Relevant bibliographies by topics / Epistemic Skepticism

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
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Academic literature on the topic 'Epistemic Skepticism'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 5 June 2025
Last updated: 2 August 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Epistemic Skepticism"

1

Brueckner, Anthony L. "Skepticism and Epistemic Closure." Philosophical Topics 13, no. 3 (1985): 89–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19851336.

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Barker, John A., and Fred Adams. "Epistemic Closure and Skepticism." Logos & Episteme 1, no. 2 (2010): 221–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2010122.

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Leite, Adam. "Skepticism and epistemic asymmetry." Philosophical Issues 29, no. 1 (2019): 184–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12147.

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Lazovic, Zivan. "Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck." Filozofija i drustvo 22, no. 1 (2011): 89–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1101089l.

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This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Starting from Prichard?s modal definition of luck and his distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck, namely veridic and reflective, the paper explores the internalist and externalist prospects for avoiding epistemic luck and skepticism. Externalism seems to be capable of both coping with the Gettier-type cases and eliminating at least veridic epistemic luck by introduci
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de Almeida, Claudio. "Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility." Synthese 188, no. 2 (2011): 197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9923-7.

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Goldberg, Sanford C. "Skepticism and Inquiry." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 3-4 (2020): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10019.

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Abstract In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that (i) is sufficient to undermine the prospect describ
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Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. "Is skepticism an epistemological predicament? Skeptisizm epistemolojik bir çıkmaz mıdır?" Journal of Human Sciences 15, no. 2 (2018): 1291. http://dx.doi.org/10.14687/jhs.v15i2.5183.

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Skeptics, by being skeptical about the certainty, accuracy and truth claims, defend that there are no objective accuracy or certainty; and for this reason, it is not possible to have an epistemological justification. The arguments on skepticism claiming that knowledge is not possible or proofs are inadequate in justifying knowledge have caused that skepticism has been considered as a notorious concept and sometimes it has been considered as a destructive activity. There is the idea that knowledge and certainty are possible behind these considerations. On this basis, skepticism has been conceiv
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MOGHADDAM, AHMAD REZA HEMMATI. "Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables." Dialogue 54, no. 2 (2015): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217315000116.

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Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that
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Bergmann, Michael. "Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13, no. 2 (2023): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10058.

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Abstract In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part iii defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.
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Vahid, Hamid. "Skepticism and Varieties of Epistemic Universalizability." Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (2001): 325–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2001_3.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Epistemic Skepticism"

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Mueller, Michaela. "Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Agency, and Skepticism." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194139.

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In my dissertation I develop an account of perceptual knowledge through thinking about epistemic luck, epistemic agency, and skepticism. Two conditions are, as I claim, necessary and sufficient to render a true belief an instance of perceptual knowledge. These conditions are the luck-precluding condition and evidence-based justification. The luck-precluding conditions are external conditions, consisting in physical regularities in the world that allow us to arrive through our evidence at the truth in a systematic way. I claim that these luck-precluding conditions also allow us to avoid Gettier
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Coppenger, Brett Andrew. "Achieving epistemic descent." Diss., University of Iowa, 2012. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3279.

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Traditional accounts of justification can be characterized as trying to analyze justification in such a way that having a justified belief brings with it assurance of truth. The internalist offers a demanding requirement on justification: one's having a justified belief requires that one see what the belief has going for it. Externalists worry that the internalist's narrow conception of justification will lead to unacceptably radical and implausible skepticism. According to the externalist, one need not know what a belief has going for it in order for that belief to be justified. Externalism,
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Reed, Andrew. "Dilemmas From Disagreement." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1766.

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When interpretations vary for the same set of evidence, what should be done? Options include just agreeing to disagree, maintaining one’s initial beliefs, or going all the way to completely suspending judgment. Taking this final option binds an agent to some interesting views, including an acceptance of epistemic dilemmas. However, the kind of total skepticism some philosophers want out of disagreement is probably a pipe dream – if there is no best option, no option can be eliminated.
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Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini. "CETICISMO E ANTICETICISMO: UM ESTUDO A PARTIR DO PRINCÍPIO DE FECHAMENTO EPISTÊMICO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2012. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9115.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like here is a hand , and h for a skeptical scenario such p is not true, but just a illusion projected in my mind , the skeptical argument can be formalized as follows: (1) If S knows that p, then S knows that ~h; (2) S doesn t know that ~h, the
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Abruzzo, Vincent G. "Content and Contrastive Self-Knowledge." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/108.

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It is widely believed that we have immediate, introspective access to the content of our own thoughts. This access is assumed to be privileged in a way that our access to the thought content of others is not. It is also widely believed that, in many cases, thought content is individuated according to properties that are external to the thinker's head. I will refer to these theses as privileged access and content externalism, respectively. Though both are widely held to be true, various arguments have been put forth to the effect that they are incompatible. This charge of incompatibilism has be
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Carrick, Laurence. "What do I know? : scepticism - reasoning and knowledge." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770.

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This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them
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Lindner, Philip. "Det där är ingen icke-zebra! : epistemisk-deduktiv slutenhet och skepticism." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-52691.

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Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise  however in
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Broeksmit, Katherine S. "A New Solution to the Skeptical Puzzle: An Epistemic Account of Limited Polysemy." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/459.

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In my Thesis I investigate many of the standard accounts of knowledge. I argue that epistemic fallibilism, infallibilism, and contextualism fail as viable accounts. I defend an account of knowledge according to which 'knows' is ambiguous. More specifically, I promote an account of knowledge according to which 'knows' is polysemous. This position was advanced by Rene Van Woudenberg. At the end of my thesis, I propose an adjustment to Van Woudenberg's view that will protect his account from problematic implications.
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MARCHESE, ELENA. "Verità in giudizio: contrasti dottrinali e filosofici." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Genova, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11567/1021467.

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Il concetto di verità ha da sempre generato intuizioni contrastanti non solo in ambito accademico ma anche nel senso comune. Il testo dà conto di alcune delle possibili ragioni alla base di tali conflitti mettendo in luce l’apprezzabile dualismo che sussiste tra le intuizioni del realismo e dell’anti-realismo aletico. Viene evidenziato, inoltre, l’incremento di una tendenza realista nel dibattito filosofico e gius-filosofico pur riconoscendo un trend più generale alla ricerca di una sintesi tra questi due poli. I temi che sottendono l’intero lavoro sono due: la necessità di portare a compim
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Braddock, Matthew C. "Debunking Challenges to Moral Realism." Diss., 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/5800.

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<p>Heightened awareness of the evolutionary, socio-cultural, and psychological origins of our moral judgments pushes many of us in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of doubting the objective truth of our moral judgments. But should awareness of the origins of our moral judgments shake our confidence in them? Are there good moral debunking challenges or debunking arguments from premises concerning the accessible origins of our moral judgments to skeptical conclusions regarding them? In vigorous pursuit of these questions, this dissertation sifts three promising moral debunk
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Books on the topic "Epistemic Skepticism"

1

Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021.

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Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.001.0001.

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Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skep
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Björnsson, Gunnar. Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0008.

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Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts rece
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Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Westview Press, 1999.

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Waterman, John, Chad Gonnerman, Karen Yan, and Joshua Alexander. Knowledge, Certainty, and Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865085.003.0009.

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Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an important role in underwriting ordinary practice in contemporary epistemology. But is it true? Here the authors present several studies that examine epistemic universalism by looking at the relationships between cultural background, folk knowledge attribution, and salience effects, whereby mention of an unrealized possibility of error undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge. These studies suggest that there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic
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Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2021.

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Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

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9

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Epistemic Values. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197529171.001.0001.

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This book collects twenty papers in epistemology by Linda Zagzebski, covering her entire career of more than twenty-five years. She is one of the founders of contemporary epistemology and is well-known for broadening the field and re-focusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. The subject areas of most of epistemology are included in these papers: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2015.

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Book chapters on the topic "Epistemic Skepticism"

1

Coliva, Annalisa, and Duncan Pritchard. "Content and epistemic externalism." In Skepticism. Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429057946-3.

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Simion, Mona. "Skepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas." In Epistemic Dilemmas. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003134565-9.

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Aikin, Scott. "Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism." In Epistemic Duties. Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429030215-21.

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Hannon, Michael J. "Skepticism and Contextualism." In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315745275-11.

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Vahid, Hamid. "Skepticism and Underdetermination." In Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230596214_7.

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Adler, Jonathans E. "Epistemic Universalizability: From Skepticism to Infallibilism." In Doubting. Springer Netherlands, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1942-6_7.

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Aikin, Scott. "Hookway's Soft Skepticism and Epistemic Conservatism." In Pragmatic Reason. Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003165699-14.

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Lynch, Michael P. "Political Skepticism, Bias, and Epistemic Colonization." In The Epistemology of Democracy. Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003311003-16.

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de Almeida, Claudio. "Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination." In Themes from Klein. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_10.

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Wright, John. "The Skeptical Arguments Against Realism I: Inductive Skepticism." In An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_2.

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