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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Epistemic intuitions

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Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic intuitions'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 15 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Epistemic intuitions"

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Huber, Jakob. "Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68, no. 5 (2020): 689–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0047.

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Abstract Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific (hypothetical) cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuit

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Nagel, Jennifer. "Epistemic Intuitions." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 6 (2007): 792–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x.

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SPICER, Finn. "Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 2 (2006): 366–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x.

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Moretti, Luca, and Tomoji Shogenji. "Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7, no. 1 (2017): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-006011213.

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This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a f

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Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." Philosophical Topics 29, no. 1 (2001): 429–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2001291/217.

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Clarke, Murray. "Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms." Logos & Episteme 1, no. 2 (2010): 269–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2010125.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000224.

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AbstractReligious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to such potential defeaters, emphasizing the way epistemic intuitions are i

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Dinges, Alexander. "EPISTEMIC INVARIANTISM AND CONTEXTUALIST INTUITIONS." Episteme 13, no. 2 (2015): 219–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.36.

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ABSTRACTEpistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by

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Roberts, Pendaran, James Andow, and Kelly Ann Schmidtke. "Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity." Synthese 195, no. 7 (2017): 3267–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6.

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Goh, Esther. "The Argument from Variation against Using One’s Own Intuitions as Evidence." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2 (2019): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956232.

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In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is n

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistemic intuitions"

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Eagleson, Ian. "The epistemic role of Kantian intuitions /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9952649.

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Loev, Wjatscheslaw. "Intellectual affectivism : intuition experiences are epistemic feelings." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PSLEE065.

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La question directrice de la présente thèse est : « Quel type d'états sont des intuitions ? » Nous appelons la réponse développée ici Affectivisme Intellectuel. L'affectivisme soutient que les intuitions sont des expériences affectives, ou plus précisément : ce sont des cas spécifiques de sentiments épistémiques, de sentiments de vérité et de sentiments de fausseté. Dans un premier temps, l'état cible dont l'affectivisme est une théorie est distingué d'autres choses que nous appelons aussi « intuition ». Le profil caractéristique des « intuitions » au sens des expériences intuitives ciblées pa

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Silva, Matheus Martins. "Uma nova defesa da tese da equivalência." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/148463.

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A tese da equivalência afirma que as condicionais indicativas e a condicional material possuem condições de verdade equivalentes, i.e., elas são falsas quando possuem a antecedente verdadeira e a consequente falsa, mas são verdadeiras nas demais circunstâncias. Essa tese tem algumas consequências contra-intuitivas. Por exemplo, ela implica que qualquer condicional com uma antecedente falsa é verdadeira. Isso é estranho, pois não é intuitivo pensar que a condicional “Se a lua é feita de queijo, então 2 +2 = 4” é verdadeira somente porque a lua não é feita de queijo. Antes, pensamos que a consti

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Bickart, John. "The possible role of intuition in the child's epistemic beliefs in the Piagetian data set." Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3589794.

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<p> U.S. schools teach predominately to the analytical, left-brain, which has foundations in behaviorism, and uses a mechanistic paradigm that influences epistemic beliefs of how learning takes place. This result is that learning is impeded. Using discourse analysis of a set of Piagetian children, this study re-analyzed Piaget's work. This study found that, although the participating children answered from both an intuitive and an analytical perspective, Piaget's analysis of the interviews ignored the value in the intuitive, right-brain answers; Piaget essentially stated that the children were

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Greve, Sebastian. "Skill and scepticism : an enquiry concerning the nature and epistemic value of intuitive judgement." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1bd76173-f478-4f31-9a1d-8f6a5e3923ce.

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This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value

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Altran, José. "Episteme do Inefável: razões da irracionalidade na univocidade mística." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/1928.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Altran.pdf: 1835681 bytes, checksum: 676cdf4ba6912928ccee8a5a2f3d586b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-12<br>The dissertation suggests that an epistemology that listen to irrationality is relevant to face perennial obstacles in the philosophy of science, against which many objects collide. This seems to be an especially useful alternative in the sciences of religion, where we see ourselves immobilized by rationality when engaging researches that are related to their typically unspeakable phenomena. The mystic

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Buck-Rieder, Christina [Verfasser], den Berg Karen [Gutachter] van, and Tasos [Gutachter] Zembylas. "Die Vermittlung künstlerischer Episteme an Hochschulen und Universitäten. Zwischen Emanzipation, Intuition und Heuristik / Christina Buck-Rieder ; Gutachter: Karen van den Berg, Tasos Zembylas." Friedrichshafen : Zeppelin Universität, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1220079642/34.

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Books on the topic "Epistemic intuitions"

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Goldman, Alvin I. Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0013.

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Gettier’s 1963 paper was enormously influential. Virtually all epistemologists agreed with Gettier that the JTB analaysis was mistaken. But this conclusion evidently depended on the reliability of the shared intuitions of Gettier’s and his philosophical contemporaries about the epistemological examples described in his chapter. How reliable are such intuitions? Today many philosophers challenge the reliability of classification intuitions. How are such challenges to be addressed, and what can we learn about the comparative reliability of putative experts (e.g. philosophers) and laypersons? Her

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Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.001.0001.

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Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skep

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Weinberg, Jonathan M. Intuitions. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.25.

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This article examines the philosophical methodology of intuitions beginning with an argument developed by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen over the descriptive adequacy of what Cappelen calls “methodological rationalism”, and their own preferred view, “intuition nihilism”. Based on inadequacies in both accounts, it offers a descriptive take on intuition-deploying philosophical practice today via what it calls “Protean Crypto-Rationalism”. It then describes the epistemic profile of the appeal to intuition, listing four key aspects of the basic shape of intuition-deploying philosophical practice:

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Lord, Errol. Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.27.

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After Edmund Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, epistemology was dominated by attempts to explain what is needed in order to make justified true belief knowledge. The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this chapter

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Horne, Zachary, and Andrei Cimpian. Subtle Syntactic Cues Affect Intuitions about Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0002.

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To investigate the nature and limits of knowledge, epistemologists often consult intuitions about whether people can be said to have knowledge or, alternatively, to know particular propositions. This chapter identifies a problem with this method. Although the intuitions elicited via statements about “knowledge” and “knowing” are treated as interchangeable sources of evidence, these intuitions actually differ. Building on prior psychological evidence, the chapter hypothesizes that the epistemic state denoted by the noun “knowledge” is viewed as stronger (e.g. more certain, more reliable) than t

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Waterman, John, Chad Gonnerman, Karen Yan, and Joshua Alexander. Knowledge, Certainty, and Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865085.003.0009.

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Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an important role in underwriting ordinary practice in contemporary epistemology. But is it true? Here the authors present several studies that examine epistemic universalism by looking at the relationships between cultural background, folk knowledge attribution, and salience effects, whereby mention of an unrealized possibility of error undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge. These studies suggest that there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic

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Stich, Stephen. Knowledge, intuition, and culture. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789710.003.0017.

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The question that is center stage in this chapter is: Do intuitions about knowledge vary across cultures? The chapter begins by explaining what intuitions are, how they are used in philosophy, and why the presence or absence of cultural variation in philosophical intuitions is important for both philosophy and cognitive science. The remainder of the chapter recounts a line of research aimed at determining whether or not intuitions about knowledge vary across cultures. The focus is on “Gettier intuitions.” The results reported support the core folk epistemology hypothesis that maintains that pe

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Pettigrew, Richard. Making Things Right. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0010.

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Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for

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Ganeri, Jonardon. Epistemology from a Sanskritic Point of View. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865085.003.0002.

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The author argues against the universality thesis, by which “the properties of the English word know and the English sentence “S knows that p” are shared by translations of these expressions in most or all languages.” The author argues that not only does the Sanskrit pramā, the closest term to English knowledge, have different properties, but its properties are most closely related to what epistemologists are investigating. English epistemic vocabulary brings with it parochial associations, including a static rather than a performative picture of epistemic agency, a model of justification that

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Rosenkranz, Sven. Justification as Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865636.001.0001.

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Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous that vindicates core internalist intuitions, without construing justification as an internal condition. The account conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, and of being in a position to know, respectively. It thus contrasts with other recently proposed views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. In developing his account, Rosenkranz devises a suitable non-n

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Book chapters on the topic "Epistemic intuitions"

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Moser, Paul K. "Epistemic Foundationalism (II): Epistemic Intuitionism." In Empirical Justification. Springer Netherlands, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4526-5_5.

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Seidel, Markus. "Epistemic Absolutism That Can Accommodate the Relativist’s Intuition." In Epistemic Relativism. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137377890_5.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Epistemic Intuition and Experimental Philosophy." In Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0013.

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This chapter considers the skeptical objection to epistemic intuition that is based on experimental philosophy, which aims to use the methods of cognitive science to conduct experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central philosophical issues. Section 1 carefully lays out this objection, identifying the crucial premises on which it relies. Section 2 considers how strong this objection needs to be if it is to be successful, arguing that stronger objections are needed if the beliefs the objections are intended to undermine are rationally held with a high degree of confidence (as appears to be the case with the beliefs based on epistemic intuition that are targeted by this objection). Section 3 examines the objection from experimental philosophy in detail, noting that each of its crucial premises faces serious challenges, with the result that it is not strong enough to undermine the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s reliance on epistemic intuitions. Section 4 draws together the various argumentative strands in the book and situates the book’s conclusions in a moderate commonsense tradition that avoids the extremes of both dogmatism and radical skepticism.

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"Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." In Biological and Cultural Bases of Human Inference. Psychology Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203774908-15.

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Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." In Collected Papers, Volume 2. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction." In Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006.

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This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.

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BOYD, KENNETH, and JENNIFER NAGEL. "The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions." In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203122884-7.

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ALEXANDER, JOSHUA, and JONATHAN M. WEINBERG. "The "Unreliability" of Epistemic Intuitions." In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203122884-8.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity." In Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009.

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This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses." In Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0007.

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This chapter elucidates and defends intuitionist particularism, which is introduced in Chapter Six. Sections 1 and 2 focus on seemings, elucidating the nature of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings and defending the reliance of intuitionist particularism on seemings. These sections present a detailed account of what seemings are and respond to various objections to seemings playing a role in philosophical work. Sections 3 and 4 elucidate the goal of the intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism (noting that it is not intended to convert the skeptic) and defend the respectability of that commonsense response against the charges that it fails to engage the skeptic or to take radical skepticism seriously.

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Conference papers on the topic "Epistemic intuitions"

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Ruge, Johanna, and Annette Bögle. "Models as design tools – physical models and their epistemic value." In IABSE Congress, New York, New York 2019: The Evolving Metropolis. International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2749/newyork.2019.1443.

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<p>In the twentieth century, efficient and elegant structures were designed by engineers like Heinz Hossdorf. At that time, these structures could not be analytically calculated or evaluated. Instead, physical models were built to verify the engineer’s intuition, gain experience and allow further development of designs.</p><p>Nowadays, engineers use digital models that allow the calculation of nearly any conceivable structure. This results in two phenomena: First, when every shape is feasible and most materials are at disposal, there is a high risk of arbitrary design. Additi

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