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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Equity Agency Costs'

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1

Junker, Lukas. "Equity carveouts, agency costs, and firm value /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/497325225.pdf.

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2

Truong, Thanh, and thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis." RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.

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Equity agency costs are important to the firm and the management of these costs is a critical element of corporate governance, yet empirical research that focuses on the magnitude and impact of agency costs is limited. This thesis sets out to furnish empirical evidence in the area of corporate ownership with a particular focus on the magnitude of equity agency costs as well as the relation that exists between the largest shareholder in a firm and equity agency costs and between the largest shareholder and the dividend policy that a firm adopts. This thesis provides an empirical analysis of
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3

Hijazi, Bassem. "Bank Loans as a Financial Discipline: A Direct Agency Cost of Equity Perspective." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2006. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5411/.

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In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direc
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4

Park, Jung Chul. "Two essays on market efficiency : tests of idiosyncratic risk: informed trading versus noise and arbitrage risk, and agency costs and the underlying causes of mispricing: information asymmetry versus conflict of interests." [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2007. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0001944.

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Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2007.<br>Document formatted into pages; contains 100 pages. Title from PDF of title page. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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5

Amini, Moghadam Shahram. "Two Essays on Competition, Corporate Investments, and Corporate Earnings." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82851.

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The general focus of my dissertation, which consists of two essays, is on how changes in the financial and economic environment surrounding a firm affect managerial incentives and firm policies regarding investment in physical capital, innovation, equity offerings, and repurchases. The first essay in my dissertation examines how product market competition affects firms' investment decisions. While competition among firms benefits consumers via lower prices, greater product variety, higher product quality, and greater innovation, recent studies provide evidence that competition has been declini
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6

Nilsson, Mattias. "Essays in empirical corporate finance and governance." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-587.

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Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, b
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7

Zhu, Yin. "Essays on accounting and incentives in Chinese equity markets." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-accounting-and-incentives-in-chinese-equity-markets(74adb2ee-0cfc-40f6-8d62-392ab7bbdc1b).html.

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In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have
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8

Puleo, Michael. "Insider Share-Pledging and Firm Investors." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/386109.

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Business Administration/Finance<br>Ph.D.<br>Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of
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9

Burkhardt, Kirsten. "Le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d'alliances stratégiques." Thesis, Dijon, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014DIJOE009/document.

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Ce travail analyse le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d’alliances stratégiques sur le marché français du capital-investissement. Après nous être fait une idée de l’importance du phénomène à l’aide des informations nouvelles que nous avons générées par notre propre enquête, nous apportons une explication au phénomène observé. L’analyse théorique se fait sous l’angle de la création de valeur actionnariale, en recourant conjointement aux théories contractuelles et cognitives. Les théories sociologiques des réseaux viennent compléter les principaux arguments de ces de
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10

HUANG, YU-CHEN, and 黃昱甄. "Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01100880424095238787.

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碩士<br>國立臺北大學<br>會計學系<br>94<br>The main purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. A series of papers by Jensen (2002; 2005) demonstrate that, when a firm’s equity is overvalued that it will not, except by pure luck, be able to deliver the financial performance the market requires justifying that valuation, managers are likely to take actions designed to meet the market’s optimistic expectations and sustain the overvaluation, instead of disseminating information disappoint capital markets. They are more likely to generate the appearance of
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11

Huang, Shin-Chiou, and 黃馨萩. "The Effect of Revision on the SFAS No.7: Evidence from Equity Agency Costs of Taiwanese MNCs." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29350361145199996387.

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碩士<br>逢甲大學<br>國際貿易所<br>97<br>Before 2005, firms only need to prepare annual consolidated financial statement, and the criteria of involving subsidiary into consolidated financial statement are extremely strictless. Even though some firms are willing to prepare semi-annual consolidated financial statement, the approving by board of director and accountant is still unnecessary. Stockholder supposed could monitor manager through consolidated financial statement, however, lag information and lack of information authentic and transparency difficult the monitoring behavior, which lead to serious equ
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12

孫惠莉. "Threshold Effect in the Relationship between Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs-Evidence from TSE-listing Hi-tech Companies." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08202896953135855304.

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碩士<br>逢甲大學<br>會計學系<br>101<br>The study is based on TSE-listing high-tech companies from 1997 to 2005 to probe into the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. The present study adopts panel smooth transition regression model (PSTR) to examine the effect of overvalued/undervalued equity (PF) on agency costs. The empirical evidence confirms the non-linear relationship between the market value of equity and agency costs. When the PF ranges from 0.4631 to 1.3351, the PF is negative relevant to the free cash flow. However, when the PF is above 1.3351 or below 0.4631, it is positive
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13

Liu, J., Saeed Akbar, S. Z. A. Shah, D. Zhang, and D. Pang. "Market reaction to seasoned offerings in China." 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/17130.

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Yes<br>This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between management's internal assessment and the market's assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience an unfavourable pre‐announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after the event. Convertible bond issues generate p
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14

Huang, Hong-Fei, and 黃鴻飛. "Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mh65jd.

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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>財務金融學研究所<br>102<br>This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm&apos;&apos;s CEO&apos;&apos;s ability, the more serious the firm&apos;&apos;s B-E agency
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15

Chang, Yi-Huan, and 張翊桓. "Does Firm Location Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54125249309753847366.

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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>財務金融學研究所<br>101<br>This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of th
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16

Chen, Guo-Chang, and 陳國彰. "A Study of the Relationships Between Corporate Governance and the Equity Capital Cost for Taiwan Listing Electronic Companies by Central Agency Problems." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57135979041366215808.

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碩士<br>國立交通大學<br>經營管理研究所<br>94<br>Based on the central agency problem between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders, this research uses the five dimensions, which namely ownership structure, board composition, manage pattern, abnormal relatet party transaction, and stock overinvestment of controlling shareholder amounting to fourteen variables, to investage the relationships between central agency problem and the equity capital cost for Taiwain listing electronic companies. Empirical results are summarized below:1.In terms of ownership structure, the larger the cash flow rights of the
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