upon to construct themselves as reflective practitioners within organizational context. Design/methodology/approach Drawing on pragmatic constructivism and Heron’s (1992) theory of learning and personhood, the framework provides a methodology for tracing the way management accountants can construct themselves as reflective practitioners by enactig epistemic practices (Cetina, 2001). Furthermore, we enquire into the epistemological requirements for creating trustworthy knowledge and the processes through which actors can diminish the proactive-pragmatic truth gap. Findings The framework shows how the participatory function of the mind, deeply rooted in affective processes, is implicated in creating empathic engagement with epistemic objects. Besides the affective dimension, there is the need for logical inferences to link facts and reveal possibilities for helping actors to pursue their value system. Coupling affective and logical processes fosters passionate humility, which helps actors create clear communicative acts with whom other actors can resonate, leading to the development of functioning practices. Research limitations/implications Providing a framework for tracing the micro-processes of epistemic practices can serve as a tool for researchers to acquire a more detailed account of the practice and. By looking into the epistemological aspect of practice, researchers could be able to go beyond describing practice and suggest improvements from a pragmatic point of view. Originality/value The paper provides a novel insight into the analysis of management accounting practice by showing the interplay between affective and cognitive processes in sustaining epistemic practice. Additionally, it opens up the dialogue on trustworthiness of knowledge generated through epistemic practices.

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McRorie, Christina G. "Moral Reasoning in “the World”." Theological Studies 82, no. 2 (June 2021): 213–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00405639211009939.

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While moral theology fundamentally relies on human reason, scholarship on social sin now raises complex questions about the connection between understanding and moral responsibility. Considering these within the frame of reflection on “the world,” this essay proposes reading our culturally mediated defects of reason as a kind of worldliness that is both imposed from without and yet also reflects humanity’s sinful rebelliousness. In this theological register, following the recommendation of liberation and contextual theologians to learn from the “other” appears necessary as a practice of epistemic humility appropriate to humanity’s finite and fallen condition, and is thus useful for tempering moral theology’s longstanding confidence in reason. It also offers a way to make ourselves vulnerable to grace.

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Sanchez, Michelle C. "Bonhoeffer's Lutheran assertions: Cataphasis as teaching responsibility to the ‘other’." Scottish Journal of Theology 70, no. 4 (November 2017): 390–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930617000369.

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AbstractStructural similarities have been noted between Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account of ethical responsibility and more recent accounts advocated by philosophers who emphasise responsibility to alterity. Yet, there remains one stubborn difference between Bonhoeffer and these philosophers: his unequivocal embrace of strongly cataphatic speech. This raises the following question: it is possible for contemporary Christian ethicists and theologians to enlist Bonhoeffer in the aim of reconceiving an ethic of responsibility to the ‘other’ when Bonhoeffer himself relies on such concrete, exclusive language? This article will argue that attention to Martin Luther's defence of theological assertions provides a lens through which the performative force of Bonhoeffer's cataphatic language can be better understood as a particular and traditional use of language that teaches an ethical posture of epistemic humility.

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Pinsent, Andrew. "Special Divine Insight: Escaping the Snow Queen's Palace." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 4 (December 22, 2015): 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i4.93.

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Insights play a role in every field that can be called knowledge, but are of particular interest to the philosophy of religion and special divine action. Although these acts of understanding cannot be generated at will, a second person can vastly accelerate understanding by a first person. In this paper, I argue that this catalysis of insight is best attained in a situation of ‘second- person relatedness’, involving epistemic humility and shared awareness of shared focus. I also argue that this approach provides an appropriate interpretation of Aquinas’s account of God’s gift of understanding. On this basis, it is specifically the context of second-person relatedness to God, as ‘I’ to ‘you’, that is expected to have the most far-reaching impact on understanding of the world. I illustrate the conclusions by means of the story of The Snow Queen, by Hans Christian Andersen, drawing also some practical implications for insights in daily life.

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Carter, J. Adam, and Robin McKenna. "Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 6 (May 12, 2020): 702–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.16.

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AbstractEmpirical work on motivated reasoning suggests that our judgments are influenced to a surprising extent by our wants, desires, and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). How should we evaluate the epistemic status of beliefs formed through motivated reasoning? For example, are such beliefs epistemically justified? Are they candidates for knowledge? In liberal democracies, these questions are increasingly controversial as well as politically timely (Beebe et al. 2018; Lynch Forthcoming, 2018; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). And yet, the epistemological significance of motivated reasoning has been almost entirely ignored by those working in mainstream epistemology. We aim to rectify this oversight. Using politically motivated reasoning as a case study, we show how motivated reasoning gives rise to three distinct kinds of skeptical challenges. We conclude by showing how the skeptical import of motivated reasoning has some important ramifications for how we should think about the demands of intellectual humility.

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Yaden, David B., Matthew W. Johnson, Roland R. Griffiths, Manoj K. Doss, Albert Garcia-Romeu, Sandeep Nayak, Natalie Gukasyan, Brian N. Mathur, and Frederick S. Barrett. "Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities." International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology 24, no. 8 (May 14, 2021): 615–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijnp/pyab026.

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Abstract Psychedelic substances produce unusual and compelling changes in conscious experience that have prompted some to propose that psychedelics may provide unique insights explaining the nature of consciousness. At present, psychedelics, like other current scientific tools and methods, seem unlikely to provide information relevant to the so-called “hard problem of consciousness,” which involves explaining how first-person experience can emerge. However, psychedelics bear on multiple “easy problems of consciousness,” which involve relations between subjectivity, brain function, and behavior. In this review, we discuss common meanings of the term “consciousness” when used with regard to psychedelics and consider some models of the effects of psychedelics on the brain that have also been associated with explanatory claims about consciousness. We conclude by calling for epistemic humility regarding the potential for psychedelic research to aid in explaining the hard problem of consciousness while pointing to ways in which psychedelics may advance the study of many specific aspects of consciousness.

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Parviainen, Jaana, Anne Koski, and Sinikka Torkkola. "‘Building a Ship while Sailing It.’ Epistemic Humility and the Temporality of Non-knowledge in Political Decision-making on COVID-19." Social Epistemology 35, no. 3 (February 23, 2021): 232–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1882610.

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Lakey, Heather. "The Many, the Wise, and the Marginalized: The Endoxic Method and The Second Sex." Hypatia 35, no. 2 (2020): 317–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2020.13.

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AbstractIn this article, I propose that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex instantiates a version of the endoxic method, a philosophical strategy practiced originally by Aristotle. After summarizing the methodological principles and the philosophical benefits of Aristotle's method, I argue that Beauvoir improves upon Aristotle's endoxic practice through her heightened focus on the endoxa of minority groups, in this case women. Despite this improvement, Beauvoir replicates some of Aristotle's mistakes with her exclusive focus on the experiences of white French women. I address problems of epistemological bias that arise with the endoxic method, and I hypothesize strategies to manage these biases. I conclude that the endoxic method offers a promising resource for feminist philosophers if we retrofit the method to include an intersectional lens and a practice of epistemic humility. My reading of the endoxic method complements feminist scholarship that reads The Second Sex as a phenomenological investigation. Thus, I suggest that future research exploring the relationship between the endoxic method and phenomenology could generate important insights regarding feminist methodologies and social activism.

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Dunlop, Claire A., Edoardo Ongaro, and Keith Baker. "Researching COVID-19: A research agenda for public policy and administration scholars." Public Policy and Administration 35, no. 4 (August 1, 2020): 365–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952076720939631.

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Coronavirus (COVID-19) is one of the defining policy challenges of an era. In this article, we sketch some possible ways in which the public policy and administration community can make an enduring contribution about how to cope with this terrible crisis. We do so by offering some elements that delineate a tentative research agenda for public policy and administration scholars, to be pursued with epistemic humility. We outline the contours of seven analytical themes that are central to the challenges presented by COVID-19: policy design and instruments, policy learning, public service and its publics, organisational capacity, public governance, administrative traditions and public sector reforms in multi-level governance (MLG). The list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive to COVID-19. The knowledge we can generate must speak not only to the daunting challenge of COVID-19 itself but also to policymakers, and indeed humankind, trying to cope with future unexpected but high impact threats, by leveraging better public policies and building administrative capacities to enable more resilient, equitable and effective public services.

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Tsekeris, Charalambos, Ioannis Katerelos, and Konstantinos Koskinas. "SAVIORGANIZACIJA IR EPISTEMOLOGINIS SILPNUMAS." Problemos 79 (January 1, 2011): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2011.0.1320.

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Straipsnyje siekiama visapusiškai sujungti pripažintas teorines ir metodologines saviorganizacijos ir sudėtingumo sąvokas su bendrosiomis socialinės teorijos problemomis (tokiomis kaip žinojimas, subjektyvumas, veikmė ir numatymas), taip pat su naujuoju episteminio nuosaikumo bei kuklumo etosu ir estetika. Kitaip sakant, bendroji saviorganizacijos teorija yra tinkamas ir patvarus analitinis karkasas kurti ir plėtoti radikalią epistemologinio silpnumo etiką/estetiką bei silpnesnę ir refleksyvesnę sociologinę/epistemologinę pasaulėžiūrą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: žinojimas, saviorganizacija ir kompleksiškumas, epistemologija ir etika, refleksyvumas ir socialinė teorija.Self-Organization and Epistemological WeaknessCharalambos Tsekeris, Ioannis Katerelos, Konstantinos Koskinas SummaryThis paper seeks to comprehensively and critically interconnect the well-established theoretical and methodological conceptions of self-organization, complexity and chaos with more general issues and dilemmas in the contemporary field of social theory (such as knowledge, objectivity/subjectivity, structure/agency and prediction), as well as with a new reflexive ethos (practice) and aesthetic (style) of epistemic modesty and humility. In other words, a general theory of self-organization seems to be a suitable and sustainable analytic framework for generating, developing and cultivating a radical ethics/aesthetics of epistemological weakness, as well as a sense of less strong and more reflexive sociological/epistemological worldview.Keywords: knowledge, self-organization and complexity, epistemology and ethics, reflexivity and social theory.

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Häggström, Olle. "Challenges to the Omohundro–Bostrom framework for AI motivations." foresight 21, no. 1 (March 11, 2019): 153–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/fs-04-2018-0039.

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PurposeThis paper aims to contribute to the futurology of a possible artificial intelligence (AI) breakthrough, by reexamining the Omohundro–Bostrom theory for instrumental vs final AI goals. Does that theory, along with its predictions for what a superintelligent AI would be motivated to do, hold water?Design/methodology/approachThe standard tools of systematic reasoning and analytic philosophy are used to probe possible weaknesses of Omohundro–Bostrom theory from four different directions: self-referential contradictions, Tegmark’s physics challenge, moral realism and the messy case of human motivations.FindingsThe two cornerstones of Omohundro–Bostrom theory – the orthogonality thesis and the instrumental convergence thesis – are both open to various criticisms that question their validity and scope. These criticisms are however far from conclusive: while they do suggest that a reasonable amount of caution and epistemic humility is attached to predictions derived from the theory, further work will be needed to clarify its scope and to put it on more rigorous foundations.Originality/valueThe practical value of being able to predict AI goals and motivations under various circumstances cannot be overstated: the future of humanity may depend on it. Currently, the only framework available for making such predictions is Omohundro–Bostrom theory, and the value of the present paper is to demonstrate its tentative nature and the need for further scrutiny.

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Blesgraaf-Roest, Bernadette. "A Smart Ethics is an Ethics Committed to Close-Listening." Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Bioethica 66, Special Issue (September 9, 2021): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbbioethica.2021.spiss.15.

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"A ‘smart’ bioethics is an ethics that is able to recognize and address the real-life and context-embedded moral concerns of the people it intends to serve, whether those people are patients, relatives, healthcare professionals, researchers or policy-makers. Therefore, close-listening to what those people have to say, should be at the start of each bioethics-undertaking. In this presentation, I will explore how narrative approaches taken from the humanities and social sciences could help bioethicists in the 21st century to attune to and examine both the stories of others and the stories we create ourselves in medicine and bioethics. I will discuss why this is an essential first step before we embark on the normative task of bioethics, and how it entails a scrutinization of epistemological and meta-ethical positions. Following, I will use my own research project –an empirical-ethical exploration of physician-assisted dying in Dutch general practice– as an example of how narrative approaches used in empirical research, training of researchers and normative evaluation may change one’s perspective on a highly contested bioethical issue. Last, I will discuss the question whether concepts such as narrative humility and epistemic (in)justice could and should receive more attention in bioethics-training and-research. "

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Baude, William, and Ryan Doerfler. "Arguing with Friends." Michigan Law Review, no. 117.2 (2018): 319. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.117.2.arguing.

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Judges sometimes disagree about the best way to resolve a case. But the conventional wisdom is that they should not be too swayed by such disagreement and should do their best to decide the case by their own lights. An emerging critique questions this view, arguing instead for widespread humility. In the face of disagreement, the argument goes, judges should generally concede ambiguity and uncertainty in almost all contested cases. Both positions are wrong. Drawing on the philosophical concepts of “peer disagreement” and “epistemic peerhood,” we argue for a different approach: A judge ought to give significant weight to the views of others, but only when those others share the judge’s basic methodology or interpretive outlook—i.e., only when those others are methodological “friends.” Thus textualists should hesitate before disagreeing with other textualists, and pragmatists should hesitate before disagreeing with like-minded pragmatists. Disagreement between the two camps is, by contrast, “old news” and so provides neither camp additional reason for pause. We also suggest that judges should give weight to the views of all of their methodological friends, not just judges. And we suggest, even more tentatively, that our proposal may explain and, to some extent, justify the seemingly ideological clusters of justices on the Supreme Court. The most productive disagreements, we think, are ones that come from arguing with friends.

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Diller, Kevin. "Does contemporary theology require a postfoundationalist way of knowing?" Scottish Journal of Theology 60, no. 3 (August 2007): 271–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930607003286.

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AbstractIn hisThe Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, F. LeRon Shults recommendspostfoundationalismas avia mediabetween modernist foundationalism and postmodernist antifoundationalism. He advocates postfoundationalism as an epistemological approach which avoids the pitfalls on either side and provides the best way forward for constructive theological work. In this article I attempt to assess how well Shults's proposal treats Christian theological knowing. I begin by entertaining a Barthian theological concern which might be employed as soft criteria for an assessment of any proposed theological epistemology. This concern stipulates that an epistemology in the service of Christian theology must respect a commitment to the objective reality of God who, as Word become flesh, makes himself known through the human experience of reality to his church, while recognising the fallibility of human knowing, presupposing a knowledge of God accessible through experience always only by the prevenient, self-giving action of God. I then turn to a brief analysis of the Shults–van Huyssteen case against foundationalism and nonfoundationalism, focusing particularly on the postfoundationalist critiques of foundationalism and fideism in dialogue with Barth. The article concludes with an appraisal of the postfoundationalist recommendation. I argue that Shults's approach maps well to the theological concern for critical realism and a recognition of the social embeddedness of human knowing. Postfoundationalism's underlying commitments, however, leave it closed to an external source of warrant, and as a consequence repudiate afrom aboveview of theological knowing. I suggest instead that only atheofoundationalist epistemology avoids the pitfalls sketched by Shults in a way that maintains proper epistemic humility without entering the ghettos of fideism or scepticism.

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Han, Paul K. J., Tania D. Strout, Caitlin Gutheil, Carl Germann, Brian King, Eirik Ofstad, Pål Gulbrandsen, and Robert Trowbridge. "How Physicians Manage Medical Uncertainty: A Qualitative Study and Conceptual Taxonomy." Medical Decision Making 41, no. 3 (February 15, 2021): 275–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989x21992340.

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Background Medical uncertainty is a pervasive and important problem, but the strategies physicians use to manage it have not been systematically described. Objectives To explore the uncertainty management strategies employed by physicians practicing in acute-care hospital settings and to organize these strategies within a conceptual taxonomy that can guide further efforts to understand and improve physicians’ tolerance of medical uncertainty. Design Qualitative study using individual in-depth interviews. Participants Convenience sample of 22 physicians and trainees (11 attending physicians, 7 residents [postgraduate years 1–3), 4 fourth-year medical students), working within 3 medical specialties (emergency medicine, internal medicine, internal medicine–pediatrics), at a single large US teaching hospital. Measurements Semistructured interviews explored participants’ strategies for managing medical uncertainty and temporal changes in their uncertainty tolerance. Inductive qualitative analysis of audio-recorded interview transcripts was conducted to identify and categorize key themes and to develop a coherent conceptual taxonomy of uncertainty management strategies. Results Participants identified various uncertainty management strategies that differed in their primary focus: 1) ignorance-focused, 2) uncertainty-focused, 3) response-focused, and 4) relationship-focused. Ignorance- and uncertainty-focused strategies were primarily curative (aimed at reducing uncertainty), while response- and relationship-focused strategies were primarily palliative (aimed at ameliorating aversive effects of uncertainty). Several participants described a temporal evolution in their tolerance of uncertainty, which coincided with the development of greater epistemic maturity, humility, flexibility, and openness. Conclusions Physicians and physician-trainees employ a variety of uncertainty management strategies focused on different goals, and their tolerance of uncertainty evolves with the development of several key capacities. More work is needed to understand and improve the management of medical uncertainty by physicians, and a conceptual taxonomy can provide a useful organizing framework for this work.

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Savchyn, Myroslav. "Postmodern worldview and problematic context of personality’s psychological cognition." Psihologìâ ì suspìlʹstvo 4, no. 82 (December 1, 2020): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/pis2020.04.007.

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The semantic characteristics of the postmodern worldview and its mostly destructive influence on the state of solving the existing problems of psychological science are analyzed at the methodological level. In this worldview, the image of the world is seen as a multidimensional, heterogeneous, mosaic formation, and culture is seen as a sphere of manifestation of the ecstasy of communication; emphasis is placed on the dynamics of processes and no attention is paid to stable modes; the order is sought in chaos, which somehow helps to maintain a sense of stability of the system in a deficit of order, the opposite processes of structuring and chaos are reflected and the idea of multiplicity of beauty is developed. In the bosom of this worldview, life is seen as a text, and communication (dialogue) as a key moment in the personality’s social existence, the contextuality (dependence on socio-cultural influences) of human’s everyday life is proclaimed, procedures of controlling the discourses are characterized, which is caused by “linguistic turn”, concentration of considerations on the texts. It is noted that postmodern ideology actually declares a taboo on science, objectivity in the world cognition, because imitation is attributed to reality itself, the possibility of constructing a systematized theory and philosophy is denied, the network principle of knowledge organization is proposed, and to ensure its “objectivity” it is proposed to abandon the category of subject in order to get rid of the subjectivity of cognition, which seems to be manifested in the adherence to values and meanings of cognitive activity, and to define the structure of cognition the concept of “epistem” is operated, which characterizes the structure of historically variable cognition. In general, in the postmodern worldview it is promoted to achieve objectivity through dialogue, communication, and convention, when intersubjectivity is a criterion of truth, and methodological progress is associated with interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. In this worldview dimension, against the background of nihilism, the personality is considered as dynamic, flowing, changeable, polyphonic, not rigidly determined, emancipated structurally, and without a stabilizing core (spiritual Self, gender, Self-concept), individually unique is exaggeratedly interpreted, that one which is not combined with universal and neutral in relation to objective values (for example, amoralism). Freedom is misinterpreted as permissiveness, even in the field of self-realization and self-creation. The postmodernist idea of narrative as a textual interpretation of the world, one’s personality and one’s life is analyzed. It is argued that there can be different relationships between the processes of real life and narration, because a person is able to live fully without resorting to narration. It is noted that postmodernism neglects the stabilizing phenomena of the human’s inner world, the eternal meanings of life (creation of faith, love, good and the fight against evil, the spread of authentic freedom and responsibility, hope, happy moments, healing states of humility and repentance for unworthy deeds, spiritual understanding of suffering). It is argued that due to the focus on the spiritual in his inner world and life, personality constructively overcomes chaos, organizes worries, thoughts, intentions, she has great hope, realizes great life goals, finds authentic meanings of being and then she really feels happy. The spiritual Self makes us stronger, allows us to act intelligently in conditions of uncertainty, the pressure of complex problems allows us to overcome stressful situations, to benefit from our own spiritual suffering.

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