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Djukic, George. "Essentialism : Paradise lost /." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1997. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phd626.pdf.
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Logue, Jessica Wollam. "Context and anti-essentialism a thoroughgoing approach /." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU0NWQmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=3739.
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Mackie, P. "How things might have been : A study in Essentialism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.234316.
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Ross, Allison. "Making sense of ʺessenceʺ : a critical examination of the adequacy of the modern philosophical conception of ʺessenceʺ." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002850.
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The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.
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Fulfer, Katherine N. "The concept of "woman" feminism after the essentialism critique /." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04202008-093433/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.Title from file title page. Christie J. Hartley, Andrew I. Cohen, committee co-chairs; Andrew Altman, committee member. Electronic text (70 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed August 1, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-70).
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Deng, Duen-Min. "A theory of essence : an Aristotelian notion reconstructed." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.607781.
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Spinelli, Nicola. "Husserlian essentialism revisited : a study of essence, necessity and predication." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/79543/.
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Husserlian Essentialism is the view, maintained byEdmundHusserl throughout his career, that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths obtain. In this thesis I have two goals. First, to reconstruct and flesh out Husserlian Essentialism and its connections with surrounding areas of Husserl's philosophy in full detail – something which has not been done yet. Second, to assess the theoretical solidity of the view. As regards the second point, after having presented Husserlian Essentialism in the first two chapters, I raise a serious problem for it in Chapter 3. In the remainder of the thesis I endeavour to solve the problem. In order to do so, I propose to amend both Husserl's theory of essence and his theory of predication. The bulk of the emendation consists in working out an account of essence and an account of predication that do not presuppose, or in any way imply, the claims that: 1) for a universal to be in the essence of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal; 2) for a universal to be truly predicated of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal. These claims, notice, apart from being what gets Husserl in trouble, are well entrenched not only in Husserl's, but in most theories of essence and predication (at least in those that feature universals). It is thus interesting to see what an alternative option may be – even regardless of the Husserlian setting in which I work it out.
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Chan, Ka-wo, and 陳嘉和. "What if natural kind terms are rigid?" Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B41633878.
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Heyes, Cressida J. "'Back to the rough ground!' : Wittgenstein, essentialism, and feminist methods." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ36981.pdf.
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Cameron, Jonathan. "Some philosophical refections on the "essentialist" v/s "constructivist" debate as it stands to the philosophical analysis of mystical experience." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2010. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=165861.
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‘Essentialism’ and ‘constructivism’ are two epistemological perspectives that have been used in the philosophical analysis of mystical experience. ‘Essentialism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as a distinct category of experience, cutting across cultural boundaries. ‘Constructivism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as unique to its various cultural contexts. The two viewpoints are variously held in opposition. ‘Constructivism’ often appears as something of an assumed perspective and is rarely, if ever, defended (in any depth) by the individuals whose views it apparently represents. Recent ‘essentialist’ thinkers (‘non-constructivists’) have taken issue with this tendency to assume ‘what is to be proved’, and have reasoned in attempts to establish ‘constructivisim’ as inappropriate to certain experiences that appear to be found recurring in reports of mystical experiences across cultures. However, those analyses have been concerned to recommend their own (‘essentialist’ / ‘non-constructivist’) position and have, therefore, operated with a certain amount of bias, despite elements of commendable intent. Indeed it is in virtue of these commendable elements i.e. by exploring the epistemological assumptions of authors who attempt to make mystical experience culture specific, that ‘essentialists’ posit and provide justification for the classification of ‘constructivism’ as a distinct philosophical approach to the data of enquiry. ‘Constructivists’ (so-called), on the other hand, tend to emphasise the importance and role of context in their discussions, and in some cases reject the classification of their views as particularly ‘constructivist’. The thesis examines the reasonable defensibility of ‘nonconstructed’ mystical experience from three perspectives: ‘essentialist’, ‘constructivist’ and ‘contextualist’ – outlining considerations for anyone approaching the material via each, and addressing the relevant issues of diversity at tension between these recognisable philosophical viewpoints.
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Wetherbee, James M. "An analysis of Plantinga's ontological argument." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1987. http://www.tren.com.
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Raley, Kristin Nicole Blashfield Roger K. "Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality structure and implications for prejudice ; a replication of Haslam and Levy, 2006 /." Auburn, Ala., 2008. http://repo.lib.auburn.edu/EtdRoot/2008/SUMMER/Psychology/Thesis/Raley_Kristin_2.pdf.
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Chan, Ka-wo. "What if natural kind terms are rigid?" Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B41633878.
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Johnston, Spencer C. "Essentialism, nominalism, and modality : the modal theories of Robert Kilwardby & John Buridan." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7820.
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In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques. In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic. In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.
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Miller, Bryan Temples. "Under Pressure from the Empirical Data: Does Externalism Rest on a Mistaken Psychological Theory?" Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/27.
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The tradition of semantic externalism that follows Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) is built on the assumption that the folk have essentialist commitments about natural kinds. Externalists commonly take the body of empirical data concerning psychological essentialism as support for this claim. However, recent empirical findings (Malt, 1994; Kalish, 2002) call the psychological theory of essentialism into question. This thesis examines the relevance of these findings to both essentialism and semantic externalism. I argue that these findings suggest that these theories fail to reflect folk beliefs about natural kinds and folk natural kind term usage. This leads me to propose an alternative thesis-- the Ambiguity Thesis-- that is better able to accommodate the existing body of empirical data.
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Snider, Kathryn. "From real essences to the feminine imaginary : critiques of essentialism in feminist theory in North America in the 1980's." Thesis, McGill University, 1994. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=26330.
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The polemical debate, within feminist theory in North America, in the 1980s, around essentialism is the central focus of this thesis.In particular, this work attempts to critically examine the notion of essentialism, the resistance to accepting a feminine "essence," and the loosely defined and employed terminology surrounding this field of inquiry. In accomplishing these objectives I draw upon, and critique, the more recent work elaborated around theorizing with/through the "body."
Aspects of feminist theory which are examined as contributive towards the above aim are an analysis of the explicit, and implicit, dangers of accepting or discarding essentialism, and an analysis of the inherent ontological and philosophical tenets that function within this present discourse.
It is maintained that by addressing the issue of essentialism, the relationship between subjectivity, identity, and gender, within feminist theory, will be liberated from further constraining propositions.
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Morais, Rosana de [UNESP]. "O essencialismo na história de Ismael Nery." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/151253.
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Essa pesquisa analisa as relações existentes entre a série História de Ismael Nery e seu sistema filosófico, nomeado Essencialismo. Na série executada em 1932, e composta por cerca de dezesseis desenhos à nanquim, nota-se uma aproximação à estética do surrealismo, no entanto, suas produções desde 1926 parecem estar coadunadas ao seu sistema filosófico, e, evidenciar a estruturação de seu projeto estético. Através da iconologia foi analisada a ocorrência desse binômio: estética e filosofia; por meio da revisão bibliográfica foram atualizados seus dados biográficos a fim de elucidar incongruências historiográficas. Além das composições, foram também analisadas as poesias de Ismael Nery, as quais da mesma forma comprovam o pensamento filosófico do artista e refletem as pinturas como um espelho da representação artística. A fim de, compreender e comprovar o essencialismo na história de Ismael Nery, e, sua importância na construção do imaginário artístico no modernismo brasileiro. Como suporte teórico-metodológico utilizado para as análises contamos com os pressupostos de E. Panofsky.
This research investigate the existing relations between the series Ismael Nery’s History and his philosophical system, named Essentialism. In this 1932 series, constituted of about sixteen drawings in Indian ink, it can be noted a closeness to the aesthetics of surrealism, however, his productions since 1926 seemed to be connected to his philosophical system and they seem to indicate an structure of his aesthetic project. Through the iconology it was analyzed both his aesthetic and his philosophy; through the bibliographical revision his biographical dates were update aiming at revealing some historiographic inconsistencies. Besides the compositions, Ismael Nery’s poetry were also analyzed, which on the same way prove the philosophical thoughts of the artist and they reflect the paintings, as a mirror of the artistic representation. The essentialism in the history of Ismael Nery could be better understood and comprehended and, above all, his importance in the artistic imagery in the Brazilian Movement. As theoretical-methodological framework for the analyses it was used the concepts of E. Panofsky.
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Birkett, Edward John. "The tensions of modernity : Descartes, reason and God /." View thesis View thesis, 2000. http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20030411.100355/index.html.
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Miller, Timothy D. "The Trinity and individual essence." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Federico, Penelas Federico. "Recepciones pragmatistas de Martin Heidegger." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113057.
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Pragmatist Receptions of Martin Heidegger”. This paper studies theAmerican Pragmatist reception of Heidegger’s thought. The article briely presentsBrandom’s and Okrent’s readings of Heidegger, paying attention afterwards toRorty’s articulation of the Heideggerian legacy with the work of Wittgensteinand classical Pragmatists, especially Dewey. Rorty’s appropriation of Heideggerassumes a philosophical and metaphilosophical anti-essentialist commitment.This commitment requires some reading operations in relation to the lastHeidegger, who cannot be easily assimilated by the Pragmatist tradition. Thetension between irony and nostalgia will be crucial for Rorty’s appropriation ofHeidegger’s thought.En el presente trabajo se hace un recorrido por la recepción norteamericanaen clave pragmatista de la obra de Heidegger. Se presentan sucintamentelas lecturas realizadas por Brandom y Ockrent, para luego concentrarse en laarticulación que hace Rorty del legado heideggeriano con la obra de Wittgensteiny de los pragmatistas clásicos, especialmente Dewey. La apropiación rortiana deHeidegger supone un compromiso antiesencialista, a nivel ilosóico y metailosóico,que requiere una serie de operaciones de lectura en relación, especialmente,con el último Heidegger, de difícil asimilación por parte de la tradición pragmatista.La tensión entre nostalgia e ironismo será una clave de dicha apropiacióny una oportunidad para pensar sus límites.
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Birkett, Edward John. "The tensions of modernity : Descartes, reason and God." Thesis, View thesis View thesis, 2000. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/399.
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Reason, material objects, God, mind and body are all interrelated in Descartes' philosophy. The misapprehension of one will lead to misunderstandings in all of them. They are bound together by being part of the one God given secure universe. This allows Descartes to put forward the understanding of the universe as being one in which rational science was possible and indubitable certainty achievable. Because they are all organically related in the one meaningful system, the essential natures of these things which Descartes discovers flow into one another in their actual existence in the world. Accepting the picture of the universe as a rational place where certainty is possible, is part of what defines much of modernity as modernity. Since this is one way of ensuring certainty, modernity demands that a thing's essence should reflect its manner of existence. However this leads to modernity demanding of Descartes' philosophy that it reflect this same structure. Modernity then reads Descartes as trying to present such a picture, and consequently finds that Descartes' arguments do not work. Because Descartes' universe is God's universe, he is able to offer to humanity a very strong form of autonomy. But modernity prefers to have a less powerful form of autonomy which is independent of God, but which makes itself a servant to nature and the community of reason. This is a result of the price of entry into the rational universe through Descartes' method of doubt. As a consequence of modernity's reworking of Descartes' understanding of autonomy, and their demand that a thing's essence should exactly reflect its mode of existence, irreducible tensions develop in modernity. These are particularly obvious in the case of the relationship between science, reason and God, and between the mind and the body. This thesis addresses these tensions
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Asadi, Dena. "A New Sense to Common Sense : Context and Interdependence in Goodman and Nāgārjuna." Thesis, University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-5137.
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Some form of absolutism has generally been the majority view within philosophy and in other traditions, and it is common to take absolutism for granted without providing rational arguments or empirical evidence in support of it. However, such attitudes are not viable if we want to avoid dogmatism. In this paper, I question absolutism and the closely associated correspondence theory of truth through the writings of Goodman and Nāgārjuna. I first describe Goodman‟s philosophy with a focus on his works dealing with „worldmaking‟ and multiple true versions. Subsequently follows an outline of Nāgārjuna‟s philosophy, in which he intended to show that the notion of an essence, an inherently existent entity or relation, is incoherent and that essences would be incompatible with experience. I then reflect on the relation between absolutism and relativism, and propose that the philosophies of Goodman and Nāgārjuna make it possible to transcend both. The paper ends with a discussion on the notion of knowledge in the absence of absolute entities and essences. From the works of Goodman, Nāgārjuna, and Bohm, I put forward the idea that an aspiration for a greater good and fitting is more general than a desire for knowledge of entities, and that it is therefore important to be aware of the larger context in which any given entity appears so that it can be seen to what extent further inquiry and use of it can lead to a greater good and fitting.
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Pfeilschiefter, Paul Kenneth. "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Seeking Natural Kinds in a Controversial Diagnosis." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/66.
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Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating condition that results from the experience of a traumatic event. Natural kinds are mind-independent entities found in nature and are the objects of scientific inquiry. It is common to deny that PTSD is a natural kind, but extant denials assume a thesis of natural kinds that can be called “essentialism”. According to essentialism, many entities are not natural kinds that one would expect should be natural kinds. The homeostatic cluster view of natural kinds offers an alternative that accommodates these cases, including, superficially, the claim that PTSD is a natural kind. I introduce two novel objections to this claim and recommend a distinction aimed to resolve the newly introduced problems.
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Miller, Kevin P. "Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality, attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, and religiosity change within a structure of interconnected beliefs /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1211408615.
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Thommen, Tristan. "Slurs in speech and thought." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLEE013/document.
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Cette thèse s'intéresse à la structure, aux fonctions, et aux bases cognitives des termes d'offense (tels que le terme "boche"). Les termes d'offense, ainsi que leurs équivalents psychologiques, posent des problèmes intéressants et possiblement fondationnels à propos de la nature de la signification, de l'expressivité dans les langues naturelles, du rôle des émotions dans la catégorisation. Ce travail discute de ces questions - ainsi que de nombreuses autres - en s'intéressant à différentes théories existantes ou originalesdu phénomène. De nouvelles données linguistiques sont mises en avant qui remettent en cause des théories linguistiques telles que les visions vériconditionnelles ou présuppositionnelles du phénomène, et de nouvelles théories non-linguistiques du phénomène sont développées, invoquant les concepts de qualité seconde ou la notion d'essence. Les propriétés linguistiques particulières des termes d'offense, telles que la projection ou l'expressivité, apparaissent dans ce travail être des conséquences linguistiques d'un phénomène essentiellement psychologique : la possibilité d'une composante émotionnelle ou évaluative dans la structure même des conceptsThe present work investigates the structure, function and cognitive underpinnings of slurring terms (such as "boche"). Slurring terms, and the mental correlates that I posit they have, raise interesting and possibly foundational issues about the nature of meaning, about expressivity in natural language, about the role of emotions in categorization. I discuss these questions - among many others - by studying different existing or original accounts of the phenomenon. I present novel linguistic evidence against linguistic views such as truth-conditional or presuppositional accounts, and develop new psychological (i.e. non-linguistic) theories of the phenomenon based on a connection with responsedependent concepts, or with essentialist concepts. The interesting linguistic properties of slurs, such as projection and expressivity, appear to be the linguistic consequences of the essentially mental fact that concepts may be loaded with emotional or evaluative content
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Sveinsdóttir, Ásta Kristjana. "Siding with Euthyphro : response-dependence, essentiality, and the individuation of ordinary objects." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28832.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).
(cont.) essentiality. I start with our practices of engaging in thought experiments about the essences of things and show how my account vindicates those practices.
The motivation for the dissertation is the desire to take a certain Kantian intuition seriously. This is the intuition that aspects of the world may be dependent in some way on, or constructed by, human thought and practices. The aim of the thesis is to offer one clear and coherent articulation of this intuition. What I offer is an account of what makes a property essential to an object that traces the source of that essentiality to our conceptual practices. This is a key component of an anti-realist essentialism. The main claim is that essentiality--the property of being an essential property of an object--is conferred by ideal representatives of us concept users. The idea that a property is conferred is familiar to us from Plato: Does the gods' love confer the property of being pious on the action or do the gods merely detect the property of being pious in the action and their love is simply a reaction to it? How is one to argue that a property is, perhaps despite first appearances, conferred? In the first chapter, I draw on the literature on response-dependence to provide a general strategy for arguing that a property is conferred. In the second chapter, I use that general strategy to argue that essentiality is conferred by ideal representatives of us concept users at the limit of enquiry into what we actual concept users are committed to in our use of concepts. It is the ideal representatives' finding it inconceivable that the object in question not have the property that confers essentiality onto a property of the object. In this way essentiality is shown to have its source in our conceptual practices, and not in a world that is independent of us. The third chapter brings out epistemological virtues of my conferralist account of
by Asta Kristjana Sveinsdóttir.
Ph.D.
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Neuve-Église, Amélie. "Etude critique de la doctrine de l'existence dans la pensée d'Avicenne et de Thomas d'Aquin sur la base de la philosophie sadrienne." Thesis, Paris 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA010613.
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Les notions d'essentialisme et d'existentialisme ont souvent été utilisées par les commentateurs et spécialistes contemporains pour désigner respectivement les philosophies d'Avicenne et de Thomas d'Aquin. Cependant, ces qualificatifs leur ont souvent été apposés sur la base d'une étude fragmentaire de leur pensée, et sans qu'une définition précise et uniforme n'en ait été donnée. En tant que fondateur d'un système philosophique constituant une synthèse critique de différents courants de pensées, Molla Sadrâ a été à l'origine d'une nouvelle réflexion sur la question de l'existence. Alliée à sa pensée critique au sujet de systèmes philosophiques l'ayant précédé, sa philosophie peut constituer une nouvelle base de réflexion sur le sens des notions d'existentialisme et d'essentialisme, ainsi que sur la façon dont Avicenne et S. Thomas ont pensé l'existence. La philosophie sadrienne est ici mise à contribution en vue de présenter une analyse du statut de l'existence dans les philosophies avicennienne et thomasienne dans un cadre à la fois global et critique, et de mettre en relief certaines options fondamentales de leur pensée. L'analyse est complétée par une évaluation critique de la façon dont certains commentateurs ont appréhendé et compris le statut de l'existence dans ces deux penséesThe notions of essentialism and existentialism have often been used by contemporary commentators and scholars to refer respectively to the philosophies of Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. However, these attributions have often taken place of the basis of fragmentary studies of their thought, whereas no precise and uniform definition of such notions has been given. As the founder of a philosophical system which constitutes a critical synthesis of different schools of thought, Molla Sadra is at the origin of a new reflection on the issue of existence. Along with a critical thinking about some philosophical systems that preceded it, his philosophy may provide a new basis for a reflection on the meaning of the notions of existentialism and essentialism, as well as on how Avicenna and S. Thomas have thought and tackled the issue of existence. In this study, the Sadrian philosophy is used in order to present an analysis of the status of existence in the philosophies of Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas within a comprehensive and critical framework, and to highlight some fundamental options of their thought. The analysis is complemented by a critical assessment of how some commentators have apprehended and understood the status of existence in these two thoughts
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Gilon, Odile. "Essentia indifferens: études sur l'antériorité, l'homogénéité et l'unité dans la métaphysique de Jean Duns Scot." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210227.
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Ce travail porte sur l'application et l'utilisation par Jean Duns Scot de la théorie de l'indifférence de l'essence, issue du péripatétisme arabe, et se donne pour enjeu d'en comprendre le fonctionnement conceptuel. Solution conjointe aux questions de la constitution ontologique des choses, des rapports entre le langage et la réalité et du mode d'appréhension des notions générales dans l'abstraction, la théorie de l'indifférence de l'essence sert de sous-bassement à la métaphysique de Duns Scot. C'est au moyen de cette théorie qu'il est possible, comme le montre cette recherche, de relire certains grands thèmes de la métaphysique scotiste: la théorie de la nature commune et de l'haeccéité, la connaissance abstractive (cognitio abstractiva), et la théorie de la non identité formelle. Le travail tente surtout de dégager le caractère proprement méthodologique de la théorie des trois états de l'essence (triplex status essentiae), répondant à la question du statut de l'essence indifférente, à celle des prédicats d'ordre supérieur et au problème de la séparation dans l'abstraction.Doctorat en Philosophie
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Del, Aguila Ursula. "Le corps maternel : le lieu de la métaphysique." Thesis, Paris 8, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA080001.
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Cette étude traque le corps maternel dans l’histoire de la métaphysique. Chez Platon, il oscille entre chôra, nourrice du vivant, et matrice animale qui gouverne le corps féminin Mais la chôra, n’est pas « Triton Genos » mais premier environnement de l’être qui est exproprié dès son origine. S’en suit l’errance du corps maternel fondatrice de la métaphysique. La volonté d’effacer le corps maternel est au cœur de la métaphysique définie comme haine et jalousie à l’égard de ce corps. Aristote théorise l’engendrement en soi mais inaugure la tradition de l’infériorisation des femmes due à leur matrice que la médecine gréco-‐latine entérine. Le christianisme comme « métaphysique des sexes » invente une figure du corps maternel purifié avec la Vierge Marie. Aux XVIIe et XVIIIème siècles, le sujet possède son corps et ses enfants et assombrit la dignité de la personne. Le corps maternel agonise et ce matricide dit la nouvelle économie libidinale qui perpétue l’enfouissement renouvelé de la mère. Le corps qui arrive est machine, sans organes et sans utérus. Un corps fabriqué, instrument de soi, qui célèbre la naissance sans mère. Le corps auto-‐engendré dit le phantasme masculin d’en passer sans le corps maternel. Son analyse dans la cartographie des philosophes femmes du XXème siècle, universaliste, différentialiste, queer, cyborg, est incontournable. Le point culminant de notre étude mesure les enjeux actuels des biotechnologies, phase finale de l’effacement du corps maternel puisqu’elles tendent à l’externaliser et à l’assujettir. Devant le commencement radical qu’ouvre la naissance qui se fait grâce à la chair matricielle pensante des femmes, ne faudrait-‐il pas bâtir la nouvelle métaphysique sur une ontologie de la vie basée sur l'ordre symbolique de la mère, seule issue possible pour sortir du désordre de la pensée ?This study seeks to uncover the maternal body in the history of Metaphysics. In Plato, it varies between the chora, nurse of the living and the animal matrix which rules the feminine body. However, the chora is not « triton genos » but the first environment of the being who is expropriated from its origins. The maternal body can begin to wander and Metaphysics lays on that wandering. The Will of erasing it is at the heart of Metaphysics defined as hatred and jealousy. Aristotle thinks through the Begetting in itself but also ushers in the tradition of devaluing Women’s bodies in particular their womb, which is exactly what the Greek Latine Medicine confirms. The Christianity as “Metaphysics of the Sexes” invents a purified figure of the maternal body with the Virgin Mary. With the XVII and XVIIIe centuries, the subject owns his body and his children and this darkens the Dignity of the Person. The maternal body is dying and this matricide illustrates the upcoming libidinal Economy that perpetuates the burial of the Mother. The new body is a machine, without organs and without a womb. This manufactured body, tool of the Self, celebrates the Birth without the Mother. The self-begotten body represents the male fantasy to procreate without the female body. Analysis of it in the cartography of Women Philosophers, alternately universalist, differentialist, queer, cyborg is highly needed. The climax of this study measures the actual stakes of Biotechnologies, considering them as the final step of a large and global Erasing of the maternal body in an attempt to externalise and enslave it. In front of the radical beginning that opens Birth, made possible by the female thinking matrix flesh, why not build a new metaphysics upon the Symbolic Order of the Mother, this is the only way to leave forever the original Disorder of philosophical Thinking?
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Kevorkian, Gilles-Alexandre. "L'essentialisme platonicien : la perspective fondationnelle." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0087.
Full textAbstract:
Quelle est la nature des entités métaphysiques premières que la tradition a retenues sous le nom de Formes platoniciennes ? À cette question, en s’inscrivant dans les pas de la critique aristotélicienne des Formes, la tradition de commentaire majoritaire a répondu de façon catégorielle : les Formes platoniciennes sont des universaux prédicatifs. Cette tradition, qui réduit les essences à des prédicats, ne rend pas justice au texte platonicien. Platon répond à la question de la nature des Formes de façon principielle : les essences platoniciennes sont des principes qui ont une double fonction définitionnelle et fondationnelle. Il y a deux voies de l’essentialisme platonicien, une voie définitionnelle, bien connue, une voie fondationnelle, ignorée. C’est pourquoi on défend ici l’hypothèse d’un essentialisme fondationnel, introduit par Platon dans le "Phédon", mis au défi dans le "Parménide". En suivant le concept de fondation, marqué dans le texte platonicien par les opérateurs "en vertu de" (διὰ+accusatif), "pourquoi" (διὰ τί), "parce que" (δι' ὃτι), on montre qu’il est l’ancêtre du concept contemporain de fondation, théorisé en philosophie analytique par la logique des expressions « in virtue of », « because ». On met en évidence, ce faisant, la différence de l’essentialisme fondationnel platonicien avec l’essentialisme aristotélicien. Cet essentialisme fondationnel ouvre un nouvel espace logique pour l’essentialisme platonicien, eidétique, à côté d’autres formes de l’essentialisme contemporain (objectuel ou générique). En articulant examen des textes antiques et des concepts de la métaphysique contemporaine, le présent travail propose une défense possible de la métaphysique platonicienneWhat is the nature of the primary beings which a long-standing tradition has studied under the name of Platonic Forms ? To this « nature question », following Aristotle’s criticisms of Forms, the majority view has given an answer in terms of metaphysical categories: Platonic Forms are universals of a predicative kind. This latter view is reductionist: Plato’s essences are not predicates. Plato answers the « nature question » about the Forms on a foundational basis: Platonic Forms are essences which perform both a definitional function and a grounding function. Plato’s definitional essentialism is well known ; Plato’s caracterization of essences as grounds has not yet been studied. That is the reason why we focus on defending a grounding view of Plato’s essentialism : essences as grounds are set forth by Plato in the "Phaedo" and criticized in the "Parmenides". This grounding view is expressed by the terms "in virtue of" (διὰ+accusatif), "why" (διὰ τί) and "because" (δι' ὃτι) in the platonic corpus, and thus anticipates the metaphysics and logic of the contemporary concept of ground. While focusing on the nature of essences as grounds, we also show how Plato’s eidetic essentialism has its own conceptual space, how it is different from both objectual and generic essentialisms. By combining the study of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, we try to defend Plato’s essentialism as a viable metaphysical option
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Del, Aguila Ursula. "Le corps maternel : le lieu de la métaphysique." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 8, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA080001.
Full textAbstract:
Cette étude traque le corps maternel dans l’histoire de la métaphysique. Chez Platon, il oscille entre chôra, nourrice du vivant, et matrice animale qui gouverne le corps féminin Mais la chôra, n’est pas « Triton Genos » mais premier environnement de l’être qui est exproprié dès son origine. S’en suit l’errance du corps maternel fondatrice de la métaphysique. La volonté d’effacer le corps maternel est au cœur de la métaphysique définie comme haine et jalousie à l’égard de ce corps. Aristote théorise l’engendrement en soi mais inaugure la tradition de l’infériorisation des femmes due à leur matrice que la médecine gréco-‐latine entérine. Le christianisme comme « métaphysique des sexes » invente une figure du corps maternel purifié avec la Vierge Marie. Aux XVIIe et XVIIIème siècles, le sujet possède son corps et ses enfants et assombrit la dignité de la personne. Le corps maternel agonise et ce matricide dit la nouvelle économie libidinale qui perpétue l’enfouissement renouvelé de la mère. Le corps qui arrive est machine, sans organes et sans utérus. Un corps fabriqué, instrument de soi, qui célèbre la naissance sans mère. Le corps auto-‐engendré dit le phantasme masculin d’en passer sans le corps maternel. Son analyse dans la cartographie des philosophes femmes du XXème siècle, universaliste, différentialiste, queer, cyborg, est incontournable. Le point culminant de notre étude mesure les enjeux actuels des biotechnologies, phase finale de l’effacement du corps maternel puisqu’elles tendent à l’externaliser et à l’assujettir. Devant le commencement radical qu’ouvre la naissance qui se fait grâce à la chair matricielle pensante des femmes, ne faudrait-‐il pas bâtir la nouvelle métaphysique sur une ontologie de la vie basée sur l'ordre symbolique de la mère, seule issue possible pour sortir du désordre de la pensée ?This study seeks to uncover the maternal body in the history of Metaphysics. In Plato, it varies between the chora, nurse of the living and the animal matrix which rules the feminine body. However, the chora is not « triton genos » but the first environment of the being who is expropriated from its origins. The maternal body can begin to wander and Metaphysics lays on that wandering. The Will of erasing it is at the heart of Metaphysics defined as hatred and jealousy. Aristotle thinks through the Begetting in itself but also ushers in the tradition of devaluing Women’s bodies in particular their womb, which is exactly what the Greek Latine Medicine confirms. The Christianity as “Metaphysics of the Sexes” invents a purified figure of the maternal body with the Virgin Mary. With the XVII and XVIIIe centuries, the subject owns his body and his children and this darkens the Dignity of the Person. The maternal body is dying and this matricide illustrates the upcoming libidinal Economy that perpetuates the burial of the Mother. The new body is a machine, without organs and without a womb. This manufactured body, tool of the Self, celebrates the Birth without the Mother. The self-begotten body represents the male fantasy to procreate without the female body. Analysis of it in the cartography of Women Philosophers, alternately universalist, differentialist, queer, cyborg is highly needed. The climax of this study measures the actual stakes of Biotechnologies, considering them as the final step of a large and global Erasing of the maternal body in an attempt to externalise and enslave it. In front of the radical beginning that opens Birth, made possible by the female thinking matrix flesh, why not build a new metaphysics upon the Symbolic Order of the Mother, this is the only way to leave forever the original Disorder of philosophical Thinking?
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Price, Benjamin J. 1980. "Toward a Rationale for Music Education in the Public School Context Framed with both Progressive and Essentialist Considerations: Operationalizing the Ideas of William Chandler Bagley." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2016. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc849619/.
Full textAbstract:
In music education, aesthetic education and praxial music education serve as two major, guiding philosophical frameworks, yet supporters of each often conflict with one another. Furthermore, both are slightly problematic with respect to the specific context of the public school. Each framework is primarily music-based, however, music education has existed in the wider context of general education since the 1830s. Given the recent core-status designation for music education, as part of all fine arts, in the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a framework from general education that supported music education could offer benefits for the domain. However, the wider context of general education is messy as well. Two groups occupy most of the space there, and remain locked in a fundamental disagreement over the purpose of a formal education. The progressive educators, historically framed by Dewey and Thorndike, contend that education functions as societal improvement. In contrast, the essentialists contend that education functions as cultural transmission. Therefore, a more specific need for music education involves selecting a framework from general education that resolves this conflict. The writings of William Chandler Bagley indicate that he balanced both considerations of a formal education while also advancing his notion of essentialism. Bagley differed from the progressive educators predominately associated with Dewey over definitions and ideas surrounding a democratic education. Emergent points of contrast with Thorndike include distinctions between social efficiency and Bagley's alternative idea of social progress. Bagley also diverged from other essentialists over definitions concerning liberal and cultural education. To make these viewpoints of Bagley explicit, I describe characteristics of a progressive education, and an essentialist education separately, before introducing Bagley. Finally, I apply Bagley's ideas into the domain of music education. Ultimately, I contend that through common outcomes of creativity, competition, and literacy, the domain of music education can remain securely grounded in the values within the public schools.
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Christoffersson, Carin. "Resonera mera! : En studie om resonemangsförmågans kvantitativa och kvalitativa betydelse i samhällskunskap för år 4-6, från Lgr 62 till Lgr 11." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Lärarutbildningen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-44453.
Full textAbstract:
Although the words reasoning or being able to reason appear 480 times in today's curriculum Lgr 11, there are no explanations and justifications why students should learn and be assessed based on the knowledge requirements in their ability to reason. This paper examines how this can be found, mainly in the syllabus in civics education for grades 4-6, and whether the relevance of reasoning has been similar in previous curricula from 1962 to the present day. With quantitative content analysis and qualitative text analysis, curricula in social studies and commentary material have been analysed. The analyses have been made based on the curriculum philosophies progressivism, essentialism and reconstructivism, as a theoretical framework and a possible way to explain the quantitative and qualitative results, and answer the purpose of the essay how the relevance has changed. Another purpose of the essay is to investigate how the change has been justified and whether a change in perception of knowledge can explain the varied occurrence of the ability to reason, or how important one have considered the ability to be. The results of the essay shows that the quantitative results are not entirely related to the qualitative ones. Although the words occur most times in Lgr 11, I find that the greatest relevance to reasoning is given in Lgr 80. One possible reason for this may be that Lgr 80 expresses a reconstructive view of knowledge where the learning process is in focus, rather than an essentialist view of knowledge as in Lgr 11, where the subject content is the most central.
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Roques, Magali. "Substance, continuité et discrétion d'après Guillaume d'Ockham." Thesis, Tours, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012TOUR2004/document.
Full textAbstract:
Dans ce travail de doctorat, nous avons pour objectif de reconstituer les présupposés et les conséquences de la thèse ockhamiste selon laquelle la quantité n’est pas réellement distincte de la substance ou de la qualité. Cette thèse est formulée dans les écrits philosophiques et théologiques de Guillaume d’Ockham, logicien et théologien anglais du début du XIVe siècle (1285-1349). La thèse est organisée en trois parties. La première partie a pour objet la question de savoir comment s’organise la catégorie de quantité si l’on admet que la quantité n’est pas réellement distincte de la substance ou de la qualité. La deuxième partie, consacrée à la physique de la quantité, traite de chacune des trois espèces de quantité, la quantité permanente continue (l’extension spatiale), la quantité successive (le mouvement et le temps) et la quantité discrète (le nombre). Enfin, la troisième partie consiste en une description et une évaluation de la théorie ockhamiste de la structure métaphysique de la substanceThe aim of this PhD dissertation is to reconstruct the assumptions and consequences of the ockhamist thesis according to which quantity is not really distinct from substance or from quality. This thesis can be found in the philosophical and theological writings of William of Ockham, a logician and Franciscan theologian from the beginning of the 14th century (1285-1349).The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the question how the category of quantity is organised if one assumes that quantity is not really distinct from substance or from quality. The second part is dedicated to the physics of quantity. Each species of quantity is examined, that is permanent continuous quantity (spatial extension), successive quantity (motion and time) and discrete quantity (number). Lastly, the third part consists in a description and an evaluation of the ockhamist theory of the metaphysical structure of substance
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Nandi, Miriam. "Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak." Universität Leipzig, 2018. https://ul.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A31261.
Full textAbstract:
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak gilt als eine der Gründungsfiguren des postkolonialen Feminismus. Ihr Profil als postkoloniale Theoretikerin gewann sie mit der Veröffentlichung ihres Werkes In Other Worlds – Essays in Cultural Politics. In ihren Texten weist Spivak auf Widersprüche innerhalb der Nationen des Globalen Südens hin. Sie fokussiert, u. a. mit Hilfe der analytischen Konzepte Repräsentation (representation) und Subalternität (subaltern), insbesondere auf die problematische Rolle von Geschlechter- und Klassenverhältnissen in postkolonialen Widerstandsbewegungen, auf den Gegensatz zwischen den indischen Eliten und den unteren Bevölkerungsschichten und auf die gewaltsame Unterdrückung von Frauen des Südens.
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Curran, Angela F. "Issues in Aristotelian essentialism." 1992. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9233049.
Full textAbstract:
Scholars agree that Aristotle held a view that has been called "Aristotelian Essentialism" (AE), but disagree about what this thesis entails. I reconstruct (AE) as the view that there are certain individuals, namely substances, that have essences, and that essences are to be understood as "explanatorily basic" features of an individual--features of an individual substance that serve as part of a scientific explanation of the presence of other features of that individual, but are not themselves explained in this way. When Aristotle's view is understood in this way, interesting differences and parallels between him and contemporary essentialists emerge. For one, so-called "properties of origin" such as "being born to George and Barbara Bush" are not essential to the individual that has them, on Aristotle's view. Furthermore, understanding Aristotle's view in this way explains why essences are not, as it has often been maintained, merely "career attributes"--properties that an individual has necessarily and at each moment at which it exists. I argue that for Aristotle, essences belong to an individual in virtue of the species to which it belongs, and that Aristotle subscribes to the "species-form" view of essence. I examine and respond to arguments to the contrary that, in both the Metaphysics and the Generation of Animals, Aristotle holds that the essence of an individual substance is an "individual form" unique to that thing, and not shared by any other individual. Aristotle's account of family resemblances, in particular, has been thought by many to present problems for understanding Aristotle's essentialism. In that text it looks like Aristotle gives up on the view that only certain features--the ones that define the species--are essential to an individual when he attempts to explain the phenomena of family resemblance. I conclude with a sketch of a reading of this text that shows Aristotle holding an account of family resemblances that is consistent with the view that only certain features--the explanatorily basic ones--are part of the essences of individual substances.
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Coates, Ashley Stephen. "Dispositional essentialism and the problem of unmanifested dispositions." Thesis, 2017. https://hdl.handle.net/10539/24559.
Full textAbstract:
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2017Powers theory is the view that some ontic or sparse properties are essentially powerful in the sense that they are “for” or “directed toward” certain manifestations. In this thesis, I consider in detail the idea that the nature of unmanifested dispositions generates serious difficulties for powers theory. I argue that extant arguments based on this idea do not succeed but also that a novel argument based on the idea does raise significant problems for powers theory and, especially, for dispositional essentialism – the version of powers theory on which some powers are fundamental natural properties. In the first two chapters, I argue that on the most charitable interpretation the most plausible extant arguments from unmanifested dispositions against powers theory collapse into a single basic argument. The putative problem that this argument raises for powers theory is that some powers stand in a relation with manifestations that do not actually exist. In chapter three, I develop an argument from unmanifested dispositions that does not depend on this idea. According to this argument, unmanifested dispositions commit the powers theorist to the problematic idea that entities that do not actually exist have a sort of ontological priority over entities that actually exist. In chapter four, I argue that the arguments discussed in the first three chapters are seriously undermined by the fact that the “directedness” of a power instance need involve only the possibility of that power instance’s token manifestation and not the token manifestation itself. In chapters five and six, I use Kit Fine’s conception of ontological dependence to reformulate the argument developed in chapter three so that it gets around this difficulty. I argue that this argument provides good grounds to think that the dispositional essentialist is committed to the claim that unrealised possibilities have a significant sort of explanatory priority over concrete reality. This result is problematic for the dispositional essentialist, as this claim is strongly counterintuitive, entails the falsity of significant forms of ontological naturalism, and is inconsistent with important parts of the standard motivation for dispositional essentialism.
XL2018
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"Locke, natural kinds, and essentialism." Tulane University, 1999.
Find full textAbstract:
'Locke, Natural Kinds, And Essentialism' argues for a minimalist theory of natural kinds. I begin with a historical treatment of Locke's account of natural kinds, which was a conventionalist view. I then build a theory of natural kinds that recognizes a restricted class of natural kinds, while remaining conventionalist in important respects, in the spirit of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding In Chapter 1, I argue that Locke clearly denies the existence of natural kinds, and I explain how he defends this position. I will also show the connection between Locke's metaphysical position regarding natural kinds, and his descriptive account of the meaning of natural kind terms Chapter 2 consists of several attempts to build a realist account of natural kinds within a Lockean framework. They are all unsuccessful, but I hope the endeavor can show why a natural kind realist may be driven toward some form of essentialism in order to defend natural kind realism In Chapter 3, I develop my minimalist theory of natural kinds. I argue that natural kinds may be found among the fundamental entities of the world, if there are any, but nowhere else The project of Chapter 4 is to examine one of the major contemporary motivations for natural kind realism: the attempt to extend the theory of direct reference for proper names to natural kind terms. I argue that this cannot be done within a respectable and well-motivated metaphysics of natural kinds, such as the one I defendacase@tulane.edu
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Lippiatt, Ian. "Lewis’ Theory of Counterfactuals and Essentialism." Thèse, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/7078.
Full textAbstract:
La logique contemporaine a connu de nombreux développements au cours de la seconde moitié du siècle dernier. Le plus sensationnel est celui de la logique modale et de sa sémantique des mondes possibles (SMP) dû à Saul Kripke dans les années soixante. Ces dans ce cadre que David Lewis exposera sa sémantique des contrefactuels (SCF). Celle-ci constitue une véritable excroissance de l’architecture kripkéenne. Mais sur quoi finalement repose l’architecture kripkéenne elle-même ? Il semble bien que la réponse soit celle d’une ontologie raffinée ultimement basée sur la notion de mondes possible. Ce mémoire comporte quatre objectifs. Dans un premier temps, nous allons étudier ce qui distingue les contrefactuels des autres conditionnels et faire un survol historique de la littérature concernant les contrefactuels et leur application dans différent champs du savoir comme la philosophie des sciences et l’informatique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous ferons un exposé systématique de la théorie de Lewis telle qu’elle est exposée dans son ouvrage Counterfactuals. Finalement, nous allons explorer la fondation métaphysique des mondes possible de David Lewis dans son conception de Réalisme Modal.Modern logic since the end of the Second World War has undergone many developments. Two of the most interesting of these are the Kripkian Possible World Semantics and Lewis’ system of Counterfactuals. The first was developed by Saul Kripke in the 1960s and the second was developed by David Lewis in the 1970s. In some senses we can say that Lewis’ system of counterfactuals or Counter Factual Semantics (CFS) is built on top of the architecture which Kripke created with his Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS). But, what is the Kripkian Possible World Semantics itself built on? The answer it seems is very finely tuned ontology founded on the notion of possible worlds. This paper will attempt to do the following. First, attempt to draw a distinction between on the one hand conditionals and the other counterfactuals and at the same time attempt to look at some of the historical literature surrounding counterfactuals and their application in various fields like the philosophy of science. Second, recapitulate Lewis’ system of counterfactual semantics as developed primarily in Lewis’ book Counterfactuals. Finally this paper will attempt to explore the metaphysical foundations of the possible worlds account argued for by David Lewis in his conception of Modal Realism.
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Gray, Frances Marie. "Essentialism and feminist theologies : some philosophical reflections." Phd thesis, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144334.
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Tessman, Lisa. "Having a people: Beyond individualism and essentialism in resistance to interlocked oppressions." 1996. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9619447.
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This dissertation draws on the Aristotelian and contemporary communitarian belief that humans are socially constituted, and analyzes the manifestations of this belief in contemporary identity politics and in the concept of 'culture' that often underlies identity politics. While I argue that it is important to maintain a communitarian conception of the self, I depart from Aristotle and the communitarian tradition by rejecting the assumption that a constitutive community is characterized by unity and homogeneity. I then claim that identity politics has inherited both the virtues and the problems of communitarian theory. Just as communitarians claim that the self is never free from social constitution, so identity politics have taken the self's identity to be formed along lines of socially defined group differences, and like communitarianism, some identity politics has entailed a call for unity. In the case of identity politics, the requirement for membership in the community may be sharing certain essential characteristics of identity; difference can result in marginalization, forced assimilation to the group norm, or expulsion. Because identity politics often relies upon the concept of 'culture' to ground group identities, I also examine this concept. When a community's unity derives from its members understanding themselves to share a culture, the maintenance of the culture itself can be conservatizing; the culture can remain closed off from changes as it preserves the "traditional" or "authentic"; furthermore, it can come to be treated as an object outside of the people who live it and as such the changing lived realities of these people--particularly changes that cross lines of identity--do not serve to continually offer new, changing, and ambiguous ways of conceiving of what is shared between members of the community. I argue for the development of group identity that recognizes intersecting group differences, and can permit hybridity or mixed identities. I end by suggesting that for a constitutive community to remain truly constitutive without harming its members through marginalization, forced assimilation to a norm or a shared essence, or stagnation, members must give up the sort of control that maintains the community as a unity.
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Hermes, Charles Monroe Mele Alfred R. "Scientific essentialism and the Lewis/Ramsey account of laws of nature." 2006. http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/07062006-171009.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2006.Advisor: Alfred Mele, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 20, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 166 pages. Includes bibliographical references.
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Turgeon, André. "La formation du sujet dans la philosophie féministe de Judith Butler." Thèse, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/12495.
Full textAbstract:
Dans Trouble dans le genre, Judith Butler conteste l’aspect identitaire du féminisme, qui selon elle produirait de nouvelles possibilités d’exclusion, basées sur la catégorie même de « femme ». Je ne contesterai pas le mouvement qu’elle adopte, à savoir que la sexualité informe du genre, qui produit le sexe, bien que j’exposerai les difficultés que cela soulève. Mon intérêt se situe dans la vision que Butler a de la formation des sujets individuels et de leur rattachement à des identités collectives, via la performativité du genre. Sa position voulant que le genre soit un acte et l’identité une pratique, je vais expliquer comment elle conçoit l’humain constitué par ses actes et critiquer, avec deux auteures féministes, sa conception du genre. J’en conclurai que Butler doit admettre qu’une forme d’identité féminine soit nécessaire au féminisme tout en tenant compte de son plaidoyer d’inclusion des individus aux sexualités marginales.In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler challenges feminism as identity politics, which, according to her, would produce a new set of potential exclusions, based on the category “woman”. I will not dispute how she articulates that sexuality gives sense to gender, which produces sex. My interest lies in how Butler understands the process of becoming a subject for an individual, and how people tend to belong to a collective identity, via gender performativity. She states that gender is an act and identity a form of practice. I will explain how she understands that human beings are constituted by their acts and criticize, according to two feminist authors, her conception of gender. I will conclude that Butler has to admit that some kind of feminine identity is necessary to feminism, even when we consider her plea for the inclusion of individuals sexually marginalized.
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(11208369), Brandon Rdzak. ""It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent": A Defense of Spinoza's Necessitarianism." Thesis, 2021.
Find full textAbstract:
There is longstanding interpretive dispute between commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism, the doctrine that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to the necessitarian interpretation whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call the semi-necessitarian interpretation. As things stand, the disagreement between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the doctrine is wildly untenable. This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have recognized, since leading semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one of the most compelling reasons (if not the most compelling reason) to prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence.
This dissertation seeks to defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his essentialism. Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism. Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front provides supplementary reason to a fortiori favor the necessitarian reading of Spinoza.
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Madritch, John. "After authenticity : varieties of Essentialists and Post-Essentialist aesthetics of the self in twentieth-century American literature /." Diss., 2001. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3036268.
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Jacobs, Jeremy John. "Non-duality in Ken Wilber's integral philosophy : a critical appaisal and alternative physicalyst perspective of mystical consciousness." Thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/2642.
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Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it.Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology
D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)
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Lobo, Camila Ribeirinha Cardoso de Lima. "Mulher inessencial, mas mulher: Feminismo, Wittgenstein e o problema da diferença." Master's thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/77692.
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É possível afirmar que, desde a sua primeira vaga, o feminismo vem desafiando conceções essencialistas do que é ser mulher. Questionando as imposições de uma ordem patriarcal, teóricas e ativistas partiram da experiência de mulheres reais para perturbar uma «imagem do mundo» hegemónica. Nas últimas décadas, porém, o desenvolvimento de uma importante crítica interna revelou o modo como o próprio pensamento feminista nem sempre fora imune a uma forma de essencialismo metodológico, problematizando a aparente coerência do conceito de mulher. Os argumentos da particularidade e da normatividade criaram aquele que ficou conhecido como o «problema da diferença», colocando teoria e prática feminista num impasse: revelada a ausência de uma essência que defina o que é ser mulher, onde jaz a força da ação feminista? Esta dissertação serve-se da segunda filosofia de Wittgenstein para analisar um conceito simultaneamente problemático e central ao movimento feminista. Exploramos a forma como alguns autores descobriram no método anti-essencialista wittgensteiniano um convite ao reconhecimento do potencial emancipatório de uma linguagem tantas vezes usada para oprimir.Feminism has arguably been defying essentializing claims about what it means to be a woman ever since its first wave. Calling into question the impositions of a patriarchal order, both theorists and activists have departed from real women’s experience aiming to disturb a hegemonic «picture of the world». However, the last decades saw the emergence of an important internal critique that revealed the way feminist thought had not itself been immune to a sort of methodological essentialism, thus problematizing the apparent coherence of the concept of woman. The so-called particularity and normativity arguments gave rise to the well-known «problem of difference», facing feminist theory and practice with a challenge: in the absence of an essence capable of accounting for what it means to be a woman, where does the strength of feminist organizing lay? This paper uses Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to analyse a simultaneously problematic and central concept to the feminist movement. Following the work of some contemporary authors, we argue that the Wittgensteinian anti-essentialist method invites us to recognise the emancipatory potential of a language too often used to oppress.
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ying, Su Tzu, and 蘇子媖. "Essentials of Yang Ci-Hu's Philosophy of mind." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52176369296493048332.
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碩士東海大學
哲學系
97
Studies in Yang Ci-Hu ‘s thought are relatively rare, I aim to analyze his thought in order to expose his sophisticate and complicate philosophy of mind. For grasping the philosophy of mind of the Southern Sung Dynasty, Yang Ci-Hu's theory is most important. This paper contains three main parts. First, by interpreting the texts of Yang Shih Yi Chuan《楊氏易傳》,Wu Gao Jie 《五誥解》,Ci-Hu Shih Chuan《慈湖詩傳》,Xian Sheng Da Xun 《先聖大訓》, Ci-Hu Yi shu 《慈湖遺書》we analyze Yang Ci-Hu's notions of “Mind”(心)and “Volition”(意) . Second, we expose the way how Yang raised the spirit of thought on to a transcendental level and integrated his thought with the Six Classics. Third, we review and evaluate the elitisms of Yang as compiled in Si Ku Quan Shu 《四庫全書》, Song Yuan Xue An《宋元學案》, and Ming Ru Xue An《明儒學案》
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Richard-Dionne, Étienne. "Analyse épistémologique du potentiel créateur de la sélection naturelle ; entre darwinisme et postdarwinisme." Thèse, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/8658.
Full textAbstract:
Ce mémoire propose de faire l’analyse épistémologique du pouvoir créateur de la
sélection naturelle. L’objectif sera de déterminer en quelle mesure il est légitime ou non de
lui attribuer un tel pouvoir. Pour ce faire, il sera question de savoir si l’explication
sélectionniste peut répondre à la question de l’origine des formes structurelles du vivant.
Au premier chapitre, nous verrons le raisonnement qui mena Darwin à accorder un pouvoir
créateur à la sélection naturelle. Nous comprendrons alors qu’un cadre exclusivement
darwinien n’est peut-être pas à même de répondre au problème de la nouveauté
évolutionnaire. Au deuxième chapitre, nous verrons dans une perspective darwinienne qu’il
est possible de conserver l’essence de la théorie darwinienne et d’accorder à la sélection
naturelle un pouvoir créateur, bien que deux des piliers darwiniens fondamentaux doivent
être remis en question. Au troisième chapitre, nous verrons dans une perspective
postdarwinienne que le pouvoir cumulatif de la sélection naturelle n’est peut-être pas à
même d’expliquer l’adaptation sur le plan individuel, ce qui remet lourdement en question
le pouvoir créateur de la sélection naturelle. Nous comprendrons alors que le débat, entre
partisans d’une vision positive et partisans d’une vision négative de la sélection naturelle,
dépend peut-être d’un présupposé métaphysique particulier.This thesis proposes an epistemological analysis of the creative power of natural selection. The aim will be to determine to what extent it is legitimate or not to give to this selection such power. To do this, we will have to know if the selectionist explanation can answer the question of the origin of structural forms of life. In the first chapter, we will see the reasoning leading Darwin to give a creative power of natural selection. We will then understand that an exclusively Darwinian framework is maybe unable to address the problem of evolutionary novelty. In the second chapter, we will see in a Darwinian way that it is possible to retain the essence of Darwinian theory and to give natural selection a creative power, although two of the fundamental Darwinians pillars must be questioned. In the third chapter, we will see in a post-Darwinian way that the cumulative power of natural selection is maybe unable to explain adaptation at individual level, challenging seriously the creative power of natural selection. We will then understand that the debate, between supporters of a positive view and supporters of a negative view of natural selection, may depend on a particular metaphysical assumption.
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Murthi, S. K. Arun. "Philosophical study of scientific laws: A challenge to the dispositional-essentialist theory and the property view of laws." Thesis, 2010. http://eprints.nias.res.in/221/1/2010-TH5-Arun-Murthi-SK.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
Analytic philosophers of science have extensively studied laws of nature and have developed different philosophical theories of laws. One of the primary focus of their study was the idea of necessity that is so intimately connected with the notion of a law. As such, these philosophers have focused on the following issue: how best can this idea of necessity be accounted for? Development in this area of work has resulted in a view known as dispositional-essentialist theory of laws that has gained much popularity in recent times, according to which the laws of nature hold of metaphysical necessity. This
theory has been strongly advocated by Brian Ellis (1999, 2001, 2002), Alexander Bird
(2005a, 2005b, 2007) and Anjan Chakravartty (2003). Such a view of laws is one
interpretation of the property theory of laws, which argues that laws of nature involve
properties. The other interpretation of property theory of laws is that given by Armstrong
(1983), Dretske (1977) and Tooley (1977). However, most of the theories given by philosophers have not engaged with
scientific laws sufficiently; laws typically found in text books of science. They have not
examined whether the theory of laws that they have proposed is tenable for scientific
laws. This thesis examines how scientific laws pose a challenge to the recent theory of
dispositional essentialism. The larger part of the argument of this thesis is also an attempt
to provide a general critique of the property theory of laws. The dispositional-essentialist
draws upon certain ideas like natural kinds, essences and dispositions to establish
essentialist view of laws. These will be re-examined in the context of scientific laws.