Journal articles on the topic 'Eritrean-Ethiopian War, 1998- – Ethiopia'

AbstractThis article examines the problematic relationship between Eritrea and Tigray as represented by the Eritrean and Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Fronts. The EPLF won independence for Eritrea in 1991, at the same time as the TPLF seized power in Ethiopia; the two movements had had a difficult relationship, beginning in the mid-1970s, during their respective armed struggles, and the issues which had caused disagreement remained unresolved as the movements made the transition to government. This paper examines the nature of those issues and the degree to which the war of 1998-2000 between the two countries can be seen to have reflected much older tensions and indeed contradictions in the Eritrean–Tigrayan/Ethiopian relationship. Thus, the paper begins with an overview of Eritrean opinion, during the recent war, about the relationship in question, and then moves back in time to the era of the liberation struggle. Here, the author attempts to explain the complexities of the respective Eritrean and Tigrayan revolutions insofar as each impinged on and influenced the other, with particular reference to the issues of frontiers, nationality and ethnicity, and sovereignty. The paper, finally, considers the apparent paradoxes in the perceptions which Eritreans have of Tigray and Ethiopia, and suggests that changes in attitude are necessary on both sides of the Mereb river border if the relationship is not to be defined by perpetual confrontation.

The post-1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea were hoped to become promising and exemplary states in Africa. But, after seven years of euphoria, national stability and security trapped both countries into a bloody conflict, and their relation is now in structural crisis: the ‘no war, no peace’ dilemma. Their security dilemmas are basically centered on the antagonistic foreign and national security as well as nation-building policies. The post-independence nation-building attempt to forge a militarized single national identity in Eritrea, under the motto of “one people, one heart” and the remaking of the age-old Ethiopian state based on ethnic federalism further deepen the nation-building dilemma. The post-1998 security dilemma between the two states is, therefore, the result of securing Eritrea’s nation-building policies and the militarization of the Yika’alo-Warsay generation where Ethiopia has been made to be “a relevant enemy to its Singaporization vision” and Eritrea is subsequently viewed as a “relevant enemy to Ethiopia’s renaissance vision and securitization of poverty”. During the militarization of the borders, Badme still remains symbolically the hotbed of the ‘no war, no peace’ regime. This article, therefore, analyzes the post-2000 security dilemma between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the subsequent dynamics that have led to securing and/or militarizing their relations.

A little over a decade after the achievement of independence, Eritrea is confronted by a range of social and political problems, problems which are rooted both in the nation's past and in the ruling movement's interpretation of that past. This paper is concerned with the widening gulf between the nation-state, as envisaged by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) during the liberation struggle and as currently ‘imagined’ by the government, and the socio-political reality. Eritrean society is now marked by widening divisions between the ‘struggle generation’ and the membership of the former EPLF on the one hand, and large sections of the remainder of the population, notably youth. The 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia, the root causes of which are as yet unresolved, has proved more destructive than was apparent even at the time, and has been used by the state as a vindication of the EPLF's particular interpretation of the past. Political and social repression, rooted in a militaristic tradition and a profound fear of disunity, has intensified since the war. In this paper the current situation is examined in terms of the deep frustration felt by younger Eritreans, the urban–rural divide, the state-level determination to cling to the values and the aims of the liberation struggle, and the position of Eritrea in international politics.

Between 1992 and 2010, Ethiopian courts prosecuted over five thousand people for the core crimes of genocide and war crimes perpetrated in Ethiopia since 1974. The vast majority of the defendants were convicted and sentenced to a range of penalties applicable under Ethiopian law. This article examines the manner in which Ethiopian courts have punished core crimes. It analyses the domestic law and practice in light of and in comparison with the sentencing practice in the unicts and the icc. The article also discusses whether Ethiopian law and practice have treated the punishment of core crimes differently than the punishment of domestic crimes.

In the late 1970s, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and the Ethiopia-Somalia border war over the Ogaden region has centered world attention on Soviet-Cuban activities in the Horn of Africa. Although the Somali army was defeated by the combined powers of the Ethiopians and the Soviet-Cuban forces in mid-March 1978, the tension between the two countries was still high. Among the other problems facing the region is that of the Eritrean struggle for self-determination.

Somalia has been without government since 1991. A transitional government was established in 2004 under the presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf, with the backing of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Inter-governmental Agency for Development (IGAD). The Government sat in Baidoa in southern Somalia from June 2005 until December 2006. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of much of southern and central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, but not Puntland and Somaliland. They declared and tried to establish an Islamic State. Somalis were told to comply with stringent Islamic rules or face harsh punishment. In the meantime, efforts to achieve national reconciliation were ongoing under the auspices of IGAD, though without much success. It was reported that on 20 July 2006 Ethiopian troops crossed into Somalia. Ethiopia only admitted to having military trainers to help the Somali Government (estimated to be 400 military personnel). On 21 July, the UIC declared a ‘holy war’ against Ethiopia. In September 2006 the Somali interim President survived an assassination attempt in Baidoa. On 25 October 2006 Ethiopia said that it was ‘technically at war’ with the Islamic Courts. After few days the UIC claimed to have ambushed and killed Ethiopian troops near the Ethiopian border.1

The article is devoted to the policy of France towards Italy and Ethiopia at the initial stage of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935—1936. It is shown that in the autumn of 1935, the French government took a position aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Italian-Ethiopian conflict at the expense of Ethiopia, since relations with Italy were much more important for France than relations with Ethiopia, and “real policy” required France to reach an agreement primarily with Italy. It is noted that a similar position was taken by the United Kingdom. It is indicated that this resulted in the formation of a plan for the settlement of the conflict, put forward in December 1935 by the head of the French government, Pierre Laval, and the British foreign Minister, Samuel Hoare. It is proved that the Hoare–Laval plan was an early form of the policy of “appeasement of the aggressor,” which became the leading direction of French and British foreign policy during the collapse of the Versailles system of international relations in 1938—1939. The research is based on publications of Soviet, French, Italian and Canadian diplomatic documents, League of Nations documents, memoirs of political figures of that era, as well as unpublished documents from the Archive of Publicistic Activity (Germany).

Eritrean independence in 1993 raised fundamental questions regarding the Eritrean past. Inevitably, scholars initially focused their analysis on the history of the Eritrean nationalist movement and liberation struggle. The long guerrilla war against the Ethiopian regime attracted the interest of numerous researchers, not only because of its implications for the redefinition of the political landscape of the Horn of Africa, but also because of the ways in which it had mobilized and reorganized Eritrean society. While this literature has shed much light upon interesting aspects of the political history of independent Eritrea, further investigation of the precolonial and colonial past is still required to gain a deeper understanding of the formation of Eritrean national identity in all its intricate facets.The question of Eritrean national identity is intimately connected to its colonial history, which in many ways remains marginalized in the analysis of Eritrean past. The Italian colonial period between 1890 and 1941 was a crucial moment in the definition of those social and political transformations which contributed to the formation of Eritrea-as-a-nation. Nevertheless, this historical phase remains underexplored. The colonial past has been an issue that European powers to varying extents have had to confront since the end of empire. Both historians of colonialism and Africanist historians have collaborated in the reconstruction of the past of colonized societies. In Italy this process remains in embryonic form. Many Africanist historians, such as Irma Taddia and Alessandro Triulzi, have already addressed the problem concerning the gaps left by Italian historiography on both the colonial past and the history of the colonized societies in its various aspects. As Triulzi points out, both practical and political reasons slowed the development of those debates that were emerging in the historiographies of other excolonial powers.

The development of transport infrastructure is a priority objective for many African countries. This process has significant impact on the efficiency of continental and world trade corridors, and also influence on the costs of economic activity. In this case, the transformation in the transport sector of Ethiopia must be noted. The government of the country has taken a decision to create national railway network and develop aviation and road lines of communication. After The Eritrean War of Independence Eritrean separation was announced and Ethiopia lost its maritime infrastructure and became a landlocked country. This situation provides great difficulties in process of international trade and economic activity for the region. Now the development of transport corridors which connect economic centers with large ports of the region is a priority task for Ethiopian government. In this case Ethiopia is actively attracting foreign investors and world financial organizations to create stable, efficient and economically profitable ways of transport communication with the port infrastructure of neighboring countries. This year, Chinese companies finished to rebuilt the railway line Addis Ababa-Djibouti, in the coming years, governments of Kenya and Ethiopia, will launch new Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Ababa motorway. This infrastructure projects are essential for enhancing Ethiopian competitiveness and economic activity and provide opportunity to reduce transport costs. Moreover, the Ethiopian authorities are making great progress in developing the internal transport infrastructure, first of all, in terms of increased paved road and development of railway infrastructure, which promotes more efficient use of natural,economic and human resources. Foreign companies are actively involved in realization of this transport projects and it can be a perspective area for cooperation between Russian Federation and Ethiopia. The article provides a detailed overview of Ethiopian transport sector and describes the key infrastructureprojects which can be interesting for Russian companies.

When foreign policies of states are examined, pride of place often goes to what are called high politics: the politics of diplomacy and war. However, for most developing nations, especially those in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, economic foreign policy, or low politics, may be as, or even more, important. In fact, the foreign policies of African nations are often seen as an extension of strategies to consolidate domestic political power. African leaders routinely place themselves in charge of foreign policy as a means of controlling these resource flows as well as to create some autonomy from competing domestic political forces. This is not to say that external state forces do not impinge on the ability of leaders to stay in power; however, in sub-Saharan Africa, this has been less of a priority, perhaps with the significant exception of Ethiopia. This paper seeks to show that the general foreign policy perspectives of Ethiopia from 1991 to the present have been an extension of the leaders and ruling elites trying to obtain significant sources of financial resources by exploring the general trends of how Ethiopia has engaged in international flows of resources. Examining Ethiopian foreign policy on three levels—international, regional, and domestic—this paper explains how, despite being a potential regional hegemon, Ethiopia has significant problems stemming from domestic issues of poverty and legitimacy. Moreover, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be highlighted as a case to explore how it affects, and is impacted by, all three levels.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed a historic agreement on July 9, 2018, in Asmara, Eritrea, ending over two decades of open hostilities and war. The Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship (Joint Declaration) marks a fundamental change for the Horn of Africa, with the reconciliation possibly altering the economic and political dynamics of the region. The Joint Declaration resulted from several key developments occurring over a few weeks from June through early July 2018. Ethiopia announced its acceptance of the original Algiers Agreement, dated December 12, 2000, which had never been implemented, and its willingness to abide by the 2002 international Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling that awarded disputed territory to Eritrea, including the border town of Badme. Previously, Ethiopia had rejected the ruling and asked for a new ruling. Ethiopia had also previously insisted that relations must be restored before any territorial resolution. President Afwerki agreed to negotiate, after stating for years that Ethiopia had to withdraw its troops from the disputed town of Badme first. A few weeks before the signing of the Joint Declaration, the Eritrean foreign minister visited Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, marking the first bilateral meeting between the two since the war began.

Using data from a cross-sectional nutrition survey conducted in rural Ethiopia between March and April 1992, roughly a year after the end of one of the longest civil wars in modern human history, this study attempts to document the magnitude and correlates of childhood undernutrition in Ethiopia. Findings from the study reveal that, at the time of the survey, 59% of children in the country were exposed to long-term or chronic undernutrition (stunted); about 4% were suffering from acute problems (wasted); and about the same proportion were both stunted and wasted. Less than a third of the country's children had normal growth. The logistic–binomial regression results demonstrated the existence of significant clustering of risks of undernutrition within areas of residence and notable differentials by age of child, duration of breast-feeding, age at introduction of supplementary foods and number of under-five siblings. Significant variations were also noted by age of household head, per capita land holding, religious affiliation and prevalence of endemic diseases in an area.

The main objective of this paper is to assess the historical out line on the Dynamics of Conflict and Intervention in North -East Africa: The Case Study on the Second Ethio- Somalian (Ogaden) War of 1977-1978. Hence, the Ogaden war, a brief but costly war fought between Ethiopia and Somalia that ended by the defeat of Somalia and her withdrawal in January, 1978 was seen differently by different sides. Opposing foreign intervention in civil wars has also been a central phenomenon of international politics. The war was aggravated by outsiders for many years and in 1970s, above all by the superpowers, namely, the USA and USSR, and also by their contingents. At the heart of the issues underlying the War in the Horn of Africa lie three legacies of the past: namely; European colonial rule; Somali irredentism; and superpowers intervention/ Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise; 2006:45/. This conflict can be viewed as a meaningless tragedy for the people of the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular. I argue that competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime and the colonial legacy are the background causes of the conflict. Politicized clan identity, the availability of weapons and the presence of a large number of unemployed youth have exacerbated the problem. With regard to the obstacles to peace, we contend that Ethiopia’s hostile policy, the absence of major power interest, lack of resources and the warlords’ lack of interest in peace are the major factors that continue to haunt the Somali peace process. Finally, the study propose ambitious peace-building mechanisms that attempt to address the key areas of security, political governance, economic development and justice in order to build a durable peace in Somalia.

ABSTRACTThe ‘non-electoral context’ of elections is often overlooked in democratisation studies, in order not to obscure an otherwise clear model or theory of transition. A key challenge for research on democratisation processes is to balance electoral ‘formalities’ with contextual factors, qualitative perceptions and non-electoral issues, in order to reach a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of democratic transitions. This article advocates a multilayered approach to – or a ‘thick description’ of – elections, as this will capture the diversity of real life experiences and expose alternative power discourses competing with the electoralist one in influencing the path of democratisation. In so doing, it casts light on the crucial impact of the Eritrean–Ethiopian war on Ethiopia's 2005 election, in addition to other qualitative and contextual factors, which lead to the conclusion that the advancement of democracy through multiparty elections in Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has failed.

Key to Ethiopia’s remarkable political and economic changes is its transformation from highly homogenising and centrist rule to a federal system aiming at managing its complex diversity. The post-1991 dispensation has ended years of civil war, and served as a foundation for the impressive economic performance. Lately the country has continued to face wide-spread protests. How does one explain the paradox between an impressive economic performance versus growing political instability? Development is centrally designed and managed along with the identification of poverty as an existential threat against which all resources must be mobilised. This means that development takes overriding priority and a central role, compromising the constitutional autonomy of the states. The outcome as witnessed in the protests is new mobilisation and conflict unleashed by growing ethno-nationalism. The absolute dominance of a single vanguard party that monopolised power has also overshadowed institutions and sidelined political opposition while emboldening hardliners.

AbstractThe Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), victor in the civil war in 1991, has since transformed into an authoritarian party. While this transition is well covered in the literature, few studies have explored how the party’s ideology has adapted after its position was consolidated. This article addresses this gap, by analysing the EPRDF’s ideology of revolutionary democracy, and how the interpretation of it has changed over time. The Ethiopian case shows that wartime ideologies should not be considered as static remnants of the past. Instead, the ideology has served as a flexible political tool for controlling the state and for justifying or concealing major policy changes. More recent protests and ruptures in the ruling party, however, indicate that revolutionary democracy may have an expiry date. There seems thus to be a limit to how long a wartime ideology can provide power to uphold a rebel government’s hegemony and coherence.

The article draws attention to the extraordinary, by African standards, respect in Eritrea for the soldiers of the Italian colonial troops, the Ascari, and even for some of their Italian officers, such as Amedeo Guillet. The author reveals the reason for this respect, which was not present in another former Italian colony Libya. After studying the materials on the number and combat path of the Ascari, colonial Libya, Eritrea, and Italy’s policy in it, the author came to the conclusion that Italian colonialism from a clean slate formed an anti-Ethiopian identity in Eritrea. It was expressed in the Ascari who played an important role in the war of independence from Ethiopia that began in 1961. Its roots go back to 1896 when Ethiopians mutilated Eritrean prisoners after the battle of Adwa.

AbstractThis article deals with the interrelationship of ethnic and national processes in a rural district in Wollega at the time of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. It describes how the state policy of ‘official nationalism’ and Amharisation on the one hand, and the policy of land confiscation and land grants on the other, affected two different categories of Oromo: the small, educated elite, and the peasants. The government promoted Amharic as the language of state, whilst the Oromo language was banned from public contexts and not allowed in print. The government feared popular involvement in politics, and all political parties and organisations were banned. University students voiced demands for modernisation and land reform whilst the war in Eritrea raised the ‘question of nationalities’, but there was not yet any Oromo nationalist claim for statehood. Among the farmers, opposition to the state centred on land tenure and taxes and on the abuse of authority by the government. Most Oromo-speaking regions had been conquered and incorporated into the empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Land was confiscated and granted to warlords, or to local leaders who collaborated with the emperor. The original inhabitants became tribute-paying tenants under the new lords. As most landlords were immigrants to the area, ethnicity was an obvious aspect of property relations. In Wollega, however, local Oromo who had collaborated with the emperor were in control of much of the land and both landlords and share-croppers were Macha Oromo. They shared basic value-orientations by which performance is judged. Memories of the moral economy of an earlier time provided an alternative to the existing situation. Reference to history implied an active selection of elements in the formulation of a critical discourse on power and property that addressed the basic opposition between society and state. The last part of the article describes how educated and farmers met in a political meeting that was organised by the local authorities in 1976 to celebrate the revolution and its land reform. The occasion turned into an intense celebration of local values and, at least to some of the participants, this was a moment of new ethnic awareness and a call to revive gada, the Oromo ritual system. Threatened by ethnic identification, the state responded with brutal repression, and several people were murdered. Shortly after, some activists joined the Oromo Liberation Front to wage guerrilla war against the state.

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the World Bank and other Western development agencies have prescribed restructuring land rights in post-communist economies to promote land markets, with the goal of alleviating poverty and social conflicts. But restructuring land rights in such settings is more difficult than it may seem. Ethiopia’s efforts in this area have produced disparate laws that have exacerbated both the intensity and the frequency of land conflicts. This article analyzes all land cases decided by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) and the House of Federation (HoF), Ethiopia’s constitutional review bodies, from 1998 to 2018. It shows that from 1998 to 2014, the trial and appellate courts were favorably disposed toward the policies of international financial agencies, and that the CCI and the HoF acquiesced. However, starting in 2014, following a countrywide protest connected to land dispossession, the CCI and the HoF have reversed the lower courts’ judgements by invoking constitutional clauses declaring that land belongs to the Ethiopian nations and that it cannot be alienated. The country’s experience reveals the perils of restructuring land rights without paying close attention to distributive concerns and the needs of those who end up being excluded from property access.

IntroductionThere are two types of Africa. The first is a place where people and cultures live. The second is the image of Africa that has been invented through colonial knowledge and power. The colonial image of Africa, as the Other of Europe, a land “enveloped in the dark mantle of night” was supported by western states as it justified their colonial practices (Hegel 91). Any evidence that challenged the myth of the Dark Continent was destroyed, removed or ignored. While the looting of African natural resources has been studied, the looting of African knowledges hasn’t received as much attention, partly based on the assumption that Africans did not produce knowledge that could be stolen. This article invalidates this myth by examining the legacy of Ethiopia’s indigenous Ge’ez literature, and its looting and abduction by powerful western agents. The article argues that this has resulted in epistemic violence, where students of the Ethiopian indigenous education system do not have access to their books, while European orientalists use them to interpret Ethiopian history and philosophy using a foreign lens. The analysis is based on interviews with teachers and students of ten Ge’ez schools in Ethiopia, and trips to the Ethiopian manuscript collections in The British Library, The Princeton Library, the Institute of Ethiopian Studies and The National Archives in Addis Ababa.The Context of Ethiopian Indigenous KnowledgesGe’ez is one of the ancient languages of Africa. According to Professor Ephraim Isaac, “about 10,000 years ago, one single nation or community of a single linguistic group existed in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Horn of Africa” (The Habesha). The language of this group is known as Proto-Afroasiatic or Afrasian languages. It is the ancestor of the Semitic, Cushitic, Nilotic, Omotic and other languages that are currently spoken in Ethiopia by its 80 ethnic groups, and the neighbouring countries (Diakonoff). Ethiopians developed the Ge’ez language as their lingua franca with its own writing system some 2000 years ago. Currently, Ge’ez is the language of academic scholarship, studied through the traditional education system (Isaac, The Ethiopian). Since the fourth century, an estimated 1 million Ge’ez manuscripts have been written, covering religious, historical, mathematical, medicinal, and philosophical texts.One of the most famous Ge’ez manuscripts is the Kebra Nagast, a foundational text that embodied the indigenous conception of nationhood in Ethiopia. The philosophical, political and religious themes in this book, which craft Ethiopia as God’s country and the home of the Ark of the Covenant, contributed to the country’s success in defending itself from European colonialism. The production of books like the Kebra Nagast went hand in hand with a robust indigenous education system that trained poets, scribes, judges, artists, administrators and priests. Achieving the highest stages of learning requires about 30 years after which the scholar would be given the rare title Arat-Ayina, which means “four eyed”, a person with the ability to see the past as well as the future. Today, there are around 50,000 Ge’ez schools across the country, most of which are in rural villages and churches.Ge’ez manuscripts are important textbooks and reference materials for students. They are carefully prepared from vellum “to make them last forever” (interview, 3 Oct. 2019). Some of the religious books are regarded as “holy persons who breathe wisdom that gives light and food to the human soul”. Other manuscripts, often prepared as scrolls are used for medicinal purposes. Each manuscript is uniquely prepared reflecting inherited wisdom on contemporary lives using the method called Tirguamme, the act of giving meaning to sacred texts. Preparation of books is costly. Smaller manuscript require the skins of 50-70 goats/sheep and large manuscript needed 100-120 goats/sheep (Tefera).The Loss of Ethiopian ManuscriptsSince the 18th century, a large quantity of these manuscripts have been stolen, looted, or smuggled out of the country by travellers who came to the country as explorers, diplomats and scientists. The total number of Ethiopian manuscripts taken is still unknown. Amsalu Tefera counted 6928 Ethiopian manuscripts currently held in foreign libraries and museums. This figure does not include privately held or unofficial collections (41).Looting and smuggling were sponsored by western governments, institutions, and notable individuals. For example, in 1868, The British Museum Acting Director Richard Holms joined the British army which was sent to ‘rescue’ British hostages at Maqdala, the capital of Emperor Tewodros. Holms’ mission was to bring treasures for the Museum. Before the battle, Tewodros had established the Medhanialem library with more than 1000 manuscripts as part of Ethiopia’s “industrial revolution”. When Tewodros lost the war and committed suicide, British soldiers looted the capital, including the treasury and the library. They needed 200 mules and 15 elephants to transport the loot and “set fire to all buildings so that no trace was left of the edifices which once housed the manuscripts” (Rita Pankhurst 224). Richard Holmes collected 356 manuscripts for the Museum. A wealthy British woman called Lady Meux acquired some of the most illuminated manuscripts. In her will, she bequeathed them to be returned to Ethiopia. However, her will was reversed by court due to a campaign from the British press (Richard Pankhurst). In 2018, the V&A Museum in London displayed some of the treasures by incorporating Maqdala into the imperial narrative of Britain (Woldeyes, Reflections).Britain is by no means the only country to seek Ethiopian manuscripts for their collections. Smuggling occurred in the name of science, an act of collecting manuscripts for study. Looting involved local collaborators and powerful foreign sponsors from places like France, Germany and the Vatican. Like Maqdala, this was often sponsored by governments or powerful financers. For example, the French government sponsored the Dakar-Djibouti Mission led by Marcel Griaule, which “brought back about 350 manuscripts and scrolls from Gondar” (Wion 2). It was often claimed that these manuscripts were purchased, rather than looted. Johannes Flemming of Germany was said to have purchased 70 manuscripts and ten scrolls for the Royal Library of Berlin in 1905. However, there was no local market for buying manuscripts. Ge’ez manuscripts were, and still are, written to serve spiritual and secular life in Ethiopia, not for buying and selling. There are countless other examples, but space limits how many can be provided in this article. What is important to note is that museums and libraries have accrued impressive collections without emphasising how those collections were first obtained. The loss of the intellectual heritage of Ethiopians to western collectors has had an enormous impact on the country.Knowledge Grabbing: The Denial of Access to KnowledgeWith so many manuscripts lost, European collectors became the narrators of Ethiopian knowledge and history. Edward Ullendorff, a known orientalist in Ethiopian studies, refers to James Bruce as “the explorer of Abyssinia” (114). Ullendorff commented on the significance of Bruce’s travel to Ethiopia asperhaps the most important aspect of Bruce’s travels was the collection of Ethiopic manuscripts… . They opened up entirely new vistas for the study of Ethiopian languages and placed this branch of Oriental scholarship on a much more secure basis. It is not known how many MSS. reached Europe through his endeavours, but the present writer is aware of at least twenty-seven, all of which are exquisite examples of Ethiopian manuscript art. (133)This quote encompasses three major ways in which epistemic violence occurs: denial of access to knowledge, Eurocentric interpretation of Ethiopian manuscripts, and the handling of Ge’ez manuscripts as artefacts from the past. These will be discussed below.Western ‘travellers’, such as Bruce, did not fully disclose how many manuscripts they took or how they acquired them. The abundance of Ethiopian manuscripts in western institutions can be compared to the scarcity of such materials among traditional schools in Ethiopia. In this research, I have visited ten indigenous schools in Wollo (Lalibela, Neakutoleab, Asheten, Wadla), in Gondar (Bahita, Kuskwam, Menbere Mengist), and Gojam (Bahirdar, Selam Argiew Maryam, Giorgis). In all of the schools, there is lack of Ge’ez manuscripts. Students often come from rural villages and do not receive any government support. The scarcity of Ge’ez manuscripts, and the lack of funding which might allow for the purchasing of books, means the students depend mainly on memorising Ge’ez texts told to them from the mouth of their teacher. Although this method of learning is not new, it currently is the only way for passing indigenous knowledges across generations.The absence of manuscripts is most strongly felt in the advanced schools. For instance, in the school of Qene, poetic literature is created through an in-depth study of the vocabulary and grammar of Ge’ez. A Qene student is required to develop a deep knowledge of Ge’ez in order to understand ancient and medieval Ge’ez texts which are used to produce poetry with multiple meanings. Without Ge’ez manuscripts, students cannot draw their creative works from the broad intellectual tradition of their ancestors. When asked how students gain access to textbooks, one student commented:we don’t have access to Birana books (Ge’ez manuscripts written on vellum). We cannot learn the ancient wisdom of painting, writing, and computing developed by our ancestors. We simply buy paper books such as Dawit (Psalms), Sewasew (grammar) or Degwa (book of songs with notations) and depend on our teachers to teach us the rest. We also lend these books to each other as many students cannot afford to buy them. Without textbooks, we expect to spend double the amount of time it would take if we had textbooks. (Interview, 3 Sep. 2019)Many students interrupt their studies and work as labourers to save up and buy paper textbooks, but they still don’t have access to the finest works taken to Europe. Most Ge’ez manuscripts remaining in Ethiopia are locked away in monasteries, church stores or other places to prevent further looting. The manuscripts in Addis Ababa University and the National Archives are available for researchers but not to the students of the indigenous system, creating a condition of internal knowledge grabbing.While the absence of Ge’ez manuscripts denied, and continues to deny, Ethiopians the chance to enrich their indigenous education, it benefited western orientalists to garner intellectual authority on the field of Ethiopian studies. In 1981, British Museum Director John Wilson said, “our Abyssinian holdings are more important than our Indian collection” (Bell 231). In reaction, Richard Pankhurst, the Director of Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa, responded that the collection was acquired through plunder. Defending the retaining of Maqdala manuscripts in Europe, Ullendorff wrote:neither Dr. Pankhurst nor the Ethiopian and western scholars who have worked on this collection (and indeed on others in Europe) could have contributed so significantly to the elucidation of Ethiopian history without the rich resources available in this country. Had they remained insitu, none of this would have been possible. (Qtd. in Bell 234)The manuscripts are therefore valued based on their contribution to western scholarship only. This is a continuation of epistemic violence whereby local knowledges are used as raw materials to produce Eurocentric knowledge, which in turn is used to teach Africans as though they had no prior knowledge. Scholars are defined as those western educated persons who can speak European languages and can travel to modern institutions to access the manuscripts. Knowledge grabbing regards previous owners as inexistent or irrelevant for the use of the grabbed knowledges.Knowledge grabbing also means indigenous scholars are deprived of critical resources to produce new knowledge based on their intellectual heritage. A Qene teacher commented: our students could not devote their time and energy to produce new knowledges in the same way our ancestors did. We have the tradition of Madeladel, Kimera, Kuteta, Mielad, Qene and tirguamme where students develop their own system of remembering, reinterpreting, practicing, and rewriting previous manuscripts and current ones. Without access to older manuscripts, we increasingly depend on preserving what is being taught orally by elders. (Interview, 4 Sep. 2019)This point is important as it relates to the common myth that indigenous knowledges are artefacts belonging to the past, not the present. There are millions of people who still use these knowledges, but the conditions necessary for their reproduction and improvement is denied through knowledge grabbing. The view of Ge’ez manuscripts as artefacts dismisses the Ethiopian view that Birana manuscripts are living persons. As a scholar told me in Gondar, “they are creations of Egziabher (God), like all of us. Keeping them in institutions is like keeping living bodies in graveyards” (interview, 5 Oct. 2019).Recently, the collection of Ethiopian manuscripts by western institutions has also been conducted digitally. Thousands of manuscripts have been microfilmed or digitised. For example, the EU funded Ethio-SPaRe project resulted in the digital collection of 2000 Ethiopian manuscripts (Nosnitsin). While digitisation promises better access for people who may not be able to visit institutions to see physical copies, online manuscripts are not accessible to indigenous school students in Ethiopia. They simply do not have computer or internet access and the manuscripts are catalogued in European languages. Both physical and digital knowledge grabbing results in the robbing of Ethiopian intellectual heritage, and denies the possibility of such manuscripts being used to inform local scholarship. Epistemic Violence: The European as ExpertWhen considered in relation to stolen or appropriated manuscripts, epistemic violence is the way in which local knowledge is interpreted using a foreign epistemology and gained dominance over indigenous worldviews. European scholars have monopolised the field of Ethiopian Studies by producing books, encyclopaedias and digital archives based on Ethiopian manuscripts, almost exclusively in European languages. The contributions of their work for western scholarship is undeniable. However, Kebede argues that one of the detrimental effects of this orientalist literature is the thesis of Semiticisation, the designation of the origin of Ethiopian civilisation to the arrival of Middle Eastern colonisers rather than indigenous sources.The thesis is invented to make the history of Ethiopia consistent with the Hegelian western view that Africa is a Dark Continent devoid of a civilisation of its own. “In light of the dominant belief that black peoples are incapable of great achievements, the existence of an early and highly advanced civilization constitutes a serious anomaly in the Eurocentric construction of the world” (Kebede 4). To address this anomaly, orientalists like Ludolph attributed the origin of Ethiopia’s writing system, agriculture, literature, and civilisation to the arrival of South Arabian settlers. For example, in his translation of the Kebra Nagast, Budge wrote: “the SEMITES found them [indigenous Ethiopians] negro savages, and taught them civilization and culture and the whole scriptures on which their whole literature is based” (x).In line with the above thesis, Dillman wrote that “the Abyssinians borrowed their Numerical Signs from the Greeks” (33). The views of these orientalist scholars have been challenged. For instance, leading scholar of Semitic languages Professor Ephraim Isaac considers the thesis of the Arabian origin of Ethiopian civilization “a Hegelian Eurocentric philosophical perspective of history” (2). Isaac shows that there is historical, archaeological, and linguistic evidence that suggest Ethiopia to be more advanced than South Arabia from pre-historic times. Various Ethiopian sources including the Kebra Nagast, the works of historian Asres Yenesew, and Ethiopian linguist Girma Demeke provide evidence for the indigenous origin of Ethiopian civilisation and languages.The epistemic violence of the Semeticisation thesis lies in how this Eurocentric ideological construction is the dominant narrative in the field of Ethiopian history and the education system. Unlike the indigenous view, the orientalist view is backed by strong institutional power both in Ethiopia and abroad. The orientalists control the field of Ethiopian studies and have access to Ge’ez manuscripts. Their publications are the only references for Ethiopian students. Due to Native Colonialism, a system of power run by native elites through the use of colonial ideas and practices (Woldeyes), the education system is the imitation of western curricula, including English as a medium of instruction from high school onwards. Students study the west more than Ethiopia. Indigenous sources are generally excluded as unscientific. Only the Eurocentric interpretation of Ethiopian manuscripts is regarded as scientific and objective.ConclusionEthiopia is the only African country never to be colonised. In its history it produced a large quantity of manuscripts in the Ge’ez language through an indigenous education system that involves the study of these manuscripts. Since the 19th century, there has been an ongoing loss of these manuscripts. European travellers who came to Ethiopia as discoverers, missionaries and scholars took a large number of manuscripts. The Battle of Maqdala involved the looting of the intellectual products of Ethiopia that were collected at the capital. With the introduction of western education and use of English as a medium of instruction, the state disregarded indigenous schools whose students have little access to the manuscripts. This article brings the issue of knowledge grapping, a situation whereby European institutions and scholars accumulate Ethiopia manuscripts without providing the students in Ethiopia to have access to those collections.Items such as manuscripts that are held in western institutions are not dead artefacts of the past to be preserved for prosperity. They are living sources of knowledge that should be put to use in their intended contexts. Local Ethiopian scholars cannot study ancient and medieval Ethiopia without travelling and gaining access to western institutions. This lack of access and resources has made European Ethiopianists almost the sole producers of knowledge about Ethiopian history and culture. For example, indigenous sources and critical research that challenge the Semeticisation thesis are rarely available to Ethiopian students. Here we see epistemic violence in action. Western control over knowledge production has the detrimental effect of inventing new identities, subjectivities and histories that translate into material effects in the lives of African people. In this way, Ethiopians and people all over Africa internalise western understandings of themselves and their history as primitive and in need of development or outside intervention. African’s intellectual and cultural heritage, these living bodies locked away in graveyards, must be put back into the hands of Africans.AcknowledgementThe author acknowledges the support of the Australian Academy of the Humanities' 2019 Humanities Travelling Fellowship Award in conducting this research.ReferencesBell, Stephen. “Cultural Treasures Looted from Maqdala: A Summary of Correspondence in British National Newspapers since 1981.” Kasa and Kasa. Eds. Tadesse Beyene, Richard Pankhurst, and Shifereraw Bekele. Addis Ababa: Ababa University Book Centre, 1990. 231-246.Budge, Wallis. 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There has been a civil war in Somalia ever since the central government collapsed in 1991 which means there has been more then twenty years of domestic violence. To stop the fight, the United Nations Missions and other forces authorised by the UN Security Council have been deployed to Somalia such as the United Nations Operations (UNOSOM) and United Task Force (UNITAF), but none of those missions and forces have bore fruit and the civil war in the country has not come to an end. Furthermore, United Nations thought it has failed militarily whatever caused in Somalia but politically it has been present because immediately after its withdrawal from the country United Nation Office in Somalia (UNPOS) was established in 1995 in neighboring country in Kenya. However, in 2006 the situation deteriorated further when there was a bloody conflict between Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) heavily supported by Ethiopia which later resulted in military defeat of the former and two years presence of Ethiopian contingent in Somalia. Consequently, the situation came under the spotlight of African Union which later established African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is currently operating in Somalia with the approval of the UN Security Council under its Resolution 1744. The idea of creating AMISOM is to assist (TFG) as well as to promote peace and stability in Somalia.