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Journal articles on the topic 'Ernest Sosa'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Marsoobian, Armen T. "SYMPOSIUM ON ERNEST SOSA." Metaphilosophy 40, no. 2 (2009): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01587.x.

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2

Battaly, Heather D. "Ernest Sosa and His Critics." International Philosophical Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2005): 395–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200545324.

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3

Pritchard, Duncan. "Ernest Sosa: Judgment and Agency." Journal of Philosophy 114, no. 5 (2017): 274–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2017114520.

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4

Salles, João Carlos. "A gnoseologia segundo Ernest Sosa." Trans/Form/Ação 44, spe2 (2021): 63–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.07.p63.

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Resumo: Ernest Sosa enfatiza a diferença entre a teoria do conhecimento (ou, simplesmente, gnoseologia) e a ética intelectual, no interior de uma epistemologia. Com efeito, tal distinção adquire importância estratégica em sua obra, servindo bem à caraterização das tarefas de sua singular epistemologia das virtudes, sobretudo em sua versão mais recente, aperfeiçoada e télica. Exploraremos assim o sentido próprio de uma gnoseologia conforme com uma posição confiabilista, procurando mostrar como essa exigência taxonômica também se associa à análise da normatividade télica das performances humanas
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5

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer. "Judgment and Agency, by Ernest Sosa." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95, no. 1 (2016): 196–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1137605.

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6

Baehr, J. "Knowing Full Well, by Ernest Sosa." Mind 121, no. 482 (2012): 532–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs036.

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7

Carter, J. Adam. "Sosa en torno al conocimiento, el juicio y la adivinación." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 159. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621564.

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En el capítulo 3 de Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa (2015) elabora el concepto de una actuación completamente apta. Al hacer esto, apela a ejemplos ilustrativos de actuaciones prácticas y aplica las lecciones aprendidas al caso de las actuaciones cognitivas y, en particular, a la actuación cognitiva que es el juicio. Los ejemplos de Sosa en la esfera práctica son ricos e instructivos. Pero, argumento, hay una falta de analogía interesante entre los ejemplos prácticos y cognitivos a los que apela. En última instancia, creo que la falta de analogía tiene su fuente tanto en una concepción proble
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8

Marshall, Richard. "The Virtue Epistemologists. Interview with Ernest Sosa." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 353. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621570.

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9

Kelp, Christoph. "The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction." Synthese 197, no. 12 (2020): 5093–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02897-5.

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10

Soteriou, Matthew. "Los sueños, la agencia y el juicio." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 315. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621565.

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De acuerdo con Sosa, Descartes es un epistemólogo de virtudes, y podemos entender el proyecto epistemológico de Descartes sólo como un proyecto de segundo orden que concuerda con esta manera de entender su epistemología. Mi objetivo en este artículo es el de ahondar en esta comparación con la epistemología de Descartes, principalmente mediante la exploración de una manera en la que uno podría añadir ciertos detalles suplementarios a la postura general de Sosa, con la finalidad de que ésta concuerde de mejor manera con la postura de Descartes, o al menos con la que yo considero que es la postur
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11

Buford, Chris, and Anthony Brueckner. "RESISTING RESISTING EXTERNALISM." Episteme 11, no. 1 (2013): 27–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.47.

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AbstractIn “Externalism Resisted,” Jonathan Vogel addresses some important, foundational questions about the nature of justification. Vogel's focus is on Ernest Sosa's case against internalism about justification in Epistemic Justification. We defend Sosa against criticism leveled by Vogel. We also question whether Vogel himself can accept what he labels the connection thesis, a thesis that figures prominently in his arguments against Sosa.
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12

Mi, Chienkuo. "What Is Knowledge? When Confucius Meets Ernest Sosa." Dao 14, no. 3 (2015): 355–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-015-9447-9.

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13

Salles, João Carlos. "NOTAS SOBRE A TEORIA DA NORMATIVIDADE TÉLICA: UM NOVO CAPÍTULO DA EPISTEMOLOGIA DAS VIRTUDES DE ERNEST SOSA." Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 61, no. 145 (2020): 195–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2020n14510jcs.

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RESUMO Ernest Sosa é um dos mais importantes filósofos da contemporaneidade. Em plena atividade há mais de cinco décadas, sua obra toma agora a forma de uma teoria da normatividade télica, com a qual Sosa pretende coroar sua procura por uma "knowledgefriendly epistemology". Pretendemos mostrar que esta nova forma teórica instala-se bem no conjunto de sua reflexão epistemológica, procurando Sosa agora, de modo ainda mais preciso, dar resposta, por exemplo, às questões decorrentes do problema de Gettier, da intencionalidade e das modalidades epistêmicas. Entre as novidades de sua atual formulaçã
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14

unwin, nicholas. "Ernest Sosa and His Critics - Edited by John Greco." Philosophical Books 48, no. 2 (2007): 170–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.440_5.x.

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15

Axtell, Guy. "Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge - Ernest Sosa." Philosophical Quarterly 61, no. 242 (2010): 203–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.685_6.x.

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16

Silva Filho, Waldomiro José. "Introduction Ernest Sosa: a philosophy for the 21st century." Trans/Form/Ação 44, spe2 (2021): 13–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.02.p13.

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17

Fernández, Miguel Ángel. "Aptness and Safety: How Are They Related?" Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 125 (2010): 27–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.869.

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In A Virtue Epistemology, Ernest Sosa defines the notions of safety and aptness of beliefs and uses them to characterize two kinds of knowledge, animal and reflective. This paper tries to bring out what I take as an incoherence in Sosa’s views concerning how safety and aptness relate to knowledge and to each other. I discuss an apparent counterexample Sosa gives to his final view that aptness suffices for animal knowledge and argue that in fact the principle on which Sosa responds to the counterexample does not permit the response he offers. The principle in question is problematic for Sosa’s
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18

Bealer, George. "A Priori knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and ernest sosa." Philosophical Studies 81, no. 2-3 (1996): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00372780.

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19

Tanesini, Alessandra. "Contemporary Debates in Epistemology ? Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds)." Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 227 (2007): 303–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.486_4.x.

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20

McCain, Kevin. "Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds): Contemporary Debates in Epistemology." Science & Education 22, no. 5 (2011): 1257–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11191-011-9358-z.

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21

Salles, João Carlos. "Conhecimento e análise em “Propositional knowledge” de Ernst Sosa." Discurso 47, no. 2 (2017): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2318-8863.discurso.2017.141430.

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A obra de Ernest Sosa apresenta versões diversas da análise do conhecimento, tendo por ponto de partida o problema de Gettier. Tendo por pressuposto que o conjunto de trabalhos de Sosa perfazem uma obra, dotada de método e démarche característicos, além de enfim configurar uma posição singular no cenário epistemológico contemporâneo, pretendemos apresentar a evolução de versões da análise anteriores à sua epistemologia das virtudes, com atenção especial para o texto “Propositional Knowledge”, de 1969. Assim, refletindo especialmente sobre a especificidade e a relação intrínseca entre as noções
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22

MacKinnon, Barbara J. "Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. Edited by Ernest Sosa." Modern Schoolman 66, no. 4 (1989): 305–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198966458.

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23

DWYER, DÉIRDRE. "The Epistemology of Testimony - Edited by Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa." Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009): 214–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00434.x.

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24

Neta, Ram. "Should We Swap Internal Foundations for Virtues?" Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 125 (2010): 63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.872.

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Internalist foundationalism was popular through much of the history of Western epistemology, but has been subjected to intense critical scrutiny in the last century. Ernest Sosa’s new book presents some novel and seemingly powerful arguments against internalist foundationalism. After laying out these arguments, I attempt to rebut them. I argue that Sosa does not, after all, give us good reason for abandoning internalist foundationalism.
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25

Etcheverry, Kátia M. "A relação entre competência epistêmica e conhecimento na teoria de Ernest Sosa." Trans/Form/Ação 44, spe2 (2021): 185–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.13.p185.

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Resumo: Este artigo enfoca a relação de atribuição entre competência e crença verdadeira presente em explicações de conhecimento em termos de virtudes epistêmicas como a de Ernest Sosa. A ideia central é que, em casos de conhecimento, o fato de o agente formar uma crença verdadeira é atribuível à sua competência cognitiva (condição da competência), e não a algum fator de sorte. Os críticos apresentaram casos nos quais, alegadamente, ou o agente tem conhecimento sem satisfazer a condição da competência (portanto, a condição da competência não seria necessária para conhecimento); ou, apesar da s
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26

Zalabardo, José. "Seguridad, sensibilidad y apoyo diferencial." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 341. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621567.

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En 1999, Sosa sostuvo que el requisito de la sensibilidad no puede recibir apoyo diferencial con respecto al de la seguridad. Esto requiere (D1) que si una creencia que tiene el estatus de conocimiento es sensible, entonces también es segura, y (D2) que si una creencia que no tiene el estatus de conocimiento no es sensible, entonces tampoco es segura. De este modo, el requisito de la seguridad no excluirá de la extensión del conocimiento a ninguna creencia que no deba ser excluida, a menos que el requisito de la sensibilidad lo haga también, y el requisito de la seguridad excluirá de la extens
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27

Dalmiya, Vrinda. "Why Should a Knower Care?" Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 34–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2002.tb00678.x.

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This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care-knowing” and “care-based epistemology” emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.
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Sosa, Ernest. "II—Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael Williams." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77, no. 1 (2003): 113–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00105.

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29

Hunter, B., and A. Morton. "Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II, by Ernest Sosa." Mind 119, no. 475 (2010): 856–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq050.

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30

Battaly, H. "Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II * BY ERNEST SOSA." Analysis 70, no. 2 (2010): 388–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq014.

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31

Dancy, Jonathan. "Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest Sosa." Philosophical Studies 78, no. 3 (1995): 189–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00990110.

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32

Morton, A. "A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1, by Ernest Sosa." Mind 118, no. 472 (2009): 1180–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp130.

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Battaly, H. "A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I * By ERNEST SOSA." Analysis 69, no. 2 (2009): 382–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp035.

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34

Kelp, Christoph. "UNREFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY." Episteme 11, no. 4 (2014): 411–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.21.

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AbstractVirtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of knowledge in Fake Barn cases, whilst holding on to the core claim that knowledge i
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35

Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and E. J. Coffman. "Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 4 (2006): 535–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0003.

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A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person's belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Traditional Foundationalism says that, first, if a human being has a nonbasic belief, then, at bottom, it owes its justification to at least one basic belief, and second, there are basic beliefs. Call the second thesis Minimal Foundationalism. In this essay, we assess three arguments against Minimal Foundationalis
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36

O'Rourke, Michael. "Knowing Full Well. By Ernest Sosa. (Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 168. Price $32.50.)." Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 250 (2012): 174–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00087.x.

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37

Navarro, Jesús. "Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation." Disputatio 8, no. 43 (2016): 233–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0014.

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Abstract The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my persona
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38

Gómez-Alonso, Modesto. "Against a Nomic Virtue Epistemology." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 283. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621573.

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AbstractIn Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa argues for a particular methodology –what he calls ‘metaphysical analysis’– whose aim is to provide a speci c sort of explanation of knowledge –a metaphysical explanation–. As I read it, this revolutionary step points to the bulk of the ontological dispositional web that necessarily sustains a virtue epistemology, contributes to a proper understanding of accidentality in epistemology, and breaks the hold of Humean contingency. I will argue that Sosa’s account of the constitution of knowledge is not only able to rule out apparent counterexamples to a
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Littlejohn, Clayde. "La verdad en el gnosticismo." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 217. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621568.

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Resumen Hay dos supuestos sobre el valor epistémico que guían las discusiones más recientes sobre éste. El primero es que hay algo bueno con respecto a la creencia verdadera. El segundo supuesto es que es posible que dos creencias di eran en su valor incluso si ambas creencias son igualmente correctas. El veritista tiene fácil explicar el primer supuesto, pero tiene más difícil explicar el segundo. Para explicarlo, el veritista tiene que mostrar que las creencias verdaderas pueden diferir en su valor porque encarnan diferentes valores de bienes derivativos. El veritista tiene que proporcionarn
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40

Williams, Michael. "Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1, no. 2 (2011): 124–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057011x608872.

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AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circular
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41

Gómez Alonso, Modesto M. "El nuevo cogito de E. Sosa: juicio e imagen en la geografía lógica del sueño." Euphyía - Revista de Filosofía 5, no. 9 (2017): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.33064/9euph79.

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De acuerdo con la concepción ortodoxa (y supuestamente cartesiana), la indiscernibilidad entre sueño y sensación legitima un escepticismo extremo que desvincula nuestras experiencias de sus nexos causales y de sus fundamentos epistémicos. Ernest Sosa le opone un modelo imaginativo: mientras soñamos nuestro proceso cognitivo se encuentra desactivado. Ello implicaría, entre otras cosas: (i) atribuir al sujeto dos sistemas contradictorios de creencias; (ii) exigirle responsabilidad moral por lo que decide en sueños; y (iii) extender el escepticismo hasta el propio hecho de que se juzga y se piens
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42

Liz, Manuel. "Virtudes epidémicas reflexivas. El conocimiento como una cuestión de confianza." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 3, no. 2 (2017): 243. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.201621569.

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Resumen De acuerdo a Ernest Sosa, el conocimiento re exivo debería ser capaz de integrar al- gunas circularidades epistémicas como fuentes virtuosas de conocimiento. Argumen- taremos que tal conocimiento re exivo tiene que estar basado en ciertas capacidades para delegar y aplazar de manera adecuada la justi cación de nuestras creencias de primer orden. También argumentaremos que entender esas capacidades comunitarias y temporales como constituyendo virtudes epistémicas re exivas nos conduce fuera de cualquier concepción criterial del conocimiento. Para estas concepciones, conocer siempre requ
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Gómez-Alonso, Modesto. "Disposiciones, competencias cognitivas y suerte epistémica." Euphyía - Revista de Filosofía 9, no. 17 (2018): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.33064/17euph198.

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El hecho de que la verdad de una creencia pueda manifestar, en condiciones modales adversas, la competencia epistémica ejercida por el sujeto, pone en entredicho las teorías de la mera aptitud. La epistemología de virtudes se ve, así, obligada a incluir el criterio de seguridad, pero de tal modo que el conocimiento sea un logro atribuible al agente. En su producción más reciente, Ernest Sosa ha mostrado que, para saber, el sujeto ha de disponer de acceso apropiado a la aptitud de su creencia, o, lo que es igual, que sus actuaciones epistémicas de primer orden han de estar guiadas por un conoci
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García, Claudia Lorena. "Sosa’s Responses to Dreaming Skepticism." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 42, no. 125 (2010): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2010.868.

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Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against (what we have called) either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what appears to be some radical surgery on the concept of knowledge; a radical surgery that,
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45

DeRose, Keith. "Replies to Commentators." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (2020): 68–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191401.

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Replies are given to comments, questions, and objections to The Appearance of Ignorance. The reply to Robin McKenna focuses mainly on his questions of whether, with the skeptical argument I’m focused on, a strong enough appearance of ignorance is generated to require an account of that appearance, and whether, to the extent that we do need to account for that appearance, we might do so without contextualism by adopting a solution proposed by Ernest Sosa. The reply to Michael Blome-Tillman focuses mainly on a counterexample he offers to my account of the operation of the “Rule of Sensitivity.”
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Weatherson, Brian. "Luminous MarginsThanks to Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne, Chris Hill, Ernest Sosa, and the AJP 's referees." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 3 (2004): 373–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659874.

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47

Davison, Scott A. "Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley: Knowledge of God (Great Debates in Philosophy Series, series editor Ernest Sosa)." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66, no. 2 (2009): 105–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-009-9210-4.

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48

Immerman, Daniel. "Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6, no. 4 (2016): 351–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-00511173.

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Michael Huemer, Ernest Sosa, and Jonathan Vogel have offered a critique of the sensitivity condition on knowledge. According to them, the condition implies that you cannot know of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. Their arguments rest on the claim that you cannot sensitively believe of any particular proposition that you do not falsely believe it. However, as we shall see, these philosophers are mistaken. You can do so. That said, these philosophers were close to the mark. There are some related propositions that you cannot believe sensitively. These propositions a
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49

Gómez Alonso, Modesto M. "El confiabilismo modal de Descartes." Praxis Filosófica, no. 32 (November 2, 2011): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i32.3436.

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El propósito de este artículo es cuestionar la lectura tradicional de las Meditaciones metafísicas, una lectura que, abstrayendo del reto escépticode una reducción de la razón al absurdo al que se enfrenta Descartes,magnifica la prioridad epistémica del argumento del Cogito, y que, haciendocaso omiso de su estrategia anti-escéptica, es incapaz de apreciar que, másque la recopilación de mejores evidencias a favor de las proposicionesnucleares, su función es la de sustraer razones para dudar, de tal forma queel Investigador adquiera una posición ilustrada desde la que los escenariosescépticos ca
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Murphy, Benjamin. "RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM: WILL THE DEBATE EVER END?" Think 9, no. 24 (2010): 35–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175609990200.

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Anyone taking a class in Modern Philosophy will learn that one of the most important issues in 17th and 18th Century philosophy was the debate between rationalists and empiricists. In 2005, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa edited a book entitled Contemporary Debates In Epistemology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2007), which includes a chapter entitled ‘Is There A Priori Knowledge?’ (pp. 98–122). In this chapter, Laurence BonJour defends rationalism and Michael Devitt defends empiricism. So, this philosophical debate has been going on for four centuries, and it still has not been settled. This is the
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