Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Epistemic Skepticism / Books

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Epistemic Skepticism.

Books on the topic 'Epistemic Skepticism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 5 June 2025

Last updated: 2 August 2025

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 44 books for your research on the topic 'Epistemic Skepticism.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse books on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Bergmann, Michael. Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skep

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Björnsson, Gunnar. Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0008.

Full text

Abstract:

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts rece

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Westview Press, 1999.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Waterman, John, Chad Gonnerman, Karen Yan, and Joshua Alexander. Knowledge, Certainty, and Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865085.003.0009.

Full text

Abstract:

Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an important role in underwriting ordinary practice in contemporary epistemology. But is it true? Here the authors present several studies that examine epistemic universalism by looking at the relationships between cultural background, folk knowledge attribution, and salience effects, whereby mention of an unrealized possibility of error undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge. These studies suggest that there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2021.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Epistemic Values. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197529171.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This book collects twenty papers in epistemology by Linda Zagzebski, covering her entire career of more than twenty-five years. She is one of the founders of contemporary epistemology and is well-known for broadening the field and re-focusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. The subject areas of most of epistemology are included in these papers: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Pritchard, Duncan. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Pritchard, Duncan. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton University Press, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Beebe, James R. Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746904.003.0011.

Full text

Abstract:

Explanationist (or abductivist) responses to skepticism maintain that our commonsense beliefs about the external world can be rationally preferred to skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that the former provide better explanations of our sensory experiences than the latter. This kind of response to radical skepticism has never enjoyed widespread acceptance in the epistemological community due to concerns about the epistemic merits of inference to the best explanation and appeals to the explanatory virtues. Against this tide of skepticism about explanationism, the chapter argues that traditional

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Hymers, Michael. Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Philosophy and its epistemic neuroses. Westview Press, 2000.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Bland, Steven. Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism: Unwinding the Braid. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Epistemic Relativism and Scepticism: Unwinding the Braid. Springer International Publishing AG, 2018.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Baker, Derek. Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0011.

Full text

Abstract:

There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, this chapter defends the view that the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter comes with preposterous first-order normative commitments.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Dunaway, Billy. Duns Scotus’s Epistemic Argument against Divine Illumination. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0004.

Full text

Abstract:

Theories of “divine illumination” were popular from St Augustine through the Middle Ages. Henry of Ghent is traditionally thought of as providing one of the last and most sophisticated theories of Divine Illumination. This chapter examines one of John Duns Scotus’s main arguments against Henry’s theory of Divine Illumination. The chapter reads Scotus as claiming that Henry’s theory aims, but fails, to avoid skepticism—the conclusion that we can’t have any knowledge on the basis of sensation. It shows how this argument can be understood formally on the basis of an analogy with modal logic, whic

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

McCain, Kevin. Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems. Oxford University PressOxford, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198905547.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract In Appearance & Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti developed “Phenomenal Explanationism” (PE). PE is a theory of epistemic justification that combines an explanationist theory of evidential support with an appearance-based/phenomenal conception of evidence. According to PE, epistemic justification is a matter of what best explains our evidence, which ultimately consists of appearances. In Appearance & Explanation it was argued that PE is a complete internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of other appearance-based theories while avoid

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

DeRose, Keith. Solving the Skeptical Problem. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199564477.003.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

In this chapter the classical form of skeptical argument, based on skeptical hypotheses, is presented. Then a contextualist response to the problem of skepticism, built upon the “Rule of Sensitivity,” is explained, defended, and shown to be superior to other solutions, including other contextualist solutions, Nozick’s solution, and, especially, skeptical solutions. It is argued that the best conclusion we can draw from the skeptic’s argument is that we are not ordinarily mistaken when we claim or ascribe knowledge, despite the best efforts of the “bold skeptic” to show that we are. Rather, the

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Pittard, John. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190051815.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part I argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case f

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Sasser, Nathan I. Hume and the Demands of Philosophy. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2022. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781666995480.

Full text

Abstract:

Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation offers a comprehensive interpretation of the relationship between Hume’s scientific project and his skepticism. Nathan I. Sasser argues that Hume is a radical epistemic skeptic who has purely practical reasons for retaining the beliefs that are essential for ordinary life and scientific research. On Sasser’s reading, the key to Hume’s epistemology is his conception of philosophy as a normative method of inquiry governing the special sciences. Philosophy approves of the mental faculties that produce reasoning and sensory be

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Gendler, Tamar Szabó, and John Hawthorne, eds. Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as n

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Johnsen, Bredo. Righting Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190662776.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

David Hume launched a historic revolution in epistemology, but allies appeared only in the twentieth century, in the persons of Sir Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman, and W. V. Quine. Hume’s second great contribution to the field was to propose reflective equilibrium theory as the framework within which to understand epistemic justification. The core of this book comprises an account of these developments from Hume to Quine, and an extension of reflective equilibrium theory that renders it a general theory of epistemic justification concerning our beliefs about the world. In chapters on Sextus, Desc

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Moran, Richard. Proust and the Limits of the Will. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633776.003.0006.

Full text

Abstract:

Beginning with the famous theme of “involuntary memory,” the project of Proust’s novel is organized along several axes by the themes of forms of value (metaphysical, epistemic, and erotic or interpersonal) which depend on the surpassing or the evading of the voluntary, or conscious, exercises of the will. This paper attempts to display some of this organization and in so doing seeks to show the connection between the themes of solipsism and its overcoming, jealousy, skepticism and the interpretation of the inadvertent signs given off by others, and some of the paradoxes in the desire for the d

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Machery, Edouard. Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807520.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should reorient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors. Attempts to resolve such issues are modally immodest: Any resolution would require an epistemic access to metaphysical possibilities and necessities, which, Edouard Machery argues, we do not have. In effect, then, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds defends a form of modal skepticism. The book assesses the main philoso

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Shoemaker, David. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This introduction to the fourth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility briefly discusses each of the new essays being published. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: free will, strength of will, the nature of intentions, practical necessity, shared agency, partial responsibility, criminal attempts, the forward-looking role of blame, responsibility for implicit bias, epistemic skepticism, forgiveness, regret, and protest. Approximately half the essays are on agency, and the other half are on responsibility, with different methodological a

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Hannon, Michael. What's the Point of Knowledge? Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914721.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This book is about knowledge and its value. At the heart of this book is a simple idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult questions in epistemology by reflecting on the role of epistemic evaluation in human life. Hannon calls this “function-first epistemology.” The core hypothesis is that the concept of knowledge is used to identify reliable informants. This practice is necessary, or at least deeply important, because it plays a vital role in human survival, cooperation, and flourishing. While this idea is quite simple, it has wide-reaching implications. Hannon uses it to cast new l

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Edenberg, Elizabeth, and Michael Hannon, eds. Political Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893338.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

As current events around the world have illustrated, epistemological issues are at the center of our political lives. It has become increasingly difficult to discern legitimate sources of evidence, misinformation spreads faster than ever, and the role of truth in politics has allegedly decayed in recent years. It is therefore no coincidence that political discourse is currently saturated with epistemic notions like “post-truth,” “fake news,” “truth decay,” “echo chambers,” and “alternative facts.” This book brings together leading political philosophers and epistemologists to explore ways in w

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

May, Joshua. The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198811572.003.0005.

Full text

Abstract:

While empirical debunking arguments fail to support wide-ranging moral skepticism, there are more modest threats to moral knowledge. First, debunking arguments are more successful if highly selective, targeting specific sets of moral beliefs that experimental research reveals to be distinguished for morally irrelevant reasons (thus flouting consistency reasoning). Second, the science of political disagreement suggests that many ordinary people can’t claim to know what they believe about controversial moral issues. Drawing on moral foundations theory, the best examples come from disagreements b

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Garfield, Jay L. The Concealed Influence of Custom. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190933401.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This volume provides a reading of Hume’s Treatise as a whole, foregrounding Hume’s understanding of custom and its role in the Treatise. It shows that Hume grounds his understanding of custom in its usage in English legal theory, and that he takes custom to be the foundation for normativity in all of its guises, whether moral, epistemic, or social. The book argues that Hume’s project in the Treatise is to provide a socially inflected cognitive science—to understand how persons are constituted through an interaction of individual psychology and their social matrix—and that custom provides the l

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Leiter, Brian. Moral Psychology with Nietzsche. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696505.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

This book offers both a reading and defense of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, drawing on both empirical psychological results and contemporary philosophical positions and arguments. Among the views explained and defended are: anti-realism about all value, including epistemic value; a kind of sentimentalism about evaluative judgment; epiphenomenalism about certain conscious mental states, including those involved in the conscious experience of willing; and radical skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. Psychological research, from Daniel Wegner’s work on the experience of willing t

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Kulp, Christopher B. Knowing Moral Truth. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2017. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781666998931.

Full text

Abstract:

This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously—judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no ma

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Rechtfertigung, Kohärenz, Kontext: Eine Theorie der epistemischen Rechtfertigung. Mentis, 2011.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Marshall, Colin. So What? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809685.003.0011.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter defends the significance of the epistemic answer to the “why be moral?” question in the face of possible moral skeptics who shrug it off. First, it is argued that the answer may be significant even if it does not motivate any moral skeptics to change, since it is capable of providing reassurance to compassionate people. Similar limitations, it is argued, would confront even the most successful possible answer that appealed to happiness. Second, a series of possible further extensions of the epistemic answer are considered that would give it more force with some skeptics. These ext

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Gerken, Mikkel. Scientific Testimony. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198857273.001.0001.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Scientific Testimony concerns the roles of scientific testimony in science and society. The book develops a positive alternative to a tradition famously expressed by the slogan of the Royal Society Nullius in verba (“Take nobody’s word for it”). For example, Gerken argues that intra-scientific testimony—i.e., testimony between collaborating scientists—is not in conflict with the spirit of science or an add-on to scientific practice. On the contrary, intra-scientific testimony is a vital part of science. This is illustrated by articulating epistemic norms of intra-scientific testimony

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Editor), Christina Hendricks (Series, Beau Branson, Marcus William Hunt, et al. Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion. Edited by Beau Branson and Christina Hendricks. Rebus Community, 2020.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Editor), Christina Hendricks (Series, Ya-Yun (Sherry) Kao, Joseph Kranak, et al. Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics. Edited by George Matthews and Christina Hendricks. Rebus Community, 2019.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Editor), Christina Hendricks (Series, Matthew Knachel, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues, et al. Introduction to Philosophy: Logic. Edited by Benjamin Martin and Christina Hendricks. Rebus Community, 2020.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Editor), Christina Hendricks (Series, Elizabeth Scarbrough, Matteo Ravasio, et al. Introduction to Philosophy: Aesthetic Theory and Practice. Edited by Valery Vino (Book Editor) and Christina Hendricks (Series Editor). Rebus Community, 2021.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Barnett, Brian C., Todd R. Long, Monica C. Poole, et al. Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Edited by Brian C. Barnett and Christina Hendricks. Rebus Community, 2021.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!