To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Epistemological idealism.
Journal articles on the topic 'Epistemological idealism'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Epistemological idealism.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
McWherter, Dustin. "Transcendental Idealism and Ontological Agnosticism." Kantian Review 17, no. 1 (January 27, 2012): 47–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000331.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractSince the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant's protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant's rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism's supposed ontological agnosticism—that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant's rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, non-ontological doctrine.
2
Paiva, Mikhael Lemos. "MATERIALISM, IDEALISM AND THE ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROOTS OF GEOGRAPHY." InterEspaço: Revista de Geografia e Interdisciplinaridade 3, no. 9 (October 10, 2017): 07. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/2446-6549.v3n9p07-26.
Full textAbstract:
MATERIALISMO, IDEALISMO E AS RAÍZES ONTO-EPISTEMOLÓGICAS DA GEOGRAFIAMATERIALISMO, IDEALISMO E LAS RAÍCES ONTO-EPISTEMOLÓGICAS DE LA GEOGRAFÍAThe present article has as proposal the discussion of the philosophical categories of Idealism and Materialism in the Geographical thought. Starting from the assumption that the knowledge is a fact, we explicit our onto-epistemological basis by a dialog between the main representatives of each Philosophy pole, from Democritus to Hegel, exposing after the sublation to the metaphysics done by the dialectical materialism. Using a bridge to the hard core of the Critical Geography (Lefebvre, Harvey and Quaini), we transmute the philosophical debate to the geographical field showing the often ignored roots, logic and addictions of the Modern Geography. Retaking in the end the duel between Idealism and Materialism, we present our thesis in which the Crisis of Geography is, in fact, just the result of a process originated from its incapacity as a discipline to overcome the limiter vestige of its birth: the Metaphysics.Keywords: Philosophy of Geography; Lefebvre; Historical Materialism; Geography’s Crisis.RESUMOO presente artigo tem como proposta a discussão das categorias filosóficas de idealismo e materialismo no pensamento Geográfico. Partindo do pressuposto de que o conhecimento é um fato, explicitamos a nossa base onto-epistemológica por meio de um diálogo entre os principais representantes de cada polo da Filosofia, de Demócrito à Hegel, expondo logo após a suprassunção à metafísica realizada pelo materialismo dialético. Pela ponte com o núcleo duro da Geografia Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), transmutamos o debate filosófico para o campo geográfico ao mostrar as tão ignoradas raízes, lógica e vícios da Geografia Moderna. Retomando ao fim o duelo entre idealismo e materialismo, apresentamos nossa tese de que a Crise da Geografia é, na verdade, apenas o resultado de um processo oriundo de sua incapacidade como disciplina de superar o resquício limitador de seu berço: a Metafísica.Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Geografia; Lefebvre; Materialismo Dialético; Crise da Geografia.RESUMEN En este artículo se propone la discusión de las categorías filosóficas del idealismo y el materialismo en el pensamiento geográfico. En la hipótesis de que el conocimiento es un hecho, aclaramos nuestra base ontológica y epistemológica por medio de un diálogo entre los principales representantes de cada polo de la filosofía, Demócrito hasta Hegel, lo que sigue la supresión hacia la metafísica realizada por el materialismo dialéctico. Considerando los autores claves en la Geografía Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), ubicamos el debate filosófico hacia el campo geográfico para indicar las raíces, por supuesto ignoradas, la lógica y los vicios de la Moderna Geografía. Pronto la retomada en el fin del artículo entre idealismo y materialismo, enseñaremos nuestra tesis de que la crisis de la Geografía es, en verdad, solamente el resultado de un proceso oriundo de su incapacidad, cómo disciplina, en superar el vestigio limitador de su cuna: la Metafísica.Palabras clave: Filosofía de la Geografía; Lefebvre; Materialismo Dialéctico; Crisis de la Geografía.
3
Lau, Chong-Fuk. "Kant’s Epistemological Reorientation of Ontology." Kant Yearbook 2, no. 1 (May 1, 2010): 123–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2010-020106.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This paper analyzes Kant’s epistemological reorientation of ontology, explaining in what sense Kant’s complex theory of transcendental idealism and empirical realism should be understood as an ontological realism under the framework of epistemological idealism. The paper shows that Kant’s concept of existence is only applicable to empirical objects in the spatiotemporal causal framework. Accordingly, not only things in themselves, but also epistemic conditions such as the transcendental subject and the faculties of sensibility and understanding cannot be said to exist. They are theoretical constructs in the transcendental discourse to account for the normative conditions of objective cognition and reality.
4
Shamarina, Elena. "Lucy Allais. In Defense of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. (Book Review Allais L. Manifest Reality. Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford University Press (UK), 2015, 329 pp. ISBN 9780198747130)." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680016010-1.
Full textAbstract:
In a review of the book “Manifest Reality. Kant's Idealism and his Realism” I present Lucy Allais's moderate metaphysical interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. An overview of the structure of the book acquaints the reader with the author's argumentation strategy. Allais criticizes the dominant interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism and reveals their contradictions. Further, she develops her own interpretation of Kant's position, combining realism and idealism, metaphysical and epistemological judgments. Intuition plays a central role in the elicited epistemological contrast between intuition and concepts, and between intuition and sensation.
5
Tse, Chiu Yui Plato. "Transcendental Idealism and the Self-Knowledge Premise." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 19–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0014.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism.
6
Dal Monte, Daniel Dal Monte. "“The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”." Revista de Estudios Kantianos 4, no. 2 (October 27, 2019): 476. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/rek.4.2.13939.
Full textAbstract:
This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.
7
Koy, Christopher E. "The notion of Māyā in Arthur Schopenhauer’s epistemological idealism." XLinguae 14, no. 3 (June 2021): 49–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.18355/xl.2021.14.03.05.
Full textAbstract:
The Hindu texts known as the Upaniṣads were written by many different people from approximately 900 B.C. to about 300 B.C. The Upaniṣads represent one of the earliest efforts of man at giving a philosophical account of the world. As such, the Upaniṣads are invaluable in the history of human thought. The writings came to the West in bits and pieces in the first half of the 19th century in Latin, English and German translation. Soon after he finished his doctoral dissertation in 1813, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), took note of the very first European-language translation (or rather a retranslation) of the Upaniṣads by Abraham Anquetil-Duperron, a Parisian Orientalist who had lived in or near India for six years and had mastered Persian. Anquetil-Duperron translated into Latin a Persian translation of fifty Upaniṣads from the original Sanskrit. This influential translation entitled Oupnek’hat (1802) held Schopenhauer’s great interest for the remainder of his life. Schopenhauer was one of the few serious philosophers who early on read and was profoundly interested in the philosophy coming out of the East in the first half of the 19th century. This contribution will examine his understanding of māyā and its role in Schopenhauer’s epistemology as revealed in his book The World as Will and Representation
8
Gabriel, Markus. "Zum Außenweltproblem in der Antike." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 12 (December 31, 2007): 15–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.12.03gab.
Full textAbstract:
Miles Burnyeat famously argued that there could, in principle, be no idealism in Greek philosophy, because it was not yet prepared to regard the existence of an external world beyond our veil of perception as a serious philosophical problem. I believe that this thesis is historically and systematically false. Burnyeat’s claim is backed up by a short sketch of the most important philosophical systems in Greek philosophy that might seem to contradict his no-idealism view, viz. ancient skepticism and Neo-Platonism. In this paper, I argue against Burnyeat’s view on the basis of a reconstruction of Sextus Empiricus’ epistemological skepticism regarding the external world. Then, I try to show that Plotinus’ idealism and his theory of νοῦς are built on the assumption that metaphysical realism entails the problem of the external world and is, therefore, potentially inconsistent because of its skeptical results. Plotinus shows how skepticism about the external world can be avoided by idealism which can, thus, be seen as an explicit overcoming of epistemological skepticism. This whole train of thought explicitly refers to the problem of an external world. Therefore, Plotinus can be seen as answering the skeptical challenge with an idealistic metaphysic of experience.
9
Greenberg, Robert. "Necessity, Existence and Transcendental Idealism." Kantian Review 11 (March 2006): 55–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400002247.
Full textAbstract:
The role of transcendental idealism in Kant's theory of knowledge has been both deliberately underrated1 and inadvertently exaggerated. If conceivably not necessary, its role in Kant's explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason is at least pivotal to the success of the explanation. On the other hand, though transcendental idealism depends on Kant's epistemological criterion of an existing object, or, simply, his criterion of existence, the criterion for its part is actually independent of the idealism. In fact, it may be because this independence has hardly been recognized that commentators have been unaware of the role the criterion may actually be playing in the continuing controversy over the correct interpretation of the idealism. Altogether, this article addresses both shortcomings – the underestimation and the exaggeration of the role of the idealism in Kant's epistemology. While it places the idealism at the centre of the epistemology, it also separates the criterion of existence from the idealism. In highlighting this contrast, the article explains how the criterion may actually be contributing to the persistence of the ongoing dispute over the correct interpretation of the idealism.
10
Vukovic, Ivan. "The religious meaning of transcendental idealism." Theoria, Beograd 49, no. 1-2 (2006): 37–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0602037v.
Full textAbstract:
In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant distinguishes things in themselves from appearances, ascribes the ordering of appearances to man and concludes that his knowledge is limited to their order. The second and the third of these hypotheses are epistemological by nature, and are related to each other through a general idea that man can know only what he has himself created. The division of reality, on the other hand, has not only an ontological, but also a religious meaning: while things in themselves are created by God, appearances are a creation of man. To understand this distinction, one should discern the way Kant viewed the relation of man to God. To do this, however, one should investigate the way Kant's critical philosophy has developed from his early writings.
11
Kanterian, Edward. "The Ideality of Space and Time: Trendelenburg versus Kant, Fischer and Bird." Kantian Review 18, no. 2 (June 4, 2013): 263–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415413000022.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractTrendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. Recently, Graham Bird has claimed that Trendelenburg (unlike his contemporary Kuno Fischer) misrepresented Kant, confusing two senses of ‘subjective/objective’. I defend Trendelenburg's ‘neglected alternative’: the ideas of space and time, asa prioriand necessary, areideal, but this does not exclude theirvalidityin the noumenal realm. This undermines transcendental idealism. Bird's attempt to show that the Analytic considers, but rejects, the alternative fails: an epistemological reading makes Kant accept the alternative, while an ontological reading makes him incoherent. As I demonstrate, Trendelenburg acknowledged the ambiguity of ‘subjective/objective’, focusing on the transcendental, not the empirical sense. Unlike Fischer, Bird denies Kant's commitment to things-in-themselves in favour of a descriptivist, non-ontological reading of transcendental idealism as an inventory of ‘immanent experience’. But neither Bird's descriptivism, nor Fischer's commitment to things-in-themselves, answers Trendelenburg's sceptical worry about transcendental idealism.
12
Lemos Paiva, Mikhael. "MATERIALISMO, IDEALISMO E AS RAÍZES ONTO-EPISTEMOLÓGICAS DA GEOGRAFIA." InterEspaço: Revista de Geografia e Interdisciplinaridade 3, no. 8 (August 14, 2017): 268. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/2446-6549.v3n8p268-287.
Full textAbstract:
MATERIALISM, IDEALISM AND THE ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROOTS OF GEOGRAPHYMATERIALISMO, IDEALISMO E LAS RAÍCES ONTO-EPISTEMOLÓGICAS DE LA GEOGRAFÍAO presente artigo tem como proposta a discussão das categorias filosóficas de idealismo e materialismo no pensamento Geográfico. Partindo do pressuposto de que o conhecimento é um fato, explicitamos a nossa base onto-epistemológica por meio de um diálogo entre os principais representantes de cada polo da Filosofia, de Demócrito à Hegel, expondo logo após a suprassunção à metafísica realizada pelo materialismo dialético. Pela ponte com o núcleo duro da Geografia Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), transmutamos o debate filosófico para o campo geográfico ao mostrar as tão ignoradas raízes, lógica e vícios da Geografia Moderna. Retomando ao fim o duelo entre idealismo e materialismo, apresentamos nossa tese de que a Crise da Geografia é, na verdade, apenas o resultado de um processo oriundo de sua incapacidade como disciplina de superar o resquício limitador de seu berço: A Metafísica.Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Geografia; Lefebvre; Materialismo Dialético; Crise da Geografia.ABTRACTThe present article has as proposal the discussion of the philosophical categories of Idealism and Materialism in the Geographical thought. Starting from the assumption that the knowledge is a fact, we explicit our onto-epistemological basis by a dialog between the main representatives of each Philosophy pole, from Democritus to Hegel, exposing after the sublation to the metaphysics done by the dialectical materialism. Using a bridge to the hard core of the Critical Geography (Lefebvre, Harvey and Quaini), we transmute the philosophical debate to the geographical field showing the often ignored roots, logic and addictions of the Modern Geography. Retaking in the end the duel between Idealism and Materialism, we present our thesis in which the Crisis of Geography is, in fact, just the result of a process originated from its incapacity as a discipline to overcome the limiter vestige of its birth: The Metaphysics.Keywords: Philosophy of Geography; Lefebvre; Historical Materialism; Geography’s Crisis.RESUMENEn este artículo se propone la discusión de las categorías filosóficas del idealismo y el materialismo en el pensamiento geográfico. En la hipótesis de que el conocimiento es un hecho, aclaramos nuestra base ontológica y epistemológica por medio de un diálogo entre los principales representantes de cada polo de la filosofía, Demócrito hasta Hegel, lo que sigue la supresión hacia la metafísica realizada por el materialismo dialéctico. Considerando los autores claves en la Geografía Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), ubicamos el debate filosófico hacia el campo geográfico para indicar las raíces, por supuesto ignoradas, la lógica y los vicios de la Moderna Geografía. Pronto la retomada en el fin del artículo entre idealismo y materialismo, enseñaremos nuestra tesis de que la crisis de la Geografía es, en verdad, solamente el resultado de un proceso oriundo de su incapacidad, cómo disciplina, en superar el vestigio limitador de su cuna: la Metafísica.Palabras clave: Filosofía de la Geografía; Lefebvre; Materialismo Dialéctico; Crisis de la Geografía.
13
Bardon, Adrian. "Kant's Empiricism in his Refutation of Idealism." Kantian Review 8 (March 2004): 62–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001874.
Full textAbstract:
In the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant laments thatit still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted on faith, and if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. (B xl n.)The two editions of the Critique each contain a celebrated refutation of epistemological scepticisms like those of Descartes and Hume. The first edition refutation has been widely decried as relying on an objectionable sort of idealism. The refutation of the second edition, though rather more difficult to interpret than the first, has usually been read as a mere reworking of the first.
14
Heffernan, George. "Stein’s Critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 95, no. 3 (2021): 455–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq202161228.
Full textAbstract:
Stein claims that Husserl’s transcendental idealism makes it impossible to clarify the transcendence of the world because it posits that consciousness constitutes being. Inspired by Aquinas, Stein counters that making thinking the measure of being deprives what is of its epistemological and ontological independence from and primacy over what thinks. She contends that this approach inverts the natural relationship between the mind and the world. Given the complicated relationship between them, however, the question is whether Stein’s argument that Husserl lacked an adequate understanding of and appreciation for the phenomenon of transcendence is sound. In fact, Husserl’s treatments of “limit problems of phenomenology” in his manuscripts from 1908 to 1937, which were only recently published in Husserliana XLII (2014), show that he undertook extensive investigations of metaphysical, metaethical, and religious and theological questions. Tragically, Stein was prevented from gaining an even remotely complete picture of Husserl’s work. In this paper, therefore, I examine Stein’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in light of the fuller evidence.
15
Stegmann, Juan Pablo. "How realism promotes better social outcomes than empiricism and subjective idealism." Studia Philosophiae Christianae 55, no. 3 (September 30, 2019): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/spch.2019.55.3.05.
Full textAbstract:
This paper proposes a conceptual model that fosters interdisciplinary thinking and critical thinking by connecting the three main philosophical traditions that impact modern thinking – British empiricism, Continental Europe subjective idealism, and realism – with their epistemological foundations and in combination with modern social disciplines: ethics, social responsibility, and political economy. Through a statistical analysis this paper shows which of the three epistemologies produces better social outcomes.
16
Ureña, Carolyn. "Fanon’s Idealism: Hopeful Resignation, Violence, and Healing." Bandung 6, no. 2 (November 5, 2019): 233–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/21983534-00602005.
Full textAbstract:
The Spirit of Bandung is marked by its idealism, a state of mind few associate with the revolutionary Martinican physician and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, who is perhaps best known for Les damnés de la terre, in particular its opening chapter on violence. And yet, Fanon’s work, too, is marked by a keen sense of hope as he urges himself and his readers, “[to] make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man.” As a clinician and philosopher who combined phenomenology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis in his work, Fanon draws our attention to the importance of healing the physical, affective, and epistemological wounds of anti-black racism by attending to the social relations that produce them. This paper takes as a point of departure Fanon’s “Letter to the Resident Minister (1956),” in which he resigns from his post as Médecin-Chef de service at the Psychiatric Hospital of Blida-Joineville in war-torn Algeria. More than a gesture, I argue that Fanon’s active withdrawal as a representative of French colonialism enabled Fanon to write Wretched of the Earth and raises the question of what role hopeful resignation can have in achieving decolonial healing.
17
M., Sanjeev Kumar H. "Traversing the Romance of a Liberal International Order: The Democratic Peace Thesis and the Regional Security Problematique in South Asia." International Studies 57, no. 4 (October 2020): 344–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881720962959.
Full textAbstract:
The democratic peace hypothesis, which is embedded in the neo-Kantian romance of liberal cosmopolitan idealism, was framed in the spatiotemporal context of the Cold War bipolarity. Michael Doyle, who is one of its proponents, invoked the Kantian philosophical abstraction of ‘the perpetual peace’ by providing an intellectual defence and moral high ground for the values of the Liberal Capitalist world. In the post–Cold War setting, Francis Fukuyama re-casted the hypothesis and portrayed the triumph of liberal international order as ‘the end of history’. He attempted to reframe the democratic peace thesis, not only to celebrate liberal values as the normative exemplar for ordering a post–Cold War international system but also to provide an intellectual defence for the newly emerging space for American leadership in a post-hegemonic international system. This intellectual defence of the ethical supremacy of liberal idealism in the world, shaped by the leadership of the USA, was entrenched in the epistemological Imperialism of the West. Besides, it also reflected an exclusionary idea of the history of international relations that was heavily grounded in the chronology of the post-Westphalia international order. Situating ourselves in this framework, this article is an attempt to critique the epistemic foundations of the democratic peace hypothesis, by deconstructing its assertions in the geostrategic context of the regional security architecture in South Asia. The article criticizes the democratic peace thesis, using an analysis of the Kargil conflict (1999) between India and Pakistan, and by placing ourselves in the epistemological framework of the historical turn in international relations.
18
Bronner, Stephen Eric. "Politics and Judgment: A Critique of Rational Choice Marxism." Review of Politics 52, no. 2 (1990): 242–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500050361.
Full textAbstract:
This article is an attempt to confront the assumptions underpinning rational choice Marxism along with its implications for politics and social theory. That initially calls for setting the new tendency within the Marxian tradition in order to see whether its proponents can deal with the issues deriving from the collapse of the old teleological vision. In this way, the subsequent epistemological critique will be undertaken within a theoretical and practical context. From this critique, it will become apparent that rational choice builds on the utilitarian assumptions of what Marx termed “vulgar materialism” and simply ignores the role of philosophical idealism entirely.
19
Baiasu, Sorin, and Michelle Grier. "Revolutionary versus Traditionalist Approaches to Kant: Some Aspects of the Debate." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 161–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000033.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
20
Baiasu, Sorin. "Space, Time and Mind-Dependence." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 175–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000045.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
21
Grier, Michelle. "The Revolutionary Interpretation of the Analytic of Concepts." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 191–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000057.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
22
Banham, Gary. "The Status of the Principles of the Analogies." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 201–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000069.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
23
Brittan, Gordon. "Graham Bird, The Revolutionary Kant: Introduction." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 211–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000070.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
24
Kuehn, Manfred. "‘How, or Why, do we Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves?’." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 221–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000082.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
25
Moore, A. W. "Bird on Kant's Mathematical Antinomies." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 235–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000094.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In hisThe Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
26
Westphal, Kenneth R. "Comments on Graham Bird's The Revolutionary Kant." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 245–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000100.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
27
Bird, Graham. "Replies to my Critics." Kantian Review 16, no. 2 (June 16, 2011): 257–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415411000112.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.
28
West, Peter. "Reid and Berkeley on Scepticism, Representationalism, and Ideas." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17, no. 3 (September 2019): 191–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2019.0242.
Full textAbstract:
Both Reid and Berkeley reject ‘representationalism’, an epistemological position whereby we (mediately) perceive things in the world indirectly via ideas in our mind, on the grounds of anti-scepticism and common sense. My aim in this paper is to draw out the similarities between Reid and Berkeley's ‘anti-representationalist’ arguments, whilst also identifying the root of their disagreements on certain fundamental metaphysical issues. Reid famously rejects Berkeley's idealism, in which all that exists are ideas and minds, because it undermines the dictates of common sense. Reid also charges Berkeley with not only accepting but furthering the progress of ‘the Way of Ideas’, a longstanding tradition which has drawn philosophy away from true science and common sense. From Berkeley's perspective, Reid is a ‘materialist’; that is, he dogmatically accepts that mind-independent things exist. I argue that these important differences can be explained by both thinkers’ construal of certain ‘philosophical prejudices’. Finally, I conclude that despite these differences, both ought to be characterised as ‘anti-representationalists’ in light of their shared epistemological concerns.
29
De Souza, Galileu Galilei Medeiros. "FILOSOFIA COMO TAREFA." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 45, no. 141 (April 30, 2018): 113. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v45n141p113/2018.
Full textAbstract:
Resumo: O artigo tem como objetivo evidenciar o sentido da filosofia como tarefa e algumas consequências que disso advêm, como a superação de limitações epistemológicas relacionadas com a identificação entre conhecimento e reflexão, fundamento de teses sobre o fim da verdade. Toma-se como elemento norteador a filosofia da ação de Maurice Blondel, especialmente recorrendo aos dois escritos que compõem Le point de depart de la recherche philosophique (publicados em janeiro e junho de 1906). Adotando uma metodologia dialética, o presente texto parte do exame da questão da crise da razão e de sua ligação com a interpretação da reflexão como instrumento de conhecimento; são examinadas algumas hipóteses sobre o ponto de partida da filosofia, ligadas ao realismo, ao idealismo crítico e ao intuicionismo; atinge-se, enfim, a individuação do conhecimento em ato, que se mostra um processo de elucidação da prospecção pela reflexão, como o modo de conhecer próprio da pesquisa filosófica.Abstract: This paper aims to highlight the nature of philosophy as a task and show some resulting epistemological consequences, such as the overcoming of epistemological limitations related to the identification between knowledge and reflection, basis of theses on the end of truth. Maurice Blondel´s work, the philosophy of action, will be our guiding element, especially his two writings making up Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique (published in January and June 1906). Using a dialectical methodology, this paper starts by examining the question of the crisis of reason and its connection with the interpretation of reflection as a tool of knowledge. It then examines some assumptions concerning the starting point of philosophy that are related to realism, critical idealism and intuitionism. Finally, it discusses the issue of individuation of knowledge as act which is a process of elucidating prospection through reflection, as the proper way of acquiring knowledge in philosophical research.
30
Joffe, Alexander H. "Identity/Crisis." Archaeological Dialogues 10, no. 1 (October 2003): 77–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1380203803001090.
Full textAbstract:
Archaeology has an identity problem. At least three factors are involved. The postmodern view of radical instability has collided with processual aversions towards ‘meaning’, resulting in a stalemate regarding the past. Modern problems with identity, including the role of the past and archaeology itself, have generated additional confusion. Identity is a hall of mirrors which parallels other epistemological debates in archaeology, all of which revolve around the divide between realism and idealism. Archaeology cannot resolve this problem. The solution is not, however, to become either better technicians or more strident ideologues, but to become more informed contributors to larger debates in the human sciences and philosophy, in an atmosphere of civility and pluralism.
31
Allais, Lucy. "Transcendental idealism and metaphysics: Kant’s commitment to things as they are in themselves." Kant Yearbook 2, no. 1 (May 1, 2010): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2010-020101.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract One of Kant’s central central claims in the Critique of Pure Reason is that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. This claim has been regarded as problematic in a number of ways: whether Kant is entitled to assert both that there are things in themselves and that we cannot have knowledge of them, and, more generally, what Kant’s commitment to things in themselves amounts to. A number of commentators deny that Kant is committed to there actually being an aspect of reality which we cannot cognise; they argue that he is committed merely to the idea that we cannot avoid the concept of things as they are in themselves. I will argue in this paper that while transcendental idealism is partly an epistemological position, it is also partly a metaphysical position, and in specific, that Kant is committed to the claim that the things we cognise have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a nature that is independent of us, which we cannot cognise.
32
Morel, Charlotte. "Lotze’s Debt to Kant Against Naturalism and Czolbe’s Counterpoint. The Ambiguities of “Epistemological Kantianism” Around 1850." Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 26, 2020): 63–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2019-0010.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe decline of Naturphilosophie deeply polarized the philosophical and scientific debate. Naturalistic–materialistic positions gained powerful influence, but the latent role of the Kantian critical position also re-emerged in the context of an “ideal-realism”. I will first consider in detail two opposing treatments of Kant’s perspective. After Lotze had criticized his earlier materialistic position, advising him to read Kant, Czolbe finally addressed Kant, thereby progressing to a non-materialistic form of naturalism. However, whether to defend or to dismiss naturalism, neither philosopher addresses Kant as a transcendentalist thinker, and I go on to examine this common feature in their writings. This invites us to reconsider what exactly in Kant’s system conflicts with naturalism. Is transcendentalism too broad a requisite for that task? Within “ideal-realism”, the realist part actually implies a denial of transcendental idealism; still, it shows how a realism which refuses to be naturalism could well learn from Kant.
33
Jessop, Bob. "Rethinking State Theory. By Mark J. Smith, New York: Routledge, 2000. 281p. $100.00." American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (March 2002): 195–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402444310.
Full textAbstract:
Mark Smith has written a dense, challenging, and provocative analysis of three contrasting approaches to power and how they are shaped by different philosophies of social science. This is not a book for the theoretically faint-hearted or meta-theoretically challenged. Indeed, those who pick it up expecting to find a simple guide to recent state theory will be badly disappointed. For it does not provide a survey or critique of state theory as such. Nor does it provide a new theory based on self-evident assumptions about the nature of the state and politics. Instead its author offers a sustained meta-theoretical commentary on the intellectual conditions of possibility of serious engagement with the state and state power from a broader, societal perspective. Smith attempts this because he discerns a crisis in the taken-for-grantedness of the typical objects of inquiry of such disciplines as economics, politics, and sociology. He claims that their respective objects are increasingly seen as complex, uncertain, and contested spaces and that these disciplines themselves have become disoriented. Inter alia, this requires a rethinking of the state as an analytical object. In pursuing this meta-theoretical project, Smith draws heavily on the “critical realist” position (initially known as “transcendental realism” or “critical naturalism”) of the British-based philosopher of science, Roy Bhaskar. Thus his analysis begins with some crucial distinctions among empiricism, idealism, and realism and explores their different ontological, epistemological, methodological, and substantive implications for the analysis of social relations. It then addresses the philosophical and theoretical development of three very different theorists of power, who are taken as interesting if not wholly representative exemplars of empiricism, idealism, and a mixture of idealism and realism, respectively. Smith concludes with some of his own meta-theoretical comments on state theory.
34
Clough, William R. "The Word and the World." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 17, no. 1 (2005): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2005171/21.
Full textAbstract:
Scientists and theologians a priori believe that it is possible and desirable for worldviews to evolve reflecting higher and higher levels of accuracy and insist. St. John the Evangelist uses the word Logos to describe the force driving this epistemological growth process. This essay suggests that the Logos explains human experience, scientific and religious, more fully than other contemporary worldviews. It explains the scientific search for order and the religious drive for spiritual transcendence. This implies that science and religion themselves can both be viewed as two subsets of a more complete, holistic worldview. They can inform and correct one another. Logos epistemology allows for a coherent understanding of emergent properties, the relationship between facts and values, consciousness, and theodicy. As an explanatory device, the Logos outperforms Materialism, Perspectivalism, and Idealism.
35
Dahlbeck, Johan. "Spinoza on the teaching of doctrines: Towards a positive account of indoctrination." Theory and Research in Education 19, no. 1 (February 23, 2021): 78–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878521996235.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of this article is to add to the debate on the normative status and legitimacy of indoctrination in education by drawing on the political philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677). More specifically, I will argue that Spinoza’s relational approach to knowledge formation and autonomy, in light of his understanding of the natural limitations of human cognition, provides us with valuable hints for staking out a more productive path ahead for the debate on indoctrination. This article combines an investigation into the early modern history of political ideas with a philosophical inquiry into a persistent conceptual problem residing at the heart of education. As such, the aim of the article is ultimately to offer an account of indoctrination less fraught with the dangers of epistemological and political idealism that often haunt rival conceptions.
36
de Sá Pereira, Roberto Horácio. "What is the Scandal of Philosophy?" International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8, no. 3 (September 21, 2018): 141–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20171276.
Full textAbstract:
The central question of this paper is: what has Kant’s Refutation of Idealism argument proven, if anything? What is the real scandal of philosophy and universal human reason? I argue that Kant’s Refutation argument can only be considered as sound if we assume that his target is what I call ‘metaphysical external-world skepticism’ (rather than traditional ‘epistemological external-world skepticism’). What is in question is not the ‘existence’ of outside things, but their very ‘nature’, that is, the claim that the thing outside us, which appears to us as persistent body in space, exists in itself as a substantia noumenon. Assuming the indirect-realist view that we only immediately know ideas and that their putative objects are known by inference, the metaphysical external-world skeptic doubts that the nature of things outside oneself is mind-independent.
37
Ratié, Isabelle. "The Dreamer and the Yogin: On the relationship between Buddhist and Śaiva idealisms." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 73, no. 3 (October 2010): 437–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0041977x10000406.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe Pratyabhijñā system, elaborated in the tenth and eleventh centuries by the Kashmiri philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, presents a rational justification of the metaphysical principles contained in the Śaiva nondualistic scriptures. However, contrary to what one might expect, many arguments to which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta resort when defending their idealism belong to Buddhist rather than Śaiva sources. This article examines the profound influence, in this respect, of the Buddhist “logico-epistemological school” on the Pratyabhijñā system. But it also shows that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are not unknowingly or unwittingly influenced by their Buddhist opponents: they systematically emphasize this influence, thus taking full responsibility for appropriating their rivals' concepts. Moreover, they highlight their fundamental divergence regarding the way consciousness manifests a seemingly external and diverse universe, most notably by replacing the Vijñānavādins' traditional analogy: according to the Śaivas, perceived objects should not be compared to dreamt objects, but to yogins' creations.
38
Perler, Dominik. "Direkte und indirekte Bezeichnung. Die metaphysischen Hintergründe einer semantischen Debatte im Spätmittelalter." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 4 (December 31, 1999): 125–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.4.07per.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Late medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition developed two theoretical models in order to explain the signication of words. Some - including Thomas Aquinas - claimed that spoken words immediately signify concepts, but extramental things only mediately, while others - such as William of Ockham - held the view that they immediately signify things. The present essay analyzes these two semantic models, paying particular attention to their metaphysical and epistemological background. It shows that the «indirect signication model» defended by Thomas is not a model committed to representationalism or semantic idealism, as some recent commentators have claimed. It is rather a model that relies upon two crucial theses: (i) human beings form concepts by abstracting universal forms from extramental things; and (ü) spoken words signify those universal forms having an immaterial existence in the intellect. Ockham's refusal of the «indirect signication model» is mainly motivated by his rejection of these controversial claims.
39
Omodeo, Pietro Daniel. "The Struggle for Objectivity: Gramsci’s Historical-Political Vistas on Science against the Background of Lenin’s Epistemology." HoST - Journal of History of Science and Technology 14, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 13–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/host-2020-0013.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This contribution interprets the intertwined issues of science, epistemology, society, and politics in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks as a culturalist approach to science that does not renounce objectivity. Gramsci particularly criticized the scientist positions taken by the Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin in Historical Materialism (1921) and the conference communication he delivered at the International Congress of History of Science and Technology in London in 1931. Gramsci did not avoid, at least implicitly, engaging with the theses of Lenin’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1909). Gramsci’s reception of these Russian positions was twofold: on the one hand, he agreed with the centrality of praxis (and politics) for a correct assessment of the meaning of epistemological positions; on the other hand, he disagreed with the reduction of the problem of epistemology to the dichotomy of materialism and idealism at the expense of any consideration of the ideological dimension of science.
40
Auroux, Sylvain. ""Vale la pena di partecipare". Rčponse ŕ Francesco Ferretti." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2009): 173–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2009-001013.
Full textAbstract:
- F. Ferretti quotes a random sample of recent studies as proofs against my arguments, and makes no mention of the conspicuous failure of glottochronology, of the one-sided methods of Ruhlen's linguistic comparison, of the questionable corres - pondences of languages with populations genetics. He clearly passes over the second, epistemological, part of the book. In his exposition, the different planes of discussion are systematically mixed up and my arguments repeatedly misinterpreted. My Reply is focused on a few points. In particular: the import of evolutionary theories on discussions of language origin, the notion of a "faculty" or "instinct" of language, the status of linguistics as an empirical science, the relations of evolutionary psychology with sociobiology. Finally, I challenge F. Ferretti's assertion, that the refutation of naturalism must necessarily result in embracing idealism. Keywords: Comparativism, Language faculty, Language origin, Limits of linguistic reconstruction, Naturalism, Sociobiology.
41
Stoliarova, Olga E. "Kant’s Copernican Revolution as an Object of Philosophical Retrospection." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 4 (2019): 219–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956477.
Full textAbstract:
The article deals with Kant's Copernican Revolution as an object of philosophical retrospection. It is suggested that Kant's Copernican Revolution can be understood in terms of the conditions of its possibility within the framework of a regressive transcendental argument. The regressive transcendental argument is equated with the universal philosophical method, which is circular in nature: starting with the facts of experience, it concludes about the necessary conditions for the possibility of a given experience and compares these conditions of possibility with what is given in experience. It is shown that in the framework of such an approach, falsification of the initial premises of the Kantian project becomes inevitable. It is shown that the character of this falsification is essentially dialectical. By falsifying the transcendental project of the “Copernican revolution” as a whole, we question the “once and for all” boundary drawn by Kant between the epistemological premises (“idealism”) and ontological foundations (“realism”).
42
Nguyen, Nghia Trong. "MAIN STREAMS OF LE QUY DON'S THOUGHT ABOUT ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY." Science and Technology Development Journal 14, no. 1 (March 30, 2011): 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdj.v14i1.1897.
Full textAbstract:
Le Quy Don was a great talent in the history of Vietnamese ideology in feudal times. Many philosophical initiatives embodied in his works that he left behind has received much admiration. The main streams of ontological and epistemological thoughts is the thought of “Thai Cuc being one” - to be and not to be are two properties, two states of Thai Cuc. "Thai cuc being the first mixed gas", which is Le Quy Don's specific and original concept of "unique cosmology", is a core concept in his theory of Li Khi. To Le Quy Don, cognition of subjects is to cognize reasons, it means to make cognizance over its rules and natures, in order to find out internally hidden existence within the subjects. He appreciated the combination of “reasons” and “positions”, and human roles in social activities, etc.. Although Le Quy Don philosophical thought has not really broken out of dualism, idealism, mysticism, etc., his knowledges in philosophical field has been cultural works of significant value.
43
Terezis, Christos, and Spyros P. Panagopoulos. "THE THEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN EUNOMIUS AND BASIL THE GREAT: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH." Perichoresis 11, no. 1 (June 1, 2013): 5–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/perc-2013-0001.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACT In this paper we examine an aspect of the conflict between Eunomius of Cyzicus and Basil the Great, as it referred to supreme dogmatic matters, such as the relationships between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. This theological rupture appears in a period, during which Christian doctrines are composed at advanced levels of maturity, also with the development among other things of impressive leaps toward which had been attempted by Origen, who was basically also the founder of Christian Hermeneutics. We refer to the basic concept of the conflict, namely the epinoia, and we set it off through the ontological-epistemological knowledge-contrast of realism-idealism. Our research programme is based in part on the historical element, par excellence on the systematic. As to the specific object of analysis, our report will be limited to an outline text of Basil of Caesarea and our aim will be to draw it out in its full development, from one expression to the next. This is the sixth chapter of the first book from the treatise Against Eunomius.
44
Sgarbi, Marco. "L'epistemologia di Richard Burthogge." RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no. 3 (August 2012): 493–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2012-003003.
Full textAbstract:
This article deals with the epistemology of Richard Burthogge (1638-1705). Friend and correspondent of Locke, Burthogge published two important epistemological treaties, the Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) and the Essay upon Reason (1694), in which he developed a particular theory of knowledge close to idealism and conceptualism. In this theory he 1) elaborated an instrumental conception of logic; 2) limited the boundaries of reason to sensible experience; 3) conceived the mind as a center of activity, energy, and operations; 4) established that all sensible knowledge is filtered by modi concipiendi, such as substance, quantity, quality, and causality; 5) stated that knowledge is merely phenomenal, namely it concerns only the objects as they appear and not as they really are; 5) established that objects have no reality and sense if not in relation to the mind and that they are framed by a priori rules that are constitutive of reason. The aim of the article is to examine in detail Burthogge's theory of knowledge and to show his original position within the historical and cultural setting of his time.
45
Pangumbahas, Recky, and Oey Natanael Winanto. "MEMBACA KEMBALI PANDANGAN MORALITAS POSTMODERNISM UNTUK KONTEKS PENDIDIKAN KRISTEN (RE-READING THE WORLDVIEW OF POSTMODERNISM MORALITY FOR THE CONTEXT OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION)." QUAERENS: Journal of Theology and Christianity Studies 3, no. 1 (June 25, 2021): 73–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.46362/quaerens.v3i1.33.
Full textAbstract:
One of the most important elements of postmodernity is the growing awareness of the diversity and potential incommensurability of the various forms of cultural life that sustain groups and individuals and addresses the postmodernist denial that postmodernism is inherently apathetic or hostile to social or political action. Postmodernism is a reaction to the epistemological ideals of modernity. Postmodernism is based on a limited human point of view, and thus becomes a prisoner of its own subjectivity, resulting in two main characteristics, namely pluralism and relativism. This study analyzes the postmodern view that is implemented in Christian education in Indonesia. The method used in this article is a literature study by using philosophical biblical glasses to analyze postmodern views. The result is that postmodern moral education (such as transcendentalism and idealism) has some useful and some negative aspects that should be considered for planning moral education and curriculum development for Christian education in Indonesia.
Satu elemen paling penting dari postmodernitas adalah tumbuhnya kesadaran akan keragaman dan potensi ketidakterbandingan dari berbagai bentuk kehidupan budaya yang menopang kelompok dan individu dan membahas penolakan postmodernis bahwa postmodernisme secara inheren apatis atau bermusuhan dengan tindakan sosial atau politik. Postmodernisme merupakan reaksi terhadap cita-cita epistemologis modernitas. Postmodernisme didasarkan pada sudut pandang manusia yang terbatas, dan dengan demikian menjadi tawanan subyektivitasnya sendiri, menghasilkan dua karakteristik utama, yaitu pluralisme dan relativisme. Kajian ini menganalisis pandangan postmodern yang diimplementasikan pada pendidikan Kristen di Indonesia. Metode yang digunakan pada artikel ini adalah studi literatur dengan memanfaat kacamata biblis filosofis untuk menganalisa pandangan postmodern. Hasilnya adalah pendidikan moral postmodern (seperti transendentalisme dan idealisme) memiliki beberapa aspek yang berguna dan beberapa negatif yang harus dipertimbangkan untuk perencanaan pendidikan moral dan pengembangan kurikulum pendidikan Kristen di Indonesia.
46
Loidolt, Sophie. "Anschauliche Ausweisung als die phänomenologische Form epistemischer Rechtfertigung." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 142–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01601007.
Full textAbstract:
Epistemic warrant for Husserl is closely tied to his phenomenological method and his main philosophical theme: intentionality. By investigating the lived experience of intentional givenness he elaborates what being a justificatory reason amounts to and thereby develops his specific conception of epistemic justification: intuitive fulfillment of a signitive intention which achieves evidence as the experienced, subjectively accessible presence of the “thing itself.” Terminologically, Husserl calls this Ausweisung (demonstration, intuitive showing or warrant). The intuitively fulfilled givenness of the intended, its self-givenness, is the ultimate reason for its epistemic justification. For Husserl a “space of reasons” is thus is tied to and made possible only by means of the fundamental accomplishment of intentionality: the conscious presence of the world itself which surpasses the classical epistemological division between inner and outer realm, mind and world. By following Husserl’s development from the Logical Investigations up to his phenomenological version of transcendental idealism, the role of epistemic justification qua demonstration of intuitive fulfillment (Ausweisung) will be spelled out according to the theses above. In the last part of the paper I will examine Husserl’s position with respect to discussions on justification in the Philosophy of Mind and analytic epistemology.
47
Kondratyeva, I. V. "THE CONCEPT GENESIS OF THE ETHICAL DOCTRINES OF KIEV ACADEMISTS." UKRAINIAN CULTURAL STUDIES, no. 1 (2) (2018): 9–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/ucs.2018.1(2).02.
Full textAbstract:
The article reveals the reasons for the Kyiv thinkers to emphasize their ethical issues in their creative intelligence. Most of all there was need for justification in the light of the moral postulates of metaphysical epistemological and eschatological developments, an updated tendency towards the injection of ethics in philosophical concepts which is characteristic to the development of European thought of the second half of the nineteenth century, needs of social practice, distribution of nihilistic ideas in society. The process of forming the ethical academic doctrine cannot be conceived without solving the problem of ideological influences. The following processes are recognized by: a) Mainly but not exclusively the Eastern-Byzantine tradition which was a logical extension of holy teachings; b) Influence of Kant's moral philosophy and in part Fichte's and theist-oriented theories of German thinkers of the nineteenth century. The ideas of the moral-educational character contained in the works of the holy fathers and teachers of the church, in particular Athanasius the Great, John Chrysostom, John Climacus, Ambrose of Mediolans, who are subsequently influenced the formation of the ethical doctrine of the Kyiv thinkers. The ideological discrepancy between spiritual philosophers and their predecessors - professors of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, who came out in their intelligence from the provisions of Aristotelian ethics, is emphasized. Reasons of the influence of German idealism were found in particular practical philosophy on the process of formation of ethical attitudes of Kyiv academicians. Separately the most influential researchers of the idea of the moral philosophy of Kant and the principle of morality a priori are considered. In order to identify possible recipes of theistic concepts of German thinkers the main propositions of the theologies of morality explained by A. Richel, F. Schleiermacher, H. Martensen, A. Wutke, R. Root, A. Ettingen, K. Palmer. Actually the ethical doctrine of the thinkers of the Kiev Theological Academy is actualized on the one hand through the creative processing of the ideological achievements of patristics, on the other hand the concepts of the practical philosophy of German idealism.
48
Pardede, Josua Navirio, and Piere Hugo Poluakan. "Law and Post-Truth: Critical Constructivism as an Ideal Legal Reasoning Method on Indonesia’s Post-Truth Era Society." Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Konstitusi 4, no. 1 (June 4, 2021): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v4i1.4202.
Full textAbstract:
This article aims to look at the current reality, which is marked by the proliferation of post-truth phenomena in the community, marking the many developments in the views and perspectives of each individual who considers something as an absolute truth by shifting the existence of facts, data. , and reality. This is the reality of challenges in the current era, so that in responding to the challenges posed by the post-truth era, scientific frameworks, including law as one of the main components that interact directly with society must try to avoid the formation of analyzes that lead to absolute truth. This article is the result of legal research using secondary legal materials. The results show that, critical constructivism as a method of reasoning that determines the process of legal reasoning, is able to prove its never-ending thought process by placing a gap between materialism and idealism, and its epistemological aspects provide a simultaneous relationship between empiricism and rationalism. The results of legal interpretation through the pattern of critical constructivism will continue to be criticized as long as the results of the interpretation cannot show the truth, this process will obtain an analysis result that will never lead to the absolute truth inherent in post-truth. world.
49
Montenegro Ortiz, Carlos Manuel. "Dewey as experience." Escritos 28, no. 61 (2020): 62–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.18566/escr.v28n61.a05.
Full textAbstract:
What did John Dewey mean by the experience? Researchers of John Dewey’s work (philosophers, psychologists, artists and educators, among many others) often attempt to decipher the American thinker’s thesis, statements and postulates. However, specific approaches have probably become inexact when interpreting many of his concepts, even thinking that they are superficial idealism. Detailed state-of-the-art review during the past decade, in terms of the idea of experience in Dewey, makes it possible to think that this concept –although not precisely defined as that of a dictionary– can be analyzed more accurately. The last is the debate and reflection that will be open to the academic community in this paper; to clarify and, subsequently, define the concept, two fundamental and inherent aspects are presented in this document: first, the pragmatist line that addresses an epistemological framework of the idea; second, two Deweyan elements will be enlightened, these are the living organism and nature, which, as the axis of an empirical influence, are analyzed from the Vermont philosopher’s perspective. This concept also addresses three essential perspectives: biological, psychological and social, bearing in mind that, according to Dewey, real experiences occur if “meaning” comes after. Finally, an interpretative approach will answer, as possible, the question posed at the beginning of this abstract.
50
Pels, Dick, Kevin Hetherington, and FrÈdÈric Vandenberghe. "The Status of the Object." Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 5-6 (December 2002): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026327602761899110.
Full textAbstract:
In their substantive introduction, the editors first revisit two classical sites of controversy which have offered frameworks for theorizing the interplay between materiality and sociality: reification and fetishism. Obviously, these critical vocabularies emerge as crucial sites of perplexity as soon as the ontological boundary between subjects and objects is rendered equally problematic and fluid as the epistemological boundary between the imaginary and the real. A thumbnail sketch of the history of the two discursive traditions (from Marxism up to Actor Network Theory) provides an elaborate systematic framework for introducing the individual articles. The first axis of debate is generated by conceptual residues of the traditional tug-of-war between idealism and materialism which continues to infiltrate recent redescriptions of the web of sociality/materiality. The concern here is how much autonomy and agency can be granted to material objects in view of their social inscription and symbolic construction, and how far conceptual experiments with the ontological symmetry between humans and nonhumans may take us and/or should be permitted to go. The second axis of debate concerns the fate of critical theory and of ethico-political sensibility in the face of heightened uncertainties about the distinction between what is real, what is constructed, and what is imaginary, and between what may count as a person and what as a thing.