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Journal articles on the topic 'Epistemic intuitions'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 15 February 2022

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1

Huber, Jakob. "Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68, no. 5 (2020): 689–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0047.

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Abstract Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific (hypothetical) cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuit

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2

Nagel, Jennifer. "Epistemic Intuitions." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 6 (2007): 792–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x.

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3

SPICER, Finn. "Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 2 (2006): 366–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x.

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4

Moretti, Luca, and Tomoji Shogenji. "Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7, no. 1 (2017): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-006011213.

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This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a f

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5

Weinberg, Jonathan M., Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions." Philosophical Topics 29, no. 1 (2001): 429–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2001291/217.

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Clarke, Murray. "Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms." Logos & Episteme 1, no. 2 (2010): 269–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2010125.

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Bergmann, Michael. "Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (October 2017): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000224.

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AbstractReligious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to such potential defeaters, emphasizing the way epistemic intuitions are i

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8

Dinges, Alexander. "EPISTEMIC INVARIANTISM AND CONTEXTUALIST INTUITIONS." Episteme 13, no. 2 (2015): 219–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.36.

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ABSTRACTEpistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by

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Roberts, Pendaran, James Andow, and Kelly Ann Schmidtke. "Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity." Synthese 195, no. 7 (2017): 3267–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6.

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10

Goh, Esther. "The Argument from Variation against Using One’s Own Intuitions as Evidence." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2 (2019): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956232.

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In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation in intuitions shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is n

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11

SOSA, Ernest. "INTUITIONS: THEIR NATURE AND EPISTEMIC EFFICACY." Grazer Philosophische Studien 74, no. 1 (2007): 51–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789401204651_004.

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12

Spicer, Finn. "Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1, no. 4 (2010): 515–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0023-2.

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13

Kim, Minsun, and Yuan Yuan. "NO CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE GETTIER CAR CASE INTUITION: A REPLICATION STUDY OF WEINBERG ET AL. 2001." Episteme 12, no. 3 (2015): 355–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.17.

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AbstractIn “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (NEI), Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier-style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Gettier Car Case. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI's 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross-cultural difference about the intuition concerning the case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication stud

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14

Killoren, David. "Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2017): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v4i1.39.

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There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. A central question in that debate concerns peer d

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15

Sękowski, Krzysztof. "Analiza empirycznych argumentów na rzecz tezy o zróżnicowaniu kulturowym intuicji epistemicznych." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14, no. 2 (2019): 75–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.14.2.4.

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An analysis of empirical arguments for the thesis on cultural diversity of epistemic intuitionsThe founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experimental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 2001. The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified.That

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Colaço, David, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich, and Edouard Machery. "EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS IN FAKE-BARN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS." Episteme 11, no. 2 (2014): 199–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.7.

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AbstractIn epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether members of the general public share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older particip

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Seyedsayamdost, Hamid. "ON NORMATIVITY AND EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS: FAILURE OF REPLICATION." Episteme 12, no. 1 (2014): 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.27.

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AbstractThe field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of the fundamental methods used in philosophy. One of the earlier influential papers that gave rise to the experimental philosophy movement titled ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’ by Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001), reported that respondents displayed different epistemic intuitions depending on their ethnic background as well as socioeconomic status. These findings, if robust,

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18

Textor, Mark. "Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions." Erkenntnis 71, no. 3 (2009): 395–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9176-8.

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19

Popovic, Nenad. "The Power of Appearances." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9, no. 1 (2019): 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20181284.

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One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards solutions that can fully explain the conflict of epistemic intuitions.

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20

Simic, Ivana. "The concept of epistemic justification." Theoria, Beograd 45, no. 1-4 (2002): 7–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0204007s.

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The thesis of this paper is that there are two distinct notions of epistemic justification, namely, deontological and non-deontological justification that work together in a full account of epistemic justification that is necessary for knowledge. These two notions apply to different beliefs. The non-deontological justification applies to first-order beliefs, while the deontological justification applies to second-order beliefs (metabeliefs). From the external perspective, although a subject, S, needs not to have any metabeliefs that are the subject of the deontological justification in order t

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21

Lee, Kok Yong. "Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts?" Logos & Episteme 11, no. 1 (2020): 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201114.

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It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view that one’s epistemic position may vary wi

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22

GOLDMAN, Alvin I. "PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS." Grazer Philosophische Studien 74, no. 1 (2007): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789401204651_002.

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23

Osborne, Philip. "A MODEST RESPONSE TO EMPIRICAL SKEPTICISM ABOUT INTUITIONS." Episteme 11, no. 4 (2014): 443–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.23.

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AbstractIn his paper entitled “How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism,” Jonathan Weinberg challenges the practice of using intuitions to substantiate philosophical theses by appealing to the principle (defended empirically) that we ought to trust only evidence sources that are not “hopeless,” where an evidence source is hopeless when it exhibits “fallibility unmitigated by a decent capacity for detecting and correcting the errors it entails.” Since intuitions are hopeless, they ought not be trusted. I respond by appealing to an alternative principle and defend this

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24

Strupp-Levitsky, Michael, Sharareh Noorbaloochi, Andrew Shipley, and John T. Jost. "Moral “foundations” as the product of motivated social cognition: Empathy and other psychological underpinnings of ideological divergence in “individualizing” and “binding” concerns." PLOS ONE 15, no. 11 (2020): e0241144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241144.

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According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrativ

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25

Pérez Otero, Manuel. "¿Existe conocimiento epistémicamente irracional?" Principia: an international journal of epistemology 22, no. 2 (2019): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p229.

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I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification

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26

Nagel, Jennifer. "Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87, no. 1 (2013): 179–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12008.

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27

Petersen, Esben Nedenskov. "Denying knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 1 (2014): 36–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.892763.

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Intuitions about contextualist cases such as Cohen’s airport case pose a problem for classical anti-skeptical versions of invariantism. Recently, Tim Black (2005), Jessica Brown (2006), and Patrick Rysiew (2001, 2005, 2007) have argued that the classical invariantist can respond by arguing that pragmatic aspects of epistemic discourse are responsible for the relevant problematic intuitions. This paper identifies the mechanisms of conversational implicature and impliciture as the basic sources of hope for this explanatory strategy. It then argues that neither of these sources provides the class

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28

Davidson, Barbara, and Robert Pargetter. "In Defence of the Dutch Book Argument." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 3 (1985): 405–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1985.10716426.

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A starting point for this paper is that there is at least one concept of probability, call it epistemic probability, which can be identified with belief or some sort of idealised belief (e.g., rational belief). If this identification is to be of any significance, then it needs to be shown that epistemic probability is a ‘true’ probability concept and is subject to those restrictions and requirements which relate and govern probabilities, which we call the probability calculus.The most rehearsed argument to establish the probability calculus for epistemic probabilities is the Dutch Book Argumen

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29

Stich, Stephen. "Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87, no. 1 (2012): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00590.x.

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30

Aschliman, Lance K. "IS TRUE BELIEF REALLY A FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC VALUE?" Episteme 17, no. 1 (2018): 88–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.29.

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ABSTRACTIn this paper, I question the orthodox position that true belief is a fundamental epistemic value. I begin by raising a particularly epistemic version of the so-called “value problem of knowledge” in order to set up the basic explanandum and to motivate some of the claims to follow. In the second section, I take aim at what I call “bottom-up approaches” to this value problem, views that attempt to explain the added epistemic value of knowledge in terms of its relation to a more fundamental value of true belief. The final section is a presentation of a value-theoretic alternative, one t

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Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity: The Case of Historiography." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 5 (2019): 331–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393119842787.

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This article tackles the problem of normativity in naturalism and considers it in the context of the philosophy of historiography. I argue that strong naturalism is inconsistent with genuine normativity. The strong naturalist faces a difficult dilemma. If he rejects any reliance on conceptual intuitions, his epistemic inquiries will not get off the ground. As a consequence, his analyses of historiography are, in effect, normatively irrelevant: any practice is epistemically as valuable as any other. Another option for the strong naturalist is to relax methodological requirements and accept that

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Frapolli, Maria Jose. "Non-Representational Mathematical Realism." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, no. 3 (2015): 331–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.14105.

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This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable (Gödel 1995, p. 150).</p><p>I will argue for the followin

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33

Keren, Arnon. "Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge." Episteme 4, no. 3 (2007): 368–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360007000147.

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I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the proposition. The account explains the intuitive appeal of the basic principle associated with the transmission view of testimony: the principle according to which, a listener can normally obtain testimon

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Bogosian, Chad A. "Impeccability, Consensus, and Trusting One’s Intuitions: Why Epistemic Might Doesn’t Make Rationally Right." Southwest Philosophy Review 31, no. 1 (2015): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20153118.

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35

Sankey, Howard. "Kuhn, Normativiy and History and Philosophy of Science." EPISTEMOLOGIA, no. 1 (July 2012): 103–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/epis2012-001008.

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The paper addresses the relation between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. Historical evidence of change of scientific method may seem to support epistemic relativism. But this does not entail that epistemic justification varies with methods employed by scientists. An argument is required that justification depends on such methods. Following discussion of Kuhn, the paper considers treatment of epistemic normativity by Lakatos, Laudan and Worrall. Lakatos and Laudan propose that the history of science may adjudicate between theories of method. H

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MacBride, Fraser. "Analytic Philosophy and its Synoptic Commission: Towards the Epistemic End of Days." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 74 (June 30, 2014): 221–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246114000095.

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AbstractThere is no such thing as ‘analytic philosophy’, conceived as a special discipline with its own distinctive subject matter or peculiar method. But there is an analytic task for philosophy that distinguishes it from other reflective pursuits, a global or synoptic commission: to establish whether the final outputs of other disciplines and common sense can be fused into a single periscopic vision of the Universe. And there is the hard-won insight that thought and language aren't transparent but stand in need of analysis – a recent variation upon the abiding philosophical theme that we nee

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37

Langkau, Julia. "Two Kinds of Imaginative Vividness." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51, no. 1 (2021): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.54.

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AbstractThis paper argues that we should distinguish two different kinds of imaginative vividness: vividness of mental images and vividness of imaginative experiences. Philosophy has focussed on mental images, but distinguishing more complex vivid imaginative experiences from vivid mental images can help us understand our intuitions concerning the notion as well as the explanatory power of vividness. In particular, it can help us understand the epistemic role imagination can play on the one hand and our emotional engagement with literary fiction on the other hand.

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Carr, Jennifer Rose. "Don’t stop believing." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 5-6 (2015): 744–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1123454.

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It’s been argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality. These arguments come partly in response to certain kinds of counterexamples to Conditionalization, but are mainly motivated by a form of internalism that appears to be in tension with any sort of diachronic coherence requirements. I argue that there are, in fact, fundamentally diachronic norms of rationality. And this is to reject at least a strong version of internalism. But I suggest a replacement for Conditionalization that salvages internalist intuitions, and carves a middle ground between (probabilist versions o

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Bräuer, Felix. "LOOKING BEYOND REDUCTIONISM AND ANTI-REDUCTIONISM." Episteme 17, no. 2 (2018): 230–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.39.

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ABSTRACTUnder which conditions are we epistemically justified to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justification reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively, someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following this line of thought, this paper develops an accoun

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Beebe, James R., and Ryan Undercoffer. "Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings." Journal of Cognition and Culture 16, no. 3-4 (2016): 322–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342182.

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In 2004 Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich published what has become one of the most widely discussed papers in experimental philosophy, in which they reported that East Asian and Western participants had different intuitions about the semantic reference of proper names. A flurry of criticisms of their work has emerged, and although various replications have been performed, many critics remain unconvinced. We review the current debate over Machery et al.’s (2004) results and take note of which objections to their work have been satisfactorily answered and which ones s

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Bublitz, Christoph. "RIGHTS AS RATIONALIZATIONS? PSYCHOLOGICAL DEBUNKING OF BELIEFS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS." Legal Theory 27, no. 2 (2021): 97–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325221000082.

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ABSTRACTThis paper explores a novel type of argument in legal theory—a psychological debunking argument—by the example of the justification of human rights and based on a psychological dual-process model of decision-making. Debunking arguments undermine confidence in a belief because of shortcomings of the empirical conditions under which it was formed. They thereby open a route from the descriptive to the evaluative, from Is to Ought, without illicitly crossing metaethical waters since they involve normative premises. As they are epistemic, they cannot replace substantive arguments on the mer

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Shaheen, Jonathan L. "Hegel, Humility, and the Possibility of Intrinsic Properties." Hegel Bulletin 32, no. 1-2 (2011): 100–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200000185.

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Rae Langton (1998) offers a non-idealist interpretation of Kantian things in themselves according to which we have no knowledge of things in themselves – the intrinsic nature of things – just because our epistemic access to things is via their relational, non-intrinsic properties. Whatever the merits of her account as an interpretation of Kant's metaphysics, its plausibility presupposes the coherence of her notion of intrinsic properties. According to the account of intrinsic properties Langton uses, as we will see, there are only intrinsic properties if certain worlds are possible. Allais (20

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Goldberg, Sanford C. "ON THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIDENCE YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD." Episteme 13, no. 4 (2016): 449–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.24.

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ABSTRACTElsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of scenario, there is a clash between a subject's higher-order evidence and the evidence she should have had: S's higher-order

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Ocheretyany, K. A. "Russian Cosmism – the Theory of Media Epistemic Actions." Discourse 5, no. 4 (2019): 26–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2019-5-4-26-41.

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Introduction. The paper deals with the possibility of referring to a conceptual resource of Russian cosmism to clarify the position of a man in the modern media realism. Cosmist philosophers for the first time drew attention to the fact that the possible conquest of space will be primarily a rediscovery of man. Indeed, space devices mastered not so much space, as a man in his communicative nature, organizing new connections, new communities, new meanings.Methodology and sources. Methodologically, the research work is based on philosophical analysis of primary sources and research literature.Re

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Peels, Rik. "The Social Dimension of Responsible Belief: Response to Sanford Goldberg." Journal of Philosophical Research 44 (2019): 79–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201944150.

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Goldberg has argued in several writings of his that our social context is crucial in determining whether we believe responsibly or not. In this reply to his criticisms, I explore whether my Influence Account of responsible belief can do justice to this social dimension of responsible belief. I discuss the case of Nancy the scientist, that of Fernando the doctor, and that of Janice who promises Ismelda to shovel her lane. I argue that the core solution to the challenges these cases provide is to distinguish between different kinds of intellectual obligations, such as epistemic, moral, and profe

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Ciurria, Michelle. "Critical Thinking in Moral Argumentation Contexts: A Virtue Ethical Approach." Informal Logic 32, no. 2 (2012): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v32i2.3298.

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In traditional analytic philosophy, critical thinking is defined along Cartesian lines as rational and linear reasoning preclusive of intuitions, emotions and lived experience. According to Michael Gilbert, this view – which he calls the Natural Light Theory (NLT) – fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminist forms of argumentation and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I argue that while Gilbert’s criticism is correct for argumentation in general, NLT fails in a distinctive and particularly problematic manner in moral argumentation contexts. Th

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Cabanchick, Samuel M. "Certeza, duda escéptica y saber." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 21, no. 62 (1989): 67–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1989.717.

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Traditionally, the skeptic has been considered as a threat to our claims to true and justified knowledge. Also, certainty appears to be as the highest possible degree of knowledge. Knowledge and certainty are thus opposed to skepticism. This paper wants to show that 'certainty' and knowledge are, probably, incompatible notions, and that the possibility of a doubt about the assumed certainty is a necessary condition to distinguish between belief and knowledge, and to construe any kind of knowledge. Its starting point is Moore's notion of cerfainty, Moore demands that the expression of certainty

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Fett, João Rizzio Vicente. "Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 20, no. 2 (2017): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179 Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to

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Kasavin, Ilya T. "Virtue Epistemology: on the 40th Anniversary of the Turn in Analytical Philosophy." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 6–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956341.

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The article summarizes the main developments in virtue epistemology and reacts to the challenges faced by the discipline. This new trend in analytic epistemology emerges as a synthesis of a number of directions (metaethics, social epistemology, metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy). On the one hand, it attempts to overcome some weaknesses of classical epistemology and, on the other hand, it performs this on the same basis, retaining the classical understanding of knowledge as justified true belief. It was dubbed “virtue epistemology” since it focuses on restoration of the normative appro

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Latimer, Trevor. "Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory." European Journal of Political Theory 17, no. 1 (2015): 65–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885115591344.

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I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather than according to a substantive standard of competence. The alternative avoids standards objections to M

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