Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic privilege'

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Journal articles on the topic "Epistemic privilege"

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Fricker, Miranda. "Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 25 (1999): 191–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10716836.

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[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic
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Verdejo, Víctor M. "Against Artifactual Epistemic Privilege." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 46, no. 136 (2014): 43–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2014.661.

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The deep intentional roots of artifacts and artifactual kinds seem to give intuitive as well as philosophical support to a form of epistemic privilege for makers regarding the objects they create. In this paper, I critically examine the thesis of epistemic privilege for artifact creators and present a counterexample based on anti-individualism. Several objections to the counterexample are considered and responded to. I conclude that, if anti-individualism is true, then the alleged epistemic privilege of creators of artifacts is either false or an explanatorily idle label. I argue, finally, tha
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Cassam, Quassim. "Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege." Monist 87, no. 2 (2004): 255–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20048729.

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Parke, Emily C. "Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege." Philosophy of Science 81, no. 4 (2014): 516–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677956.

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Wolf, Allison B. "“Tell Me How That Makes You Feel”: Philosophy's Reason/Emotion Divide and Epistemic Pushback in Philosophy Classrooms." Hypatia 32, no. 4 (2017): 893–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12378.

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Alison Bailey has recently explored the nature of what she calls privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback or “the variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when they are asked to consider both the lived experience and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience daily.” In this article, I want to use Bailey's argument to demonstrate how privilege‐evasive epistemic pushback is facilitated and obscured by the disciplinary tools of traditional Western philosophy. Specifically, through exploring philosophical cultures of justification and case
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Kotzee, Ben. "Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege." Argumentation 24, no. 3 (2010): 265–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10503-010-9181-8.

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Walker∗, J. C. "PHILOSOPHY, EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE." Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 6, no. 1 (1985): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0159630850060101.

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Narayan, Uma. "Working Together Across Difference: Some Considerations on Emotions and Political Practice." Hypatia 3, no. 2 (1988): 31–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1988.tb00067.x.

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Uma Narayan attempts to clarify what the feminist notion of the ‘epistemic privilege of the oppressed’ does and does not imply. She argues that the fact that oppressed ‘insiders’ have epistemic privilege regarding their oppression creates problems in dialogue with and coalitionary politics involving ‘outsiders’ who do not share the oppression, since the latter fail to come to terms with the epistemic privilege of the insiders. She concretely analyzes different ways in which the emotions of insiders can be inadvertantly hurt by outsiders and suggests ways in which such problems can be minimized
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Rolin, Kristina. "The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology." Episteme 3, no. 1-2 (2006): 125–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2006.3.1-2.125.

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ABSTRACTSandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as better than others, the si
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Wray, K. Brad. "Epistemic Privilege and the Success of Science." Noûs 46, no. 3 (2010): 375–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00793.x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistemic privilege"

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Barnette, Kara, and Kara Barnette. "Necessary Error: Josiah Royce, Communal Inquiry, and Feminist Epistemology." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12323.

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Feminist epistemologists have often argued that our relationships with structures of power shape the content, expression, and social force of what we know. While feminist standpoint theorists have often maintained that experiences on the margins of social power can lead to better understandings of the roles of systems of oppression in society, more recent writings on epistemologies of ignorance examine the reverse, how experiences from positions of social power limit our understandings. In this project, I draw on the concept of epistemic privilege as it has been formulated by feminist standpo
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Abruzzo, Vincent G. "Content and Contrastive Self-Knowledge." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/108.

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It is widely believed that we have immediate, introspective access to the content of our own thoughts. This access is assumed to be privileged in a way that our access to the thought content of others is not. It is also widely believed that, in many cases, thought content is individuated according to properties that are external to the thinker's head. I will refer to these theses as privileged access and content externalism, respectively. Though both are widely held to be true, various arguments have been put forth to the effect that they are incompatible. This charge of incompatibilism has be
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Books on the topic "Epistemic privilege"

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Pasnau, Robert. The Privileged Now. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801788.003.0005.

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This chapter ascends to the intellectual level and considers our ability to reason from premises to a conclusion. Is there some domain of epistemic privilege, at the intellectual level, where we can be certain that things are just as they seem to be? This requires considering an unfamiliar question: the extent to which we can or should attempt to encompass a whole chain of thoughts within the scope of the privileged now. The idea of the privileged now, which is a close relative of the modern notion of working memory, can be found to go back to Anselm. It runs through scholastic philosophy and
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Harris, Harriet A. The Epistemology of Feminist Theology. Edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.44.

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This chapter examines four modes of feminism and their diverse epistemological attitudes: liberal, experience, women’s-voice, and poststructuralist feminisms. Liberal feminists commit to objectivity, autonomy, and impartiality; experience and women’s-voice feminists claim epistemic privilege for women or the marginaliazed; and poststructuralists typically avoid epistemological claims. While they diverge over whether to aspire to truth claims, all feminist theologians are interested in our realizing our humanity. This chapter considers Schiller’s aesthetic philosophy that argues that truth is e
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Gatzia, Dimitria Electra, and Berit Brogaard, eds. The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190648916.001.0001.

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Most of the research on the epistemology of perception has focused on visual perception. This is hardly surprising given that most of our knowledge about the world is attributable to our visual experiences. This edited volume is the first to instead focus on the epistemology of non-visual perception—hearing, touch, taste, and cross-sensory experiences. Drawing on recent empirical studies of emotion, perception, and decision-making, it breaks new ground on discussions of whether perceptual experience can yield justified beliefs and how to characterize those beliefs. The Epistemology of Non-Visu
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Lord, Errol. What it is to Possess a Reason. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0003.

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It is a truism that in order to possess a reason, one must stand in a privileged epistemic relation with that reason. Most of the literature on possession is about this condition. This chapter defends a view about the epistemic condition. It does this by considering three different divisions between views about the epistemic condition and arguing via process of elimination that the epistemic condition is being in a position to know. Along the way arguments are given against the E = K thesis and the view that reasons explanations are non-factive. Initial connections between possession and corre
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Manne, Kate. Exonerating Men. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190604981.003.0007.

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The flipside of misogyny’s punishment of women is exonerating the privileged men who engage in misogyny. This chapter canvasses this phenomenon, along with the flow of sympathy up the social hierarchy, away from the female victims of misogyny toward its (again, privileged) male perpetrators. This is dubbed “himpathy.” These phenomena are connected to epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression, theorized by Miranda Fricker and Kristie Dotson, among others. As a contrast with the much-discussed Isla Vista killings, the chapter considers the far less publicized case of the serial rapist police
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Byrne, Alex. Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0005.

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This chapter attempts to solve the puzzle of transparency for belief. The notion of an epistemic rule is introduced, and the proposed solution is that knowledge of one’s beliefs may be (and typically is) obtained by following the epistemic rule: BEL If p, believe that you believe that p. This is an inferential theory of knowledge of what we believe; it can be extended to an inferential theory of knowledge of what we know. The theory is also economical and detectivist, and is argued to give a satisfactory explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. The chapter concludes by examining a v
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Levine, Joseph. Experience and Representation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0005.

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Here I criticize the most popular version of Representationalism, what I call “Externalist Representationalism.” On this view, the phenomenal character of a conscious state is identified with, or supervenes on, its wide representational content. I argue that this position is implausible because of the unpalatable epistemic consequences that follow from it. In particular, on Externalist Representationalism, what it is like for someone is a function of which property of external object they are currently representing, so it’s possible to be wrong about one’s qualitative experience in a way that
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Byrne, Alex. Problems of Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0001.

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Various problems of self-knowledge are introduced, along with the important notions of transparency, privileged access, and peculiar access. Accounts of self-knowledge are classified according to whether they are economical, inferential, detectivist, or unified. Roughly: economical accounts repurpose other epistemic capacities; inferential accounts say self-knowledge is acquired by inference; detectivist accounts say the explanation of self-knowledge involves causal mechanisms; and unified accounts give the same basic epistemological story for all mental states. The account to be defended late
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Bar-On, Dorit, and Kate Nolfi. Belief Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.51.

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A fundamental puzzle about self-knowledge is this: spontaneous, unreflective self-attributions of beliefs and other mental states (avowals) appear to be at once epistemically groundless and epistemically privileged. On the one hand, it seems that avowals simply do not require justification or evidence. On the other hand, avowals seem to represent a substantive epistemic achievement. Several authors have tried to explain away avowals’ groundlessness by appeal to the so-called transparency of present-tense self-attributions. After a critical discussion of two extant construals of transparency, t
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Byrne, Alex. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821618.001.0001.

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T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief
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Book chapters on the topic "Epistemic privilege"

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Macdonald, Amie A. "Feminist Pedagogy and the Appeal to Epistemic Privilege." In Twenty-First-Century Feminist Classrooms. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230107250_5.

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English, Fenwick W. "Relational Goods, Democracy, and the Paradox of Epistemic Privilege." In Educational Leadership Theory. Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6568-2_11.

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Black, Tim, and Danielle Spratt. "Epistemic Injustice in Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park; Or, What Austen Teaches Us about Mansplaining and White Privilege." In The Routledge Companion to Jane Austen. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429398155-41-47.

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Mignolo, Walter D. "Enduring Enchantment: Secularism and the Epistemic Privileges of Modernity." In Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion. Springer Netherlands, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2538-8_15.

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Medina, José. "Vices of the privileged and virtues of the oppressed in epistemic group dynamics 1." In The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429326769-40.

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"Epistemic Privilege." In Fracking the Neighborhood. The MIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10345.003.0009.

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Gullion, Jessica Smartt. "Epistemic Privilege." In Fracking the Neighborhood. The MIT Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262029766.003.0007.

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"5. Nature, Indians, and Epistemic Privilege." In Indianizing Film. Rutgers University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.36019/9780813547138-008.

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Merz, Martina. "Embedding Digital Infrastructure in Epistemic Culture." In New Infrastructures for Knowledge Production. IGI Global, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59140-717-1.ch005.

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This chapter introduces the notion of a “disunity of e-science:” It posits that different epistemic cultures privilege different forms of digital infrastructure, integrate them into their practice in historically and culturally specific ways and assign to them distinct functions, meanings and interpretations. Based on an ethnographic case study of theoretical particle physics, the chapter demonstrates how digital infrastructures are firmly embedded and deeply entwined with epistemic practice and culture. The case is made, firstly, by investigating the practice of distributed collaboration and how it is sustained by e-mail-based interaction and, secondly, by analyzing the practice of preprinting and how an electronic preprint archive has turned into a central element of the scientists’ culture. In its conclusion, the chapter cautions against techno-deterministic views of how digital infrastructure might align sciences and turn them into a homogenized “e-science.”
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Manalansan, Martin F. "Tensions, Engagements, Aspirations: The Politics of Knowledge Production in Filipino American Studies." In Flashpoints for Asian American Studies. Fordham University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823278602.003.0012.

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Contending that Filipino American Studies as diasporic field negotiates to varying ends the vexed borders of area studies, American studies, and Ethnic Studies, Manalansan observes that the problems of borders are by no means limited to semantics but instead encompass issues of unequal power distribution. Indicative of a heretofore under-examined epistemic privilege, these inequalities render visible the present and future predicaments of Filipino American Studies.
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