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Journal articles on the topic 'Equilibria (Economics)'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Mossel, Elchanan, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, and Omer Tamuz. "Social Learning Equilibria." Econometrica 88, no. 3 (2020): 1235–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta16465.

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We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation.

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2

Cooper, Russell. "Equilibrium Selection in Imperfectly Competitive Economies with Multiple Equilibria." Economic Journal 104, no. 426 (September 1994): 1106. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2235067.

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3

KINSELLA, STEPHEN. "BLUEPRINT FOR AN ALGORITHMIC ECONOMICS." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 08, no. 01 (March 2012): 101–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005712400066.

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Algorithmic economics helps us stipulate, formulate, and resolve economic problems in a more precise manner than mainstream mathematical economics. It does so by aligning theorizing about an economic problem with both the data generated by the real world and the computers used to manipulate that data. Theoretically coherent, numerically meaningful, and therefore policy relevant, answers to economic problems can be extrapolated more readily using algorithmic economics than present day mathematical economics. An algorithmic economics would allow mathematical economics to prove theorems relating to economic problems, such as the existence of equilibria defined on some metric space, with embedded mechanisms for getting to the equilibria of these problems. A blueprint for such an economics is given and discussed with an example.

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4

FARMER, ROGER E. A., and MICHAEL WOODFORD. "SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE." Macroeconomic Dynamics 1, no. 4 (December 1997): 740–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100597005051.

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We demonstrate that multiple stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist in a version of Lucas's island economy. The existence of these equilibria follows from the fact that there is an indeterminate set of monetary equilibria in the two-period overlapping-generations model. We show how to construct stationary rational-expectations equilibria by randomizing over the set of nonstationary monetary equilibria. In some of our equilibria, a positively sloped Phillips curve exists even though our economy contains no signal-extraction problem as in the original Lucas paper. Our equilibria are indexed by beliefs and are examples of the existence of sunspot equilibria in which allocations may differ across states of nature for which preferences, technology, and endowments are identical. Our technique for constructing stationary sunspot equilibria should prove useful in a wide class of models in which an indeterminate stationary equilibrium exists.

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Balder, Erik J., and Nicholas C. Yannelis. "Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium." Economic Theory 38, no. 2 (October 2, 2007): 385–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0288-6.

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6

Miftakhova, Alena, Karl Schmedders, and Malte Schumacher. "Computing Economic Equilibria Using Projection Methods." Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (August 2, 2020): 317–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025711.

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The analysis of dynamic economic models routinely leads to the mathematical problem of determining an unknown function for which no closed-form solution exists. Economists must then resort to methods of numerical approximation when analyzing such models. Among the computational methods that have been successfully applied in economics and finance, one set of techniques stands out due to its flexibility and robustness: projection methods. In this article, we describe the basic steps of these methods for several different applications, surveying many successful applications of projection methods to dynamic economic models. Importantly, we emphasize that the ever-increasing complexity and dimensionality of dynamic models have made the previously used simpler methods obsolete and the applications of projection methods all but mandatory. We closely examine the most recent endeavors in the literature on solving economic models with projection methods.

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7

Duffy, John, and Daniela Puzzello. "Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence." American Economic Review 104, no. 6 (June 1, 2014): 1735–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.6.1735.

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We study the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange in the laboratory. With a finite population of sufficiently patient agents, this model has a unique monetary equilibrium and a continuum of non-monetary gift exchange equilibria, some of which Pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium. We find that subjects avoid the gift exchange equilibria in favor of the monetary equilibrium. We also study versions of the model without money where all equilibria involve non-monetary gift exchange. We find that welfare is higher in the model with money than without money, suggesting that money plays a role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device. ( JEL C92, D12, E40, Z13)

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8

Farmer, Roger E. A., Daniel F. Waggoner, and Tao Zha. "Generalizing the Taylor Principle: Comment." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 608–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.608.

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Troy Davig and Eric Leeper (2007) have proposed a condition they call the generalized Taylor principle to rule out indeterminate equilibria in a version of the new-Keynesian model where the parameters of the policy rule follow a Markov-switching process. We show that although their condition rules out a subset of indeterminate equilibria, it does not establish uniqueness of the fundamental equilibrium. We discuss the differences between indeterminate fundamental equilibria included by Davig and Leeper's condition and fundamental equilibria that their condition misses

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9

Lyn, Gary, and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. "External Economies and International Trade Redux: Comment*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (August 29, 2013): 1895–905. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt017.

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Abstract Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; “External Economies and International Trade: Redux,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829–858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under different transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH’s model. We confirm many of GRH’s results, but also find that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to “natural” comparative advantage, and also find that there is a profitable deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.

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10

Myerson, Roger B., and Philip J. Reny. "Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions." Econometrica 88, no. 2 (2020): 495–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13426.

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We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional ε‐equilibrium if, for any of a player's positive probability signal events, his conditional expected utility is within ε of the best that he can achieve by deviating. With topologies on action sets, a conditional ε‐equilibrium is full if strategies give every open set of actions positive probability. Such full conditional ε‐equilibria need not be subgame perfect, so we consider a non‐topological approach. Perfect conditional ε‐equilibria are defined by testing conditional ε‐rationality along nets of small perturbations of the players' strategies and of nature's probability function that, for any action and for almost any state, make this action and state eventually (in the net) always have positive probability. Every perfect conditional ε‐equilibrium is a subgame perfect ε‐equilibrium, and, in finite games, limits of perfect conditional ε‐equilibria as ε → 0 are sequential equilibrium strategy profiles. But limit strategies need not exist in infinite games so we consider instead the limit distributions over outcomes. We call such outcome distributions perfect conditional equilibrium distributions and establish their existence for a large class of regular projective games. Nature's perturbations can produce equilibria that seem unintuitive and so we augment the game with a net of permissible perturbations.

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11

Kubler, Felix, and Karl Schmedders. "RECURSIVE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS." Macroeconomic Dynamics 6, no. 2 (April 2002): 284–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136510050203105x.

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We examine minimal sufficient state spaces for equilibria in a Lucas asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. It is clear that even if all fundamentals of the economy follow a first-order Markov process, equilibrium prices and allocations generally will depend not only on the current exogenous shock but also on the distribution of wealth among the heterogeneous agents. The main contribution of this paper is to give an example of an infinite-horizon economy with Markovian fundamentals, where the joint process of equilibrium asset holdings and exogenous shocks does not constitute a sufficient state space either.

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12

de Paula, Áureo. "Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria." Annual Review of Economics 5, no. 1 (August 2, 2013): 107–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081612-185944.

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13

Kandori, Michihiro. "Equivalent Equilibria." International Economic Review 29, no. 3 (August 1988): 401. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2526787.

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14

Bullard, James. "Learning Equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 64, no. 2 (December 1994): 468–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1077.

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15

Turocy, Theodore L. "Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria." Economic Theory 42, no. 1 (February 6, 2009): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0443-3.

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16

Bossi, Luca, and Pere Gomis-Porqueras. "CONSEQUENCES OF MODELING HABIT PERSISTENCE." Macroeconomic Dynamics 13, no. 3 (June 2009): 349–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100508080085.

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In this paper, we study the stationary and non-stationary equilibria of a deterministic, pure exchange, two-period overlapping generations model with habit persistence. We show that preferences with multiplicative habits can lead to quite different equilibrium outcomes compared to subtractive ones. The two most commonly adopted habit specifications can differ in terms of homotheticity, gross substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibria. We illustrate these differences in terms of steady-state equilibria, as well as local dynamics.

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17

Bullard, James, George W. Evans, and Seppo Honkapohja. "A MODEL OF NEAR-RATIONAL EXUBERANCE." Macroeconomic Dynamics 14, no. 2 (March 9, 2010): 166–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100509090208.

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We study how the use of judgment or “add-factors” in forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn by using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which new phenomena, which we callexuberance equilibria, can exist in a standard self-referential environment. Local indeterminacy is not a requirement for existence. We construct a simple asset-pricing example and find that exuberance equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative to fundamental equilibria.

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18

Goerg, Sebastian J., Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Tibor Neugebauer. "Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games." German Economic Review 17, no. 3 (August 1, 2016): 284–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12100.

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Abstract In a recent paper, Croson et al. (2015) experimentally study three weakest link games with multiple symmetric equilibria. They demonstrate that static concepts based on the Nash equilibrium (including multiple Nash equilibria, quantal response equilibria, and equilibrium selection by risk and payoff dominance) cannot successfully capture the observed treatment differences. Using Reinhard Selten’s impulse response dynamics, we derive a proposition that provides a theoretical ranking of contribution levels in the weakest link games. We show that the predicted ranking of treatment outcomes is fully consistent with the observed data. In addition, we demonstrate that the impulse response dynamics perform well in tracking average contributions over time. We conclude that Reinhard Selten’s impulse response dynamics provide an extremely valuable behavioral approach that is not only capable of resolving the indecisiveness of static approaches in games with many equilibria, but that can also be used to track the development of choices over time in games with repeated interaction.

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19

Reny, Philip J. "Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games." Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (August 2, 2020): 439–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-111720.

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We review the discontinuous games literature, with a sharp focus on conditions that ensure the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in strategic form games and of Bayes-Nash equilibria in Bayesian games.

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20

Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, and Martín Uribe. "Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria." American Economic Review 91, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 167–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.1.167.

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This paper characterizes conditions under which interest-rate feedback rules that set the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of the inflation rate induce aggregate instability by generating multiple equilibria. It shows that these conditions depend not only on the monetary-fiscal regime (as emphasized in the fiscal theory of the price level) but also on the way in which money is assumed to enter preferences and technology. It provides a number of examples in which, contrary to what is commonly believed, active monetary policy gives rise to multiple equilibria and passive monetary policy renders the equilibrium unique. (JEL E52, E31, E63)

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21

Detemple, Jerome, Marcel Rindisbacher, and Scott Robertson. "Dynamic Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium With Insider Information." Econometrica 88, no. 6 (2020): 2697–737. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta17038.

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We study equilibria in multi‐asset and multi‐agent continuous‐time economies with asymmetric information and bounded rational noise traders. We establish the existence of two equilibria. First, a full communication equilibrium where the informed agents' signal is disclosed to the market and static policies are optimal. Second, a partial communication equilibrium where the signal disclosed is affine in the informed and noise traders' signals, and dynamic policies are optimal. Here, information asymmetry creates demand for two public funds, as well as a dark pool where private information trades can be implemented. Markets are endogenously complete and equilibrium returns have a three factor structure with stochastic factors and loadings. Results are valid for constant absolute risk averse investors, general vector diffusions for fundamentals, nonlinear terminal payoffs, and non‐Gaussian noise trading. Asset price dynamics and public information flows are endogenous, and rational expectations equilibria are special cases of the general results.

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22

Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson. "Economics versus politics: pitfalls of policy advice." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 12 (December 20, 2013): 4–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-12-4-28.

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The standard approach to policy making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria — and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria.

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23

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 2 (February 1, 2013): 173–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.27.2.173.

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The standard approach to policy making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria—and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria.

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24

D’Agata, Antonio. "Existence of Exact Walrasian Equilibria in Nonconvex Economies." Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 6, no. 2012-12 (2012): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-12.

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25

LACHAPELLE, AIME, JULIEN SALOMON, and GABRIEL TURINICI. "COMPUTATION OF MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMICS." Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences 20, no. 04 (April 2010): 567–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218202510004349.

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Motivated by a mean field games stylized model for the choice of technologies (with externalities and economy of scale), we consider the associated optimization problem and prove an existence result. To complement the theoretical result, we introduce a monotonic algorithm to find the mean field equilibria. We close with some numerical results, including the multiplicity of equilibria describing the possibility of a technological transition.

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26

Gregoir, Stéphane, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. "Restricted perception equilibria and rational expectation equilibrium." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, no. 1 (January 2007): 81–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.10.001.

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27

Ramoglou, Stratos. "Why do disequilibria exist? An ontological study of Kirznerian economics." Cambridge Journal of Economics 45, no. 4 (June 23, 2021): 833–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/beab015.

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Abstract In his influential critique of mainstream economics, Israel Kirzner rejected the notion of equilibrated economies in an attempt to develop a realistic account of the workings of entrepreneurial markets. Key to Kirznerian analysis are the arguments that (i) economies do not equilibrate because there always exist unexploited opportunities, and (ii) opportunities remain unexploited until ‘entrepreneurially alert’ individuals discover them. This paper draws from Tony Lawson’s philosophy of economics to explain that Kirznerian economics is no more realistic than mainstream. According to Lawson, it is the ontological commitment to closed systems thinking—not superficial theoretical features such as equilibrium—that makes mainstream economics unrealistic. I argue that Kirzner’s theoretical system similarly presupposes a closed system ontology. Whereas the mainstream worldview presumes the instant exploitation of opportunities, the Kirznerian worldview presumes their delayed yet unavoidable exploitation. The ontological critique of Kirznerian economics simultaneously facilitates the reorientation of entrepreneurship theory towards genuinely realistic modes of thought. This is feasible once we acknowledge the non-empirical ontology of ‘entrepreneurial opportunity’ and concomitant fallibility of the ‘entrepreneurial imagination’: opportunities remain unexploited because (inter alia) their existence is known only after their actualisation. The existence of economic disequilibria does not require non-actors who are blind to opportunities, and there is no mysterious force of ‘entrepreneurial alertness’ guaranteeing their eventual exploitation and inevitable movement towards economic equilibria.

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28

Voorneveld, Mark. "Equilibria and approximate equilibria in infinite potential games." Economics Letters 56, no. 2 (October 1997): 163–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81895-2.

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29

Aliprantis, Charalambos D., Donald J. Brown, and Owen Burkinshaw. "Edgeworth equilibria in production economies." Journal of Economic Theory 43, no. 2 (December 1987): 252–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90060-3.

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30

Gorbenko, Alexander S., and Andrey Malenko. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions." American Economic Review 101, no. 5 (August 1, 2011): 1806–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.1806.

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We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options. (JEL D44, D82, G10)

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31

Gradwohl, Ronen, and Ehud Kalai. "Large Games: Robustness and Stability." Annual Review of Economics 13, no. 1 (August 5, 2021): 39–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-072720-042303.

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This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.

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32

Hommes, Cars, and Gerhard Sorger. "CONSISTENT EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA." Macroeconomic Dynamics 2, no. 3 (September 1998): 287–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100598008013.

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We consider a class of nonlinear dynamic economic models in which the actual realizations of a certain variable (e.g., price) depend on the agents' expectations about this variable. We define a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) by the property that the sample average and the sample autocorrelations of the realizations of the actual law of motion equal the average and the autocorrelations of the perceived law of motion. Along a CEE agent's expectations are thus self-fulfilling in terms of the observable sample average and sample autocorrelations. Restricting ourselves to the case in which beliefs are described by an AR(1) process, we study existence and stability of three different types of CEE: steady-state, two-cycle, and chaotic. We illustrate how these equilibria can emerge in the nonlinear cobweb model. Learning dynamics based on sample average and sample autocorrelations are introduced and stability of CEE under this learning process is investigated.

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33

Duffie, D., J. Geanakoplos, A. Mas-Colell, and A. McLennan. "Stationary Markov Equilibria." Econometrica 62, no. 4 (July 1994): 745. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2951731.

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34

Dhillon, Amrita, and Jean François Mertens. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 68, no. 2 (February 1996): 279–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0018.

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35

Ghiglino, Christian, and Mich Tvede. "Multiplicity of Equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 75, no. 1 (July 1997): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2279.

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Schönhofer, Martin. "Chaotic Learning Equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 89, no. 1 (November 1999): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2509.

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Hendricks, Ken, Michele Piccione, and Guofu Tan. "Equilibria in Networks." Econometrica 67, no. 6 (November 1999): 1407–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00084.

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Judd, Kenneth L., Sevin Yeltekin, and James Conklin. "Computing Supergame Equilibria." Econometrica 71, no. 4 (July 2003): 1239–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00445.

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39

Hommes, Cars, and Mei Zhu. "Behavioral learning equilibria." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 778–814. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.002.

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40

Tuinstra, Jan, and Florian O. O. Wagener. "On learning equilibria." Economic Theory 30, no. 3 (December 1, 2005): 493–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0059-1.

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41

GHOSAL, S., and H. M. POLEMARCHAKIS. "Nash–Walras equilibria." Research in Economics 51, no. 1 (April 1997): 31–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/reec.1996.0034.

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42

Burke, Jonathan L. "Quasi equilibria for growth economies." Economics Letters 105, no. 3 (December 2009): 197–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.07.005.

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43

Aliprantis, Charalambos D., Monique Florenzano, and Rabee Tourky. "Production equilibria." Journal of Mathematical Economics 42, no. 4-5 (August 2006): 406–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.04.006.

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44

Buccella, Domenico, and Luciano Fanti. "A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE CHOICE OF UNION-OLIGOPOLY BARGAINING AGENDA." Investigación Económica 77, no. 305 (November 1, 2018): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fe.01851667p.2018.305.67485.

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<p align="center"><strong>ABSTRACT</strong><strong></strong></p><p>This paper investigates the selection of the bargaining agenda in a unionized industry with decentralized negotiations for different competition modes. The firms choose the agenda (right-to-manage, RTM, <em>versus</em> efficient bargaining, EB), considering alternative timing of the bargaining game in the case of mixed duopoly. In fact, the EB (RTM) firm can be either Stackelberg wage follower (leader) or Stackelberg output leader (follower). A two-stage game is developed in which the typology as well as the timing of the negotiations is endogenous. It is shown that, in pure strategies, no equilibria arise for a wide set of the parameters’ space while RTM appears as the unique equilibrium agenda for a different combination of the parameters; moreover, multiple, asymmetric equilibria emerge in a limited area of the parameters’ space. These results are in sharp contrast to the received literature in which EB can arise as an industry bargaining institution in equilibrium.</p><p align="center"> </p><p align="center">UN ENFOQUE DE TEORÍA DE JUEGOS PARA LA SELECCIÓN DE LA AGENDA DE NEGOCIACIÓN DEL OLIGOPOLIO SINDICAL</p><p align="center"><strong> </strong><strong>RESUMEN</strong></p>Este artículo investiga la selección de la agenda de negociación en una industria sindicalizada con negociaciones descentralizadas para diferentes modos de competencia. Las empresas eligen la agenda (negociación con derecho de administrar, NDA, frente a negociación eficiente, NE) considerando casos alternativos de la sucesión de eventos en el juego de negociación con duopolio mixto. De hecho, la empresa NE (NDA) puede ser seguidora de salarios Stackelberg (líder) o líder de cantidades Stackelberg (seguidora). Se desarrolla un juego de dos etapas en el que la tipología y el momento de las negociaciones son endógenos. Se muestra que en estrategias puras no surgen equilibrios para un amplio conjunto del espacio de los parámetros, mientras que NDA aparece como la agenda de equilibrio única para una combinación diferente de los parámetros; además, los equilibrios múltiples y asimétricos emergen en un área limitada del espacio de los parámetros. Estos resultados contrastan con la literatura existente, en la que NE puede surgir como una institución de negociación de la industria en equilibrio.

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Clark, Daniel, and Drew Fudenberg. "Justified Communication Equilibrium." American Economic Review 111, no. 9 (September 1, 2021): 3004–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201692.

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Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51)

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Bullard, James, George W. Evans, and Seppo Honkapohja. "Monetary Policy, Judgment, and Near-Rational Exuberance." American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (May 1, 2008): 1163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.1163.

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We study how the use of judgment or “add-factors” in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We examine the possibility of a new phenomenon, which we call exuberance equilibria, in the New Keynesian monetary policy framework. Inclusion of judgment in forecasts can lead to self-fulfilling fluctuations in a subset of the determinacy region. We study how policymakers can minimize the risk of exuberance equilibria. (JEL E17, E31, E52)

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Clark, Daniel, Drew Fudenberg, and Alexander Wolitzky. "Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 5 (March 12, 2021): 2179–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab016.

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Abstract We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player’s record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player’s own actions, fewer actions can be supported. Here, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma and restrict attention to strict equilibria that are coordination-proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by their records and expected continuation payoffs. Such equilibria can support full cooperation if the stage game is either “strictly supermodular and mild” or “strongly supermodular,” and otherwise permit no cooperation at all. The presence of “supercooperator” records, where a player cooperates against any opponent, is crucial for supporting any cooperation when the stage game is “severe.”

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Arifovic, Jasmina. "STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA UNDER GENETIC-ALGORITHM ADAPTATION: AN ANALYSIS." Macroeconomic Dynamics 2, no. 1 (March 1998): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100598006014.

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The stability of stationary equilibria under genetic-algorithm adaptation is studied in an overlapping-generations economy with a unique, monetary steady-state and two-period cyclic equilibria. Agents use the genetic algorithm to update their labor-supply decisions. The results of simulations and the analysis of the dynamics show that the two-period cycle is stable and that the steady-state equilibrium is unstable under genetic-algorithm adaptation. The dynamics are driven primarily by the wealth and substitution effects that lead to the algorithm's convergence to the two-period cycle.

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Lin, Lai-Jiu, and Hsin I. Chen. "Coincidence theorems for families of multimaps and their applications to equilibrium problems." Abstract and Applied Analysis 2003, no. 5 (2003): 295–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/s1085337503210034.

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We apply some continuous selection theorems to establish coincidence theorems for a family of multimaps under various conditions. Then we apply these coincidence theorems to study the equilibrium problem withmfamilies of players and2mfamilies of constraints on strategy sets. We establish the existence theorems of equilibria of this problem and existence theorem of equilibria of abstract economics with two families of players.

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Bade, Sophie. "Ambiguous act equilibria." Games and Economic Behavior 71, no. 2 (March 2011): 246–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006.

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