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Journal articles on the topic 'Epistemic states'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Ma, Jianbing, Weiru Liu, and Salem Benferhat. "A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states." International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 59 (April 2015): 20–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2015.01.003.

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2

Hookway, Christopher. "Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy." Metaphilosophy 34, no. 1‐2 (January 2003): 78–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00261.

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3

Jenkin, Zoe. "The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition." Philosophical Review 129, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 251–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8012850.

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According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs.

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4

Meyer, Timothy. "Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic Cooperation in International Environmental Governance." Transnational Environmental Law 2, no. 1 (March 18, 2013): 15–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2047102513000010.

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AbstractUnder what conditions should epistemic institutions (institutions that provide policy-relevant scientific advice) be integrated into international legal institutions – for example, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change? Following work in law and economics on the theory of the firm, this article argues that where states will not implement environmental policies absent a collective decision to do so, greater hierarchical control of epistemic institutions by legal institutions may be necessary to ensure the credibility and availability of a usable scientific record. Hierarchy creates credibility because it allows all states necessary for cooperation in the legal institution to oversee the production of the scientific record that provides the basis for international legal rules. Hierarchy thus enhances the effectiveness of international law as a coordination tool, even at the expense of the autonomy of the scientific process. By contrast, where collective action is not necessary because states will unilaterally regulate an environmental problem once scientific uncertainty has been reduced, epistemic and legal institutions should be fragmented to ensure the unbiased production and dissemination of scientific information. In such situations, the credibility of the scientific record is demonstrated by decentralized adoption of science-based regulation.

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5

Lane, Melissa. "States of Nature, Epistemic and Political." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, no. 2 (January 1999): 211–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00055.

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6

Letheby, Chris. "The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states." Consciousness and Cognition 39 (January 2016): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.012.

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7

Rahman, AKMMahbubur, ASM Iftekhar Anam, and Mohammed Yeasin. "Robust modeling of epistemic mental states." Multimedia Tools and Applications 79, no. 47-48 (June 16, 2020): 35785–809. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11042-020-09145-5.

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8

Maher, Paul J., Wijnand A. P. Van Tilburg, and Eric R. Igou. "Lost in Multidimensional Space: Epistemic Motivations Define and Distinguish Negative Affect." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 45, no. 9 (March 12, 2019): 1409–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167219833395.

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People’s knowledge of the world is limited and frequently imprecise. Thus, epistemic challenges are commonplace and much research in psychology has investigated their consequences. However, research has not systematically investigated how states of negative affect correspond to the desire for understanding and meaning in life. We investigated the role of epistemic motivations (e.g., meaning search) as features that distinguish forms of negative affect from one another. In three studies, we used multidimensional scaling to model the perceived similarity of negative affect states and then examined to what extent people differentiate these states based on their association with epistemic motivations. These studies revealed that negative states are reliably differentiated through their relation to epistemic pursuits. These findings were verified in a fourth study in which we experimentally induced epistemic affect. Overall, these results indicate that epistemic concerns characterize states of negative affect to a substantial degree.

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9

Ch. Meyer, J. J., and W. van der Hoek. "A DEFAULT LOGIC BASED ON EPISTEMIC STATES." Fundamenta Informaticae 23, no. 1 (1995): 33–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1995-2312.

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10

Skotiniotis, Michael, Aidan Roy, and Barry C. Sanders. "On the epistemic view of quantum states." Journal of Mathematical Physics 49, no. 8 (August 2008): 082103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.2966133.

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11

Schellenberg, Susanna. "THE ORIGINS OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE." Episteme 14, no. 3 (September 2017): 311–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.22.

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ABSTRACTI argue that the ground of the epistemic force of perceptual states lies in properties of the perceptual capacities that constitute the relevant perceptual states. I call this view capacitivism, since the notion of a capacity is explanatorily basic: it is because a given subject is employing a mental capacity with a certain nature that her mental states have epistemic force. More specifically, I argue that perceptual states have epistemic force due to being systematically linked to mind-independent, environmental particulars via the perceptual capacities that constitute the perceptual states. Thus, capacitivism shows how the epistemic force of experience is grounded in metaphysical facts about experience. Capacitivism is a distinctive externalist view of evidence and knowledge that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and in recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.

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12

Rigo-Lemini, Mirela. "Epistemic schemes and epistemic states. A study of mathematics convincement in elementary school classes." Educational Studies in Mathematics 84, no. 1 (January 18, 2013): 71–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10649-013-9466-6.

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13

Drew, Paul. "Epistemics in social interaction." Discourse Studies 20, no. 1 (February 2018): 163–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461445617734347.

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My argument here is principally that the ubiquity of (the relevance of) epistemics is evident in the ways in which knowledge claims and attributions of knowledge to self and other (1) are embedded in turns and sequences, (2) inform the design of turns at talk, (3) are amended in the corrections that speakers sometimes make, to change from one epistemic stance to another (e.g. from K+ to K−), and (4) are contested, in the occasional ‘struggles’ between participants, as to which of them has epistemic primacy. I show that these cannot be understood in cognitive terms; furthermore, I show that epistemics – again the attribution of knowledge to self and other – is ‘real’ for participants. That is, in these four practices and aspects of interaction (i.e. embedding, turn design, correction and contesting) it is evident that participants orient to their states of knowledge relative to one another, on a moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn basis.

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14

Dubois, D. "Three Scenarios for the Revision of Epistemic States." Journal of Logic and Computation 18, no. 5 (February 15, 2008): 721–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exm092.

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15

Van Den Meerssche, Dimitri. "International Organizations and the Performativity of Measuring States." International Organizations Law Review 15, no. 1 (May 1, 2018): 168–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15723747-01501006.

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This article explores how the World Bank’s engagement with governance reform has sparked a practice of measuring, ranking and diagnosing countries based on an epistemically constructed ideal-type of the modern state. With Foucault, I define this praxis of normalisation as a ‘transnational discipline of diagnosis’. The contribution of the article is both empirical and doctrinal. On an empirical level, it weaves together an innovative assemblage of three different technologies in the Bank’s epistemic governance praxis: the axiomatic dimension (World Development Reports); the statistical dimension (Worldwide Governance Indicators) and the diagnostic dimension (Systematic Country Diagnostics). On a doctrinal level, drawing on critical sociology and performativity theory, the article categorises this epistemic praxis as a world-making socio-political enterprise. It thereby rejects both the categorisation of epistemic power as a mode of public authority (to be integrated in a public law framework), as well as the respresentationalist idioms that inform ideology critique.

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16

Borges, Nerio, and Ramón Pino Pérez. "Belief change and 3-valued logics: Characterization of 19,683 belief change operators." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 69 (October 29, 2020): 657–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.12091.

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In this work we introduce a 3-valued logic with modalities, with the aim of having a clear and precise representation of epistemic states, thus the formulas of this logic will be our epistemic states. Indeed, these formulas are identified with ranking functions of 3 values, a generalization of total preorders of three levels. In this framework we analyze some types of changes of these epistemic structures and give syntactical characterizations of them in the introduced logic. In particular, we introduce and study carefully a new operator called Cautious Improvement operator. We also characterize all operators that are definable in this framework.

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17

Kerr, Ian. "Schrödinger’s Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20, no. 1 (March 16, 2019): 123–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0005.

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Abstract Can robots or AIs operating independently of human intervention or oversight diminish our privacy? There are two equal and opposite reactions to this issue. On the robot side, machines are starting to outperform human experts in an increasing array of narrow tasks, including driving, surgery, and medical diagnostics. This is fueling a growing optimism that robots and AIs will exceed humans more generally and spectacularly; some think, to the point where we will have to consider their moral and legal status. On the privacy side, one sees the very opposite: robots and AIs are, in a legal sense, nothing. The received view is that since robots and AIs are neither sentient nor capable of human-level cognition, they are of no consequence to privacy law. This article argues that robots and AIs operating independently of human intervention can and, in some cases, already do diminish our privacy. Epistemic privacy offers a useful analytic framework for understanding the kind of cognizance that gives rise to diminished privacy. Because machines can actuate on the basis of the beliefs they form in ways that affect people’s life chances and opportunities, I argue that they demonstrate the kind of cognizance that definitively implicates privacy. Consequently, I conclude that legal theory and doctrine will have to expand their understanding of privacy relationships to include robots and AIs that meet these epistemic conditions. An increasing number of machines possess epistemic qualities that force us to rethink our understanding of privacy relationships with robots and AIs.

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18

Levi, Isaac, and Peter Gardenfors. "Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States." Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 8 (August 1991): 437. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2026706.

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19

Menzies, Peter, and Peter Gardenfors. "Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States." Philosophical Review 103, no. 1 (January 1994): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185882.

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20

Marchildon, L. "The epistemic view of quantum states and the ether." Canadian Journal of Physics 84, no. 6-7 (January 15, 2006): 523–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/p06-018.

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The idea that the wave function represents information, or knowledge, rather than the state of a microscopic object has been held to solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics. Realist interpretation schemes, like Bohmian trajectories, have been compared to the ether in prerelativistic theories. I argue that the comparison is inadequate, and that the epistemic view of quantum states begs the question of interpretation.PACS Nos.: 03.65.Ta, 03.50.De, 03.30.+p

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21

Harrigan, Nicholas, and Robert W. Spekkens. "Einstein, Incompleteness, and the Epistemic View of Quantum States." Foundations of Physics 40, no. 2 (January 9, 2010): 125–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10701-009-9347-0.

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22

Boylan, David. "What the Future ‘Might’ Brings." Mind 129, no. 515 (August 6, 2019): 809–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz037.

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Abstract This paper concerns a puzzle about the interaction of epistemic modals and future tense. In cases of predictable forgetfulness, speakers cannot describe their future states of mind with epistemic modals under future tense, but promising theories of epistemic modals do not predict this. In §1, I outline the puzzle. In §2, I argue that it undermines a very general approach to epistemic modals that draws a tight connection between epistemic modality and evidence. In §3, I defend the assumption that tense can indeed scope over epistemic modals. In §4, I outline a new way of determining the domain of quantification of epistemic modals: epistemic modals quantify over the worlds compatible with the information accumulated within a certain interval. Information loss can change which interval is relevant for determining the domain. In §5, I defend the view from some objections. In §6, I explore the connections between my view of epistemic modality and circumstantial modality.

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23

Leigh, Fiona. "Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato." Phronesis 65, no. 3 (July 3, 2020): 247–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-bja10020.

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Abstract In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self-knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application of norms to cognitive self-ascriptions, and not confined to the first-personal perspective. This implies first-personal plural epistemic authority for self-knowledge.

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24

Raskin, Jonathan D. "Objecting, subjecting, and epistemic diversity." Theory & Psychology 30, no. 3 (June 2020): 394–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354320914392.

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Held (2020) portrays critical and Indigenous psychologists as subscribing to an epistemological “anti-objectivism” that inhibits their ability to combat oppression. She believes that their anti-objectivism yields a troublesome relativism in which truth is overly context-dependent; what counts as true knowledge for one Indigenous group may not count for another. This commentary explores whether critical and Indigenous psychologists are strict “anti-objectivists,” as Held contends. It also challenges the need for epistemological consistency, while encouraging a shift from “objectivism” and “subjectivism” as essentialized states to “objecting” and “subjecting” as complementary ways to explore and study the world.

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25

CAIE, MICHAEL. "AGREEMENT THEOREMS FOR SELF-LOCATING BELIEF." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 2 (April 5, 2016): 380–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020316000101.

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AbstractIn this paper, I first outline Aumann’s famous “no agreeing to disagree” theorem, and a second related theorem. These results show that if two or more agents, who have epistemic and credal states that are defined over algebras that do not include any self-locating propositions, have certain information about one another’s epistemic and credal states, then such agents must assign the same credence to certain propositions. I show, however, that both of these theorems fail when we consider agents who have epistemic and credal states that are defined over algebras that do include self-locating propositions. Importantly, these theorems fail for such agents even when we restrict our attention to the credences that such agents have in non-self-locating propositions. Having established this negative result, I then outline and prove three agreement theorems that hold for such agents.

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26

Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. "Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program." International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 367–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300001533.

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Studies in this issue show that the epistemic communities approach amounts to a progressive research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of reason and ideas in international relations. By focusing on epistemic communities, analysts may better understand how states come to recognize interests under conditions of uncertainty. According to this research program, international relations can be seen as an evolutionary process in which epistemic communities play meaningful roles as sources of policy innovation, channels by which these innovations diffuse internationally, and catalysts in the political and institutional processes leading to the selection of their shared goals. The influence of epistemic communities persists mainly through the institutions that they help create and inform with their preferred world vision. By elucidating the cause-and-effect understandings in the particular issue-area and familiarizing policymakers with the reasoning processes by which decisions are made elsewhere, epistemic communities contribute to the transparency of action and the development of common inferences and expectations and thereby contribute to policy coordination. International cooperation and, indeed, the development of new world orders based on common meanings and understandings may thus depend on the extent to which nation-states apply their power on behalf of practices that epistemic communities may have helped create, diffuse, and perpetuate.

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27

Zubcic, Marko-Luka. "Comparative standard in institutional epistemology." Filozofija i drustvo 30, no. 3 (2019): 418–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1903418z.

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Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse?s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund?s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

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28

Byerly, T. Ryan. "Faith as an Epistemic Disposition." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 1 (March 21, 2012): 109128. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i1.310.

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This paper presents and defends a model of religious faith as an epistemic disposition. According to the model, religious faith is a disposition to take certain doxastic attitudes toward propositions of religious significance upon entertaining certain mental states. Three distinct advantages of the model are advanced. First, the model allows for religious faith to explain the presence and epistemic appropriateness of religious belief. Second, the model accommodates a variety of historically significant perspectives concerning the relationships between faith and evidence, faith and volition, and faith and doubt. And, finally, the model offers an appealing account of what unifies religious faith with other kinds of faith.

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29

Huxster, Joanna K., Matthew H. Slater, Jason Leddington, Victor LoPiccolo, Jeffrey Bergman, Mack Jones, Caroline McGlynn, et al. "Understanding “understanding” in Public Understanding of Science." Public Understanding of Science 27, no. 7 (October 23, 2017): 756–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963662517735429.

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This study examines the conflation of terms such as “knowledge” and “understanding” in peer-reviewed literature, and tests the hypothesis that little current research clearly distinguishes between importantly distinct epistemic states. Two sets of data are presented from papers published in the journal Public Understanding of Science. In the first set, the digital text analysis tool, Voyant, is used to analyze all papers published in 2014 for the use of epistemic success terms. In the second set of data, all papers published in Public Understanding of Science from 2010–2015 are systematically analyzed to identify instances in which epistemic states are empirically measured. The results indicate that epistemic success terms are inconsistently defined, and that measurement of understanding, in particular, is rarely achieved in public understanding of science studies. We suggest that more diligent attention to measuring understanding, as opposed to mere knowledge, will increase efficacy of scientific outreach and communication efforts.

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Pettigrew, Richard. "JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF ‘THE WILL TO BELIEVE’." Episteme 13, no. 3 (October 16, 2015): 253–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44.

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ABSTRACTFamously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).

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31

Friederich, Simon. "How to spell out the epistemic conception of quantum states." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42, no. 3 (August 2011): 149–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.01.002.

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32

Chapman-Schmidt, Ben. "‘Sex Trafficking’ as Epistemic Violence." Anti-Trafficking Review, no. 12 (April 29, 2019): 172–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.14197/atr.2012191211.

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While the American Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA) has been heavily criticised by researchers and activists for the harm it inflicts on sex workers, many of these critics nevertheless agree with the Act’s goal of fighting sex trafficking online. This paper, however, argues that in American legal discourse, ‘sex trafficking’ refers not to human trafficking for sexual exploitation, but rather to all forms of sex work. As such, the law’s punitive treatment of sex workers needs to be understood as the law’s purpose, rather than an unfortunate side effect. This paper also demonstrates how the discourse of ‘sex trafficking’ is itself a form of epistemic violence that silences sex workers and leaves them vulnerable to abuse, with FOSTA serving to broaden the scope of this violence. The paper concludes by highlighting ways journalists and academic researchers can avoid becoming complicit in this violence.

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33

Redmond, Walter. "Logical Analogies: Interpretations, Oppositions, and Probabilism." Philosophies 4, no. 2 (April 2, 2019): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020013.

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I present two logical systems to show the “analogy of proportionality” common to several interpretations: modality (necessity and possibility), quantification, truth-functional relations, moral attitudes (deontic logic), states of knowledge (epistemic logic), and states of belief (doxastic logic). To display the two underlying analogical relations, I call upon the originally Scholastic convention, recently put to use again, of using squares, hexagons, and octagons “of opposition”. A combined epistemic–deontic logic happens to be found in the traditional “probabilist” theory of the “good conscience”, and I shall then briefly explain how this is so.

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Ruebeck, Joshua B., Piers Lillystone, and Joseph Emerson. "ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory have a measurement problem." Quantum 4 (March 16, 2020): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.22331/q-2020-03-16-242.

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ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory maintain that quantum states only represent incomplete information about the physical states of the world. A major motivation for this view is the promise to provide a reasonable account of state update under measurement by asserting that it is simply a natural feature of updating incomplete statistical information. Here we demonstrate that all known ψ-epistemic ontological models of quantum theory in dimension d≥3, including those designed to evade the conclusion of the PBR theorem, cannot represent state update correctly. Conversely, interpretations for which the wavefunction is real evade such restrictions despite remaining subject to long-standing criticism regarding physical discontinuity, indeterminism and the ambiguity of the Heisenberg cut. This revives the possibility of a no-go theorem with no additional assumptions, and demonstrates that what is usually thought of as a strength of epistemic interpretations may in fact be a weakness.

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Quark, Amy Adams. "Outsourcing Regulatory Decision-making: “International” Epistemic Communities, Transnational Firms, and Pesticide Residue Standards in India." Science, Technology, & Human Values 44, no. 1 (June 5, 2018): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0162243918779123.

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How do “international” epistemic communities shape regulatory contests between transnational firms and civil society organizations in the Global South? With the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), member states committed to basing trade-restrictive national regulations on science-based “international” standards set by “international” standard-setting bodies. Yet we know little about how the WTO regime has shaped the operation of epistemic communities within standard-setting bodies and, in turn, how standard-setting bodies articulate with national policy-making processes in the Global South. Building on work in the new political sociology of science, I argue that neoliberal globalization and the establishment of the WTO have created incentives for Western epistemic communities to at once cast themselves as “international” under the WTO regime and orient their scientific agendas toward the priorities of transnational firms. Moreover, this transformation of epistemic communities has created opportunities for transnational firms facing contentious policy environments in the Global South to effectively outsource regulatory decision-making to “international” epistemic communities that can claim legal status under the WTO regime. Empirically, I focus on the case of one Western epistemic community—the Association of Analytical Communities International—and its claim to epistemic jurisdiction over pesticide residue standards for soft drinks in India.

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36

Kirfel, Lara, and David Lagnado. "Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents' epistemic states." Cognition 212 (July 2021): 104721. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104721.

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37

Chrisman, Matthew. "Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency." Synthese 197, no. 12 (November 29, 2017): 5137–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1641-3.

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AbstractSosa famously argues that epistemic normativity is a species of “performance normativity,” comparing beliefs to archery shots. However, philosophers have traditionally conceived of beliefs as states, which means that they are not dynamic or telic like performances. A natural response to this tension is to argue that belief formation rather than belief itself is the proper target of epistemic normativity. This response is rejected here on grounds of the way it obscures the “here and now” exercise of cognitive agency that I view as central to any account of epistemic normativity and doxastic agency. Although the etiology of a belief can be relevant to its normative status, often so much more is relevant and more centrally so. This generates a dilemma for anyone following Sosa in pursuing the idea that epistemic normativity is a species of performance normativity.

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BITTLINGER, MERLIN. "Call of Duty at the Frontier of Research: Normative Epistemology for High-Risk/High-Gain Studies of Deep Brain Stimulation." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27, no. 4 (September 10, 2018): 647–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180118000142.

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Abstract:Research participants are entitled to many rights that may easily come into conflict. The most important ones are that researchers respect their autonomy as persons and act on the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Since 2014, research subjects from numerous states in the United States of America also have a legal “right to try” that allows them, under certain circumstances, to receive experimental (i.e., preliminarily tested) interventions, including medical devices, before official approval from the United States Food and Drug Administration. In the context of experimental interventions, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Alzheimer’s disease, this article argues that research participants ought never to have a legal “right to try” without a corresponding “right to be sure.” The latter refers to external epistemic justification construed in terms of reliance on reliable evidence. This article demonstrates that the mere complexity of intervention ensembles, as in the case of DBS for Alzheimer’s disease which serves as a paradigm example, illustrate how unanswered and/or unasked open questions give rise to a “combinatorial explosion” of uncertainties that require epistemic responses that no single research team alone is likely able to provide. From this assessment, several epistemic asymmetrical relations between researchers and participants are developed. By elucidating these epistemic asymmetries, this article unravels the reasons why open science, transparent exhaustive data reporting, preregistration, and continued constant critical appraisal via pre- and postpublication peer review are not scientific virtues of moral excellence but rather ordinary obligations of the scientific work routine required to increase reliability and strength of evidence.

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Cross, Mai'a K. Davis. "The Limits of Epistemic Communities: EU Security Agencies." Politics and Governance 3, no. 1 (March 31, 2015): 90–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i1.78.

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This article examines the cases of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen) to argue that although they are comprised of high-level security experts, they do not constitute epistemic communities. Research on other groups of security experts based in Brussels has shown that epistemic communities of diplomats, military experts, security researchers, and civilian crisis management experts, among others, have been able to influence the trajectory of security integration by virtue of their shared knowledge. Importantly, these security epistemic communities have been shown to significantly impact outcomes of EU security policy beyond what would be expected by looking only at member-states’ initial preferences. In exploring two examples of “non-cases” that are at the same time very similar to the other examples, the author seeks to shed light on why some expert groups do not form epistemic communities, and how this changes the nature of their influence. In so doing, the goal is to sharpen the parameters of what constitutes epistemic communities, and to add to our understanding of why they emerge. The argument advanced in this article is that institutional context and the nature of the profession matter as preconditions for epistemic community emergence.

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Haas, Peter M. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination." International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300001442.

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How decision makers define state interests and formulate policies to deal with complex and technical issues can be a function of the manner in which the issues are represented by specialists to whom they turn for advice in the face of uncertainty. The contributors to this issue examine the role that networks of knowledge-based experts—epistemic communities—play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation. Their analyses demonstrate that control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and data can lead to new patterns of behavior and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination.

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Allan, Bentley B. "Producing the Climate: States, Scientists, and the Constitution of Global Governance Objects." International Organization 71, no. 1 (December 20, 2016): 131–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818316000321.

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AbstractThis paper argues that the climate came to take on a geophysical rather than a bioecological form in global governance because it emerged from a dynamic, interactive process between states and scientists. In the 1950s, state agencies, especially elements of the US military, steered and accelerated the development of the geophysical sciences, which set the discursive frame within which climate politics now plays out. In the 1990s, scientists and IO experts responded to states' requests to study carbon sinks by expanding the climate to include new greenhouse gases and land-use practices. Drawing on Science and Technology Studies as well as discursive theories of global governance, I theorize object constitution as a process of co-production in which states steer the development of scientific knowledge and scientists assemble epistemic objects. This contingent interaction of political and scientific actors shapes the form and content of global governance objects. The argument extends and challenges the epistemic communities literature and theories of the global governance life cycle that focus on how problems end up on the agenda of states rather than the processes of problem construction.

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Kang, Arum, and Suwon Yoon. "From inquisitive disjunction to nonveridical equilibrium: Modalized questions in Korean." Linguistics 58, no. 1 (February 25, 2020): 207–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ling-2019-0038.

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AbstractThe goal of the present study is to identify a novel paradigm of epistemic modal operator derived from disjunction. Our main data involves an inquisitive disjunction marker nka in Korean, the presence of which enhances a speaker’s epistemic uncertainty and forms a modalized question. We show how nka contributes the modal effects in question within a theory of nonveridicality. In particular, we propose that the prerequisite of nka are non-homogenous nonveridical states that are partitioned in equipoised epistemic spaces because of the absence in ranking between them. The distinct notions of disjunction, question, and possibility modals can thus be systematically captured under the framework of nonveridical equilibrium. The current analysis offers important insights into the relationship between the classes of nonveridical and modal ingredients involved in inquisitive disjunction: First, Korean facts importantly reveal that modalized questions do not form a uniform class with regular questions, since interrogative semantics alone cannot predict the epistemic uncertainty. Second, languages parameterize as to how they lexicalize the function of manipulating modal base. The implication of our findings is that disjunction needs to be recognized as a novel device for encoding a speaker’s weakest perspective on epistemic modality.

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Oberst, Michael. "Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 2 (June 5, 2018): 172–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2003.

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Abstract: This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he still considers objects outside our mind unknowable. This sheds new light on Kant’s refutation of idealism.

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Iles, Alastair. "Greening chemistry: Emerging epistemic political tensions in California and the United States." Public Understanding of Science 22, no. 4 (July 13, 2011): 460–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963662511404306.

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Hogrefe, G. Juergen, Heinz Wimmer, and Josef Perner. "Ignorance versus False Belief: A Developmental Lag in Attribution of Epistemic States." Child Development 57, no. 3 (June 1986): 567. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1130337.

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Pan, Tianqun. "Conversation through actions and the changing of epistemic states in a game." Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5, no. 4 (December 2010): 666–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-010-0121-3.

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Pitts, Andrea J. "Challenging the Carceral Imaginary in a Digital Age: Epistemic Asymmetries and the Right to Be Forgotten." Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 19 (June 7, 2021): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/ltdl.76459.

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This paper argues that debates regarding legal protections to preserve the privacy of data subjects, such as those involving the European Union’s right to be forgotten, have tended to overlook group-level forms of epistemic asymmetry and their impact on members of historically oppressed groups. In response, I develop what I consider an abolitionist approach to issues of digital justice. I begin by exploring international debates regarding digital privacy and the right to be forgotten. Then, I turn to the long history of informational asymmetries impacting racialized populations in the United States. Such asymmetries, I argue, comprise epistemic injustices that are also implicated within the patterns of racialized incarceration in the United States. The final section brings together questions regarding the impact of such epistemic injustices on incarcerated peoples and focuses specifically on the public availability of criminal histories in online search databases as a fundamental issue within conversations regarding digital justice. I thus conclude by building from the work of contemporary abolitionist writers to argue that the underlying concerns of an individualized right to be forgotten should be transformed into a collective effort to undermine societal carceral imaginaries.

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Barseghyan, Hakob, and Nichole Levesley. "Question Dynamics." Scientonomy: Journal for the Science of Science 4 (August 1, 2021): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/js.v4i0.37120.

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The paper presents a new scientonomic account of question dynamics. To explain the process of question acceptance and rejection, we begin by introducing the notion of epistemic presupposition and show how it’s different from the notion of logical presupposition. With the notion of epistemic presupposition at hand, we formulate the law of question acceptance, a new scientonomic axiom, which states that a question becomes accepted only if all of its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, and it is accepted that the question is answerable. We then show how the process of question rejection can be explained by means of the question rejection theorem, which states that a question becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the question become accepted. To deduce this theorem in the usual scientonomic fashion (from the first law and the compatibility corollary), we first ascertain that the notion of compatibility/incompatibility is applicable to questions and show that one can legitimately speak of both question-theory and question-question incompatibility. We conclude by providing a quick illustration of the historical applicability of this new framework and suggest a number of questions for future research.

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Haas, Peter M. "Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone." International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 187–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002081830000148x.

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The emergence of scientific evidence that emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were depleting the stratospheric ozone layer prompted an epistemic community of atmospheric scientists and concerned policymakers to push for regulations regarding CFC use. Members of the transnational epistemic community played a primary role in gathering information, disseminating it to governments and CFC manufacturers, and helping them formulate international, domestic, and industry policies regarding CFC consumption and production. Community members contributed to the timing and stringency of CFC regulations through a combination of strategies ranging from the persuasion of individuals to the capture of various decision-making channels. Most important, by influencing the actions of the United States and DuPont, the largest producer of CFCs, the epistemic community changed the external environment in which policy decisions were made by other governments and firms.

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MOORE, DWAYNE. "Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes." Dialogue 51, no. 3 (September 2012): 397–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217312000674.

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Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiphenomenalism from the epistemic argument. In this paper I consider and ultimately reject two such replies, namely, the common underlying cause reply and the appeal to physical-effect epiphenomenalism.

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