Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Equilibria (Economics)'
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Anwar, Ahmed Waqar. "Multiple equilibria in theory and practice." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297967.
Full textMackensen, Heide C. U. "Equilibria in overlapping generations models." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17347.
Full textInterest rates are fundamental in the explanation of equilibrium prices over time, because they provide the link between the present and the future. Capturing this dynamic feature, the overlapping generations model is particularly suitable to address the interest rate problem, as has been shown by Paul Samuelson, David Gale and Costas Azariadis. This thesis reviews their contribution to the theory of interest: with his consumption-loan model, Samuelson sets the analytical framework for subsequent research. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the optimal interest rate is unstable, implying that a competitive economy may fail to approach the social optimum. The Samuelson and classical sets of assumptions are consolidated in the intertemporal exchange model of Gale. Its equilibrium nature, however, ignores the sequential adjustment of disequilibrium interest rates to their equilibrium values. Consequently it is difficult to comment on the direction of causality involved in the interest rate determination, unless a clearing house is introduced which simultaneously resolves the starting-up, continuity and causality problems. Departing from the full certainty scenario, Azariadis analyses the existence and likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies. It is shown that the implications of the economy's assumed Markovian structure are twofold: while facilitating the parametric treatment of the transition probabilities, it negates the question concerning the likelihood of sunspot equilibria. Within the specified framework it is impossible to explain how the economy arrives at such equilibria; it is only possible to identify the conditions that maintain (once they exist) these self-fulfilling prophecies.
Burke, Jonathan Lewis. "Essays on equilibria in dynamic economies." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/15138.
Full textMICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND SCIENCE.
Vita.
Bibliography: leaves 187-189.
by Jonathan Lewis Burke.
Ph.D.
Bonanno, Giacomo. "Topics in oligopoly : local equilibria, choice of product, entry deterrence." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267267.
Full textShea, Paul. "Adaptive learning and multiple equilibria /." view abstract or download file of text, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1404347271&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=11238&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Full textTypescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-125). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
Zhosan, Dmytro. "Nash equilibria on a spatial commons theory and experimental evidence /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2009. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3386734.
Full textTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 15, 2010). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-12, Section: A, page: 4790. Adviser: Roy J. Gardner.
Yang, Chao. "Social Interactions under Incomplete Information: Games, Equilibria, and Expectations." The Ohio State University, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1429117943.
Full textJames, Kevin. "Estimating Auction Equilibria using Individual Evolutionary Learning." Chapman University Digital Commons, 2019. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cads_dissertations/1.
Full textSteiger, Laura Christina 1977. "Three essays on adaptive learning, institutions and multiple equilibria." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10241.
Full textThis dissertation examines the role that institutions play in the existence of multiple equilibria in models of economic development. In addition, it examines the dynamics of transition between such equilibria. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I build a dynamic model of institutional choice, wherein the government invests in the legal infrastructure in response to the need for the protection of output from appropriation. A unique equilibrium exists only under commitment, not under discretion. This would suggest that a measure of institutional quality must not only consider the extent to which current policies protect property rights but also include the ability of the government to commit to reform in the long run. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the effect of adaptive learning on stability and transitional dynamics between multiple equilibria in a growth model with human capital externalities. I find that there are two equilibria, one a poverty trap with no education. Only the poverty trap is locally stable under learning. However, productivity shocks are not sufficient to generate transitions between the equilibria. Indeed, productivity shocks must lie below a threshold in order for the economy to escape the poverty trap. These escape paths do not allow the economy to transition to the upper steady state. I propose instead the use of shocks to expectations to permit such a transition. The third chapter of this dissertation presents an empirical test for the role that human capital and institutions may play in transitions between equilibria by estimating a Markov-switching regression. This methodology allows me to characterize both distinct growth regimes and transitions between them. I explore the effects of time-varying institutional measures and human capital on transition probabilities. I find that political and economic institutions are similar in their effects on transitions arid that the time variation in the institutional measure increases the probability of identifying both miracle growth and stagnation regimes. Furthermore, human capital has a significant effect on switches between miracle growth, stable growth and stagnation.
Committee in charge: George Evans, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Shankha Chakraborty, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Jeremy Piger, Member, Economics; Yue Fang, Outside Member, Decision Sciences
McCune, Benton John Varadarajan Kasturi. "Algorithmic game theory and the computation of market equilibria." [Iowa City, Iowa] : University of Iowa, 2009. http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/405.
Full textSteiger, Laura Christina. "Three essays on adaptive learning, institutions and multiple equilibria /." Connect to title online (Scholars' Bank) Connect to title online (ProQuest), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10241.
Full textShevyakhova, Elizaveta. "Two Essays in Economics." Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/992.
Full textThe thesis includes two essays. The first essay, Inequality Moments in Estimation of Discrete Games with Incomplete Information and Multiple Equilibria, develops a method for estimation of static discrete games with incomplete information, which delivers consistent estimates of parameters even when games have multiple equilibria. Every Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete game of incomplete information is associated with a set of choice probabilities. I use maximum and minimum equilibrium choice probabilities as upper and lower bounds on empirical choice probabilities to construct moment inequalities. In general, estimation with moment inequalities results in partial identification. I show that point identification is achievable if the payoffs are functions of a sufficient number of explanatory variables with a real line domain and outcome-specific coefficients associated with them. The second essay, Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, co-authored with Richard Arnott, investigates the effect of tenancy rent control on maintenance and welfare. Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. The essay analyzes the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to show it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The essay formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Holmberg, Pär. "Modelling Bidding Behaviour in Electricity Auctions : Supply Function Equilibria with Uncertain Demand and Capacity Constraints." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-5882.
Full textIn most electricity markets, producers submit supply functions to a procurement uniform-price auction under uncertainty before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer commits to the supply function that maximises his expected profit given the bids of competitors.
The presence of multiple equilibria is a basic weakness of the SFE framework. Essay I shows that with (i) symmetric producers, (ii) perfectly inelastic demand, (iii) a reservation price (price cap), and (iv) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, a unique symmetric SFE exists. The equilibrium price reaches the price cap exactly when capacity constraints bind.
Another weakness is difficulty finding a valid asymmetric SFE with non-decreasing supply functions. Essay II shows that for firms with asymmetric capacity constraints but identical constant marginal costs there exists a unique and valid SFE. Equilibrium supply functions exhibit kinks as well as vertical and horizontal segments. The price at which the capacity constraint of a firm binds is increasing in the firm’s share of market capacity. The capacity constraint of the second largest firm binds when the market price reaches the price cap. Thereafter, the largest firm supplies its remaining capacity with a perfectly elastic segment at the price cap. Essay III presents a numerical algorithm that calculates a similar SFE for asymmetric firms with increasing marginal costs.
Essay IV derives the SFE of a pay-as-bid auction such as the balancing market for electric power in Britain. A unique SFE always exists if the demand’s hazard rate is monotonically decreasing, as for a Pareto distribution of the second kind. Assuming this probability distribution, the pay-as-bid procurement auction is compared to the SFE of a uniform-price procurement auction. Two theorems in Essay V prove that the demand-weighted average price is (weakly) lower in the pay-as-bid procurement auction.
Agbor, Julius Agbor. "Essays on the political economy of 20th century colonisation and decolonisation in Africa." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/14609.
Full textThe focus of this dissertation is on colonisation and decolonisation as cornerstones in the development of sub-Saharan Africa's current institutions and how these historical institutions affect current economic growth outcomes. The dissertation consists of three main chapters besides the introductory and concluding chapters. The rst main chapter considers conditions of optimality in a co-optive strategy of colonial rule. It proposes a simple model of elite formation emanating from a coloniser's quest to maximise extracted rents from its colonies... In the second main chapter, I argue that the pattern of decolonisation in West Africa was a function of the nature of human capital transfers from the colonisers to the indigenous elites of the former colonies. Underpinning the nature of these human capital transfers is the colonial educational ideology... The third main chapter investigates the channels through which colonial origin affects economic outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It focuses on four key channels of transmission namely, human capital, trade openness, market distortion and selection bias.
Abazajian, Katya A. "Can Cities Manage Growth Through Taxation? A Study of Spatial Equilibria in California Cities." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/752.
Full textSolomon, Raphael Haim Reuven. "Every bank run need not cause a currency crisis. models of twin crisis with imperfect information." The Ohio State University, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1054309457.
Full textMilán, Pau. "The Social economics of networks and learning." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/393733.
Full textEsta tesis explora diversos entornos económicos en los que la estructura de las interacciones sociales entre los individuos determina los distintos resultados. En el primer capítulo, se estudia acuerdos de seguro mutuo restringidos en una red social. Utilizo datos de comunidades bolivianas para medir las predicciones teóricas y encuentro que los intercambios observados entre los hogares coinciden con la regla de reparto basada en la red obtenida por la teoría. Sostengo que este marco ofrece una reinterpretación de los resultados estándar de distribución de riesgos, prediciendo heterogeneidad entre los hogares en respuesta a los shocks de ingresos. En el segundo artículo, estudio el comportamiento individual y colectivo en juegos de coordinación, donde la información se dispersa a través de una red. Demuestro cómo los cambios en la distribución de las conectividades de la población afectan a los tipos de coordinación en equilibrio, así como la probabilidad de éxito. En el tercer capítulo, analizo un marco de aprendizaje y cambio de personal en el mercado de trabajo. Muestro que emparejamiento selectivo positivo (PAM) se extiende más allá del entorno estable de Eeckhout y Weng (2010) a una situación de incertidumbre residual que exhibe períodos de des-aprendizaje. También extiendo esta configuración para permitir elementos de career concerns y muestro que el equilibrio de PAM sólo puede sostenerse bajo fuertes supuestos.
Heap, Paul. "General equilibrium models of monetary economics." Thesis, University of York, 1996. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9784/.
Full textMouzouni, Charafeddine. "Topic in mean field games theory & applications in economics and quantitative finance." Thesis, Lyon, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LYSEC006.
Full textMean Field Game (MFG) systems describe equilibrium configurations in differential games with infinitely many infinitesimal interacting agents. This thesis is articulated around three different contributions to the theory of Mean Field Games. The main purpose is to explore the power of this theory as a modeling tool in various fields, and to propose original approaches to deal with the underlying mathematical questions. The first chapter presents the key concepts and ideas that we use throughout the thesis: we introduce the MFG problem, and we briefly explain the asymptotic link with N-Player differential games when N → ∞. Next we present our main results and contributions, that are explained more in details in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, we explore a Mean Field Game model with myopic agents. In contrast to the classical MFG models, we consider less rational agents which do not anticipate the evolution of the environment, but only observe the current state of the system, undergo changes and take actions accordingly. We analyze the resulting system of coupled PDEs and provide a rigorous derivation of that system from N-Player stochastic differential games models. Next, we show that our population of agents can self-organize and converge exponentially fast to the well-known ergodic MFG equilibrium. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with a MFG model in which producers compete to sell an exhaustible resource such as oil, coal, natural gas, or minerals. In Chapter 3, we propose an alternative approach based on a variational method to formulate the MFG problem, and we explore the deterministic limit (without fluctuations of demand) in a regime where re- sources are renewable or abundant. In Chapter 4 we address the rigorous link between the Cournot MFG model and the N-Player Cournot competition when N is large. In Chapter 5, we introduce a MFG model for the optimal execution of a multi-asset portfolio. We start by formulating the MFG problem, then we compute the optimal execution strategy for a given investor knowing her/his initial inventory and we carry out several simulations. Next, we analyze the influence of the trading activity on the observed intra-day pattern of the covariance matrix of returns and we apply our results in an empirical analysis on a pool of 176 US stocks
De, Chiara Alessandro. "Essays in regulation and organizational economics." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209058.
Full textThe first part of the dissertation addresses questions related to the procurement decisions of private and public organizations. In particular it focuses on how the anticipation of renegotiating the contractual terms during the execution of a procurement contract affects the initial arrangements between the parties. Renegotiation may involve the design itself of the goods which are procured, and not just their price or the time of their delivery. A plausible explanation for its pervasiveness is the existence of transaction costs which prevents contracts from being complete. This is especially true for more sophisticated and customized goods, such as new infrastructures or cars' and aircrafts' parts or components. Ex-post these goods may fail to fit the buyer's specific needs and/or may exhibit flaws unforeseen at the planning stage.
In the first two chapters, I show that the anticipation of ex-post adaptations has critical implications for many procurement choices, such as that of the contractual agreement, the award mechanism, and the delegation of the design task to the suppliers. Therefore, a proper inclusion of design failures into the analysis of procurement contracts can help broaden our understanding of the wide variety of procurement modes and outcomes observed in the real world. My analysis offers an explanation for the procurement practices adopted in complex manufacturing and construction industries. Moreover, it can provide useful guidance for public procurement. Governments face tight restrictions in their choices of the procurement modes and for this reason they should carefully evaluate whether or not to adopt the best practices of the private sector.
The second part of the dissertation concerns the optimal design of an organization. In many organizations the task of evaluating an agent's performance is delegated to a third party, a supervisor, who can opportunistically misreport information. The question of how the provision of incentives in hierarchies is affected by the supervisor's opportunism is of great importance since it can improve our understanding of the internal organization of firms and can have broad applications to regulatory design.
The third chapter of the thesis, co-authored with Luca Livio (ECARES, FNRS), contributes to this line of research by studying the optimal task a supervisor should be charged with in the presence of corruption concerns. We highlight the existence of a trade-off between monitoring the agent's effort choice and auditing it ex-post, which arises when the two faces of corruption, collusion and extortion, are present.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
Giesecke, James Andrew David. "FEDERAL-F : a multi-regional multi-sectoral dynamic model of the Australian economy /." Title page, appendix, contents and abstract only, 2000. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phg4554.pdf.
Full textPijoan-Mas, Josep. "The role of habit formation in general equilibrium macroeconomics." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.271028.
Full textWitt, Robert James. "3 essays on intemporal substitution, equilibrium unemployment and crime." Thesis, University of Essex, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.293678.
Full textHendtlass, Matthew. "Constructing fixed points and economic equilibria." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2013. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4973/.
Full textMorron, Salmeron Adrià. "Unemployment in local labor markets : empirics and theory." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/403954.
Full textLa presència de costos de transport fa que els mercats laborals tinguin una dimensió local. Concretament, l'existència d'economies d'aglomeració fa que hi hagi una correlació positiva entre la mida d'una ciutat i la productivitat dels treballadors que hi viuen. La tesi explora les implicacions d'aquest fet estilitzat sobre les taxes d'atur urbanes i sobre els fluxes del mercat laboral. En primer lloc, a partir de la lògica d'un model estàndard d'aparellament al mercat laboral, es demostra que caldria esperar que la probabilitat de trobar una feina augmenti amb la mida de la ciutat, que la probabilitat de perdre una feina disminueixi amb la mida de la ciutat i que, per tant, la taxa d'atur sigui menor en ciutats més grans. En segon lloc, es mostra que, segons les dades, tant la probabilitat de trobar una feina com la de perdre-la disminueixen amb la mida de la ciutat, de tal manera que les taxes d'atur no estan correlacionades amb la mida de la ciutat. En darrer lloc, construeixo tres models que racionalitzen aquests fets estilitzats dins del marc d'un mercat laboral local governat per una funció d'aparellament amb retorns constants a escala.
Crawford, Daniel P. "Minimizing Pollution Through Semi-Antagonistic Equilibrium Points." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1366897624.
Full textGarino, Gaia. "A competitive temporary equilibrium approach to the housing and mortgage markets." Thesis, University of York, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297108.
Full textBrixen, Peter. "The financial sector in applied general equilibrium models : the case of Ecuador." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389710.
Full textBardai, Barjoyai bin. "Evaluation of the 1988 Malaysian tax reform proposals : a general equilibrium approach." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.245217.
Full textKhan, Rosli Azad. "The effect of time-value distributions on competitive equilibrium in the bus market." Thesis, Cranfield University, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333547.
Full textJung, Yong-Gook. "Essays on the specification of New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model." Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2007. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3273810.
Full textTitle from first page of PDF file (viewed October 3, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 60-64).
Ghadimi, Hodjatollah. "Economic development in economies with an exhaustible resource : a dynamic computable general equilibrium analysis for the case of Iran /." The Ohio State University, 1993. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1389273708.
Full textKenc, Turalay. "Dynamic general equilibrium tax modelling : a study of the UK in the 1980's." Thesis, University of York, 1992. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9807/.
Full textCampos, Filho Leonardo. "Brazilian trade policy in the 1980's and 1990's : an applied general equilibrium analysis." Thesis, University of London, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.300292.
Full textShing, Chak Hung, and 盛澤鴻. "Invariance of resource allocation under the following contractual arrangements: share contract, piece rate andtime rate." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31954686.
Full textZiramba, Emmanuel. "Essays on public finance and economic growth using dynamic general equilibrium models." Thesis, Pretoria : [s.n.], 2009. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-03282009-125923/.
Full textShachat, Jason Matthew 1967. "Heterogeneity and equilibrium." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289566.
Full textSalazar, Natalia. "Essays on fundamental equilibrium exchange rates /." Connect to resource, 2000. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1261237229.
Full textLarson, Nathan (Nathan Christopher) 1974. "Essays on equilibrium selection." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8651.
Full textIncludes bibliographical references (p. 111-112).
The first two chapters of this thesis explore how coordination happens in simple games. The first chapter models the adaptive play of a 2 x 2 game by pairs of agents matched together from a large population. In contrast with the existing literature, I assume that agents have some control over who they are matched with - specifically, I give them the option to sometimes continue playing against the same opponent. This renewal option allows agents playing efficiently to isolate themselves from those who are not. Perhaps counterintuitively, efficient play may be less likely to survive in the long run when agents have this additional instrument, even in games with common interests. This is because isolation has two effects: it raises the returns to an efficient but fragile strategy, but it also "ghettoizes" agents playing inefficiently - they rarely learn about the efficient strategy and when they do learn about it, they rarely hear good news. I look at an extension in which agents have long memories about the performance of a strategy. With long memories, good news about an efficient strategy will be more likely to trickle down to ghettoized agents, mitigating the bias in learning. With this bias removed, long run survival of efficient play becomes more likely - even when it is not a static Nash equilibrium. Essentially, agents learn to use the renewal option to punish non-cooperators. However, the speed of learning may still be quite slow, so that ghettoization persists for a long time.
(cont.) The second chapter investigates the interaction of strategic uncertainty and timing in a coordination game. Carlsson and van Damme have shown that small departures from common knowledge of the game being played can dramatically alter the equilibrium set. In the game I look at, there are two equilibria, but only the risk dominant equilibrium survives such a perturbation. I augment this model by giving agents a costly option to delay choosing a strategy (thereby observing any actions that were taken without delay). Strategic uncertainty gives agents a reason to exercise this option (under complete information, it never would be). In turn, the fact that Agent B sometimes waits and chooses an action after observing Agent A's choice, mitigates the risk that A faces when taking an action that is efficient but sensitive to coordination. As a result, the efficient equilibrium is played more often; in fact, as the cost of delay vanishes, it is always played. In Chapter 3, I explore the interaction between imperfect consumer information and the endogenous level of product differentiation in a non-spatial model of monopolistic competition with horizontally differentiated products. A principle of extreme differentiation is derived: firms will always choose to differentiate either maximally or minimally. In equilibrium, differentiation is maximal when search costs are low and minimal when search costs are high, providing a new interpretation of Hotelling's classic result.
by Nathan Larson.
Ph.D.
Robert-Nicoud, Frederic L. "New economic geography : multiple equilibria, welfare and political economy." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2879/.
Full textSen, Gupta Sonali. "Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5102/.
Full textZullo, Junior Jurandir 1963. "Calculo de equilibrios economicos por otimização." [s.n.], 1990. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/307351.
Full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Matematica, Estatistica e Computação Científica
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Resumo: Não informado.
Abstract: Not informed.
Mestrado
Mestre em Matemática Aplicada
Rotondo, Wladimir. "Calculo de equilibrios economicos por complementaridade." [s.n.], 1988. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/307349.
Full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Matematica, Estatistica e Computação Científica
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Resumo: Não informado.
Abstract: Not informed.
Mestrado
Otimização e Pesquisa Operacional
Mestre em Matemática Aplicada
Accinelli, Elvio. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in productive economies." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/95022.
Full textRozenfeld, Tales. "Avaliação dos impactos econômicos de investimentos em rodovias sob diferentes alternativas de financiamento." Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-24032016-104649/.
Full textThis study explores the issue of road infrastructure funding, analyzing the impact of financing a road improvement project through tolls tariff charged from the final users vis-a-vis the financing through an increase in the country\'s payroll tax rate or in the tax rate on the sales of the transport sector. Using a transport model integrated to an interregional computable general equilibrium model this research simulated alternative arrangements for financing investments made at BR-040, Brazilian road recently granted by the Federal Government and which figured as the case study for this Master thesis. The results indicate that the way the investment is financed is relevant to the regionally distributed impacts of the project, being decisive in defining which regions are benefited by the improvement project. Analyzing the country\'s aggregated results, the situation that has the greatest impact on the Brazilian\'s GDP growth is the investment financed by the road users through the payment of a toll tariff. From a regional perspective, a clear area of influence that benefits from the improvements on the road can be identified and, when the costs for executing such improvements are shared with the whole country through a tax increase, these benefits are accentuated
Proença, Esmeralda Palumbo. "Analise de equilibrio geral aplicada a economias distorcidas." [s.n.], 1991. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/307348.
Full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Matematica, Estatistica e Computação Científica
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Resumo: Não informado.
Abstract: Not informed.
Mestrado
Mestre em Matemática Aplicada
English, William Berkeley. "Credit rationing in general equilibrium." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14891.
Full textMICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY.
Vita.
Includes bibliographies.
by William Berkeley English.
Ph.D.
Cao, Dân (Dân Vuʺ). "Essays in dynamic general equilibrium." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58202.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-202).
This thesis consists of three chapters studying dynamic economies in general equilibrium. The first chapter considers an economy in business cycles with potentially imperfect financial markets. The second chapter investigates an economy in its balanced growth path with heterogeneous firms. The third chapter analyzes dynamic competitions that these firms are potentially engaged in. The first chapter, "Asset Price and Real Investment Volatility with Heterogeneous Beliefs," sheds light on the role of imperfect financial markets on the economic and financial crisis 2007-2008. This crisis highlights the role of financial markets in allowing economic agents, including prominent banks, to speculate on the future returns of different financial assets, such as mortgage-backed securities. I introduce a dynamic general equilibrium model with aggregate shocks, potentially incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents to investigate this role of financial markets. In addition to their risk aversion and endowments, agents differ in their beliefs about the future aggregate states of the economy. The difference in beliefs induces them to take large bets under frictionless complete financial markets, which enable agents to leverage their future wealth. Consequently, as hypothesized by Friedman (1953), under complete markets, agents with incorrect beliefs will eventually be driven out of the markets. In this case, they also have no influence on asset prices and real investment in the long run. In contrast, I show that under incomplete markets generated by collateral constraints, agents with heterogeneous (potentially incorrect) beliefs survive in the long run and their speculative activities drive up asset price volatility and real investment volatility permanently. I also show that collateral constraints are always binding even if the supply of collateralizable assets endogenously responds to their price. I use this framework to study the effects of different types of regulations and the distribution of endowments on leverage, asset price volatility and investment. Lastly, the analytical tools developed in this framework enable me to prove the existence of the recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998) with a finite number of types. This has been an open question in the literature. The second chapter, "Innovation from Incumbents and Entrants," is a joint work with Daron Acemoglu. We propose a simple modification of the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth models, by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products. This model provides a tractable framework for a simultaneous analysis of entry of new firms and the expansion of existing firms, as well as the decomposition of productivity growth between continuing establishments and new entrants. One lesson we learn from this analysis is that, unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models, taxes or entry barriers on potential entrants might increase economic growth. It is the outcome of the greater productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which outweighs the negative effect of the reduction in creative destruction. As the model features entry of new firms and expansion and exit of existing firms, it also generates an equilibrium firm size distribution. We show that the stationary firm size distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called "Zipf distribution"). The third chapter, "Racing: when should we handicap the advantaged competitor?" studies dynamic competitions, for example R&D competitions used in the second chapters. Two competitors with different abilities engage in a winner-take-all race; should we handicap the advantaged competitor in order to reduce the expected completion time of the race? I show that if the discouragement effect is strong, i.e., both competitors are discouraged from exerting effort when it becomes more certain who will win the race, we should handicap the advantaged. We can handicap him either by reducing his ability or by offering him a lower reward if he wins. Doing so induces higher effort not only from the disadvantaged competitor because of his higher incentive from a higher chance of winning the race but also from the advantaged competitor because of their strategic interactions. Therefore, the expected completion time is strictly shortened. To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria (including symmetric and asymmetric equilibria) that leads to the conclusion, I use a boundary value problem formulation which is novel to the dynamic competition literature. In some cases, I obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibria.
by Dan Cao.
Ph.D.
Staines, David. "Stochastic equilibrium, the Phillips curve and Keynesian economics." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2019. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/118938/.
Full textJoosten, Reinoud Anna Maria Gerardus. "Dynamics, equilibria, and values." Maastricht : Maastricht : Universiteit Maastricht ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1996. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6709.
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